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Abstract
The manned spaceflight program of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) has suffered three fatal accidents: one in the Apollo program and two in the
Space Transportation System (the Shuttle). These were the fatal fire in Apollo 204
(Apollo 1) in 1967, the explosion of the Solid Rocket Booster in STS-51L (Challenger)
in 1986, and the destruction of the orbiter in STS-107 (Columbia). Three astronauts lost
their lives in 1967, and in each Shuttle accident seven astronauts were killed. Following
each of these fatal accidents, a significant investigation was conducted and a
comprehensive investigation report produced.
These investigation reports each served to create public narratives of the reasons for the
accidents. The reports shaped the accidents' legacies for the space program and for
large-scale complex engineering projects more generally. This thesis re-examines the
evidence produced to investigate and explain each accident. By analyzing the
investigation reports critically, as well as reviewing the accidents themselves, this work
considers how engineering cultures and practices at NASA shifted to meet the changing
demands of the space program. It argues that the public narratives of the accidents are
not completely congruent with the engineering evidence, and that these very selective
narratives are influential in shaping future strengths (and weaknesses) at NASA.
By re-examining the accident evidence, the reports, and the role of each accident in
shaping NASA engineering cultures, the thesis provides a view of engineering very
different from what is apparent in previous historical work on the space program.
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INTRODUCTION
The manned spaceflight program of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) has suffered three fatal accidents: one in the Apollo program and two in the
Space Transportation System (the Shuttle). These were the fatal fire in Apollo 204
(Apollo 1)' in 1967, the explosion of the Solid Rocket Booster in STS-51L (Challenger)
in 1986, and the destruction of the orbiter in STS-107 (Columbia). Three astronauts lost
their lives in 1967, and in each Shuttle accident seven astronauts were killed. Following
each of these fatal accidents, a significant investigation was conducted and a
comprehensive investigation report produced.
These investigation reports each served to create public narratives of the reasons for the
accidents. The reports shaped the accidents' legacies for the space program and for
large-scale complex engineering projects more generally. This thesis re-examines the
evidence produced to investigate and explain each accident. By analyzing the
investigation reports critically, as well as reviewing the accidents themselves, this work
considers how engineering cultures and practices at NASA shifted to meet the changing
demands of the space program. It argues that the public narratives of the accidents are
not completely congruent with the engineering evidence, and that these very selective
narratives are influential in shaping future strengths (and weaknesses) at NASA.
The Apollo accident is framed in its investigation report as an anomaly caused by
dedicated, overworked engineers who misjudged their priorities in their zeal to contribute
to a successful moon landing. More properly, the accident should be understood as
resulting from then-normal engineering practices and standards; and the report should be
understood as the final episode of the accident, an episode that helped move the space
program in a new direction. The Challenger accident is usually understood as resulting
from a long decline in engineering management standards following the triumph of the
Apollo missions. Its investigation report emphasizes flawed decision-making at the
'This mission was named Apollo 204 at the time, and on the wishes of the wives of the astronauts,
renamed Apollo 1 in 1968, in memoriam. In this work, the term Apollo 204 refers to the events of
accident, while Apollo 1 refers to the public narrative(s) around the accident.
highest levels and has contributed to the use of the Challenger episode in many areas of
management and psychology instruction. This thesis finds that returning to an
engineering-based understanding of the Challenger accident reveals continuities with the
Apollo 204 accident and provides a view of how engineering practice had developed in
the intervening years. The investigation of the Columbia accident departed from the
practices of the previous two accident investigations and resulted in a reprise of
Challenger's explanatory narrative that neglects to account adequately for the significant
time that had elapsed between the two shuttle accidents and the changes in engineering
practice over that time.
By re-examining the accident evidence, the reports, and the role of each accident in
shaping NASA engineering cultures, the thesis provides a view of engineering very
different from what is apparent in previous historical work on the space program.
Apollo 204
On 27 January 1967, the spacecraft assigned to the Apollo 204 mission underwent a
Plugs-Out Integrated Test on Pad 34 at Kennedy Space Center in Florida. This meant
testing the internal power systems of the newly delivered Command and Service Module
012 (CSM 012). The three astronauts who were to crew Apollo 204, Gus Grissom, Ed
White, and Roger Chaffee, entered the cabin and the doors were shut and sealed. The
crew cabin was pressurized to 16 pounds per square inch (psi) of pure oxygen. At around
6:31 p.m. EST, the astronauts reported a fire in the spacecraft. Less than 20 seconds later,
the spacecraft heatshield ruptured and flame burst into the service tower. The crew in the
Command and Service Module level of the support tower immediately evacuated the area
but quickly returned with what firefighting and protective gear they could find. However,
they were unable to extinguish the fire immediately or remove the astronauts from the
cabin. Meanwhile, Grissom, White, and Chaffee attempted to remove the middle hatch of
the spacecraft but were overcome before doing so. Firefighting crews and medical
support arrived approximately 20 minutes later.
I -
NASA Deputy Administrator Robert Seamans had considered the possibility of an
accident in the manned spaceflight program after Neil Armstrong and Dave Scott in
Gemini 8 lost control of their capsule when docking with an Agena booster in 19662 In
the aftermath of Gemini 8, Seamans developed a set of procedures to be followed should
an accident ever occur. On the evening of 28 January, he followed those procedures and
immediately convened an accident review board.3 The board met at Kennedy Space
Center in Florida and was chaired by Floyd "Tommy" Thompson, director of NASA's
Langley Research Center.4 The board was made up of three senior NASA engineers, a
chemist from the Bureau of Mines, an Air Force officer from the Inspector General's
office, NASA Langley's general counsel, and an astronaut.5
On 5 April 1967, the Apollo 204 Review Board presented its report to NASA
Administrator James Webb. They concluded that the fire was caused by an unknown
source of electrical arc, probably malfunctioning wire insulation around the
environmental control unit on the floor of the spacecraft, although the cause would never
be definitively known. The spark ignited nylon netting, Velcro strips, and other
combustible materials inside the spacecraft. These materials would have been removed
before spaceflight, but under test conditions were not considered hazardous. The coolant
inside the spacecraft, water-glycol, was not itself flammable but left a flammable residue
in the cabin after evaporation. As the air-conditioning pipes melted, coolant leaked,
evaporated, and the residue ignited, further fueling the fire. The fire was rendered
particularly dangerous by the high-pressure, pure-oxygen environment inside the
spacecraft during the test. The crew was unable to use the inward-opening inner hatch
under the pressurized conditions. The Board determined that the crew had died from
asphyxiation caused by fumes from the fire.6
2 Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Aiming at Targets: The Autobiography of Robert C. Seamans, Jr. (Washington
DC: NASA, 1996), pp. 135-136; Barton C. Hacker and James M. Grimwood, On the Shoulders of Titans:
A History of Project Gemini, NASA Sp 4203 (Washington, DC: NASA, Scientific and Technical
Information Office, 1978), pp. 308-319.
3 U.S. Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration: Appendix a-G, Board Minutes (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1967), pp. 1-5 - 1-6.
4 James R. Hansen, Engineer in Charge: A History of the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 1917-1958,
NASA History Series (Washington, DC: NASA Scientific and Technical Information Branch, 1987), pp.
387-391.
5 Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator: Appendix a-G, Board Minutes, pp. 2-1 - 2-17.
6 Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator: Appendix a-G, Board Minutes, pp. 5-1 - 5-12.
The Apollo 204 report is almost exclusively devoted to an analysis of the engineering
problems that the Board argued caused the fire.7 The sections discussing the fabrication,
delivery, and inspection of the CSM spacecraft, which cover the period from August
1964 until December 1966, take up less than 10 percent of the report. The remainder of
the history of the accident is a detailed chronology of the Plugs-Out Integrated Test of
CSM 012, starting around 5 hours and 30 minutes before the accident. The sole mention
of other, larger contributory factors is the final paragraph, noting that these engineering
problems came about through deficiencies in design and manufacturing. But none of the
political circumstances surrounding the Apollo program-its status as President
Kennedy's legacy, as a visible symbol of American technical prowess, as a marker of
position in the Cold War-were identified as contributory. Nor was NASA's
organizational structure or its culture. No individuals were identified as bearing particular
responsibility for the accident.
Challenger
On 28 January 1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger launched from Kennedy Space Center
on mission STS 51-L. There were seven astronauts on board: Dick Scobee, Michael
Smith, Ellison Onizuka, Judith Resnik, Ronald McNair, Christa McAuliffe, and Gregory
Jarvis. Their mission was to deploy and recover a satellite in orbit and to conduct flight-
dynamics experiments.8 Christa McAuliffe, a teacher from New Hampshire, was to
conduct a science lesson in orbit.9 The 28th of January was a very cold morning. The
temperature at Kennedy Space Center in Florida had dropped below freezing overnight,
and ice teams had been sent out three times to examine potential damage to the shuttle.
Parts of the Space Shuttle, including the Solid Rocket Boosters, were still below freezing
point at launch. The ambient air temperature was 36oF, 15 degrees lower than any
7 Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator.
8 U.S. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident., Report to the President, 5 vols.
(Washington, DC: The Commission, 1986), p. 16; U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
"John F. Kennedy Space Center-51-L Shuttle Mission," http://wiww-
pao. ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/missions/51-1/mission-51-1.html.
9 For Christa McAuliffe's official NASA biography, see
http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/Bios/htmlbios/mcauliffe.html.
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previous flight."
Less than a second after launch, at 11:38 a.m. EST, a puff of gray smoke emerged from
the right Solid Rocket Booster (SRB). Over the next two seconds, eight more puffs of
smoke, blacker and more dense, emerged from the same place on the SRB. Thirty-seven
seconds after launch, the Shuttle experienced a 27-second period of severe wind shear,
stronger than any other Shuttle launch had experienced. Fifty-eight seconds after launch,
a small flame appeared on the aft field joint of the right SRB. Over the next 14 seconds,
the flame grew rapidly, burning through the lower strut holding the SRB to the External
Tank. Seventy-two seconds after launch, the strut burned through and the right SRB
rotated around the upper strut, crashing into the External Tank. The tank collapsed,
venting the hydrogen fuel into the atmosphere. The fuel immediately ignited, and the
entire Shuttle flew into the fireball. The orbiter entered the fireball, broke up under severe
aerodynamic load, and fell back into the Atlantic Ocean. There were no survivors."
On 3 February 1986, President Ronald Reagan appointed a Presidential Commission to
investigate the Challenger accident. 12 The Commission was chaired by William Rogers,
formerly Secretary of State under Richard Nixon and an attorney by training and
experience. The Commission included two astronauts, a test pilot, two physicists, another
attorney, three engineers, a senior Air Force officer, an aerospace journalist, and an
astronomer. Another engineer was executive director. The Commission conducted public
and private hearings over the early part of 1986 and presented its report to President
Reagan on 6 June 1986.
The report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident is a
striking contrast to the Apollo 204 report.13 It opens with a preface and an introduction,
outlining the task of the Commission and contextualizing the development of the Space
Shuttle. The report goes on to outline the events of 28 January 1986 and from there leads
into its analysis of the physical cause of the accident in a chapter simply titled "The
O U.S. Presidential Commission on the Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 1, pp. 16-21.
" U.S. Presidential Commission on the Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 1, pp. 20-21.
2 , pp. 212-213.
13
Cause of the Accident." The remainder of the report analyzes the series of events that
contributed to the accident: the chain of decisions that led to the decision to launch, the
history of design problems with the O-ring system, the political and organizational
pressures to launch, and the failure of the safety system. The Presidential Commission
was clear that there were physical causes for the accident-in this case, the failure of the
O-rings in the Solid Rocket Booster to seal correctly. But unlike the Apollo 204 Review
Board, the Commission saw secondary contributing causes. These secondary causes were
the flawed decision to launch in extremely cold weather, political pressures on the launch
schedule, and a silent safety system. The previous model of an accident report, the 1967-
model of setting out an understanding of engineering failures to be fixed with engineering
solutions, was replaced by a critique of both engineering and management with separate
solutions for each area of endeavor.
Columbia
On 16 January 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia launched from Kennedy Space Center
on mission 107. There were seven astronauts on board: Rick Husband, William McCool,
Michael Anderson, David Brown, Kalpana Chawla, Laurel Clark, and Ilan Ramon. Fifty-
seven seconds after launch, at around 10:40 a.m. EST, the Columbia entered a period of
unusually strong wind shear, which created a low-frequency oscillation in the liquid
oxygen in the External Tank.14 At 81.7 seconds after launch, at least three pieces of
Thermal Protection System foam detached from the left bipod ramp of the External Tank
and fell backwards at between 416 and 573 miles per hour, smashing through the leading
edge of the left wing of the orbiter. The largest piece of foam was around 2 feet long and
1 foot wide. The launch was otherwise without incident, and Columbia arrived in orbit by
11:39 a.m. EST.
On 1 February 2003, after a successful 17-day mission, the orbiter reentered the Earth's
atmosphere for a landing at Kennedy Space Center. As the orbiter reentered, superheated
air penetrated the left wing through the foam strike in the leading edge and started to melt
14 U.S. Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol. 1,
(Washington, DC: Columbia Accident Investigation Board and NASA, 2003), pp. 33-34.
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away the wing from the inside. At around 9:00 a.m. EST, the orbiter broke up under
severe aerodynamic load and disintegrated over the Southwest of the United States. There
were no survivors.
Around 10:00 a.m. on 1 February 2003, NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe declared a
Shuttle Contingency and, acting under procedures set in place after the Challenger
accident, established the International Space Station and Space Shuttle Mishap
Interagency Board." O'Keefe named Admiral Harold Gehman as Chair of the Board.
Gehman was retired from the Navy and had recently headed the investigation into the
terrorist attack on the USS Cole.16 Ex officio, there were immediately seven Board
members: four military officers with responsibilities for safety in their home services, a
Federal Aviation Administration representative, a Department of Transportation
representative, and a NASA Center Director. O'Keefe soon thereafter named both
NASA's Chief Engineer and the counsel to Glenn Research Center to the Board. Over the
next six weeks, five more members were appointed to the renamed Columbia Accident
Investigation Board (CAIB). They included an aeronautical engineer and former Air
Force Secretary, a physicist, a former astronaut and Challenger Commission member, a
space policy expert, and the retired CEO of a major defense contractor.1 7 Over the first
six months of 2003, the Board held hearings and conducted investigations into the
Columbia accident and, on 26 August 2003, released its report.
Like the Challenger report, the Columbia report devotes only one chapter, chapter 3, to
the proximate physical cause of the accident-the separation of Thermal Protection
System (TPS) foam from the External Tank and its subsequent impact on the leading
edge of the orbiter.'" But the report has four chapters, chapters 5 through 8, discussing the
context of the decision-making that led to the breakup of the orbiter on reentry. Chapter 3
discusses the engineering analyses the Board performed, the history of External Tank
design decisions, and the conclusions to be drawn from these, presenting this engineering
'5 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, pp 231-232.
16 William Langewiesche, "Columbia's Last Flight: The inside story of the investigation and the catastrophe
it laid bare," The Atlantic Monthly (November 2003), 65-66.
7 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, p. 232.
8 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report.
section as needing no context or justification. Only when the Board starts to examine the
decision-making of NASA engineers and managers that led to the Columbia disaster do
they find that more sophisticated explanatory frameworks are needed. The Board drew on
a variety of theoretical perspectives for those four chapters, considering Charles Perrow's
theory of normal accidents and the work of both Scott Sagan and Todd LaPorte on high-
reliability theory.1 9
The CAIB report also drew heavily on the work of Diane Vaughan. Vaughan's 1996
book, The Challenger Launch Decision, set out a sociological explanation for the
decision to launch in risky circumstances, arguing that far from the managerial
misconduct identified by the Challenger report, the accident can best be understood in
terms of the normalization of deviance, the culture of production at NASA and Morton
Thiokol, and structural secrecy.20 This perspective informed chapter 8 of the CAIB
report, where the Board drew explicit links between the Challenger and Columbia
accidents, applying the components of Vaughan's analysis to Columbia. Unlike the
Challenger report, the CAIB report gives significant weight to the organizational causes
of the accident, arguing that while mistakes were made, the organizational structure of
NASA was more to blame that any individual failings.
Challenging the reports: exploring engineering at NASA
These three accidents form the basis for this study. The study starts from the observation
that accidents in the US manned spaceflight program have attracted particular media and
public attention.21 In the aftermath of these accidents, wide-ranging investigations were
conducted to determine the causes of the accidents and prevent them from recurring. The
accident investigations resulted in extensive accident reports, each constructed around the
19 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, pp. 180 - 182.20 Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
21 Thomas White Jr., "Establishment of Blame as a Framework for Sensemaking in the Space Policy
Subsystem; a Study of the Apollo 1 and Challenger Accidents." (PhD diss, Virginia Polytechnic Institute
and State University, 2000). White's thesis analyzes the ways in which blame was allocated in these two
accidents - but also makes it very clear that public and political concern and outrage was extremely high in
both cases.
need to identify deviance, rather than normality. They were written to identify what went
wrong, and in most cases to identify what could be done to ensure that the identified
cause was remedied. The accident reports therefore emphasized deviations from normal
practice, or more accurately, emphasized deviance from an idealized version of normal
practice. From the position of hindsight, accident boards could identify where errors
were made, where wrong decisions were taken, and where bad luck occurred, but were
only able to come to these conclusions because an accident has laid open to view
practices that would not usually be visible. Accident reports do not focus on normal
practice, but in the course of their creation, normal practice is frequently revealed.
Investigators reconstructed the day-by-day activities of those involved in the accidents,
looking for the error or poor decision, and in doing so, create a record of those day by day
activities.
In writing the histories of the physical causes of the accidents, the reports are the
quintessential Whig histories of engineering.22 Accident reports judge the actions and
understandings of engineers against ahistorical and decontextualised standards, and based
on a detailed knowledge of the accident to come. They observe where errors were made,
noting the misunderstandings or wrongdoings, with no attempt to put these into any
context. And yet these accounts are some of the best accounts in existence of how
engineering has been conducted within the US manned spaceflight program.
Sec. 203. (a) (3) of the National Aeronautics and Space Act directs NASA to "provide for
the widest practicable and appropriate dissemination of information concerning its
activities and the results thereof."23 To fulfill that mandate, NASA Administrator T.
Keith Glennan instituted the NASA history office in 1959.24 The office has stayed open
ever since, collecting archival materials for NASA staff and outside researchers and
22 Nick Jardine, "Whigs and Stories: Herbert Butterfield and the Historiography of Science," History of
Science 41 (2003), pp. 125 - 140; Peter J. Bowler and Iwan Rhys Morus, Making Modern Science: A
Historical Survey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 1 - 3.
23 John M. Logsdon et al., eds., Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S.
Civil Space Program, 6 vols., Organizing for Exploration, The NASA History Series (Washington, DC:
NASA History Office, 1995), p. 337.
24 Roger D. Launius, "NASA History and the Challenge of Keeping the Contemporary Past," The Public
Historian 21, no 3 (Summer 1999), p. 63.
commissioning a wide range of works on NASA's history. The budget of NASA's
history office has remained constant at around $335,000 per annum, although funds
allocated to the history office from project offices vary from year to year. Over its
lifetime, NASA's commitment to telling its own history has cost the organization at least
$15 million. But this figure is dwarfed by the three official histories of NASA not
commissioned by the history office, the accident reports. In 1967, 1986 and 2003, NASA
spent $31M, $75M, and $152.4M to produce multi-volume accounts of the three fatal
accidents in the manned space program.2 5
This study begins by departing from Whig history and attempting to provide a history of
these accidents that does not emphasize deviance, but rather attempts to ground the
accidents in the day-to-day business of building and flying spacecraft. Put another way,
this study asks what these accidents can tell us about engineering cultures and practices at
NASA, but goes on to further ask if looking at the three accidents through the lens of
engineering culture and practices can help to explain them in a new way. The study also
asks if by looking at engineering culture and practices, what continuities or changes be
seen between the accidents. Finally, the study asks what do these new explanations tell us
about engineering and safety at NASA or in large-scale engineering programs in general.
By reading past the formalized accident reports to look at the evidence that is compiled in
the process of investigating accidents and writing the reports, the workings of day-by day
engineering at NASA can be seen. Accident investigations take a comprehensive look at
the design, manufacture and operation of the broken artifact or system and so provide a
way to look at engineering work at the routine, everyday level, as well as at the creative
design level. The process of investigating an accident results in the description of these
everyday routines, routines that are often seen as so mundane as to leave little trace in the
documentary record of the project under normal circumstances. Thus, if these accident
reports are examined in a new context, they can trace both engineering design and routine
25 For Apollo 1, see U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, The Apollo Spacecraft: A
Chronology, 4 vols., NASA History Series (Washington DC: NASA Scientific and Technical Information
Division, 1969), vol. 4, May 1; for Challenger see Frank Oliveri, "NASA gets $50 million for Shuttle
Investigation," Florida Today, 21 February 2004; for Columbia see Paul Recer, "NASA: Columbia
Cleanup costs near $400M," Newsday, 11 September 2003.
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engineering practice.
These questions are not the typical concerns of the historiography of the US manned
space flight program, which tends to emphasize the stories of the pilots, specific
programs, or the political context of the overall space program.26 Rather, this study looks
to some more general themes from the history of science and technology and from the
cluster of disciplines that make up Science and Technology Studies (STS) to examine the
meanings of the three accidents, which are explored in more detail later in this
introduction.
Reading accident reports
Brian Wynne has observed that engineering accidents are like scientific controversies in
that a deeper examination allows analysis of the ways in which scientific knowledge is
produced. By extension, engineering accidents allow a way inside a complex engineering
system to see how it works in real time. Wynne further suggests that an examination of
engineering accidents reveals tension between the public face of the technological
enterprise - one that is rational, scientific, and rules-based - and the practitioner's
perspective of technology as irrational, ambiguous, and prone to acting in unpredictable
ways.27 Wynne goes on to note that the inherent ambiguity of technology means that
adherence to formal sets of rules in developing new technologies is, in practice,
impossible. This means that in situations of formal enforcement, as can occur in
expensive, large-scale, and government-funded programs, experts are frequently held
accountable for things they cannot and were not able to control. In their defense, Wynne
finds, these experts tend to blame human error in other parts of the system. Wynne's
work points to the difficulties of using accident report findings to understand accidents.
26 Perhaps the best review of the historiography of manned spaceflight in the U.S. is by Asif Siddiqi,
"American Space History: Legacies, Questions and Opportunities for Future Research," in Steven J. Dick
and Roger D. Launius, eds., Critical Issues in the History of Spaceflight (Washington, DC: NASA, 2006),
pp. 4 3 3 - 481.
27 Brian Wynne, "Unruly Technology: Practical Rules, Impractical Discourse and Public Understanding,"
Social Studies of Science 18, no. 1 (February 1988), pp. 147 - 167.
The work of Stephen Hilgartner on scientific advice offers a useful perspective through
which to further understand the process of accident and investigation.28 Hilgartner
observes that the metaphor of performance is particularly useful. Through the lens of
dramatic performance, he finds that examining the actions of scientific (and
technological) experts and the documents they produce and use, allows an understanding
of the ways in which information is disclosed and enclosed. This production and
performing of information is intended to create authoritative technical and scientific
knowledge in order to achieve closure on a particular issue. Hilgartner's analysis of the
ways in which the National Academy of Science (NAS) produce their reports reveals the
use of rhetorical modes to reinforce expertise and authority. Hilgartner emphasizes the
ways NAS reports deploy techniques like appealing to the cultural authority of science,
and silencing any dissent or dialogue that may have been present in the production of the
report in order to present a unified account. He goes on to analyze the production of
reports in terms of the "front-stage" and "back-stage" elements: the "front-stage" is the
public face which is authoritative and univocal while the backstage element comprises
the polyvocal discussions and series of often-conflicting draft opinions that remain
unseen in the final report.
Peter Galison has also examined the writing of accident reports, arguing that accident
reports have tensions and instabilities built into the modes of explanation that they
employ. He argues that accident reports, above all, attempt to develop both localizing
and diffusing accounts of their accident. That is to say, accident reports attempt to
simultaneously localize the cause of an accident in one particular action while seeking
causal chains that spread into the realms of organizational culture. From this, Galison
argues, two other explanatory tensions emerge within accident reports: first, a tension
between an insistence on the need to follow protocol and procedure and, on the other
hand, the need to exercise professional judgment; and second, a tension between a desire
to seek human causes and a desire to seek technological causes. Like Wynne, Galison
observes that accident investigations frequently blame experts for following protocol in
situations where experts would equally be condemned for following their professional
28 Stephen Hilgartner, Science on Stage: Expert Advice as Public Drama (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2000).
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judgment.
Galison also observes that reports reflect a profound desire to control and establish
agency within these accidents. If this is not done, Galison argues:
If the bramble of cause, agency and procedure does not issue from a fault nucleus
but is rather unstably perched between scales, between human and non-human,
and between protocol and judgment, then the world is a more disordered and
dangerous place. These reports and much of the history we write, struggle,
incompletely and unstably, to hold that nightmare at bay.29
Like Wynne and Galison, the work of Philip Scranton also points to the fundamental
tension between the outward face of engineering, and the inner workings of the design
and manufacturing process." In his study of the design and manufacture of jet engines in
post-war America, Scranton observes that when examined from the inside, engineering is
unstable, involving sustained clashes between a desire to control and manage innovation
and the irrationality, non-linearity and unpredictability of innovation in an environment
of extreme urgency, project complexity and underdeveloped knowledge. As with
Wynne, Scranton observes that engineering on the shop-floor is often passionate,
irrational, cut-and-try, and empirical, which stands in constant tension to the public image
of rationality in management, politics and technology. Scranton's research characterizes
aviation engineering in the post-war period as passionate, conflict-filled and failure
prone, non-linear and secret.
Sitting in sharp contrast to the work of Scranton and Wynne, which emphasize the inner
workings of engineering as unstable and irrational, is a body of literature that presents the
outer face of the US manned spaceflight program over this period. This literature,
exemplified by Walter McDougall's The Heavens and the Earth, discusses what
McDougall describes as the fundamental political and economic shift of the twentieth
29 Peter Galison, "An accident of history," in Peter Galison and Alex Roland, eds., Atmospheric Flight in
the Twentieth Century (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), pp. 3 - 45.
30 Philip Scranton, "Urgency, uncertainty, and innovation: Building jet engines in postwar America,"
Management and Organizational History 1, no. 2 (2006), pp. 127-157.
century: the mobilization of all national resources to a peacetime struggle for superiority
across all aspects of life, but exemplified in the US manned spaceflight program.31
McDougall argues that prior to 1957, only in war-time had major nations used command
economics to spur technological development. After Sputnik, however, McDougall
argues, a new form of government emerged, the technocracy - "the institutionalization of
technological change for state purposes.""32 This new form of government created a
permanent technological revolution through state managed research and development.
McDougall suggests that the Soviet success hit the US self-image as leader of the free
world particularly hard. He argues that it challenged the idea of the US as politically and
materially superior to the USSR and the idea of the US as sheltering the rest of the world
under its nuclear umbrella. Sputnik was an extraordinary challenge to the non-
interventionist state, a challenge that Eisenhower was able to partially resist but that both
Kennedy and Johnson could not resist. Under these two Democratic Presidents during
the 1960s, the United States set out to prove its superiority through technological
revolution - applying technological and managerial fixes to both domestic and
international problems. Thus, McDougall concludes, Sputnik turned the Cold War from
a military and a political struggle to a total war, where all the resources of the nation -
intellectual, economic, cultural and social - were turned to the struggle.
In a similar way, David Nye's work discusses the relationship of the American public to
the US space program, arguing that the massive public enthusiasm for the Apollo
program, in particular, reflected a national turn towards technocratic solutions: "in an
atomic age, the pilgrimage to the Kennedy Space Center (to watch an Apollo launch)
promised a sublime experience that renewed faith in America and in the ultimate
beneficence of advanced industrialization."33 Paul Edwards, in The Closed World.
Computers and the Politics ofDiscourse in Cold War America, produces a similar
analysis.34 Edwards argues that 1960s America was characterized by a Cold-War derived
3' Walter McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York: Basic
Books, 1985).
32 McDougall p. 5.
33 David E. Nye, American Technological Sublime (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), p. 256.
34 Paul Edwards, The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America
ideology which he call a "closed-world discourse" that emphasized the use of
mathematical and engineering techniques for modeling the world, a propensity for the use
of these technologies to solve complex social problems, and a faith in the power of
rationality. Thomas P. Hughes' work, particularly Rescuing Prometheus and Human-
Built World, draws similar conclusions about the enthusiasm displayed by Americans for
grand technological systems in the post-war world.35 Jennifer S. Light's work, From
Warfare to Welfare: Defense Intellectuals and Urban Problems in Cold War America,
reinforces this point - that technological solutions to wide social problems, informed by
techniques drawn from the military and from defense-related industry, were widely
popular in the US in the 1950s and 1960s.36
Refocusing on the US manned spaceflight program, Howard McCurdy's work, Space
and the American Imagination, links this move towards technocratic solutions to social
problems with NASA:
In the public mind, the civilian space agency established a reputation as a
government organization that could take on difficult tasks and get them done.
Project Apollo was widely viewed as a triumph of effective government as well as
a demonstration of technology. NASA's ability to fashion a sense of competence
helped boost public confidence in the capability of government in general. [...]
This level of public trust allowed the government to move ahead with other large
initiatives during the 1960s, including the War on Poverty and civil rights reform,
and helped maintain faith in the value of government-sponsored science and
technology."
Accident reports, while on their face presenting a rational, linear account of the causes of
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).
3 Thomas P. Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998); Thomas P. Hughes,
Human-Built World: How to think about technology and culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2004).
36 Jennifer S. Light, From Warfare to Welfare: Defense Intellectuals and Urban Problems in Cold War
America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).
" Howard E. McCurdy, Space and the American Imagination (Washington, DC: The Smithsonian
Institution Press, 1997), p. 84.
an accident, must be read in the context of these tensions. For the engineers, engineering
managers, program managers, Congressional funders, politicians and the public, the
reports served a range of purposes and carried a range of risks. The content and findings
of the reports responded as much to their eventual audiences as to the evidence on which
they were based.
Accident reports also provide a window into the more human activities that constitute
engineering.
Engineering culture and engineering practice
Studies of engineering cultures tend to divide into two groups, the first discussing the
relationships between engineering styles and national identity, and the second focusing at
the level of clusters of organizations, looking at the development of local engineering
cultures.38 Gabrielle Hecht in The Radiance of France: nuclear power and national
identity after World War II argues that technology, culture and politics should be studied
together to understand how technology can be a site for the playing out of politics, while
at the same limiting and shaping those politics. 39 Hecht has examined the ways in which
French national identity after the Second World War was profoundly shaped by the
French nuclear industry, an industry that was itself in part established as away to reassert
French identity. Engineering activity is both local and national at the same time -
participation in shop culture is at the same time participation in national identity forming
and participation in national politics.
In a similar vein, Donald Mackenzie's work Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology
of Nuclear Missile Guidance shows the interplay between politics, the military and
technology.4 0 His investigations show quite clearly how very small decisions in the
" See also Eda Kranakis, Constructing a bridge: an exploration of engineering culture, design, and
research in nineteenth-century France and America (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); Hughes,
Rescuing Prometheus; Peter Meiksins, Engineering Labour: Technical Workers in Comparative
Perspective (New York: Verso, 1996).
39 Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance ofFrance: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).
40 Donald Mackenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance
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design of guidance systems can have far reaching political and institutional
consequences. Nevertheless, Mackenzie also examines local conditions, but focuses his
attention on the way in which local communities are joined via their shared membership
in a "gyroculture" - a technology centered community of "a whole set of knowledge,
skills, ideas and devices based around the gyroscope." 41
A number of useful studies of engineering cultures and practice have examined local
engineering cultures and practices.42 In Taylorism at Watertown Arsenal: scientific
management in action, 1908-1915, Hugh Aitken discusses the introduction of Taylorist
labor practices (scientific management - rigid discipline and time-motion studies) into
Watertown Arsenal, and shows how industrialization and technological change are
seldom passively accepted by workers. Aitkin shows that accounts of these processes
that do not acknowledge conflict, resistance and appropriation fail to tell the full story.
The culture of an individual workplace, its traditions and history, will shape and may
even determine the form of technological change. By examining individual communities
or workplaces, Aitkin shows that historical contingency and individual personalities can
play a key part in processes that at a macro-level look like they have their own inexorable
logic. Engineering culture is not just skills and knowledge but part of labor history.43
Merritt Roe Smith's Harpers Ferry armory and the new technology: the challenge of
change examines the creation of two specific engineering cultures, one at Springfield
armory and the other at Harper's Ferry.44 Smith treats engineering - gunsmithing in this
case - as a collection of practices, traditions and knowledge, but linked to particular types
of machinery as well. For Smith, material culture is a key element of engineering culture.
Yet in the space program literature, the materiality of the work is rarely addressed.
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990).
4' Mackenzie, p. 31.
42 See also Louis L. Bucciarelli, Designing Engineers (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994); Gary Lee
Downey, The Machine in Me: An Anthropologist Sits among Computer Engineers (New York: Routledge,
1998); Dominique Vinck and Eric Blanco, Everyday Engineering: An Ethnography of Design and
Innovation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
43 Hugh Aitken, Taylorism at Watertown Arsenal: Scientific Management in Action, 1908-1915
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960).
44 Merritt Roe Smith, Harpers Ferry Armory and the New Technology: The Challenge of Change (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1977).
David Mindell's work Between human and machine: feedback, control, and computing
before cybernetics uses an engineering culture approach that draws on these other
authors, relating design and use decisions to local traditions of training, education,
manufacturing and conceptualizing.45 This work traces four cultures, showing the ways
in which engineers were shaped by their local environments, academic and industrial.
Mindell's later work, Digital Apollo, also relates the engineering cultures of the early US
manned spaceflight program to the specific technologies being created.46 Mindell's work
discusses the relationship of engineering culture to engineering practice, arguing that
local engineering culture provides the critical context for understanding what it is that
engineers do. He argues:
An engineering culture interacts with technologies it produces in numerous ways,
but we can describe some of the salient mechanisms. Different engineering
cultures have different organizational structures, different individual career
trajectories for engineers, different languages for describing systems, and
different relations to the broader world of technology. Their influence on
engineering practice is perhaps best summarized by the engineer's adage, 'You do
what you know.' "47
There is a need for a body of literature on the recent institutional and cultural history of
engineering comparable to the literature on the rise of the engineering profession in the
later half of the 1 9 century. We know much about the engineering triumphs of the early
twentieth century and the involvement of engineers in the winning of World War II and
the Cold War, as producers of military technology but also as the creators of the
consumer society.48 But we know little about how engineers have responded to changing
45 David A. Mindell, Between Human and Machine: Feedback, Control, and Computing before Cybernetics
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).
46 David A. Mindell, Digital Apollo: Human and Machine in Spaceflight (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2008).
47 Mindell, Digital Apollo, p. 12.
48 See Thomas Parke Hughes, American Genesis: A Century ofInvention and Technological Enthusiasm,
1870-1970 (New York: Penguin Books, 1990); David A. Hounshell, From the American System to Mass
Production, 1800-1932: The Development of Manufacturing Technology in the United States, Studies in
Industry and Society; 4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984).; Terry S. Reynolds, The
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economic and cultural circumstances since the 1960s.
Moving from engineering culture to engineering practices, Henry Petroski's work, spread
over three books - To Engineer is Human: The Role ofFailure in Successful Design;
Small Things Considered: Why there is no Perfect Design; and Invention by Design:
How Engineers get from Thought to Thing - is perhaps the most comprehensive analysis
of the practice of engineering.4 9 Through the use of a series of case-studies varying in size
and scope from the paperclip to the Boeing 747, Petroski points out the essential features
of engineering practice, an activity he characterizes as creative, fallible and human.
Petroski makes several key points. First, he argues that engineering design is an iterative,
experimental process, characterized by uncertainty and imperfection. He argues that
there are always constraints in the design process, whether these be time, cost, or
available resources, and as such there can never be a perfect design." He goes on to
characterize the engineering design as a hypothesis - to be elaborated and tested via
paper design and by laboratory testing, but always open to revision under changed
circumstances or new knowledge.
Using a number of examples from structural engineering, Petroski also points out that
failure is the most valuable tool for improving design. By this he means that through an
examination of how a structure or other engineered object did not work as it was
expected to, changes can be made to the misconceptions or misunderstandings that lead
to the initial failure. This process, he argues, is the key dynamic for the improvement of
design. But, Petroski argues also, that engineering design must be conducted with the
obviation of failure in mind. As such, the concept of safety margin is key - by which he
means deliberately building into a design a margin of error, so that even if the worst case
scenario for which the object or system was designed takes place, there is enough margin
Engineer in America: A Historical Anthology from Technology and Culture (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1991).
49 Henry Petroski, To Engineer is Human: The Role ofFailure in Successful Design (New York: Vintage
Books, 1992); Henry Petroski, Small Things Considered: Why there is no Perfect Design (New York:
Vintage Books, 2003); Henry Petroski, Invention by Design: How Engineers get from Thought to Thing
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).
5o Petroski, Small Things, pp. 14 - 16.
so that the object does not fail completely.1 With regard to the relationships between
safety margins and failure, however, Petroski observes that:
When failures occur, a larger factor of safety is used in subsequent structures of a
similar kind. Conversely, when groups of structures become very familiar and do
not suffer unexplained failures, there is a tendency to believe that those structures
are over designed, that is to say, they have associated with them an unnecessarily
high factor of safety. Confidence mounts among the designers that there is no
need for such a high factor of ignorance in structures they feel they know so well,
and a consensus develops that the factor of safety should in the future be
lowered.52
Petroski also observes that engineering is a cumulative process; that there are very few
new designs, and that almost all design involves taking older ideas and adapting them to
new circumstances. However, he also cautions about developing a sense of complacency
or narrowness, and notes that the assumptions that lie beneath an old design must remain
constantly visible, to be questioned and reassessed as circumstances change. Finally,
Petroski notes that theoretical models and predictions do not capture the variability and
difference inherent in the material world, and as such must be treated with caution, and
design must be conservative to reflect this.5 3
Eugene Fergusson in Engineering and the Mind's Eye, also comments on the role of
failure and the design process.5 4 He argues that there are limits to the extent that
quantitative methods can be used as part of the design process, and that any new design
contains:
a combination of formal knowledge and experience and always contains more
judgment than certainty. Judgment is brought to bear as the designer responds to
the design-in-progress by repeatedly modifying means to reach desired ends.
51 Petroski, To Engineer is Human, pp. 98 - 106.
52 Petroski, To Engineer is Human, pp. 100 - 101.
3 Petroski, Invention by Design, pp. 62 - 64.
54 Eugene Fergusson, Engineering and the Minds's Eye (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992).
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Design is thus a contingent process, subject to changes brought about by
conditions that come to the surface after the big decisions have been made. It is
also a creative process, in which the designer's imagination is required whenever
a contingency occurs, and [...] a creative process 'is, virtually by definition,
unpredictable.' 55
Fergusson concurs with Petroski on the importance of learning from engineering failure,
but sounds a cautionary note, arguing that very seldom do failures in engineering come
about through faulty calculation but almost always through faulty judgment. He argues
that this puts particular onus on the engineer to be aware of the ways in which his
analytical tools are developed, and the assumptions that are built into them.56 Fergusson's
argument around the importance of understanding and teaching of engineering design is
heightened by his observation that the trend in engineering education since the mid-1950s
has been towards the teaching of more and more sophisticated analytical methods, and
less and less towards the teaching of engineering design. Fergusson argues that:
the real problem of engineering education is the implicit acceptance of the notion
that high-status analytical courses are superior to those that encourage the student
to develop an intuitive feel for the incalculable complexity of engineering practice
in the real world.57
He goes on to argue that "in this new era, with engineering guided by science, the process
of design would be freed from messy nonscientific decisions, subtle judgments, and, of
course, human error." 8
The work of Edward Constant discussing the development of the turbojet, introduces two
concepts that are useful in discussing all three accidents discussed in this study.59 First,
55 Fergusson, p. 173.
56 Fergusson, pp. 181 - 183.
57 Fergusson, p. 168.
58 Fergusson, p. 171.
59 Edward W. Constant II, The Origins of the Turbojet Revolution (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1980).
he discusses normal technology as the primary activity conducted by most engineers and
technologists, most of the time. Normal technology is comparable, for Constant, to
Thomas Kuhn's normal science and shares similar characteristics. Normal technology is
the improvement of current technology or its application under new conditions. It is
incremental and is generally practiced within a community of technological practitioners.
Second, Constant argues that a community of technical practice is a good unit of analysis
for analyzing technological change as it is at the level of the community of practice that
the technological and social structures that define normal technology are articulated.
Technological communities, Constant argues, effect technological change via responses
to problems, defined as either when a conventional technology deployed under new
conditions results in system failure, or when changes to other technologies require
commensurate change. Critically, Constant observes, change in this context is usually
incremental development of the current solution, rather than radical redesign.60
Walter Vincenti has examined in detail the relationship between engineering knowledge
and engineering design practice, setting out the types of knowledge needed for
engineering design, and discussing how that knowledge is created.61 Vincenti, like most
other scholars of engineering practice, notes that in reality, the process of design is
messy, repetitious, and contingent, but that some typological work can be done to
articulate the types of knowledge that working design engineers create in the course of
their daily work. He argues there are six types of engineering knowledge that are created
in the process of engineering design practice: first are fundamental design concepts,
followed by an understanding of the normal configuration of the object being designed.
Next, are criteria and specifications, translating the larger qualitative goals for the object
or system into tangible quantitative specifications. Following this are the development of
theoretical tools and quantitative data, which are counterbalanced by practical
considerations developed from the engineer's experience and judgment, and provide
ways of thinking and understanding about the object and system.62
60 Constant, pp. 10 - 13.
61 Walter Vincenti, What Engineers Know and How They Know It (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1990).
62 Vincenti, pp. 207 - 222.
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Vincenti then goes on to discuss the sources of engineering knowledge that engineers use,
noting the importance of experience derived from observation in operation and testing of
objects in design.63
The final piece of literature useful to in understanding engineering practice as it relates to
the three accidents discussed in this study is by Theodore Porter.64 Porter's work
describes the way technical specialists use quantitative methods and the knowledge
produced by those methods to form scientific and engineering communities of practice
across boundaries of institution and of distance. Porter argues that by adopting the
methods and languages of numbers, engineers and scientists could overcome concerns
around subjectivity and trust within otherwise weakly bound communities. He goes on to
argue that:
the relative rigidity of rules for composing papers, analyzing data, even
formulating theory, ought to be understood in part as a way of generating a shared
discourse, of unifying a weak research community. [...] Results are to be assessed
according to a protocol that is to be nearly as mechanical as possible. There
should be little room for personal judgment, and hence also a minimum of
opportunity for others to doubt the analysis.65
Engineering cultures provide the contexts within which engineering is practiced, and are
constituted of a group of traditions, practices, and knowledge. Engineering cultures can
follow organizational structures, but can also form around particular artifacts and types of
artifacts or technological communities. Engineering practice, and particularly engineering
design is a cumulative, iterative process of developing knowledge about the object or
system being designed, generally via operating, testing or modeling. Engineering
practice is both a creative, intuitive process, but also a quantitative, evidence-based
process, constrained and shaped by the material world.
63 Vincenti, pp. 229 - 234.
64 Theodore Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1995).
65 Porter, p. 228.
This study focuses on engineering culture and practice, but is also interested to address
the relationship of engineering cultures to safety cultures. Safety culture is a relatively
new analytic concept, and there are still substantial debates as to its meaning. Safety
culture literature derives from the study of accidents, with most studies arguing that the
term came about in the initial investigation of the Chernobyl accident in 1986.66 One
recent analysis of the literature around safety culture has concluded that the term has been
used in a variety of ways, but is most fundamentally concerned to define:
the enduring value and priority placed on worker and public safety by everyone in
every group at every level of an organization. It refers to the extent to which
individuals and groups will commit to personal responsibility for safety, act to
preserve, enhance and communicate safety concerns, strive to actively learn,
adapt and modify behavior based on lessons learned from mistakes. 67
Almost all literature working with the idea of safety culture argues that the concept is
primarily derived from the field of organizational culture studies, focusing on the
behavior of individuals within their organizational contexts, rather than any intellectual or
professional framework.68 Within this context, there are two common schools of thought
about how to create an organizational culture that will promote safety.
The first is most closely associated with Charles Perrow, and is the "normal accidents"
theory. Perrow has argued that accidents are inevitable in complex technological artifacts
to technological systems. He identifies two key features of these systems that render
them accident-prone. The first is interactive complexity, or the possibility that two or
more components or subsystems can interact in an unforeseen manner. The second
characteristics is that of "tight coupling", meaning that the system is extremely
interdependent, to the point that failing individual components or subsystems can neither
66 Najmedin Meshkati, "Human performance, organizational factors and safety culture," Paper presented on
National Summit on Transportation Safety, Washington DC, April 1997.
67 Douglas A. Weigmann, Hui Zhang, Terry von Thaden, Gunkan Sharma and Alyssa Mitchell, "A
synthesis of safety culture and safety climate research," Technical Report ARL-02-3/FAA-02-2.
http://www.humanfactors.uiuc.edu/Reports&PapersPDFs/TechReport/02-03.pdf accessed 7 April 2006.
68 See, for example, M. D Cooper, "Towards a model of safety culture," Safety Science, vol. 36 (2000), pp.
111-136.
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be isolated nor turned off fast enough to prevent any effects of failure propagating
throughout the whole system. Perrow has argued that technological systems or artifacts
with these characteristics will inevitably suffer from accidents; that accidents should be
expected as normal. 69
The other school of accident theorizing is that of high reliability organization theory,
most associated with the work of Todd LaPorte, Karlene Roberts and Karl E. Weick.
This school of thinking takes on Perrow's concept of normal accidents and, through
detailed ethnographic work, examines a series of organizations that appear to work with
highly complex technological artifacts and yet avoid "normal accidents." Studies have
been conducted on nuclear reactors, aircraft carriers and chemical plants. Researchers
have identified a number of factors that contribute to making high reliability
organizations. These include strategies like decentralization of decision-making, strong
enculturation processes and the role of a strong organizational culture that prioritized
safety.7" One interesting element of the role of culture is highlighted by Bierly in his
discussion of Rickover's nuclear navy as a high-reliability organization. He notes that
one of Rickover's most successful strategies, and the one that "held all the strands
together" was his appeal to patriotism. In Rickover's navy, the "patriotic belief that it
[safe operation of nuclear submarines] was of vital importance to the nation" was the
most important organizational context.7 While critiques of both schools of thinking have
been offered, most safety culture analysis works within either normal accident or high
reliability theorizing. 72
69 Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1999).
70 See Todd R. LaPorte, and Paula Consolini, "Working in Practice but not in Theory: Theoretical
Challenges of High-Reliability Organizations," Journal of Public Administration and Theory, vol. 1 (1991),
pp. 19 - 47; Karlene H. Roberts, "Managing High Reliability Organizations," California Management
Review, vol. 32, no. 4 (1990), pp. 101-114; Karl E. Weick, "Organizational Culture as a Source of High-
Reliability," California Management Review, vol. 29 (1987), pp. 112 - 127; Paul E. Bierly and J-C
Spender, "Culture and High-Reliability Organizations: The Case of the Nuclear Submarine," Journal of
Management, vol. 21, no. 4 (1995), pp. 639-656.
71 Bierly and Spender, p. 655.
72 Karen Marais, Nicolas Dulac and Nancy Leveson, "Beyond Normal Accidents and High Reliability
Organizations: The Need for an Alternative Approach to Safety in Complex Systems," Paper presented at
Engineering Systems Division Symposium, MIT, Cambridge, MA, March 29-31, 2004.
http://sunnvday.mit.edu//papers/hro.pdf accessed 2 September 2005. See also Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of
Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
It is interesting to note that most safety culture literature is focused around the safe
operation of technological systems; little discussion is offered around how to design and
build safe systems. It is at this intersection of engineering practice and safety that this
study is focused.
Structure of this study
This study consists of three sections. First, there are two chapters on Apollo 204, two
chapters on Challenger, and finally, an examination of the Columbia accident and its
relationship to the previous accidents.
Chapter one discusses the Apollo 204 accident and its aftermath. First, the accident on
27 January 1967 is discussed in detail, and the subsequent NASA accident investigation
process is traced from its formation on 27 January 1967 through to the publication of its
report in April 1967. The report produced in the aftermath of the accident is analyzed in
the context of other information produced around the accident. Secondly, this chapter
examines the ways in which historians have responded to the Apollo 204 accident, noting
how the accident has been given meaning in histories of NASA and the Apollo program.
This chapter also links these two elements, making observations about the role of various
interpretations of the Apollo 204 accident in subsequent decisions about learnings from
the accident.
Chapter two examines more closely the limitations of explanations discussed in chapter
one and provides a new explanation of the Apollo 204 accident. This chapter follows
North American Aviation and NASA in their development of the CSM, and discusses the
responses of both engineering cultures to the development of the discipline of systems
engineering. Chapter two examines the engineering cultures and practices of both NASA
and North American, and how they changed over the period 1961 - 1967.
Chapter three starts by discussing the Challenger accident and the activities of the
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Presidential Commission that was appointed to investigate it. It critically examines the
Presidential Commission's report, not as a primary source, but as a particular
interpretation of the accident. It analyses the large body of Challenger interpretation and
historiography, examining the way in which the Challenger accident has come to stand in
for a variety of theories of organizational behavior and sociotechnological thinking.
Chapter four briefly traces the origins of the Shuttle program in the late 1960s and early
1970s, linking some characteristics of the Shuttle program to changes put in place after
Apollo 1. This chapter then recounts the story of NASA's development of the O-ring
system in the Shuttle's solid rocket boosters, telling the story from the perspective of the
Marshall Space Flight Center and Morton Thiokol personnel involved. In doing so, the
chapter offers a new explanation of the accident, showing both the relationship of the
accident to engineering cultures and practices at the two organizations, but also drawing
comparisons with the Apollo 204 accident, suggesting that the two accidents reflect an
ongoing set of challenges faced by engineers in the manned space flight program.
Chapter five draws together the themes of the previous chapters, discussing the Columbia
accident in 2003, and the investigation of that accident carried out by the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). The CAIB report is discussed, its conclusions
analyzed, and the process of arriving at those conclusions critiqued. The small body of
Columbia literature is discussed, linking the construction of the report to the perspectives
taken by commentators. Finally, elements of a new explanation are suggested for the
Columbia accident, drawing on similarities between this accident and the previous two
fatal accidents.
Methods and Sources
A note about sources is necessary. This study focuses on three accidents over a forty-
year period, and attempts to draw some links between them. Whilst all three accidents
were within the US manned space flight program, they were investigated by three
completely different investigatory bodies. This has meant that the record collections
created by each investigatory body are different, each with its own areas of depth and
each with its own silences. This study will follow the records, meaning that it has been
necessary to carefully delimit change over time from changes in availability of sources.
NASA has also preserved a significant amount of material related to Apollo, as well as
commissioning both in the 1960s and in the 1990s, an extensive series of oral histories
with key figures in the Apollo program. These records are one of the best sources
available for the study of engineering cultures and practices at NASA, but are created
from the perspective of senior managers and administrators, and reflect the limits of their
experiences during Apollo. There are no interviews with shopfloor technicians, or lower-
level engineers.
These factors have had the unintended effect of concentrating historical attention on
management as the really interesting thing about the space program. Even histories of
NASA centers/labs and programs have chosen to manage the increasing complexity of
their subjects by shifting focus further and further up the management hierarchy as time
passed and organizations grew.
The other major hurdle is also unintentional. NASA has, since its outset, been conscious
of its role as a historically significant institution. It has encouraged its employees to be
conscious of their responsibilities to the historians of the future. This has had the
unintended consequence that many NASA employees have spent much of their life
rehearsing the stories they tell of their experiences. Retrospective interviews with NASA
personnel, particularly Apollo era personnel, frequently repeat each other, reinforcing the
popular mythologies of the period. This study has attempted, where possible, to privilege
sources created at the time, rather than in retrospect, in order to minimize the effects of
this phenomenon.
There has been less historical interest in the Space Shuttle than Apollo or other Apollo-
era space programs, and historical sources for the Space Shuttle program are more limited
than for Apollo. The Apollo Oral History series used in chapter one has no comparison
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for the Space Shuttle program. NASA, in the early 1970s, did not commission its
historians to record the events unfolding during the shuttle's development in the same
way they did in the 1960s. Thus, there are some constraints in the source material
available to provide context to the Challenger section of this study.
However, the Rogers Commission which investigated the Challenger accident collected a
vast amount of material and conducted over 170 in-depth substantial interviews with
engineers, managers and administrators in the months after the Challenger accident.
These voluminous records provide much of the evidentiary base for the Challenger
section of the study. 73 The nature of the Challenger source material is such that it permits
a very detailed examination of events and issues deemed broadly relevant to the
investigation, and encompasses the perspectives of shopfloor and workbench engineers as
well as more senior managers and administrators. It is also a curious fact that these
documents have seldom been examined by the historical community, with all but one
major work relying on the printed Rogers Commission report, rather than the surrounding
document archive. Thus, by going into this under-used resource, it is possible to draw a
far richer and more nuanced picture of the Challenger accident than has generally been
seen before. The nature of the sources available to study the Challenger accident does,
however, mean that this section of the study will necessarily be of smaller, but more
detailed scope than the discussion of the AS204 accident.
The CAIB conducted a substantial investigation into the Columbia accident, and created
an extensive set of interviews and hearings with most of the key figures at NASA, Boeing
and the United Space Alliance. However, at the outset, the CAIB decided that these
interviews and hearings would be conducted under legal privilege, in order that witnesses
not feel any fear of retaliation should their testimony indicate wrong doing or negligence
on the part of themselves or others. In their report, the CAIB noted that:
The Board took extraordinary measures to ensure that privileged witness
73 The records of the Rogers Commission are held in the National Archives at College Park, MD. The
record collection is over 200 boxes of textual material, comprising over 122,000 pages of technical
documents, 12,000 pages of interview transcripts and 2,800 pages of hearing transcripts.
statements would remain confidential by restricting access to these statements to
its 13 members and a small number of authorized support staff. Witness
statements and information derived from them are exempt from disclosure under
the Freedom of Information Act.74
While this may have elicited greater candor from witnesses, it has also meant that the
ability to examine these sources has been lost to current and future historians. It can only
be hoped that these records will be released into the public domain at some later stage.
For the purposes of this study, a brief explanation of the Columbia accident is all the
sources permit, although enough records exist to allow some comparisons.
The scope of this study
It is important to note what this study does not do. It does not attempt to reproduce the
investigations of the three accidents. While there is uncertainty in each of the three
accident investigation reports, especially Apollo 204, the physical and technical facts of
the accidents are well established, and certainly beyond the means or aims of this study to
attempt to reinvestigate. This study instead focuses on the interpretations of these facts,
the methods of explanation employed by investigators both professional and academic,
and how these interpretations and explanations have been used.
Second, this study does not discuss the astronauts involved in these accidents to any great
extent. There is no intent to diminish the human cost of these accidents. Simply put
however, the astronauts played little or no role in either cause or investigation of any of
the three accidents examined, and so have only a small role in the study of the
engineering and organizational aftermath of the accidents. The life stories of the
astronauts are extensively told elsewhere.75 Nevertheless, it is my hope that this study
74 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, p. 233.
7 The life of Gus Grissom is the subject of Ray E Boomhower, Gus Grissom: The Lost Astronaut
(Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society Press, 2004), which also discusses Ed White and Roger Chaffee.
Grissom also features extensively in Tom Wolfe's mythologised history The Right Stuff(London: Picador,
1980). Most of the Apollo-era astronauts have written their memoirs, and almost all devote space to
discussion of the lives of Grissom, Ed White and Roger Chaffee. There is extensive discussion of the seven
Challenger astronauts in Daniel and Susan Cohen, Heroes of the Challenger (London: Archway
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lends some additional meaning to their deaths, in that it offers some thoughts that may
render the manned spaceflight endeavor slightly less risky in future.
This study argues that accident reports have flattened our understanding of engineering at
NASA. The process of accident investigation elicits substantial knowledge about
engineering practice, but the reports use only a subset of that knowledge and are written
in specific historical contexts. The reports have been adopted in surprisingly uncritical
ways by most scholars who write about the space program. This work aims for a broader
view of these events. It incorporates the investigations and accident reports as
constitutive parts of the overall accidents because they shape what is knowable, what is
known, and what meaning is assigned to the accidents. This study argues that in many
ways it is ultimately not the accidents themselves, but the investigation reports, that have
substantially shaped engineering at NASA over the past forty years.
Paperbacks, 1986) and in chapter 7 of Malcolm McConnell, Challenger: A Major Malfunction, A Story of
Politics, Greed and the Wrong Stuff(Garden City, NY: Doubleday Books, 1987). The lives of the seven
Columbia astronauts are discussed in detail in chapters two through eight of Philip Chien, Columbia: Final
Voyage: The Last Flight ofNASA's First Space Shuttle (New York: Copernicus Books, 2006). NASA
maintains webpages on the Challenger and Columbia crews, available at
httD://historv.nasa. ov/Biographies/challenger.html and http://history.nasa. ov/columbia/Biographies.htmlF [ LI LI 1 ,
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CHAPTER ONE: APOLLO 1 - THE ACCIDENT AND
RESPONSES
Introduction
In January 1967, a fire started inside Command Module 012 of the Apollo spacecraft
being tested at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida. Less than 10 minutes after its
ignition, the fire had killed the three-man crew of the spacecraft: United States Air Force
Lieutenant-Colonel Virgil Ivan (Gus) Grissom, United States Air Force Lieutenant-
Colonel Edward Higgins White, II, and United States Navy Lieutenant-Commander
Roger Bruce Chaffee. The astronauts were the first fatalities of the Apollo program.
The three astronauts had been training to fly an Apollo mission named AS-204, which
had been due to launch on the 2 8 ' of February 1967. After the fire on 27 January, the
astronauts' widows asked that the designation Apollo 1 be reserved for the mission their
husbands would never make. In March 1967, NASA Associate Administrator for Manned
Space Flight, George Mueller, announced that the mission originally scheduled for
Grissom, White and Chaffee would be known as Apollo 1.' Since then the accident of
January 2 7 th 1967 has become known as the Apollo 1 accident or more poignantly, within
NASA, simply as "the fire."
The accident that claimed these astronauts and the Apollo 204 craft is examined in two
chapters in this study.
The first chapter sets out the accident and its subsequent investigation, looking in detail at
the accident report as an artifact. This chapter also analyses the Apollo 204 Review
Board report in a way that will allow comparison to be made with the Challenger and
Columbia reports, later in this study.
This chapter argues that the process whereby the Apollo 204 review board produced its
George M. Low, Memo to D. K. Slayton, 31 March 1967, Box 074-52, Johnson Space Center Historical
Collection, University of Houston Clear Lake.
report and the report itself show similarities to the processes described by Stephen
Hilgartner in his discussion of NASA reports.2 The messy nature of Apollo engineering
was removed to "back-stage" in the Review Board's report, as were the differences
between the NASA and the North American Aviation interpretations of the causes of the
accident. As such, the official history of the Apollo 204 accident, as the Review Board
report became, speaks with one authoritative voice, presenting the official version of the
Apollo 204 accident.
This chapter argues that the investigations into the Apollo 204 accident conducted by the
Senate and the Congress reveal the differences between the public face of engineering at
NASA - the epitome of rationality and progress - and the private reality of engineering as
"passionate, conflict-filled and failure prone," as Philip Scranton has observed.3 It further
argues that this difference was not articulated by many either at NASA or in the
Congress, creating a gap of misunderstanding that became filled by accusations and
blame that may not have been warranted. In essence, the Apollo 204 accident
investigation report both reveals and helped constitute the difference between the public
ideal of NASA and the reality of complex engineering.
Finally, this chapter examines the ways in which historians have responded to the Apollo
204 accident, noting how the accident has been given meaning in histories of NASA and
the Apollo program. The chapter links this historiography to the Review Board report,
making observations about the role of various historical interpretations of the Apollo 204
accident in subsequent understanding of the accident and of the course of the manned
spaceflight program. It argues that in many accounts, the success of the larger Apollo
program served to diminish the significance of the Apollo 204 accident. The key to these
accounts of Apollo 1 as the first step towards successful moon landing is an accident
report that deflected attention from engineering practice and contributed instead to
creating an understanding of the accident as a heroic tragedy foreshadowing eventual
success.
2 Stephen Hilgartner, Science on Stage: Expert Advice as Public Drama (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2000).
3 Philip Scranton, "Urgency, uncertainty, and innovation: Building jet engines in postwar America,"
Management and Organizational History 1, no. 2, 2006.
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The second Apollo 1 chapter in this study addresses the gaps in the Apollo 1
historiography and in the Review Board's explanation of the accident. It puts forward a
new interpretation of the Apollo 204 accident, one rooted in tensions and interplay
between a number of engineering cultures, technical philosophies and manufacturing
styles that can be seen through the US manned spaceflight program in the 1960s, where at
least two very different engineering cultures struggled to find a way to successfully build
a piece of technology profoundly different and more complex than either had
accomplished before. It also discusses how NASA and North American engineers and
managers rose to the challenges of adapting engineering practices to the circumstances of
the manned spaceflight program, challenges that this study argues recurred in both the
Challenger and Columbia accidents.
Sources
The Apollo 204 Review Board, in their investigation, conducted a series of interviews of
personnel involved in the accident. These interviews, however, were solely confined to
discussing the events of 27 January 1967. These interviews permitted the Board to
reconstruct to great detail the minute-by-minute circumstances of the accident, but leave
the longer-term causes of the accident unaddressed. Additional materials were created in
subsequent years but often these touch on the Apollo 204 accident only in passing. As
with much of the historiography of the Apollo program, the historian is largely left with
the memoirs, interviews and recollections of the more senior engineer-managers, rather
than the shop-floor engineers and technicians. During the mid-1960s, the NASA history
office commissioned a series of interviews with both NASA and North American
engineers, some at senior levels and some more junior. Through these accounts it is
possible to get a stronger sense of the Apollo spacecraft in its historical and
organizational context.
This section of the study draws on the interviews with engineers, managers and
administrators involved with the Apollo program at both NASA and North American
Aviation leading up to the accident, their published and unpublished documents, and the
historical literature around the Apollo program. It also draws on the accident
investigation documents created in the aftermath' of the accident, and subsequent
interviews and documents concerning responses to the accident.
The Apollo 204 accident
At approximately 5 minutes before eight o'clock on the morning of January 27, 1967, the
CM012 spacecraft was sitting on pad 34 at the Kennedy Space Centre, undergoing a
plugs-out test. The purpose of this test was to:
demonstrate all space vehicle systems and operational procedures in as near a
flight configuration as is practical and to verify their capability in a simulated
launch. System verification is performed, an abbreviated final countdown
conducted and a flight simulation made. All communication and instrumentation
systems are activated and proper measurements are monitored at appropriate
ground stations. At the start of the simulated flight, umbilicals are disconnected
and the spacecraft is on simulated fuel-cell power.4
Entering the spacecraft at around 1:00pm that afternoon were astronauts Lieutenant-
Colonel Virgil Ivan (Gus) Grissom, Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Higgins White, II, and
Lieutenant-Commander Roger Bruce Chaffee.
Gus Grissom was a veteran astronaut, having been commander of Gemini 3 in 1965 and
pilot of Mercury-Redstone 4 (also known as Liberty Bell 7).5 He was one of the original
seven Mercury astronauts, and had been part of the manned spaceflight program since its
inception in 1959.6 Ed White was one of the New Nine who joined NASA in 1962. He
4 U.S. Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1967), p. 4-3.
5 Grissom is extensively discussed in Ray E. Boomhower, Gus Grissom: The Lost Astronaut (Indianapolis:
Indiana Historical Society Press, 2004), which also discusses Ed White and Roger Chaffee.
6 The Mercury Seven were Scott Carpenter, Gordon Cooper, John Glenn, Gus Grissom, Wally Schirra,
Alan Shepard and Deke Slayton. Their story is told in Tom Wolfe's The Right Stuff(London: Picador,
1980).
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had been the pilot of the Gemini 4 mission, and had been the first American to participate
in an extra-vehicular activity (EVA). White had also been back-up pilot on Frank
Borman's Gemini 7 mission. Roger Chaffee had joined NASA with the third group of
astronauts selected,' and was, by the standards of his crewmates, a relative newcomer.
Anecdotally, a number of observers claim that Apollo Program Manager Joseph Shea had
proposed that he sit in the spacecraft for the plugs-out test, in order that he could assist
diagnosing whatever technical problems may have arisen.s Several years later James
Webb thought that it was possible that both Shea and Director of Flight Crew Operations
Deke Slayton had intended to be in the CM012 spacecraft on 27 January 1967. 9
Approximately 20 minutes after the simulation began, the simulated countdown was
halted. Grissom had noticed an unusual smell through his environmental control system,
which he described as smelling like sour milk.'0 Following an approximate hour and
twenty minute delay to investigate, no problem was found and the countdown was
restarted. There were also ongoing problems with the communications equipment in
CMO 12. "How do you expect to communicate with us in orbit if you can't even talk to us
on the pad?" Gus Grissom is reported to have said." From about 5:45pm to about
5:55pm, communications technicians worked on the CM012 equipment, but were unable
to resolve a problem resulting in a permanently live microphone within the spacecraft.
At that stage the countdown was held at T-10.' 2
At about 6:31pm, instrumentation picked up a significant voltage surge in the AC Bus 2,
and at the same time, the highly sensitive Guidance and Navigation system started to
' The third group of astronauts selected were known as "the fourteen," comprising Chaffee, Buzz Aldrin,
William Anders, Charles Bassett, Alan Bean, Eugene Cernan, Michael Collins, Walter Cunningham, Donn
Eisele, Theodore Freeman, Richard Gordon, Russell Schweickart, David Scott, and Clifton Williams
s Michael Gray, Angle of attack: Harrison Storms and the Race to the Moon (New York: W.W. Norton,
1992), p. 226 - 227 repeats this story.
9 James Webb. Interview by Robert Sherrod, 1969, p. 3. See also
http://www.isc.nasa.gov/Bios/htmlbios/slayton.html for Slayton's biography.
" Gene Kranz, Failure is not an option: mission controlfrom Mercury to Apollo 13 and beyond (New
York, 2000), p. 195. Sour milk smell is characteristic of butyric acid, which was a constituent element of a
number of plastic products in the 1960s.
" Quoted in Christopher C. Kraft, Flight: my life in mission control (New York: E.P. Dutton, 2001), p. 269.
12 Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, pp. 4-3 - 4-4.
detect movement in the spacecraft. Almost immediately the crew gave the first verbal
indication of an emergency - Gus Grissom's microphone was live throughout, and his
voice was heard to say either "hey" or "fire." Almost immediately after that, Roger
Chaffee reported a fire in the spacecraft, saying "we've got a fire in the cockpit." About
seven seconds following that, another transmission was made, this more garbled, saying
either "They're fighting a bad fire - Let's get out ....Open 'er up," or "We've got a bad fire
- Let's get out ....We're burning up," or "I'm reporting a bad fire ....I'm getting out ...."'3
Subsequent investigation suggested that the fire had started in the lower left-hand
equipment bay, to the left and below Gus Grissom, who was strapped in a horizontal
position. 4
'~ Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, pp. 5-8 - 5-9.
14 Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, p. 5-2.
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Image 3: From left, Roger Chaffee, Ed White and Gus Grissom, showing the hatch above Ed White's
head. NASA Historical Collection, NASA Headquarters.
NASA's standing emergency procedure was for Ed White, who was in the center couch,
to remove the hatch of the spacecraft while keeping his safety harness fastened (see
Image 3, which shows the three astronauts wearing orange safety harnesses, with the
hatch above White's head). A number of witnesses watching the television picture of the
Command Module hatch window during this stage of the fire saw motion that suggests
that White was reaching for the inner hatch handle. White's harness buckle was found
unopened after the fire, suggesting that he started the standard hatch-opening procedure."
Kennedy Space Center personnel located on level 8 of the umbilical tower responded to
the report of the fire. The order was given to start evacuation procedures for the
astronauts and the pad technicians started toward the White Room which surrounds the
hatch and into which the crew would step upon exiting the spacecraft. At that point,
approximately 18 seconds after the first indication of a fire, the spacecraft ruptured.
Flame and gas gushed out of the ruptured area, which spread flame into the space
between the inner pressure vessel and outer heat shield of the spacecraft, through access
hatches and into the service structure. A number of the pad personnel reported that at
that time they believed the spacecraft was about to explode, and so rapidly left the area.1 6
The design of the hatch was an important element for understanding the pad technicians'
attempt to assist the astronauts, and the Review Board that investigated the accident made
special note of its idiosyncrasies:
Three hatches were installed on the Command Module. The outermost hatch,
called the boost protective cover (BPC) hatch, is part of the cover which shields
the Command Module during launch and is jettisoned prior to orbital operation.
The middle hatch is termed the ablative hatch and becomes the outer hatch when
5 Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, p. 4-5. The AS204 board report provides a
chronology for the immediate events after the accident which is the basis of the next few paragraphs.
Individual eye-witness accounts are also published in the report.
6 Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, p. 4-5.
the BPC is jettisoned after launch. The inner hatch closes the pressure vessel wall
of the Command Module and is the first hatch to be opened by the crew in an
unaided crew egress.
The outer or BPC hatch was in place but not fully latched because of distortion in
the BPC caused by wire bundles temporarily installed for the test. The middle
hatch and inner hatch were in place and latched after crew ingress. Although the
BPC hatch was not fully latched it was necessary to insert a specially-designed
tool into the hatch in order to provide a hand-hold for lifting the hatch from the
Command Module."
Less than a minute after the first report of a fire, thick smoke reduced visibility in the
White Room surrounding the spacecraft to almost nil. The technicians had to work
essentially by touch. There was a hatch removal tool in the White Room, and once the
technicians had extinguished a small fire near the outer hatch, the Pad Leader and an
assistant removed the outer hatch, with some difficulty. 8
Although visibility was limited and there had been much damage to both the spacecraft
and the astronauts, the Board concluded that it was most likely that Grissom had left his
couch to avoid the initial fire, which had started on his side of the spacecraft, while Ed
White had stayed in his couch, following the evacuation procedure and attempting to
open the hatch and Roger Chaffee had stayed still to maintain communications until the
hatch could be opened. The Board also concluded that due to a higher pressure inside
the spacecraft than outside, opening the inner hatch was impossible because of the
resulting force on the hatch.19
About nine minutes after first reports of the fire, an emergency firefighting crew arrived
at the White Room. They were soon followed by three NASA doctors. The doctors
entered the White Room and determined that the crew had not survived the heat, smoke,
17 Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, p. 4-6.
18 Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator,, p. 4-7.
19 Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, p. 4-7.
and thermal bums. Seven and a half hours after the accident, the crew were removed
from the craft.20
The interior of the CMO 12 spacecraft was essentially destroyed by the fire, leaving little
remaining of the nylon netting and Velcro strips that fuelled the fire in the spacecraft,
underneath the astronauts' couches (see image 4).
Image 4: Interior of CM012 after the fire. Couches have been removed. NASA Historical
Collection, NASA Headquarters.
The Investigation
20 Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, p. 4-7 - 4-8.
NASA's senior administration moved fast. All use of pressurized oxygen was prohibited,
and NASA and contractor personnel were requested to refrain from commenting to the
media, or giving public talks, whether technical or non-technical.21 However, even in the
earliest days of the investigation, it is clear that this fire was not seen as likely to threaten
the Apollo program in general. Indeed, memos and speeches from the most senior NASA
leadership make it clear that the Apollo 204 fire was seen as something that needed to be
got past in order to continue with business as usual.22 Joe Shea later described his
response as initially despondent: "I told Berry (Shea's wife) what had happened -
throwing a towel the length of the room, sobbing out 'They're dead! Those three guys
are dead. The whole fucking thing is over."' 23 However, Shea soon understood that his
challenge would be "to minimize the impact on the program." 24
NASA Administrator James Webb appointed a review board that day, following a
meeting in the early afternoon with President Lyndon Johnson. After a discussion of the
political risks of any investigation, it was agreed that Webb would appoint a board of
NASA officials to investigate the accident. Webb then met with the chairs of the House
and Senate committees with oversight for NASA and successfully convinced them to
hold off formal investigations until the NASA-appointed Board had completed its task.
The quidpro quo was that Deputy Administrator Robert Seamans would report weekly
on the progress of the investigation to Webb, who would then brief Congressmen and
Senators.2 5
The board was made up almost exclusively of senior NASA officials and was chaired by
Floyd Thompson, then the Director of Langley Research Center. Thompson was a long-
time NASA (and formerly NACA) employee having joined the Langley Research Center
21 George M. Low, Memo, 1 February 1967. Box 067-63/64, Johnson Space Center Historical Collection,
University of Houston Clear Lake; Low was Deputy Directory, Manned Spaceflight Centre at the time.
Wayne W. Corbett, Memo, 1 February 1967. Box 067-63/64, Johnson Space Center Historical Collection,
University of Houston Clear Lake; Corbett was Chief, General Research Procurement Branch at the time.
22 George M. Low, Announcement, 1 February 1967. Box 067-63/64, Johnson Space Center Historical
Collection, University of Houston Clear Lake.
23 Joeseph Shea, Unpublished manuscript and untitled manuscript, 1973, written for submission to Knopf,
p. 3. Held in folder 013363, NASA Historical Collection, NASA Headquarters.
24 Shea, Unpublished manuscript, p. 10.25 W. Henry Lambright, Powering Apollo: James E. Webb ofNASA, New series in NASA History
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 146 - 147. Webb, Interview by Sherrod, p. 2.
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in 1926, straight from an aeronautical engineering degree from the University of
Michigan.26
USAF Colonel Frank Borman was soon appointed to the Board to represent the astronaut
corps. Borman had graduated from the California Institute of Technology with a master's
degree in aeronautical engineering before entering NASA in 1962 with the second group
of astronauts, the New Nine.27 In December 1965, Borman had been commander of the
Gemini 7 mission, and would, in 1968, command the highly successful Apollo 8
mission. 28 Borman was not the first choice to sit on the Board, Wally Schirra having
being initially proposed,29 but in the opinion of Floyd Thompson, Borman was the right
choice. Thompson wrote: "He has a good connection between his mouth and his brain.
He wasn't the first astronaut chosen for the board, but he was the perfect one."30
There were eight other board members - 6 engineers including Max Faget, plus Robert
Van Dolah, a chemist from the Bureau of Mines and a flammability expert, and a lawyer,
George Malley, who was also general counsel to Langley and an ex-US Navy engineer.31
Of these engineers, almost all were NASA employees, most of whom had senior
positions and had worked for NASA since its inception.
The Board's investigation was supported by NASA engineers, most notably by Joe Shea.
Over the first few weeks of the investigation, Shea became obsessed with the
investigation, leading first to his working extreme hours, often as many as 20 hours a day.
This work schedule, when combined with Shea's sense of personal guilt over the
accident, and his personal identification and friendships with the astronauts, led quickly
26 Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
p. 2-1.
27 The New Nine were Borman, Neil Armstrong, Pete Conrad, Jim Lovell, James McDivitt, Elliott See,
Tom Stafford, Ed White and John Young. Borman's biography is on p. 2 - 17 of Ibid.
28 Frank Borman and Robert J. Serling, Countdown: an autobiography (New York: Silver arrow books,
1988). Borman's autobiography discusses both his Gemini and Apollo experiences in detail.
29 Jack King, Interview by Robert Sherrod, 1969, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA
Headquarters, p. 1.
30 Floyd L. Thompson, Interview by Robert Sherrod, 1969, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA
Headquarters, p. 3.
" Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator. Chapter 2 of this report gives full biographical
details of the members of the Apollo 204 Board.
to a breakdown. Frank Borman, who had been close to Shea since the early 1960s,
believed that Shea perhaps took the fire hardest of all the NASA and North American
engineers involved.32 The Board had been instructed by James Webb, however, to avoid
close interaction with Shea and others in the management team at Houston.
The Review Board immediately established 21 separate panels to examine a variety of
possible causes, each panel led by a Board member. These panels investigated and
supervised a range of areas: disassembly of the CMO 12 spacecraft, establishing the
sequence of events, test procedures, fire propagation, materials and design reviews,
security, integration of final report.33 These panels met in sessions closed to all but panel
members and relevant NASA and contractor officials.34 These panels reported back to
the Board in March with their findings.
In keeping with the commitment made by Webb to Representative Teague and Senator
Anderson, the Board reported their preliminary findings to Robert Seamans on the 3rd,
14t and 25' of February 1967, which he then summarized for Webb.35 In the report
from 3 February 1967, the Board advised Seamans that to develop an understanding of
possible ignition sources, it would be necessary to conduct a detailed step-by-step
examination of the entire spacecraft and its related test support equipment.36
On February 14, 1967, Seamans advised Webb that the Board was in full operation:
The Board now has 21 panels established and operating, each with a specific
assigned task, each chaired by a Government employee, and each reporting to a
specific Board member. A detailed Review Board activity schedule has been
32 Borman and Serling, Countdown, p. 176.
33 Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, pp. 3-5 - 3-6. There are technical reports still
extant that record the findings of the 21 panels, but details of how the panels made their findings do not
appear to have survived.
34 U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Untitled presentation to Robert Seamans, 22
February 1967. Held in Folder "Board Organization and Investigation", box 2, Office files of the Review
Board, Apollo 204 Review Board, Record Group 255, National Archives.
3 Coversheets for these reports, in the original versions rather than the reprints in the AS204 Board report,
make it clear that these updates were written for Congress as well as for James Webb. See for example
NASA News Release 67-28, 15 February 1967. Held in folder 007223, NASA Historical Collection.
36 Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, p. 3-47.
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established and is reviewed daily to ensure that milestones are being met or that
scheduled adjustments are made as early as necessary. This permits close
coordination and integration of all the necessary activities, analyses, and studies.37
On 25 February 1967, Seamans wrote to Webb giving the third interim report. By this
point, the Board had reached a point close to its final findings, indicating that it did not
necessarily anticipate ever finding a definitive source of ignition for the fire. The Board
also released a set of preliminary recommendations:
That combustible materials now used be replaced wherever possible with non-
flammable materials, that non-metallic materials that are used be arranged to
maintain fire breaks, that systems for oxygen or liquid combustibles be made fire
resistant, and that full flammability tests be conducted with a mockup of the new
configuration;
That a more rapidly and more easily operated hatch be designed and installed; and
That on-the-pad emergency procedures be revised to recognize the possibility of
cabin fire.38
As the work of Stephen Hilgartner reminds us, it is important to read these accounts as
being written both for Administrator Webb, but also for the more general observer.
Seamans' reports were reproduced in the Review Board's final report, and were carefully
neutral in their findings.
Behind the scenes, however, the reports being made to Seamans were more candid.
They identified that there were no chafeguards for wiring harnesses close to one of the
access doors to the Environmental Control System (ECS), identified several wires that
appeared to have sustained damage before the fire, and identified improperly soldered
37 Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, p. 3-51 - 3-52.
38 Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, p. 3-58.
joints in the ECS plumbing that appeared to have broken.39 The investigation also
documented numerous events of leakage from the ECS in the three months prior to the
accident, and observed the potential for both corrosion and flammability risk from the
residue of the water glycol. Most candid, however, were the tentative findings:
A serious fire occurred inside the spacecraft cabin under conditions which were
reasonably similar to the past seven years of manned spacecraft operational
experience. Previous policy had been based on the assumption that fire inside the
cabin was sufficiently remote to not require on-board fire protection. This
accident gives a new perspective regarding the probability of such a fire. 40
The environmental control system installed in spacecraft 012 had a history of
many removals and significant technical problems including glycol leaks. The
design and location of the environmental control unit makes repair and removal
extremely difficult from a mechanical standpoint. Leakage at solder joints has
been a particularly chronic problem.41
Inspection of wire bundles in spacecraft 012 indicate several instances where
individual wires were subject to abuse and undue installation strain. 42
The behind-the-scenes reports were laying the causes of the fire at the feet of both
NASA's failure to recognize the risks of fire, and North American's poor workmanship.
The Report
On 31 March, the board concluded its inquiry, and on 5 April 1967, the Apollo 204
Review Board presented its report to NASA Administrator James Webb. The report was
a large document, over three thousand pages long and included a plethora of technical
39 Untitled presentation to Robert Seamans, 22 February 1967, p. 12.
40 Untitled presentation to Robert Seamans, 22 February 1967, p. 50..
41 Untitled presentation to Robert Seamans, 22 February 1967, p. 54.
42 Untitled presentation to Robert Seamans, 22 February 1967, p. 56
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detail about the Apollo spacecraft."3 The first few pages of the report set the stage for
what was to come, in a way that was so authoritative that its findings, and the wider
context of the investigation, has seldom been challenged.
The report opens by establishing its formal authority - reproducing a letter signed by all
board members to the Administrator of the National Air and Space Administration,
informing the Administrator that the report is full and final, and that all members of the
Review Board concur with all the findings, determinations and recommendations of the
Board. The final report of the Review Board was to the NASA Administrator; no
mention is made of any reporting responsibility, either legal or moral, to any other body.44
The report then presents a photograph of the conical Apollo Command Module, painted
white. Prominent on the left-hand side of the spacecraft is an American flag, with the
words United States above it. On the right-hand side, the hatch sits open with the interior
obscured in darkness. While the upper background of the image is of a star field, the
lower background shows the Apollo spacecraft sitting on some form of trailer,
unconnected to any other piece of hardware. The image presents an interesting message -
of a manned American spacecraft aspiring to the stars, but also clearly on the ground, in a
factory setting, with more work to be completed to achieve the mission.45
Following this image is a short preface, only six paragraphs long. Despite its brevity, this
Preface neatly captures the larger message the report is designed to convey. The preface
is reproduced here in full:
The Nation's space program requires that man and machine achieve the highest
capability to pursue the exploration of space. Three gallant men lost their lives in
the line of duty during the development of that capability.
The Apollo 204 Review Board was charged with the responsibility of reviewing
43 Stephen Hilgartner discusses the role of the physical presentation of the reports in establishing their
authority. See Hilgartner, pp. 42 - 45
44 See Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, p. 1 - 3.
45 Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, p. 1 -5.
the circumstances surrounding the accident, reporting its findings relating to the
cause of the accident, and formulating recommendations so that inherent hazards
are reduced to a minimum.
Throughout its proceedings, the Board recognized the need for an impartial and
totally objective review in order to arrive at its findings. The Board believes that
this was accomplished.
The Board is very concerned that its description of the defects in the Apollo
Program that led to the condition existing at the time of the Apollo 204 accident
will be interpreted as an indictment of the entire manned space flight program and
a castigation of the many people associated with that program. Nothing is further
from the Board's intent. The function of the Board has been to search for error in
the largest and most complex research and development program ever undertaken.
This report, rather than presenting a total picture of that program, is concerned
with the deficiencies uncovered.
The Board has been greatly impressed by the integrity, candor and dedication of
those people upon whom the Board relied in conducting this investigation. All
have felt a personal loss in this accident, and all are determined that a comparable
tragedy shall not occur.
This report represents the dedicated effort of many hundreds of individuals in
government, industry and educational institutions. In addition, useful advice was
received from many private individuals in this country and abroad. The Board
acknowledges with appreciation these contributions.46
The key points of the Preface are: that the accident was about the sacrifice of the
astronauts in order to achieve goals of the larger program; that the job of the Board was
only to investigate rather than to ascribe blame; that any fault found must be balanced
46 Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, p. 1- 6.
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against the uniquely difficult and dangerous task being undertaken; and no fault found
could be ascribed to any personal failings. These findings bear a striking resemblance to
the characteristics of almost all the Apollo 1 historiography, demonstrating the power of
the Apollo 204 Review Board's report to shape the meaning of the accident.
Following the Preface is a reproduction of the letters setting out the Board's authority and
biographies of the Board members, followed by an abbreviated version of the Board's
proceedings. Again the message being sent here is one of authority and unanimity.
Following these messages, the Board sets out its history of the accident, starting with
"Initiation Of Fabrication" as its foundational event. The Board Report tells the reader
that this event took place in August 1964, strongly suggesting that investigations into
history prior to this point has no utility.
The report then sets out the Board's conclusions around the causes of the accident. They
concluded that the fire was caused by an unknown source of electrical arc, probably
malfunctioning wire insulation around the environmental control unit on the floor of the
spacecraft, although the cause would never be definitively known. The spark ignited
nylon netting, Velcro strips, and other combustible materials inside the spacecraft. These
materials would have been removed before spaceflight, but under test conditions were not
seen as hazardous. The coolant inside the spacecraft, water-glycol, was flammable and
leaks from the system had left a flammable residue in the cabin after evaporation. As the
air-conditioning pipes melted, coolant leaked and ignited, further fueling the fire. The fire
was rendered particularly dangerous by the high-pressure, pure-oxygen environment
inside the spacecraft during the test. The crew was unable to use the inward-opening
inner hatch under the pressurized conditions. The Board determined that the crew had
died from asphyxiation caused by fumes from the fire.47
The Board told a story of engineering failure, noting particular instances of poor
workmanship around the wiring loom:
47 Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, pp. 5-1-5-12.
The Teflon covering on the wire used in Apollo 204 could be damaged easily or
penetrated by abrasion. The covering could also be damaged when forced against
the structure by poor installation. The Board found numerous examples in the
wiring of poor installation, design and workmanship.48
Vividly, the Board report contained an image of a wrench socket left within the wiring
loom of CM012 (see image 5) While this wrench was unlikely to have had any causal
role in the accident, the image evoked a larger message around poor workmanship and
quality control. The Board was also critical around the environmental coolant system:
Numerous plumbing joints are distributed around the spacecraft. It was found
that the solder joints were improperly designed in that strength margins were
inadequate to resist damage from unplanned loads. Such loads may result during
equipment installation or when tubing is used as hand-holds or is bumped by
technicians working in the Command Module. The result was that a number of
leaks in solder joints were experienced during the history of all Block I spacecraft.
The mechanical joints also had leakage problems. 49
The Board made specific note of the fact that the environmental coolant unit had been
removed and replaced in its cabinet within the spacecraft a number of times. In order for
the unit to be removed, the door to the cabinet needed to be opened, which had the
potential to abrade the wiring harnesses that crossed the floor of the spacecraft in the
lower left forward bay, where the fire is believed to have started.50
48 Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, p. 5-10.
49 Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, p. 5-11.
So Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, p. 4-1.
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Image 5: Enclosure 27 of the AS 204 Board report clearly shows in the center, a wrench socket left
between two bundles of wires.
More broadly, the Board identified six conditions that led to the fire. These six conditions
were a sealed cabin with a pressurized atmosphere, extensive distribution of flammable
materials in the cabin, vulnerable wiring carrying spacecraft power, vulnerable plumbing
containing combustible and corrosive coolant, inadequate escape provisions, and an
inadequate provision for rescue or medical assistance. 1
5 Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator: Appendix A-G, board minutes, p. 5-12.
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The Board made eleven findings in their report. Each finding stated a particular fact or
set of facts the Board had identified as causal, accompanied by a determination that
discussed the effects of the causal facts. In most cases, following the pair of finding and
determination, the Board issued brief recommendations.
Findings 1 through 10 were technical in nature, discussing the test processes, the design
of the spacecraft or way in which operating procedures were implemented. Finding 2
notes that testing in a pure oxygen environment makes testing hazardous, while Finding 9
notes the presence of a pure oxygen environment presents a hazard if combustible
materials in the spacecraft cabin are not controlled.
Finding 10 was perhaps the most critical, stating that: "Deficiencies existed in Command
Module design, workmanship and quality control," and that "these deficiencies created an
unnecessarily hazardous condition and their continuation would imperil any future
Apollo operations." 52
Moving from the technical to the organizational, in finding 11 the Board made the
finding that: "an examination of operating practices showed the following examples of
problem areas: The number of the open items at the time of shipment of the Command
Module 012 was not known. There were 113 significant Engineering Orders not
accomplished at the time Command Module 012 was delivered to NASA," and
determined that "problems of program management and relationships between Centers
and with the contractor have led in some cases to insufficient response to changing
program requirements." 53
Having made this determination, however the Board's recommendation was neutral in
tone: "Every effort must be made to insure the maximum clarification and understanding
of the responsibilities of all the organizations involved, the objective being a fully
52 Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, pp. 6-1 - 6-3.
5 Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, p. 6-3.
coordinated and efficient program." 54 This was the only recommendation that addressed
primarily a management rather than purely an engineering issue.
The report makes measured engineering recommendations that, while they identify and
publicize engineering problems, stop short of reducing confidence in the ability of NASA
engineers to accomplish the spaceflight mission. By taking the form of engineers
explaining technical issues, the report served as a blueprint for resuming work with
increased confidence in the likelihood of success. In particular, the Board carefully
refrained from criticizing the NASA team's skills.
After the Board made their engineering recommendations, they spoke briefly about the
larger circumstance surrounding the accident:
Having identified the condition that led to the disaster, the Board addressed
itself to the question of how these conditions came to exist. Careful
consideration of this question leads the Board to the conclusion that in its
devotion to the many difficult problems of space travel, the Apollo team
failed to give adequate attention to certain mundane but equally vital
questions of crew safety. The Board's investigation revealed many
deficiencies in design and engineering, manufacture and quality control.
When these deficiencies are corrected the overall reliability of the Apollo
Program will be increased greatly.5
Perhaps what is most interesting about the Apollo 204 report is what is not discussed.
Interim reports make it clear that behind the scenes, investigators were clearly focused on
poor workmanship at North American but were also very aware that unchallenged
assumptions around the safety of pure oxygen, rooted in NASA's operational history with
Gemini and Mercury, were equally to blame.
Furthermore, the Board made no mention of any outside pressures on NASA or North
54 Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, p. 6-3.
5 Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, p. 5-12.
American, whether political or economic. The Board provided no sense of any historical
context or any significant critique of management practices or organizational behaviors,
either within NASA or any of its contractors. No individuals were mentioned by name,
let alone any blame assigned to any individual or organization.
The investigation of the Apollo 204 accident recognized the effects of the material
history of the spacecraft - the uncovered, ill-positioned, abraded wiring, the leaky ECS,
the unexamined oxygen environment - but the Review Board report systematically
removed the engineering practices that underpinned the material history. This ahistorical
account has taken on its own life, and is still reproduced in much of the Apollo literature.
As Peter Galison has observed, the genre of accident reports has inbuilt a series of
explanatory tensions, and several of these can be seen in the Apollo 204 Review Board
report. The Review Board's conclusions veer from local to global explanations; from
finite, specific comments like "The fire in Apollo 204 was most probably brought about
by some minor malfunction or failure of equipment or wire insulation. This failure, which
most likely will never be positively identified, initiated a sequence of events that
culminated in the conflagration," to sweeping statements that "deficiencies existed in
Command Module design, workmanship and quality control. These deficiencies created
an unnecessarily hazardous condition," to comprehensive, high-level findings: "Problems
of program management and relationships between Centers and with the contractor have
led in some cases to insufficient response to changing program requirements. Every effort
must be made to insure the maximum clarification and understanding of the
responsibilities of all the organizations involved, the objective being a fully coordinated
and efficient program." 56 In these statements can also be seen in the other tension
Galison identifies in accident reports: a tension between human and technological
causative factors. 57
From the work of Hilgartner and Galison, we see two contrary patterns. On the one hand,
56 Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, pp. 6-1 - 6-3.
57 See Peter Galison, "An Accident of History," in Peter Galison and Alex Roland, eds., Atmospheric Flight
in the Twentieth Century (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), pp. 1 - 4.
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Hilgartner has shown how rhetorical and print techniques create authoritative accounts of
internally more fluid scientific and technological controversies. Galison, on the other
hand, argues that these accounts will always contain instabilities. The Apollo 204
Review Board Report contains instabilities, but more powerfully it created an
authoritative explanation for the fire. This authority, however was to be challenged when
the Report became public.
North American 's response
Following the release of the report in April 1967, North American Aviation prepared its
responses to the Review Board's findings as part of their preparation for Congressional
hearings. North American concurred with most of the findings of the Board, except
finding 10, which addressed deficiencies in the workmanship and quality control of the
Apollo spacecraft. North American reminded Congress of the long history of changes
over the years when the spacecraft was being designed, engineered and manufactured.
North American noted the search for weight losses had contributed to decisions around
the removal of protective covers, and that wire harnesses were only vulnerable to foot
traffic on the ground. A number of North American's responses indicate that a problem
area was known, and remedied in Block II spacecraft, but not in Block I.5
North American's comment with regard to finding 9, relating to the pure oxygen
environment, is short but cogent: "The part of this item dealing with combustibles has
been previously commented on. With respect to the balance of this item, North American
concurs in the necessity of conducting studies of the use of a diluent gas, and had
previously proposed in 1963 that it be authorized to conduct studies of this kind."59
North American's response to Finding 11 dealing with the seemingly large number of
open engineering items on the CM012 spacecraft, notes that "paperwork formalities"
were not always completed because of the "dynamic nature" of the Apollo program.
58 "Memorandum for Committee on Science and Astronautics Subcommittee on NASA oversight, of the
House of Representatives," n.d. Held in Box 077-33, Johnson Space Center History Collection, University
of Houston Clear Lake.
59 "Memorandum for Committee on Science and Astronautics."
In North American's response can be seen a partial counter-narrative to the authorized
version of the Apollo 204 Review Board. North American's narrative emphasizes that
the decision to use a pure-oxygen environment was NASA's and that North American
had protested that decision. It also starts to address another issue: the messy nature of
engineering and manufacturing in the Apollo program.
Congressional Investigations
On February 7 and 27, the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences met to
hold hearings on the Apollo 204 fire, chaired by Democratic Senator Clinton Anderson of
New Mexico. The Review Board's work was ongoing at this time. At the 7 February
hearing, held in executive session, the committee members were first briefed by Robert
Seamans on the constitution of the investigation Board, and then discussed the use of
pure oxygen in the spacecraft, and whether the use of a two-gas mix might be more
appropriate.60 The Democratic Senator from Minnesota, Walter Mondale, raised the issue
of whether NASA's desire to win the race to the Moon was causing it to take too many
chances with the lives of the astronauts.61
On the 27 February 1967 session of the hearings before the Senate, James Webb and
Robert Seamans were again confronted by Mondale. Mondale asked them about a report
that senior NASA manager General Samuel Phillips had prepared in 1965, critical of
North American's engineering and manufacturing practices. Webb and Seamans initially
denied any knowledge of the report and then engaged in hairsplitting definitions to argue
that it was not in fact a report, but rather a memo, a set of notes or an informal
discussion.62 Webb then argued that he was not going to release the report for reasons of
60 Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Aiming at targets: The autobiography of Robert C. Seamans, Jr. (Washington,
DC: NASA, 1996), pp. 140 - 141.
61 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Hearings on the Apollo
Accident, 90' Congress, first session 1967 (Washington DC: GPO, 1967), p. 48. An article in Trud, an
official Soviet newspaper, laid similar accusations immediately after the accident, calling the astronauts
"victims of the space race ... created by the leaders of the United States space program." "Borisov (Trud)
on Death of Astronauts at Cape Kennedy," held in folder 007223, NASA Historical Collection.
62 Gilbert Roth, Interview, 18 February, 1971. Folder 013289, NASA Historical Reference Collection,
NASA Headquarters.
commercial confidentiality, as it contained details of contract negotiations between
NASA and North American. The evidence is ambiguous as to whether Webb knew of the
Phillips report in February 1967, or knew of it in those terms, 63 but nevertheless Senator
Mondale in particular became highly critical of NASA's unwillingness, as he saw it, to be
accountable to elected officials. In later hearings, Representatives made the point that the
Phillips report was investigating the performance of North American at exactly the time
the CMO 12 spacecraft was on the factory floor, and were highly critical of NASA's
unwillingness at the time to release this report to Congressional oversight bodies.6 4
If the Senate hearings, by intersecting with the period of the Review Board's most active
research, encouraged the Board to consider carefully how to pursue their investigation,
the House hearings influenced the Board differently. The House held off their hearings
until after the investigation report was published. This meant the Board wrote their
report with the knowledge they would soon be defending it before a group of men
comprising NASA's key political supporters and possibly their key political opponents as
well.
On April 11, six days after the Review Board's report was issued, the House Committee
on Science and Astronautics began hearings into the Apollo 204 fire. The house hearing
subcommittee was chaired by Representative Olin Teague of Texas, a long-term
supporter of the space program. The hearings were contentious, with a Republican from
Illinois, Donald Rumsfeld, taking particular aim at Webb, Seamans and Max Faget.
Rumsfeld objected to the constitution of the board, arguing that it was made of people
responsible for the areas of work whose failure they were investigating. NASA was, in
effect, investigating itself, Rumsfeld accused. He was also concerned about the narrow
focus of the Board's report, suggesting that they had defined their terms very specifically
to avoid investigating larger problems within NASA management:
It is inconceivable to me, in view of the scope and magnitude of the conditions
63 Webb's biographer indicates that Webb was unaware of the report. See Lambright, Powering Apollo, pp
153 - 155. On the other hand, officials like Sam Phillips and George Mueller believe that Webb was aware
of the report's existence, if not its contents.
64 U.S. Senate, Hearings on the Apollo Accident, 9 May 9 1967, pp. 610 - 614.
found by the Board, that they could exist without their being the direct result of
serious and fundamental management defects within NASA. The report tells what
conditions existed to cause this accident. The House Committee [...] must now
determine why these conditions were permitted to exist and recommend the
necessary structural changes in NASA management to avoid similar catastrophes
in the future.65
Finally, he wanted to know why NASA did not have a separate and independent safety
organization. Webb and Seamans gave fairly weak responses to Rumsfeld's questions
and were only saved from embarrassment by Teague's interruptions.6 6
But the worst was still to come for NASA. It was revealed, again by opponents of the
space program on both the left and the right, that in the initial awarding of the Apollo
spacecraft contract to North American, North American had scored lower in the technical
assessment than competitor Martin Marietta.6 7 The congressmen used this revelation to
imply some sort of improper relationship between NASA and North American. James
Webb defended himself weakly, explaining that "in the selection of North American
Aviation, the work of the Source Evaluation Board was not rejected or discarded. It was
used as the basis for a more extensive and detailed examination of all pertinent factors
than the Board had performed at the time its report was presented to Dr. Gilruth, Dr.
Seamans, Dr. Dryden and to me." 68
In the final days of the House hearing, Thomas Baron, a quality assurance inspector from
North American, presented to the committee a detailed report of deficiencies, official
malfeasances and general complaints about the standard of workmanship and care at
North American. 69 Baron's report was received by the House via a rather circuitous
route, coming from a NASA employee who shared a room with Baron in a Florida
65 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on NASA Oversight,
Investigation into the Apollo 204 accident, Hearings, 9 0 th Congress, first session, April 10, 11, 12, 17, 21;
May 10, 1967, vol. I (Washington DC: GPO, 1967), pp. 11 -12.
66 House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Apollo 204 Accident Hearings, pp. 13 - 14.
67 House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Apollo 204 Accident Hearings, pp. 230 - 234.
68 "NASA News Release 67-122," 11 May 1967. Held in folder 007240, NASA Historical Collection.
69 Thomas Ronald Baron, "An Apollo Report," n.d. Held in folder 007232, NASA Historical Collection.
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hospital for the mentally ill.70 Baron's statement to the Apollo 204 Review Board and
subsequently to the House made some dramatic allegations about the performance of
North American staff at the Kennedy Space Center. Some of Baron's allegations were
immediately credible to the House, included claims that the ECS had always created
hazards by leaking water-glycol and that poor workmanship at North American had
resulted in tools being left in the spacecraft." Other statements were less credible,
including allegations of covered-up incidents of fire, corruption among NASA and North
American management, and most provocatively to the House, allegations that the Apollo
204 fire had lasted for at least ten minutes, during which time the astronauts struggled to
exit the Apollo spacecraft.7 2 The House did not react well to Baron's testimony on this
point, particularly as Baron was able to offer no corroborative evidence except for a
fellow North American employee, who disclaimed any knowledge of Baron whilst before
the House.
While the Baron report was eventually shown to be largely personal grievances and
unproven accounts of interactions between workers at North American, it all contributed
to a picture of poor management and workmanship at North American and poor
supervision by NASA. NASA produced an extensive, point-by-point rebuttal of Baron's
accusations, and as Baron had been killed in a train accident several weeks after the
House hearings, no further action was taken over the report."
In both the House and Senate hearings, the appearance towards the end of the hearings of
astronaut Frank Borman, a member of the Review Board, provided a boost to NASA's
credibility. Borman's presence at the House hearings had been requested by
Congressman Teague specifically to present the point of view of the astronauts.7 4
70 Norbert Vaughn, Memorandum for Record, Chairman Panel 12, Apollo 204 Review Board, 30 March
1967. Held in Folder "Witness Statement - Childers, Frank R.", box 3, Apollo 204 Review Board, Record
Group 255, National Archives.
" Thomas Ronald Baron, "Thomas Ronald Baron, February 7, 1967," pp. 8 - 10, 23 - 27. Held in Folder
"Witness Statement - Baron, Thomas, R", box 1, Task Panel 12: Witness statements, AS 204 Accident,
Apollo 204 Review Board, Record Group 255, National Archives.
72 House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Apollo 204 Accident Hearings, pp. 571 - 594.
73 See "NASA Evaluation of Thomas Ronald Baron Notes," n.d, held in folder 007232, NASA Historical
Collection, NASA Headquarters.
7 Willis H. Shapley, Memorandum for the Record, 23 March, 1967. Held in folder 007223, NASA
Historical Collection, NASA Headquarters.
Borman asked the question of the House committee: "We are confident in our
management, our engineering, and ourselves. Are you confident in us?" and in doing so
put the Congressmen on the spot.75 Not all members of the House nor Senate hearings
were willing to publicly attack NASA, but some were, and were barely kept under control
by their respective chairmen, Senator Clinton Anderson and Representative Olin Teague,
both supporters of the manned spaceflight program. Teague recalled of his dealings with
the critics on his oversight committee that a number of the more outspoken critics were
using the hearings to further personal political ambitions, a point also made by Sen.
Anderson.76
Both Representative Teague and Senator Anderson, who had both been strong supporters
of NASA prior to the hearings, came away less supportive than before. Senator
Anderson released a public statement in which he praised the work of the Review Board
but noted, in regard to the revelations around the Phillips report, that he believed that
NASA had acted unwisely and inappropriately in not informing the Senate about the
Phillips report at the time it had been produced." In private, Anderson was much more
critical, noting that the Apollo 204 accident had caused him to lose a great deal of faith in
the capability of NASA and its management."
In January 1968, the Senate Committee of Aeronautical and Space Sciences released their
report on the Apollo 204 accident. The authors were critical of both NASA and North
American, and further, were very critical of what the Senators saw as NASA's lack of
candor before the committee. NASA's performance was described as characterized by
"over-confidence and complacency," and the report found that "the care and diligence
exercised in both technical and managerial areas [was] below the level required.""79 The
75 House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Apollo 204 Accident Hearings, p. 540.
76 Olin Teague, Interview 1 April 1969. Held in folder 013290, NASA Historical Collection, NASA
Headquarters.
" Clinton P. Anderson, "Statement by Senator Clinton P. Anderson, D-N.M. On Apollo Accident
Hearings," 12 May 1967. Held in folder 007225, NASA Historical Collection, NASA Headquarters.
78 Clinton Anderson, Interview, 25 July 1968. Held in folder 013285, NASA Historical Collection, NASA
Headquarters.
79 United States Congress. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Apollo 204 Accident.
Report of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, United States Senate, with additional views.
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1968), pp. 5 and 10.
committee report did address the effect of schedule pressure on the accident however, an
issue that had not been directly addressed by the NASA Board. The Senate strongly
endorsed maintaining President Kennedy's vision of a moon landing within the decade,
arguing that:
When set in 1961, it was a goal set for achievement and it was technically
feasible. While this goal has attracted a great deal of attention in terms of national
prestige, as a pacesetter for the program and as a rallying point for the people on
the program, its true significance is seldom mentioned. The target date was and
still is essential to efficient management of the program. The schedule is an
essential and significant management tool - without it the program would require
more and more time and more and more money. 80
The House and Senate Hearings called senior NASA officials, members of the Apollo
204 Review Board, and senior North American officials to their hearings. As most of
these individuals had either been involved in the production of the Apollo 204 Review
Board Report or extensively briefed on its contents, little new information about the
Apollo 204 accident came to light during the hearings. In both the Senate and the House
hearings, Congressmen were concerned at what they saw as discrepancies between the
picture painted by NASA officials of a well-managed, efficient program, and the messy
realities described by the Phillips report and Thomas Baron, and to a lesser degree by the
Apollo 204 Review Board. Those representatives with an interest in discrediting NASA
sought to identify personal culpability, which NASA officials resisted, frequently with
the assistance of committee chairs.
Brian Wynne observes that "accidents and their subsequent inquiries are perhaps the only
passing moment when outsiders may glimpse the routinely less orderly, less rule-
controlled world of technology and science. However, because it is seen this way only
around accidents, the belief is consolidated that normally practices are more orderly.""
8o Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Apollo 204 Accident Report, p. 10.
81 Brian Wynne, "Unruly Technology: Practical Rules, Impractical Discourse and Public Understanding,"
Social Studies of Science 18, no. 1 (February, 1988), p. 150.
The House and Senate hearings were confronted with this new insight into NASA and the
space program through the lens of Apollo 204, one that seemed very far from the
technocratic vision of scientific and technological methods as ways to solve large scale
problems, and one that seemed very far from the vision of Apollo as the technical
triumph of the Cold War struggle over the Soviet Union.
The Congressional hearings, by attempting to focus on human actions - engineers and
managers making decisions and performing work - revealed and documented some of the
complexities of working on such a large-scale technology project. But the complexity
that is visible from the hearings was harnessed to a pessimistic view that the space
program might be a very expensive, very public failure. This vision of engineering
practice contrasts with the Review Board's more optimistic portrayal of an engineering
system that needed only some modest course corrections to resume a journey to success.
As the Apollo project continued and more people wrote about both the Apollo 204
accident and the overall spaceflight program, it was the Board's report that helped define
the public face of engineering and the public ideal of NASA's work. The Board, while
acknowledging problems, built a portrait of NASA engineering as heroic and success-
prone. The reality of complex engineering became increasingly less visible and more
difficult to reconcile with the public ideal.
Historiography
Despite the appearance of numerous publications on the space program, the Apollo 204
accident has not been substantially examined by historians to date. There have been
several popular accounts of the accident, mostly published in the 1960s, with Erik
Bergaust's Murder on Pad 34 presenting the most critical account. Bergaust argues that
NASA's desire to achieve a successful landing on the Moon before the end of the 1960s
led senior NASA officials deliberately to ignore safety concerns.8 2 Other works come to
similar conclusions, although most make fewer direct accusations about blame and
82 Erik Bergaust, Murder on Pad 34 (New York: Putnam Publishing, 1968).
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culpability. 3
There has, however, been some brief examination of the Apollo 204 accident in the
context of larger studies of other accidents, or of NASA in a more broad sense, and in
those studies it is possible to see some historiographical trends.
Perhaps the most comprehensive review of NASA historiography to date is Asif Siddiqi's
recent work.84 In his 2006 article, Siddiqi identifies four historiographical themes into
which a great deal of writing about NASA falls. These four themes are exploration,
technological program history, "nose-cone" insights, and Cold War competition.
Exploration history depicts NASA and the space program as an episode in America's
journey outwards to the frontier. Programmatic history is focussed around technology
development in a particular program - Apollo, Mercury, Gemini, for example. Nose-cone
history refers the view from the tip of the vehicle; it is made up primarily of semi-
autobiographical accounts from astronauts and senior engineers intimately involved with
the space program. The final theme, Cold War historiography, studies the space program
in a context of American competition with the Soviet Union. Siddiqi identifies these four
themes but notes that these modes of historical writing are being gradually replaced by a
"New aerospace history" that has started to take a more sophisticated approach to the
study of the space program, bringing in approaches from other disciplines, and using new
types of analysis."8
Siddiqi makes another critical point in his discussion of the historiography of the US
space program when he notes that almost all writing about the space program is shaped
by the Apollo experience. He argues that the shadow cast by the Apollo program
profoundly affects writing about the programs that followed:
83 See Erlend A. Kennan and Edmund H. Harvey, Jr., Mission to the Moon: A Critical Examination of
NASA and the Space Program (New York: William Murrow, 1969).
84 Asif A. Siddiqi, "American Space History: Legacies, Questions and Opportunities for Future Research,"
in Steven J. Dick and Roger D. Launius, eds., Critical Issues in the History of Spaceflight (Washington,
DC: NASA, 2006), pp. 433 - 480.
85 Siddiqi, pp. 458 - 459.
Because of the program's status as being emblematic of a lost, young, and
adventurous America, space historians negotiating the delicate boundaries
between memory and nostalgia have typically veered from the former to the latter
with an ease that underscores more about the state of the current space program
than the one that actually happened. Apollo's huge shadow has helped to
marginalise many important but unexplored areas of space history.86
Apollo 1 historiography, in any of the four earlier schools of NASA historiography
Siddiqi identifies, shares several characteristics.8 7 Authors working within all four
schools of historiography have engaged with the Apollo 204 accident, attempting to
explain its meaning and locate it within their wider story. And yet, despite the different
historiographical approaches - understanding the accident in the context of personal
recollections, official program histories, accounts of exploration, or Cold War conflict -
most accounts of the Apollo 204 accident share similarities.
First, the stories told of Apollo 1 are largely teleological, written in full knowledge of the
final outcome of the Apollo program. Most accounts, whether by historians or by those
recounting their involvement in the Apollo program, emphasise the role of the accident
and its investigation in the final success of the Apollo project. Some authors stress the
ways in which the horror and shock induced by the fate of the Apollo 204 spacecraft and
astronauts strengthened the purpose of engineers and astronauts at North American
Aviation and at NASA. For example, NASA veteran Eugene Kranz wrote that in the
aftermath of the fire:
I had each member of the control team on the blackboards in their offices write
"tough and competant" at the top of that blackboard, and that could never be
erased until we had gotten a man on the Moon. I believe that set the framework
for our work in the weeks and months that followed.8 8
86 Siddiqi, p. 433.
87 While Siddiqi does not quantify his analysis, it is clear that historical writing in these four modes greatly
outweighs the "new aerospace history."
88 Quoted in Glen Swanson, ed., "Before this Decade is out... " Personal Reflections on the Apollo
Program (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 2002), p. 126.
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Historian Andrew Chaikin's interpretation draws a similar picture:
Most of the astronauts put the tragedy of the fire behind them with an acceptance
that was difficult for outsiders to understand. [...] Their biggest concern now
was making Apollo fly. The immediate causes of the fire had to be fixed - and
now there was a much-needed chance to correct the long list of inadequacies. It
would take time,but they had to recover and move on. Before them was the most
extraordinary goal of the twentieth century.89
Other accounts argue that the discovery, in the aftermath of the accident, of poor
workmanship and quality assurance at both North American Aviation and at NASA
prevented these faults from manifesting during the actual flights. These accounts also
identify the extra time given by the slowdown of the program in the aftermath of Apollo
1 as a critical element in the success of Apollo. In their work Apollo, Charles Murray
and Catherine Bly Cox suggest "Consider this elusive overarching irony: Might it not,
after all, have been a good thing for Apollo that the fire occurred? Many at NASA
thought so." In a similar manner, Deke Slayton wrote in his autobiography:
The fire and the investigation, and the redesign of the Apollo spacecraft, made it
possible for us to reach the moon within President Kennedy's deadline. If it
hadn't happened, I don't know. 90
Other authors take an almost fatalistic or probabilistic approach to understanding the
accidents, arguing in essence that all successful programs include failure of some sort. In
this type of account, the Apollo 204 accident was necessary for the success of the Apollo
program as a whole. Robert Seamans makes this point: "I have also thought that if we
had not had the Apollo 204 fire when we did, we might well have failed in our overall
mission of going to the Moon by the end of the decade, because a similar catastrophe
89 Andrew Chaikin, A Man on the Moon: The Voyages of the Apollo Astronauts (New York: Penguin
Books, 1994), p. 26
90 Donald K. "Deke" Slayton with Michael Cassutt, Deke! U.S. Manned Space: From Mercury to the
Shuttle (New York: Forge Paperback, 1994), p. 195.
might have hit us later on, when it would have been much more difficult to recover."91
Most of the accounts emphasize the heroism of the three astronauts - Grissom, White and
Chaffee. However it is clear that the speed of propagation of flame in the Apollo 204
spacecraft rendered the astronauts unable to do much more than briefly initiate their
(inadequate) escape procedures. The accident did not provide opportunity for these men
to demonstrate heroism; their reputations and courage are more firmly established in their
actions in the years and months leading up to the accident. The Apollo 204 accident was
neither caused, mitigated nor accentuated by the astronauts. Their role was minimal.
All of these approaches emphasise the accident in relation to the successful moon
landing. Indeed, for most of these accounts, the only way the Apollo 204 accident can be
seen as anything other than a meaningless tragedy - a combination of poor workmanship
and bureaucratic incompetence - is by emphasizing the positive elements of the aftermath
of the accident.
Another characteristic that most accounts of Apollo 1 share is that they regard the Apollo
204 accident as some form of aberration from the norm, rather than symptomatic of any
deeper characteristic of either NASA, spaceflight in general or even as symptomatic of
some larger characteristic of the human-built world. It should be noted, however, that
this historiographical trend does not extend to examinations of later accidents like the
Challenger and the Columbia. Indeed, it is in studies of the shuttle accidents in particular
that Apollo 1 is contrasted with the shuttle accidents. For example, in Prescription for
Disaster: From the Glory ofApollo to the Betrayal of the Shuttle, Joseph Trento's brief
analysis of Apollo 1 concludes that while it was a tragic accident, the failures of NASA
were quickly repaired by James Webb and redeemed by the successes of Apollo 8 and
Apollo 11, the first missions to orbit and land on the Moon.92 Trento argues that the
Challenger and shuttle program more generally were political failures, whereas the
Apollo program, by self-evident virtue of its success, was a political success.
91 Seamans, Aiming at Targets, p. 143.
92 Joseph J. Trento, Prescription for Disaster: From the Glory ofApollo to the Betrayal of the Shuttle (New
York: Crown Publishers, 1987), pp. 66 - 76.
In a similar manner, in the aftermath of the Columbia accident in 2003, Joseph Hall
wrote:
It can be argued that [the Apollo 204 accident] was an organizational failure
based on the extremely hazardous conditions of the test capsule. However,
Apollo is distinct compared to Challenger and Columbia considering Apollo took
place during NASA's formative years when all vehicles were designated as
research and development craft. Notably the Apollo accident does not display the
path dependence or normalization of deviance characteristic of Challenger and
Columbia.93
Looking further into Hall's article it is interesting to note that Hall's definition of path-
dependence is "a tendency for organizations to make decisions based on their history."
Hall then goes on to argue that Apollo-era NASA was the history that caused the
Challenger accident. Hall seems, in a different form, to be advancing the same argument
as Trento, and indeed many other commentators: that the success of the Apollo program
redeemed or otherwise neutralized the Apollo 204 accident and it is only subsequent
accidents, unredeemed by similar successes, that require further investigation.
Accounts of the Apollo 204 accident generally follow Hall's assumption about the
negligible effect of NASA's own history on the Apollo 204 accident. There is an
assumption that an accident that took place in 1967, less than 10 years after the creation
of NASA as an agency, could not have its causes in the history of the agency simply
because there had not been very much history to date. In most accounts that are not
focused on a particular program or center, but rather which examine NASA's history
since its inception, the history of the manned spaceflight program is roughly divided into
Apollo and post-Apollo.94 While Gemini and Mercury are understood as separate
93 Joseph L. Hall, "Columbia and Challenger: Organizational Failure at NASA," Space Policy 19 (2003),
pp. 239 - 247.
94 There are not very many longer-scale histories of NASA, perhaps because of the scale of the subject
matter. William Burrows, This New Ocean: The Story of the First Space Age (New York: The Modern
Library, 1998).
programs to Apollo, they are also seen as constitutive of the "original culture" of NASA.
In a similar manner, almost all of the historical literature around Apollo 1 accepts the
findings of the Review Board that investigated the accident. Unlike the Challenger
accident and to a lesser extent the Columbia accident, there is little revisionist
historiography. There have been few attempts to re-examine the Apollo 204 accident in
light of new evidence, new theoretical approaches, or even in light of the passage of time.
Accounts of the accident follow the timelines set out in the Review Board report, report
the findings of the Board largely uncritically, and agree that the success of Apollo 8 at the
end of 1968 demonstrates that NASA and North American recovered from the Apollo
204 fire.
There are two key objections to the findings of the Review Board. The first is largely
associated with J. Leland Atwood, President and CEO of North American at the time of
the accident. Atwood felt and continues to feel that the NASA Review Board unfairly
blamed North American for the accident. He argues that North American repeatedly
warned NASA of the fire hazards associated with an oxygen environment, and that
NASA's decision to continue with a one-gas environment caused the accidents. He does
not believe that frayed wiring was responsible for an ignition source.95
The second objection is raised by a number of more conspiratorially inclined
investigators who have worked on the Apollo 204 accident. These writers have advanced
a number of interpretations, most of which involve NASA deliberately causing the
Apollo 204 fire in order to achieve a variety of ends, including preventing Gus Grissom
from commanding the first lunar landing. 96 They interpret the Review Board as covering
up known flaws or deliberate sabotage.
95 Atwood has made this point in several interviews, and in a self-published pamphlet, "The Apollo Fire:
An Analysis by J. Leland Atwood," 1988. This pamphlet is reproduced in S. Thomas, "The Apollo Fire
and Investigation: Facts Not Considered," Proceedings of 47' International Astronautical Congress,
October 7-11, 1996, Beijing, China.
96 While these theories have not attracted any interest from the scholarly community, in 2000 Rep. James
Sensebrenner required NASA to reexamine the wreckage of the Apollo 1 spacecraft to examine claims
from Scott Grissom, Gus Grissom's son, that the fire had been deliberately started by NASA.
Thus. a review of historical literature around the Apollo 204 accident shows that it is
largely written in a narrative and non-theoretical manner, reflects the findings of the
Review Board, and is primarily concerned with documenting individual and
organizational responses to the accident and NASA's recovery from the accident. Those
authors who examine the longer term consequences of the accident do so in the context of
the Apollo program rather than the space program as a whole.
This type of analysis fits quite strongly with the accounts of NASA that trace a decline in
the organization from Apollo in the 1960s to the present day. This larger declensionist
historiography, which Siddiqi has described as the "shadow of Apollo", is a key point of
difference for this study and will be discussed in greater detail in chapter two.
Alongside scholarly attention to Apollo 1, some scholarly attention has been paid to the
study of NASA's engineering culture during the 1960s. However, somewhat less
attention has been spent examining the history and culture of North American Aviation
during the same period. The efforts made by NASA to record and preserve its own
history since 1958 have not been matched by other major entities involved in the US
space program, which may explain the relative scarcity of historical research on NASA's
commercial partners in the US space program. 97
Howard McCurdy's study, Inside NASA: High Technology and Organizational Change
in the US Space Program, investigates the nature of NASA's engineering culture from
NASA's inception in 1958. As will be discussed in more detail in chapter two, however,
McCurdy's work is also concerned to identify the reasons behind the decline of this
culture from the successful Apollo program in the 1960s to the failures of the 1980s.9 8
McCurdy's work argues that NASA's Apollo-era culture came out of the constituent
laboratories that made up the old National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA),
" The establishment and history of NASA's history office is well documented in Roger D. Launius,
"NASA History and the Challenge of Keeping the Contemporary Past," The Public Historian 21, no. 3
(Summer, 1999), pp. 63 - 81.
98 Howard McCurdy, Inside NASA: High Technology and Organizational Change in the US Space
Program (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).
the Army Ballistic Missile Agency at Huntsville, Alabama, the US Navy's Naval
Research Laboratory, and the California Institute of Technology's Jet Propulsion
Laboratory (JPL). Although he describes the various sources of NASA's culture and
suggests that these were well established and persistent, McCurdy's work is most
concerned to identify similarities across NASA cultures, rather than emphasize local
differences. McCurdy identifies a number of characteristics of the original NASA culture
which include an emphasis on testing of hardware and the value of personal knowledge
gained thereby, the importance of maintaining in-house technical capability, the value of
hands-on experience, the need to recruit and develop exceptional people, and an
institutional tolerance for failure. Apollo 1 was the first direct challenge to that culture,
in McCurdy's account, demonstrating that a tolerance for failure within NASA was not
shared by the Congress or the American people.
It is worth emphasizing that McCurdy's work was based on archival research and a series
of around 20 intensive interviews with NASA senior managers of the 1980s and 1960s.
Most of these interviews were conducted in early 1987, at the time the Rogers
Commission was conducting its investigation into and releasing its findings about the
Challenger accident of 1986. As McCurdy acknowledges, this incident caused a mood of
introspection among NASA managers and it is unsurprising that their recollections of
their careers would emphasize a decline in NASA culture from the 1960s to the 1980s.99
Another important work examining engineers at NASA is Sylvia Fries, NASA Engineers
and the Age ofApollo.100 Fries' study examines the life-trajectory of a cohort of
approximately 50 NASA engineers, tracing their early lives, military service and
experiences at NASA over the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Fries emphasizes for the most
part the similarities between these engineers, and is very focused on the subjective lived
experiences of the engineer, seldom generalizing about their experiences. Nonetheless,
there are themes that move through her work, with the major one being the sense of
Apollo-era engineers as transitional figures, moving somewhat uncomfortably out of an
older, test-bench style of engineering into a larger-scale, more procedural-focused mode
99 McCurdy, pp. 185-192.
100 Sylvia Fries, NASA Engineers and the Age of Apollo (Washington DC: NASA, 1992).
of operating. Fries' decision to follow one generation of engineers through their careers
at NASA allows her to link this transition through the Apollo years to the sense of
professional dislocation and obsolescence felt by her cohort as they age and move into
management. As with McCurdy, much of the critical interviewing for this work was
conducted around the time of the Challenger accident, a point Fries does not explore but
simply points out to the reader. 101
By contrast, other authors have been concerned to tease out the differences between the
cultures of the individual NASA centers. Works by Yasushi Sato and Stephen Johnson
fall into this category. Johnson, in his comparative study of the US and European space
programs in the 1960s and 1970s, focuses on the introduction of new methods of large-
scale engineering to NASA in the mid-1960s. 10 2 Johnson argues that new modes of
systems engineering and systems management coming out of the US Air Force in the
1950s were adopted into NASA to address issues of cost and schedule slippage in the
Apollo program in the early 1960s. Johnson's account identifies a "conservative"
engineering and management style, coming out of the George C. Marshall Space Flight
Center and the Langley Research Centre and their involvement in the Mercury and
Gemini programs. Johnson characterizes this management style as one of collegiality,
openness and flat structures, combined with an engineering style that emphasized
reliability, redundancy and safety over cost. Johnson's discussion of the introduction of
systems engineering and management methods into NASA, spearheaded by USAF
General Samuel Phillips, notes the resistance that Phillips faced, but tells a story of the
success of these new methods and the Apollo program.10 3
Yasushi Sato examines the same period and the same series of events, with emphasis on
the challenges faced by both those attempting to introduce systems engineering methods
into NASA in the 1960s and those who were more resistant to the new ways of
o10 Fries, pp. xvii - xviii.
102 Stephen B. Johnson, The Secret ofApollo: Systems Management in American and European Space
Programs (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).
103 See also Stephen B. Johnson, "Samuel Phillips and the Taming of Apollo," Technology and Culture 42,
no. 4 (2001), pp. 685 - 709; and Stephen B. Johnson, "Three Approaches to Big Technology: Operations
Research, Systems Engineering, and Project Management," Technology and Culture 38, no. 4 (October
2001), pp. 891 - 919.
engineering. Sato casts this conflict as an ongoing tension between NASA's local, craft-
based, informal engineering tradition, coming out of the historical engineering culture of
the NACA centers, and a new national, state-sponsored engineering tradition. 10 4 Sato
characterizes the older NACA style of engineering as collegial, informal and based on
mutual technical respect, with flat management structures. In contrast, he describes the
systems-engineering approach as bureaucratized, hierarchical, procedural and impersonal.
Unlike Johnson, Sato argues that the conflict he identifies did not result in one style
winning out over the other, but rather that a productive tension was established that
resulted in the development of a successful space program. Sato argues that the two
styles of engineering ebbed and flowed over the period of the Apollo program, with the
local tradition in abeyance during the mid-1960s, but coming back into prominence
following the Apollo 204 accident. Sato makes the point that these styles were embodied
in particular people, singling out Joe Shea as the exemplar of the systems engineering
style, and George Low as the consummate local engineer.
David Mindell's recent work, Digital Apollo: Human and Machine in Spaceflight, goes
further in its examination of engineering cultures than either Johnson or Sato. Mindell
explicitly examines the engineering cultures of the Apollo program, rather than those of
NASA or NASA's individual centers. 5"' In doing so he links the technologies and
technological problems of that program to the styles of engineering that developed over
the 1960s. Although Digital Apollo is most concerned to trace the tensions and
relationships between humans and machines in the Apollo program, Mindell is clear that
the tensions between human and machine are mirrored in tensions between center and
periphery at NASA, between system and intuition, and between documentation and
personal trust. Mindell goes on to discuss the role of the astronaut and the links between
those professional roles and the political alliances that shaped the US manned spaceflight
program, particularly in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
104 Yasushi Sato, "Local Engineering in the Early American and Japanese Space Programs: Human
Qualities in Grand System Building," unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2005;
Yasushi Sato, "Local Engineering and Systems Engineering: Cultural Conflict at NASA's Marshall Space
Flight Center, 1960- 1963," Technology and Culture 46, no. 3, 2005, pp. 561 - 583.
'05 David A. Mindell, Digital Apollo: Human and Machine in Spaceflight (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2008).
The role of North American Aviation in the US space program has not been extensively
analyzed by historians. There are, however, several key works that speak to this issue.
Joan Bromberg's NASA and the Space Industry examines the relationship between NASA
and North American during the 1960s, noting that the level of federal involvement in a
private enterprise was about as great as is ever seen, in an attempt to manage cost,
schedule and technical performance.106 North American and NASA came to this position
in part because of the sheer level of commitment made by NASA in their awarding of
two critical hardware contracts - the Apollo Command and Service Module and the
second stage of the Saturn booster - to North American. Bromberg argues that during the
Apollo period, North American and NASA became increasing close, sharing engineering
and management methods, whilst maintaining divergent goals. She is clear, however,
that this process was not without problems, noting North American's difficulties in
managing the expansion of personnel and resources needed to fulfill the Apollo contracts,
and NASA's increasing frustration with North American's attempts to address these
difficulties. Nevertheless, Bromberg concludes, the relationship between NASA and
North American over the 1960s was a successful one.
Taking a more detailed perspective, and focusing on the development of the second stage
of the Saturn booster is Roger Bilstein's Stages to Saturn: A Technological History of the
Apollo/Saturn Launch Vehicles.0 7 Bilstein's work traces the technological development
of the second stage of the Saturn booster (SII) at the Space and Information Division
(S&ID) of North American at the same time as S&ID was also designing and
manufacturing the Apollo CSM. Bilstein's account argues that North American Aviation
suffered from significant management shortcomings, especially in the mid-1960s, and
also had difficulty developing manufacturing methods for the SII. However, Bilstein
argues, with close interaction from NASA to resolve technical challenges, and through
the introduction via NASA of more appropriate management methods, these difficulties
were overcome. Being focused on the development of the Saturn systems, rather than
106 Joan Lisa Bromberg, NASA and the Space Industry (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
2002).
107 Roger Bilstein, Stages to Saturn: A Technological History of the Apollo/Saturn Launch Vehicles,
paperback ed. (Gainseville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2002).
the development of North American, Bilstein does not discuss much of the origins or
later history of North American, but his account aligns with that of Blomberg.'0 8
The work of Mike Grey, in Angle of Attack: Harrison Storms and the Race to the Moon is
perhaps the most detailed account of North American over the 1960s, with particular
attention being focused on the development of the Apollo CSM. 10 9 Grey's account
discusses the difficulties experienced by North American in its transition from designing
and manufacturing aircraft to the significantly more complex and less mass-production
oriented world of spacecraft. Grey's perspective on this issue, however, emphasizes the
human relationships involved, and is critical of the systems engineers from NASA and
what he describes as their adversarial approach, contrasting them with the close
relationships North American staff had with both pilots and longer-term NASA
employees. In this account, Sam Phillips and Joe Shea are described as bloodless, un-
manly, management-focused bureaucrats who did not understand engineering, whereas
Harrison Storms and his allies at NASA like Bob Gilruth and the astronaut corps, are
portrayed as hard-drinking, heroic engineers and pilots. Grey, perhaps more than any
other author, takes a strong position on the causes of the Apollo 204 accident, arguing
that the Apollo 204 Review Board failed to identify the correct causes of the accident and
unfairly placed the blame on North American. Indeed, Grey is perhaps the only author
beyond Leland Atwood who disputes the Board's findings to this extent - as has been
discussed previously, very few other historians dispute the evidential findings of the 204
Review Board.
Chapter two of this study aims to fill some gaps in this historiography. In examining the
engineering cultures of NASA and of North American, it aims to build on the work of
McCurdy, Sato, Johnson and Mindell. Mindell's linking of the technology of the Apollo
program to its culture (rather than linking engineering culture to geographic location, as
other historians have done) provides a key insight. This study builds on that insight,
examining the engineering cultures of North American and at NASA over this period and
108 J. Leland Atwood, who was President and CEO of North American during this period, frequently cited
Bilstein's work as an accurate representation of North American in the 1960s.
109 Gray, Angle ofAttack.
;
relating them to the technology being built, rather than the NASA center involved.
The next section also re-examines the Apollo 204 accident in terms of time-scale and
analytic concepts. Rather than treat the accident as an event whose causes started some
time in 1966 and whose effects ended in 1968, this study looks back further into NASA
and North American's history for origins, and also seeks to examine some longer-term
effects of the accident. In doing so, no assumptions are made about any connections
between the meaning of the accident and the later success of the Apollo program.
Indeed, this study suggests that the Apollo 204 accident had a long-term effect at least
equal to the long term effects of the technical triumph of the Apollo landings.

CHAPTER TWO: RE-READING APOLLO 1-
CAUSES OF THE ACCIDENT
Introduction
This chapter examines the years and events leading up to the accident, making several
new arguments about the Apollo 204 fire.
First, this chapter argues that through the lens of the Apollo 204 fire, and responses to
that accident, we see in the manned spaceflight program of the 1960s the tensions and
interplay between a number of engineering, risk and safety cultures, technical
philosophies and manufacturing styles. An examination of the interactions between
NASA's Apollo program and North American Aviation shows two very different
engineering cultures struggling to find a way to successfully build a piece of technology
profoundly different and more complex than either had accomplished before. As part of
this argument, I find that engineering cultures at NASA are more closely related to
engineering programs at NASA, in particular the technologies they work on, than the
disparate NASA centers and the geographic differences found among them. Engineers
who shared a work program had more in common than those who shared a worksite.
Indeed, one component element of the Apollo 204 accident was the interplay between the
Gemini and Apollo programs, with differing ways of designing and building spacecraft.
Second, this chapter argues that the Apollo 204 fire is a direct consequence of these
tensions between different ways of doing engineering and manufacturing. By examining
the history of the design, development and manufacturing of the Command and Service
Module (CSM) involved in the Apollo 204 fire, it can be seen that the cause of the fire
was more than an oversight, a mistake, or an engineer's blind-spot.' Rather, the fire was
the cumulative effect of both an environment of schedule pressure and cost pressure, and
differing engineering and safety cultures and technical philosophies at NASA and North
'Wemher von Braun, quoted in J. Leland Atwood, "The Apollo Fire: An Analysis by J. Leland Atwood,"
1988. This pamphlet is reproduced in S. Thomas, "The Apollo Fire and Investigation: Facts Not
Considered," Proceedings of 47th International Astronautical Congress, October 7-11, 1996, Beijing,
China.
American.
By 1967, the CM012 spacecraft, which became the Apollo 204 spacecraft, had the quality
of a palimpsest - "a document that has been written upon several times, often with
remnants of earlier, imperfectly erased writing still visible." 2 Traces of past design and
manufacturing decisions were imperfectly erased from the CM012 spacecraft to make
way for new decisions, and those remnants were a cause of the accident. As Langdon
Winner reminds us, in a book that opens with an anecdote about John Glenn in Mercury,
"machines, structures and systems can embody power and authority."3 The CM012
spacecraft embodied a history of a struggle for power between NASA and North
American, for authority over the right way to build a spacecraft, or even, as David
Mindell has suggested, a struggle for whether human or machine would have power
within this hybrid system. This chapter suggests that these struggles had left their marks,
imperfectly erased, on the body of the spacecraft.
Third, this chapter argues that the Apollo 204 accident was a watershed moment in the
history of the manned spaceflight program. With the deaths of the three astronauts, the
vision of an expansive lunar exploration and colonization program, complete with
manned space stations, lunar colonies and fleets of exploratory vehicles, came to an end.
The fire also shaped the new US manned spaceflight effort that followed the Apollo
program. The NASA field centers and NASA Headquarters, the US Congress, the US and
international media, and the wider engineering community responded to Apollo 1 and its
investigation by forcing changes that would shape the manned spaceflight program
through the remainder of the 1960s, the 1970s and into the 1980s. These changes were to
provide key contexts to the fatal explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger in 1986. In
this way, the links - albeit indirect links - between the Apollo 1 accident and the
Challenger accident can be seen.
Fourth, the chapter argues that the Apollo 204 accident took place within an environment
2 The American Heritage Dictionary, 2nd ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985), p. 894.
3 Langdon Winner, The Whale and the Reactor: A Searchfor Limits in an Age of High Technology
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 19.
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of political pressure and uncertainty and economic scarcity, which lead to a focus on
maintaining tight control over increasing costs and slipping production schedules. In the
wider literature around NASA's history, NASA's first decade has frequently been
characterized as one of an abundance of resources. I argue that in the minds of key
decision-makers, this was not so, and that their actions and ideas were deeply shaped by
this perception. Later in this study, I will argue that this is one of the key continuities
between the three accidents.
Fifth, I argue that the Apollo 204 accident points to something fundamental about
technology and engineering. The introduction of systems engineering into the Apollo
program in 1963-64 was an attempt to control costs, schedule pressure and technological
development. In doing so, the systems engineers created a public account of their
activities that portrayed the development of the Apollo hardware as a rational, scientific,
manageable activity. By examining the Apollo program in the making through the lens
of the Apollo 204 accident, it is possible to see the irrationality, the passion, the
unpredictability and non-linearity of the technological development process. In the
course of the investigation of the accident, these two differing understandings were
brought into the open, and I argue that the revelation of the gap between the public and
private faces of NASA caused Congress to lose trust in NASA's ability at a crucial stage
in the Apollo program.
The AS 204 Accident Investigation Board begins their history of the accident with the
start of the fabrication of Spacecraft 012 in August 1964, whereas NASA's official
account of the Apollo program begins its account of the accident on the day itself, with
flashbacks to 1965 and 1966.4 This chapter's account, however, starts earlier in NASA's
history, arguing that two events mark the start of the history of the Apollo 1 accident: the
award to North American Aviation of the contract to build the Apollo spacecraft at the
4 U.S. Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (Washington, DC: GPO, 1967), p. 4 - 1. Page numbers in this report are given in 2 parts.
The first number indicates the section and the second number is the number within the section. Thus page
4 - 1 is the first page of the fourth section of the report. See also Courtney G. Brooks, James M.
Grimwood, and Loyd S. Swenson, Chariots for Apollo: a history of manned lunar spacecraft, NASA
history series (Washington, DC: NASA, 1979), pp. 213 - 235.
end of 1961 and NASA Administrator James Webb's formal decision in November 1962
to use the Lunar-Orbit Rendezvous method to get to the moon.
North American Aviation
In 1960, North American Aviation was a very successful aircraft manufacturing
company, having had successes with the WWII era B-25 bomber and P-51 fighter, and
the mainstay of the Korean air war, the P-86 Sabrejet. These aircraft were extremely
well-regarded and North American was generally viewed as manufacturing a pilot's
aircraft.5 In 1955, North American had been awarded the contract to build NACA's (and
then NASA's) experimental hypersonic vehicle, the X-15. 6 The X-15 program had been
extremely successful and North American had high hopes of success when the request for
proposals for the second stage of the Saturn rocket was announced in 1960.' Indeed,
Dale Myers and Milt Sherman, respectively vice-president of engineering and head of
long-range planning, put together in 1960 a plan to establish a division of North
American in order to bid for contracts associated with the manned spaceflight program.8
Soon thereafter, North American did reorganize, creating the Space and Information
Division under Harrison Storms and putting John Paup in charge of preparing a bid for a
contract for the Apollo spacecraft. 9
When the contract for the Apollo spacecraft went to bid in 1961, North American was
well positioned but still had significant competition. Earlier that year, North American
had won the contract to build the second stage of the Saturn rocket (S-II). However they
5 Robert Piland, Interview, 3 December 1971. Held in folder 013289, NASA Historical Collection, NASA
Headquarters.
6 Dennis R. Jenkins, Hypersonics before the shuttle: a concise history of the X-15 research airplane,
Monographs in aerospace history 18 (Washington, D.C.: NASA 2000), Dennis R. Jenkins and Tony
Landis, Hypersonic: the story of the North American X-15 (North Branch, MN: Specialty Press, 2003),
Milton O. Thompson, At the edge ofspace: the X-15 flight program (Washington DC: Smithsonian
Institution Press, 1992).
' For North American's attitude to the prospect of the SII contract see Eberhard Rees, Interview, 6 February
1971. Held in folder 013289, NASA Historical Collection, NASA Headquarters.
8 Milt Sherman, Interview, 8 June 1966. Held in Box 074-52, Johnson Space Center History Collection,
University of Houston Clear Lake.
9 John Paup, Interview, 7 June 1966. Held in Box 074-51, Johnson Space Center History Collection,
University of Houston Clear Lake. Harrison Storms, Interview, 6 June 1966. Held in Box 074-52, Johnson
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:
had not won a study contract for Apollo."° For the spacecraft bid they faced competition
from several consortia of industry heavyweights. In October 1961, North American
presented the results of its preliminary studies to a NASA Source Evaluation Board
(SEB).
The SEB was a panel of eleven engineers, headed by Max Faget of the Space Task Group
(STG). The SEB had nine other voting representatives, six from STG, two from NASA
Headquarters and one from Marshall Space Center. The SEB had formal criteria by
which to evaluate the five proposals to build the Apollo spacecraft. They scored each
proposal on its technical approach, worth 30% of the final score; technical qualifications,
also worth 30%; and business qualifications, which would form 40% of the final score."
North American engineers felt confident, although some NASA officials were concerned
that building a spacecraft was rather different from building aircraft. Furthermore, the
North American team led by Harrison Storms that was known for its success with the X-
15 was not the team that would be building the Apollo spacecraft. Robert Piland, a
member of the SEB, recalled:
There wasn't any Storms team, really. The North American people working on
the spacecraft were not the same people who made the X-15 or the F-86. And the
spacecraft was not an airplane. John Paup had not worked on the X-15, the F-86
or anything else. People forget that conditions change. The X-15 outfit is not the
same a few years later.12
In the final assessment, the SEB rated Martin Martietta highest, with General Dynamics
and North American tied for second and GE and McDonnell tied for fourth. The SEB's
report recommended the award of the contract to Martin, with North American as the
next best alternative.13 On 2 4th November 1961, the SEB submitted their assessments to
to Sherman, Interview.
" "Report of the Source Evaluation Board Apollo Spacecraft: NASA RFP 9-150," undated, pp. 6 - 16.
Held in folder 007250, NASA Historical Collection.
12 Piland, Interview.
" "Report of the Source Evaluation Board Apollo Spacecraft: NASA RFP 9-150," undated, pp. 6 - 16.
the Source Selection Board (SSB), whose job it was to determine to whom the contract be
awarded.
The SSB, which consisted of NASA Administrator James Webb, Deputy Administrator
Hugh Dryden and Associate Administrator Robert Seamans, decided to go with North
American, to the surprise of the Martin Marietta company. On the 2 8 th of November the
SSB formally awarded North American the contract to build the Apollo spacecraft. 14 In
his memoirs, Seamans recalled that:
North American was selected as the contractor for the Apollo capsule and service
module even though Martin Marietta was scored higher by the source evaluation
board. At the meeting after the board's presentation, Bob Gilruth met with Jim
Webb and the other members of the Triad (Webb, Dryden and Seamans). He
expressed concern that Martin hadn't had any aircraft experience for years and
Apollo was to be flown by the astronauts. We then listed recent North American
aircraft experience. There were many, with the X- 15 heading the list. The X- 15
had had many successful flights, both inside and outside the atmosphere, at speeds
up to 7,000 mph. After Bob left the room, we examined Martin's strengths and
determined that they excelled in areas not as key to the success of Apollo as North
American's high-speed flight capability."
However, at the time the decision was made, and again six years later, other more sinister
motives for the decision were rumored. In particular, Congress and some journalists
were dubious about Jim Webb's connections with Oklahoma Senator James Kerr, and
through him connections to Bobby Baker and Fred Black, somewhat unsavory lobbyists
for North American Aviation.16 Webb was able to defend himself adequately from these
charges." Whether or not North American had won the contract by fair competition, by
Held in folder 007250, NASA Historical Collection.
14 Brooks, Grimwood, and Swenson, Chariots for Apollo, pp. 42 - 44.
15 Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Project Apollo: the tough decisions (Washington DC: NASA, 2005), p. 78.
16 See, for example, William Hines, "Apollo: A Shining Vision in Trouble," Washington Star, Sunday, 21
May 1967 or Clark Mollenhoff, "Probe Turns to Webb in Apollo Case - Question his Links to North
American," Des Moines Sunday Register, 14 May 1967.
17 W. Henry Lambright, Powering Apollo: James E. Webb ofNASA, New series in NASA history
the end of 1961, the decision had been made. North American Aviation, a contractor
whose key experience was in building aircraft rather than missile systems, was to build
the Apollo spacecraft.
At the time of the award of the Apollo spacecraft contract to North American, no final
decision had yet been made on the technical configuration of the Apollo mission. There
was an implicit assumption that one Apollo spacecraft would transport the astronauts
from the surface of the earth to the surface of the moon and back again, but in late 1961
this had not been confirmed, despite a number of studies having been carried out. On
this basis, North American and NASA started to design the Apollo spacecraft, although
always with the caveat that further decisions would need to be made to resolve this issue.
Robert Piland commented:
Until we settled on the rendezvous thing, that [lack of a decision] gave problems.
Any time you've got a contract where a piece of it is loose and open, it's hard to
get on with the rest of it because everybody wants to worry about that open aspect
of it.'8
Following the award of the Apollo spacecraft contract, North American moved very fast
into building hardware, even before decisions had been taken on how the lunar missions
would be accomplished. One engineer commented on the speed of North American's
efforts:
I was surprised with two things - the rate at which hardware started to show up
for Apollo, the way they were actually doing the Little Joe tests, and some of the
earlier boilerplate effort and how quickly that stuff went together before some of
the major program decisions were made, if I recall. It seemed like we were
testing things like earth landing approaches, etc., before we really had a good
definition of the total concept. [...] It seemed to me that there was hardware
coming out much more quickly than the real detailed development of the concept,
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 181 - 184.
18 Piland, Interview.
which is one way you get a job done quickly. 19
This pace of frantic hardware production at North American would continue throughout
the early 1960s. That the hardware was arriving before major technical decisions about
the mission had been made guaranteed that significant reworking of the hardware would
be required.
Lunar-Orbit Rendezvous (LOR)
Over the period 1959 - 1961, a number of NASA's Research Centers, the Army Ballistic
Missile Agency at Huntsville, Alabama and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory at Pasadena,
California explored and championed a number of methods of achieving a lunar landing
and return to Earth. These methods included direct ascent, rendezvous of two craft (one
for the moon landing, one for return to Earth) in Earth orbit (EOR), rendezvous in transit
to the Moon, rendezvous in lunar orbit before landing (LOR), rendezvous in lunar orbit
after takeoff from the Moon, and rendezvous in both Earth and lunar orbit, and finally,
lunar-surface rendezvous, where two spacecraft would land on the lunar surface, one with
astronauts and the other with a craft and supplies to return them to earth.20
19 George B. Merrick, Interview 14 July 1970. Held in Box 074-46, Johnson Space Center History
Collection, University of Houston Clear Lake.
20 See Andrew J. Dunar and Stephen P. Waring, Power to explore: a history of Marshall Space Flight
Center, 1960-1990, NASA historical series (Washington, DC: GPO, 1999), pp. 54 - 55; James R. Hansen,
Enchanted Rendezvous: John C. Houbolt and the Genesis of the Lunar-Orbit Rendezvous Concept.
Monographs in Aerospace History 4 (Washington DC: NASA, 1995), pp. 7 - 17.
Image 1: Possible methods of accomplishing a lunar landing, from 1962. NASA Historical
Collection, NASA Headquarters.
One of the Langley researchers, John C. Houbolt, had developed a keen interest in the
idea that the best way to accomplish a lunar landing was to develop a mission mode
which would require a detachable lunar lander to leave the spacecraft which carried it
from earth, in a lunar orbit while the lander descended to the surface (see image 1). The
advantage of this approach was that the propellant required for travel back to earth was
not needed to be carried down to the lunar surface, thus reducing the size and complexity
of engines and fuel storage in the lander. The disadvantage, of course, was the need for
two spacecraft, with two life-support systems, two guidance systems, and two sets of
engines.
While Houbolt found himself a voice in the wilderness through much of 1960 and 1961,
he continued to press his case through letters to senior NASA officials, particularly
Robert Seamans.21 Seamans, it would appear as much to rid himself of Houbolt as for
any other reason, directed that the idea be more fully investigated.22 One who became
convinced of the idea was Joe Shea, newly appointed to the position of deputy director
for spaceflight systems.23 With Shea's assistance - and Shea's more adroit handling of
the inter-Center politics around NASA - Houbolt's LOR idea gradually became more
accepted around NASA. The last person to be converted to this approach was Wernher
von Braun, the Director of the Marshall Space Center, who was approached by Shea in
May 1962, and convinced to support LOR by a promise that there would be both lunar
bases and lunar vehicles to be designed by von Braun's team in the future Apollo
program. 24 With von Braun's support, the case had been won, and NASA announced that
it favored the Lunar-Orbit Rendezvous model on 11 July 1962.
North American was in favor of either the EOR or direct options for the lunar mission,
but did not have significant input into NASA's decision to use the LOR concept for the
Apollo program. Nonetheless, North American expected to get the contract to build the
lunar lander and were very upset when this was awarded to Grumman. 25
By the end of 1962, key decisions had been finally made. The lunar landing would be
made in a three-part spacecraft, with a detachable lunar module to descend to the moon's
surface, and a Command and Service Module to fly to and from lunar orbit. North
American Aviation would build the Apollo spacecraft, but not the lunar module.
1961 to 1964 at North American Aviation and NASA
Over the period from 1961 to 1964, North American Aviation underwent what some of
its engineers called the crisis years. Over this period, North American faced the
21 Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Aiming at targets: The autobiography of Robert C. Seamans, Jr. (Washington,
DC: NASA, 1996), pp. 98 - 99.
22 In Seamans' more recent set of memoirs, he suggests that his experience with guidance and navigation
systems at the MIT Instrumentation Laboratory and RCA convinced him of the technical merits of
Houbolt's proposal. See Seamans, Project Apollo, pp. 36 - 37.
23 Joseph Shea, Interview 12 February 1970, p. 17. Held in Box 074-52, Johnson Space Center History
Collection, University of Houston Clear Lake.
24 Shea, Interview, pp. 22 - 23.
25 Shea, Interview, p. 13.
challenge of attempting to transition from an engineering culture formed within a mass-
production aircraft facility to one focused around the production of individual, highly
complex spacecraft - production that was several orders of magnitude more complex. J.
Leland Atwood, the CEO of North American, did not believe that the building of the
Apollo spacecraft required any fundamental changes from the way in which North
American built its aircraft;26 other North American engineers were less sanguine about
the difference between Apollo and the X-15.27
Prior to the award of the Apollo contract, North American Aviation was an aircraft
manufacturer, with little experience in the design of spacecraft. The teams that were
charged with building the Apollo spacecraft developed a new way of working in 1961
and 1962, derived from the experiences of the NASA engineers who had worked on the
Mercury program, with a focus on designing as well as possible, to the exclusion of other
considerations. Norman Ryker, who was a senior engineer at North American in 1962,
observed that this way of working was different from his experience in building aircraft.
Ryker's experience had been that even in the preliminary stages of aircraft design,
configurations were frozen in order that individual groups of engineers were able to work
to a standardized model. In the new relationship with NASA, however, this was not to be
the case:
When we started the program, quite a lot of people says 'that's not the way we
want to run space programs. We want to have the best possible ship at the time
we launch, regardless of how late the idea was conceived.' And we didn't agree
with them. In the Mercury program, they made it work; and the Mercury program
was a lot smaller group at NASA. [...] They were able to make the judgments on
which [changes] were required and which were not [and] get it implemented. 28
Charles Feltz made similar comments about the early part of the 1960s at North
26 J. Leland Atwood, Interview, 12 January 1990. National Air and Space Museum.
http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/dsh/TRANSCPT/ATWOOD6.HTM accessed 12 December 2004.
27 Merrick, Interview.
28 Norman Ryker, Interview, 9 June 1966. Held in Box 074-52, Johnson Space Center History Collection,
University of Houston Clear Lake.
American:
The basic mistakes made in Apollo Program [were] twofold. One, we started
designing and cutting boiler plates - hardware - before we really knew what the
hell we were doing either side of the fence (NASA or North American). And
secondly, we didn't have what we might say base-line specification in which to
work with. And so confusion reigns as to really what the guys were supposed to
be designing, what the basic thing was.29
This process of simultaneous design, engineering and manufacturing continued
throughout the early 1960s, and following the LOR decision, the level of complexity got
significantly greater. During this period, NASA established the Resident Apollo
Spacecraft Program Office (RASPO) in Downey, California at the North American plant,
to assist coordination between the organizations. The focus of the NASA engineers
assigned to RASPO was on engineering and design, with an emphasis on subsystem
specialization, mirroring the expertise at North American. In these early years, there was
less attention to either integration of subsystems or to manufacturing. 30
Over the period 1961 to 1963, there was an environment of constant change, with
requests for design changes flowing freely from NASA to North American. There were
significant effects on both the cost and the schedule of the Apollo program as a result of
this process of constant change. North American had originally submitted a bid, in 1961,
for $330M to build the Apollo spacecraft and have it ready to fly by 1964. By the time
the contract was finalized eighteen months later, that cost had increased to just under a
billion dollars with an estimated first flight date of late August 1964.31 Reflecting on
North American's performance, in a memo written in 1964, Joe Shea commented:
29 Charles Feltz, Interview, 6 June 1966. Held in Box 074-43, Johnson Space Center History Collection,
University of Houston Clear Lake.
30 Glenn Briggs, Maurice Collins, Ford Miller and Harry Linder, Interview, 29 January 1970. Held in Box
074-41, Johnson Space Center History Collection, University of Houston Clear Lake.
3 Joseph Shea, Memo to George Mueller, 5 August 1964. Held in folder 013363, NASA Historical
Collection, NASA Headquarters.
By the Spring of 1963 trouble indicators were flying. After much pressure, North
American finally admitted that the 1964 flight dates were unrealistic. [...]
Analysis of schedules showed that North American slipped roughly two weeks
per month. There was much 'passing the buck' between NASA and North
American. Lack of definition, changes, unrealistic early schedules all were
blamed.32
North American also had to come to terms with its lack of management capability, both
capability to manage its own activities and to manage the increasingly numerous and
complex sub-contractor relationships. Over the period of time from 1962 to 1964, North
American had also to manage a massive increase in personnel in the Space and
Information Division, increasing from approximately 10,000 people in 1962 to
approximately 30,000 by 1964. 33 Harrison Storms observed that while he did not see that
there was significant difference between designing aircraft and designing spacecraft, he
did see that management of the Apollo program was going to present significant
challenges:
It's greater in scope and it's greater in depth by the numbers of people involved.
[...The project] gained its complexity purely through the numbers route. One of
the difficulties of any large organization is to make sure that you get everything
done, not too many things are overlapped and not too many things fall through the
cracks. ... The programs of the Apollo and Saturn are relatively shortlived.
They're not like a long production run or anything like that where you can have a
large stabilized force. It's pretty much of a large transient force.34
North American also had to come to terms with a new working arrangement with NASA
- one that was significantly closer than it had experienced either with NASA during
production of the X-15, or with the US Navy and US Air Force, for whom North
American had produced a number of types of aircraft in the post war period. Dale Myers,
32 Shea, Memo to George Mueller.
3 J. J. Edwards, Interview, 30 January 1970. Held in Box 074-51, Johnson Space Center History
Collection, University of Houston Clear Lake.
34 Storms, Interview, 6 June 1966.
who was Apollo Program Manager at North American from 1964 onwards, noted that
NASA attempted to implement at North American a series of technical checks and
balances:
NASA used this check and balance system where they would have technical
people confronting technical people essentially to develop the best way to go on
the particular approach, whereas the Air Force generally had broader performance
type specifications, depended on the industry to do their job and if the industry
fell down, then they would have the confrontation about what to do. 35
Other North American Aviation engineers noted that this arrangement was perhaps
inevitable in a project the size of Apollo:
The job was so large that the Government could never completely relinquish
control of the contract. The job was so large that the contractor [North American]
had his troubles in just running it without having a whole lot of people looking
over his shoulder and second-guessing as to whether he was right. [...] I would
have preferred to have seen fewer people helping us with our problems, but on the
other hand there were times when we were trying to get honest help when they
couldn't bring about a decision either. But nevertheless, the troubles were intense
at times.36
The tensions caused by this close, almost interpenetrated style of working were immense,
resulting in strained relationships and frequently poor communication between NASA
and North American. 37 These relationships were greatly exacerbated by NASA's
constant changing of the requirements for the CSM over this period, with North
American attempting to conduct concurrent design, engineering and manufacturing
processes over this period. J. Leland Atwood, discussing North American as it was in
35 Dale Myers, Interview, 14 October 1970. Held in Box 074-46, Johnson Space Center History Collection,
University of Houston Clear Lake.
36 Paup, Interview, 7 June 1966.
37 Charles Feltz, Interview, 6 June 1966. Held in Box 074-43, Johnson Space Center History Collection,
University of Houston Clear Lake.
1965, noted that:
It was an organization that was really pressed by technical problems. Your ideal
is to engineer something, put it in the shop, get it built efficiently and then inspect
it carefully and get it out the door and operate. We had an environment that
required us to do all those things at once, with much backtracking to make
changes. The changes were almost overwhelming. So this was part of the
problem of the organization and it was far from normal. It was, to a considerable
degree, out of control. Parts had to go back for re-engineering, redesign, again
and again, re-release, new material, supply and manufacturing and tooling.38
One of the great engineering concerns in 1961 through 1963 was the need to reduce
weight in the Apollo spacecraft, as extra weight in the spacecraft meant greater boost
capacity needed for the boosters, which themselves were undergoing significant design
problems over this period. In the process of NASA and North American engaging over
the best ways to remove weight from the spacecraft, several decisions were made which
would have later ramifications.
Critically, a decision was made to avoid the use of protective covers over the wiring
harnesses on the floor of the Apollo spacecraft. Several reasons lead to this decision.
The first was simply a desire to reduce weight in the spacecraft. The second was a fear
that the use of fiberglass covers would cause the emission of particles of glass fiber into
the cabin.39 The third was an assumption that the wiring harnesses on the floor of the
spacecraft would be protected from damage by technicians by the presence of the
astronauts' couches.40
The wiring harnesses were particularly susceptible to constant changes in design. The
need to be able to supply power to a constantly changing set of subsystems meant the
38 Atwood, Interview, 25 June 1990.
39 Dale Myers, Interviews, 5 March 1999 and 26 August 1998. Johnson Space Center Oral History Project,
http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/historv/oral histories/MyersDD/myersdd.pdf accessed 17 September 2005.
40 Dale Myers, Interview, 12 May 1969. Held in Box 074-46, Johnson Space Center History Collection,
University of Houston Clear Lake.
wiring harness was one of the last pieces of equipment to be able to be finalized, and yet
it needed to be installed and functioning so that other pieces could be installed and
tested.41 One engineer at North American noted that this process took its toll on the
wiring harnesses: "you have to have all your systems, schematics out, and your basic
mechanizations established to come up with the detail wiring required to come up with
wiring a vehicle. And we've got a pretty sneaky-looking wire harness down there."42 In
a similar manner, RASPO engineers noted that wiring harness were more vulnerable on
the ground, as they had been designed to function in a zero-g environment where their
positioning on the floor did not render them exposed to foot traffic.43
At the same time, early thinking around the role of the astronauts in the Apollo missions
anticipated that they would be able to conduct in-flight repairs to subsystems of the
spacecraft if necessary. In the design of the block I, this decision was reflected in the
positioning of various subsystems so that astronauts could access them during flight.
Dale Myers commented "it was the very strong drive for light weight and a configuration
requirement, at one time, that we have in-flight maintenance which made boxes available
to be pulled out but left us in a configuration where wiring was exposed."44 Over time
this requirement was removed, but the configuration of the spacecraft remained driven by
these priorities until it was significantly redesigned for Block II.45
One particular area of ongoing trouble was the design and manufacture of the
environmental control system (ECS), which North American engineers remembered as
problematic to design and manufacture. Harrison Storms remembered that of all the
engineering challenges he faced during the design and manufacture of the Apollo
spacecraft, the ECS was among the most difficult. 46 The ECS used a system whereby a
water-ethylene-glycol mixture flowed through aluminum tubes in the spacecraft as part of
an evaporator cooling system. Water-glycol itself is not flammable, but should leaks
41 Atwood, p. 6.
42 R. L. Benner, Interview, 7 June 1966. Held in Box 074-41, Johnson Space Center History Collection,
University of Houston Clear Lake.
43 Glenn Briggs, Maurice Collins, Ford Miller and Harry Linder, Interview 29 January 1970.
44 Myers, Interview, 12 May 1969.
45 Benner, Interview, 7 June 1966.
46 Storms, Interview, 6 June 1966.
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occur, the residue that is left is flammable, and is potentially corrosive to exposed
electrical wiring. This was known to both NASA and North American, and had been
since 1963, particularly to the Marshall Space Center's Materials Advisory Board.47
Sanford Falbaum, a North American engineer who became one of the spacecraft
managers in the manufacture of the later spacecraft, also noted that the ECS created
significant problems in the early years of the Apollo program. "The compatibility of the
system always seemed to leave something to be desired," he recalled, but after many
redesigns and re-manufactures "a pretty reliable system" was created.48 What is important
to note is that the reliability was achieved after substantial rework in line with the way
engineering was carried out at North American in the mid-1960s.
At the same time, North American's shop-floor culture had not adapted to the demands of
the engineering and manufacturing required to produce the Apollo spacecraft, perhaps
reflecting the opinions of senior management at North American, who did not believe
building spacecraft was significantly different to building aircraft. Technician practices
were still reflecting the demands of working on relatively uncomplex and standardized
aircraft, designed to be flown within atmosphere and gravity, rather than the Apollo
spacecraft, with a sealed environment and zero-gravity. The treatment of the fabrication
and installation of the wiring harnesses reflects this. Dale Myers observed that wiring
harness were stepped on in the course of technicians' daily practices, in part because
assumptions translated over from Gemini did not regard this practice as risky:
Gemini, with its exposed wire runs, wasn't as vulnerable as Apollo because you
can't walk around in the goddamn thing. You get in the position where, in
Gemini, you could put the wire runs in and then the workman aren't in there to
walk on the wires, where as in Apollo, it's large enough that you get several guys
in there and all the manufacturing procedures that you take to protect that wiring -
it's never quite a hundred percent. So we had guys damaging wires that shouldn't
47 "History of MAB Influence upon Activities at KSC," undated, but after the Apollo 204 fire. Held in
folder 012971, NASA Historical Collection, NASA Headquarters.
48 Sanford Falbaum, Interview, 15 July 1970. Held in Box 074-43, Johnson Space Center History
Collection, University of Houston Clear Lake.
have been out there.49
John Healey, who was brought into North American from Martin-Marietta immediately
after the fire, noted that he did not see significant problems with the quality of fabrication
and manufacturing at North American, but rather that the quality of management was not
as good as possible. He noted "too many guys were calling the shots and channeling
organizational decisions and responsibility." Healey's responses to this situation is
revealing of the environment on the shop-floor at North American prior to his arrival:
I had vice-presidents chasing plans so the workers could stay in the command
module. You can only put five workers and one inspector inside the command
module. They were getting out to get tools, parts shortages, a new drawing or
process plan. I said 'from the time somebody goes into the command module,
they don't come out until the job's done.' But if they had this job to do, I would
supply support to them so that they did not have to come out. [...] But I supported
them. Chief engineers, project engineers, vice-presidents, and buyers would come
to the spacecraft and support the spacecraft.
Then I started 'kitting' all the parts and put them in a tote basket. All the parts for
a given job, all the tools, all the process plans and drawings, were put in there, and
I wouldn't let them go until everything was in the kit. I started forbidding 'work-
arounds.' The genius of the American ingenuity says we can work around it.
Then you start spending money and blowing schedules. What 'kitting' means is
that if you are the worker, we put you in the command module until it was all
done. But once you got in, you didn't come out - no hunting for tools."
What Healey's observations point to is that in the mid-1960s, on the shop-floor at North
American, there were no processes in place to control technicians' access to tools within
the spacecraft or even controls as to the number and frequency of technicians entering the
49 Myers, Interview, 12 May 1969.
50 John Healey, Interview, 21 July 1970. Held in Box 074-44, Johnson Space Center History Collection,
University of Houston Clear Lake.
craft. The common use of 'work-arounds' - and the tendency to call it ingenuity - also
suggests that processes were not followed and the plans on paper were not necessarily
followed in practice. Healey also observed that in the mid-1960s, managers from North
American and visitors would frequently tour the interior of spacecraft while they were
being assembled.
Safety culture in the period 1961 to 1964 was constituted in several ways at North
American, both from the top down and from the bottom up. There were ground-level
programs, focused on instilling pride in workmanship within the North American
workforce. These programs emphasized quality of workmanship, but also drew on
another technique. The work of Paul E. Bierly and J-C Spender has discussed the ways in
which shared cultural values can support a strong safety culture, with a suggestion that
overt patriotism can and has been used in this way, particularly in the Nuclear Navy." At
North American, this strategy was made explicit - workers were provided the opportunity
to have personalized news stories sent to their hometown newspapers, discussing their
individual contributions to fulfilling the national goals of the manned spaceflight
program.52 Similarly, the cultural power of the astronaut corps was deployed in support
of the North American effort, with astronauts paying visits to the North American plant
to encourage a sense of personal identification with the work. One North American
engineer remembered:
A lot of the fellows had gotten individual attention, or group attention. Not just
saying 'why didn't you do that' or 'how come you screwed up' but now and then a
'hey you did a good job.' The astronauts would come to see them instead of just
walking around 'mahogany row' shaking hands with the guys who were accused of
not doing anything anyway, but getting in there with the people who do the work.53
5' Paul E. Bierly and J-C Spender, "Culture and High-Reliability Organizations: The Case of the Nuclear
Submarine," Journal of Management 21, no. 4 (1995), pp. 639-656.
52 Earl Blount, Interview, 29 January 1970. Held in Box 074-41, Johnson Space Center History Collection,
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Driven by concerns from the top, North American design engineers were also conscious
that along with technical performance, safety was a critical parameter of their work.
In the mid 1960s when systems engineering was brought in, the justification was to
control costs and schedule overruns. By definition, however, this moved the focus away
from safety. Priorities had to be balanced at all stages, but with strong messaging from
NASA to control costs and time, the steps most likely to be pressured were the checks
and redundancies that formed the quality assurance for the work.
Similarly, North American management had developed safety procedures and processes
in alignment with the standards and guidelines promulgated by NASA. North American
had established safety offices in its facilities, including the facility at Downey, CA where
the Apollo spacecraft was manufactured. Over the period 1961 to 1965, however, this
office was regarded as ineffective and understaffed, with "no directive authority and
provid[ing] only advisory services and policy on a request basis."54 Staff from NASA
noted that "the duties and responsibilities as outlined in their (NAA) policy and
procedures documents appear to be well-defined and comprehensive, however,
implementation and application of the program is ineffective and not adequate." 55 A
NASA "Ad-hoc Safety Review Group" report in 1966 observed that "the emphasis by
NAA personnel on meeting schedule commitments has overshadowed safety
consideration; 'NAA is worse than other contractors and not getting better."' 56
Over the period 1961 to 1964, North American's engineering culture experienced a
number of changes. It had to change from one focused around mass-production of
aircraft to a focus on producing a small number of specialized spacecraft. North
American had been used to working largely autonomously from its customer rather than
in a situation where challenges to design practices were made almost daily, and also was
54 Memorandum from NASA Safety Director to Col. L. W. Vogel, "Synopsis of NASA Field Safety
Surveys and Evaluation of North American Incorporated," 12 April 1967. Held in folder 007250, NASA
Historical Collection, NASA Headquarters.
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accustomed to working with a defined configuration rather than an endless changing
specification. Similarly the disciplines of working to cost and schedules were conceded
in order to accomplish the technical challenges at hand. These challenges were felt at the
level of management, down through design and engineering to the shop-floor, and change
was driven from the top but took longer to penetrate down to the shop-floor. At the same
time, North American's safety culture was coming under threat from the pressure to
manage schedule and cost on the Apollo program. While efforts were made to develop a
sense of pride in workmanship on the shop-floor and sense of the need to design for
safety, it also clear that the engineers were coming under pressure to manage the change
requests coming from NASA, and to meet the schedule goals set by North American
management.
Over the period 1961 - 1964, as well, the first Apollo spacecraft were on the factory floor
at the Downey, CA plant of North American, and the changing engineering culture left its
mark on those spacecraft in a number of ways. The need to minimize weight had left
wiring harness unprotected on the floor of the spacecraft, the initial design of a spacecraft
to be repairable by astronauts during missions had left subsystems like the ECS
configured in ways that increased the likelihood of damage by technicians, the pattern of
redesign and reinstallation had increased wear and tear, and the patterns of work on the
shop-floor had meant that visitors and workers moved in and out of the spacecraft in a
relatively uncontrolled manner. Attention to safety was eroded as well by increasing
emphasis on meeting budget and scheduling goals. Incomplete transition from the
previous technology to space technology at North American, tensions arising from the
different engineering cultures at NASA and North American, and the difficulty of
sustaining attention to safety when systems engineering was introduced all contributed to
the development of a flawed Block 1 craft.
Joseph Shea, Samuel Phillips and Systems Engineering at NASA
Meanwhile, at NASA over this period, concerns about cost overruns and schedule
pressures in the Apollo program (and in Mercury and Gemini) were increasing. It became
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clear to NASA officials that neither North American nor NASA had an adequate
management capability to control a project as large and complex as Apollo had the
potential to become. While NASA's existing management systems had coped with both
Mercury and Gemini, Apollo presented several new challenges. Searching for examples
of successfully developed and managed complex technical projects, NASA senior
officials looked to the US Air Force's development of its ballistic missile program in the
1950s.5 7
In order to bring some of the US Air Force's successful engineering and management
tools into NASA, in 1963, George Mueller was appointed NASA Associate
Administrator for Manned Spaceflight. Mueller came to NASA from Thompson Ramo
Wooldridge (TRW), where he had been managing, in conjunction with the US Air Force,
the development of missile systems as well as unmanned probes for NASA."
One of Mueller's first actions was to transfer Joe Shea from NASA Headquarters in
Washington, DC to Houston to take over the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office. Shea's
appointment effectively put him in charge of development of the Apollo spacecraft."59
This appointment was part of a larger desire on the part of Mueller to exercise greater
control over the NASA centers, driven by Mueller's concern that all three manned
spaceflight programs were overrunning costs and not meeting schedules. Mueller
reorganized the structure of NASA around a matrix structure so that the Mercury, Gemini
and principally Apollo program offices had greater authority over the activities of the
NASA centers and were able to direct their activities.
Mueller described the difficult transition:
When I came in, we set up the structure where center directors reported to
57 Seamans, Aiming at Targets, pp. 103 - 105, 108 - 1 10; George E. Mueller, Interview, 2 May 1988. Held
at http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/dsh/TRANSCPT/MUELLER5.HTM Accessed 17 April 2006.
58 George Mueller, Interview, 15 February 1988.
http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/dsh/TRANSCPT/MUELLER4.HTM Accessed 17 April 2006.
59 Mary Louise Morse, and Jean Kernahan Bays, The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, Volume II,
November 8, 1962-September 30, 1964 (Washington, DC: NASA, 1973). entry for 8 October, 1963. htt://
www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/SP-4009/v2p2b.htm Accessed 23 February, 2006.
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associate administrators for particular areas of responsibility. Like in the case of
manned space flight, we had what are now Kennedy and Johnson, and Marshall
reporting to me directly. This dual role I set up was one of program offices within
the associate administrator structure in Washington, who had counterpart program
offices in the centers. Those counterpart program offices had a dual reporting
responsibility, to the center director and to the program director in Washington.
And that was an innovation that the center directors found it somewhat difficult to
understand for some period of time. They said, "Well, what's our role if we have
direct control from Washington's program office over our program office? What
are we supposed to do?" And the answer was, "Make it work." But that took a fair
amount of doing because they were not used to and didn't like having to have
anyone have direct access to anyone within their department. 60
Mueller also changed the personnel. By bringing the experienced General Sam Phillips
and Dr Joseph Shea into the Apollo program, albeit for Shea by way of a paper demotion,
Mueller brought in a new way of doing complex engineering.
Joseph Shea was educated at Dartmouth College, the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and the University of Michigan, earning his BS in Math in 1946, and a PhD
in Engineering Mechanics in 1955. Both degrees were granted by the University of
Michigan. He was commissioned into the US Navy in 1946 and served for a year in the
Pacific before returning to the US where he worked for three years at Bell Labs, doing
what he described as "research mathematics." 61
After graduating in 1955, Shea returned to Bell Labs where he worked on the radio-
guidance system being developed for the Titan I missile. Shea was swiftly promoted
60 Mueller, Interview, 2 May 1988.
61 See Shea's biographical data sheet in the Johnson Space Center Oral History Project, available at
http://www.isc.nasa.gov/historvy/oral histories/SheaJF/SheaJF Bio.pdf, accessed 12 December 2004, and
Joseph Shea, Interview, 12 February 1970, p. 17. Held in Box 074-52, Johnson Space Center History
Collection, University of Houston Clear Lake.
103
until he was essentially acting as the systems engineer for the guidance project.62 Shea's
work on the Titan I brought him into contact with the new methods for managing the
complex ballistic missile development programs being established by the US Air Force's
Western Development Division and TRW.63 In 1959, AC Spark Plugs hired Shea to start
up a research and development operation. Very soon after Shea's move to AC, the
company was awarded the contract for developing the guidance system for the Titan II. 4
In 1961, Shea was formally hired by Ramo-Wooldridge, by then called TRW. During
Shea's time at Bell Labs, he had met Brainerd Holmes, who by late 1961, was Director of
the Office of Manned Space Flight at NASA Headquarters in Washington DC.6 5 On
December 29, 1961, Holmes brought Shea into NASA HQ. In an interview in 1970,
Shea recalled the circumstances of his hiring into NASA:
There was an uncomfortableness on the part of [...] Holmes about the technical
competence of the Centers to handle as complex a program as the lunar operation
was going to be. What they wanted to do was to pull into Washington a level of
technical strength and technical decision making that was just completely
different than anything that existed either in NACA or the prior NASA operation.
For the first time, Washington was, in effect, going to be, in principle, as
technically strong as the Centers, in particular in what we referred to as the
system engineering or the definition and specification part of the operation. 66
In the same conversation, the interviewer asked Shea: "was an integrated view of using
headquarters to control - was it considered to be a tight system?" Shea replied, "The
concept was tight control, very tight control.""67
62 Shea, Interview, 12 February 1970, p. 2.
63 Shea, Interview, 12 February 1970, pp. 1 - 2. For more discussion of WDD and Ramo-Wooldridge, see
Thomas Parke Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998), pp. 69 - 139, and
Stephen B. Johnson, The Secret ofApollo: Systems Management in American and European space
programs, New series in NASA history (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), ch. 2 and
3.
64 Shea, Interview, 12 February 1970.
65 Jane Van Nimmen and NASA History Office, NASA historical data book, 4 vols., NASA historical series
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1988), vol. 1, p. 609.
66 Shea, Interview, 12 February 1970, p. 5.
67 Shea, Interview, 12 February 1970, p.5
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In late 1963, Brigadier General Sam Phillips was transferred from the Air Force to the
Apollo Program Office at NASA headquarters in Washington D.C. Phillips was an
electrical engineer by training and a career Air Force officer, having received his
education at the University of Wyoming before the Second World War. Before joining
NASA, he had just completed a five-year tour as Director of the US Air Force's
Minuteman program, and was scheduled to become vice-commander of the Ballistic
Missile Division.68
Phillips specialized in the management of complex technical projects, whilst Shea was an
engineer and was focused on the development of controls over the interfaces between
complex subsystems and the integration of these systems into the whole. Both, however,
understood themselves to be systems engineers.
In theory, and in the descriptions of its practitioners, systems engineering was a set of
techniques invented to simultaneously control cost, schedule, and technological
development.6 9 Systems engineers created formalized documentation processes to track
and control design changes, they managed the complex interfaces between subsystems in
missile systems, and they handled changes to baseline requirements by trading off
between subsystems and components. The primary tool these new systems engineers
used was control configuration management, which combined detailed procedures for
communication between NASA and its contractors with a series of reviews designed to
provide immediate feedback on progress, problems and inconsistencies. Systems
engineering, in theory, became a way of formalizing the process of manufacturing and
design by removing the human element and instead embodying engineering judgment
and intuition in a set of abstract systems. Sam Phillips described his task upon joining
68 Samuel C. Phillips, Interview, 2 July 1971. Held in Folder 013288, NASA Historical Reference
Collection, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC. Samuel C. Phillips, Interview, 19 June 1987, pp. 2 - 11.
Held in Folder 013285, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC.
69 Agatha C. Hughes and Thomas Parke Hughes, Systems, experts, and computers: the systems approach in
management and engineering, World War II and after, Dibner Institute studies in the history of science and
technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus; Stephen Johnson, "Samuel
Phillips and the Taming of Apollo," Technology and Culture 42 (2001); Stephen Johnson, "Three
Approaches to Big Technology: Operations Research, Systems Engineering, and Project Management.,"
Technology and Culture 38 (1997); Johnson, The secret ofApollo. These two authors most explicitly
discuss systems engineering in the context of ballistic missile development in the 1950s and space systems
development in the 1960s.
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NASA as to establish:
a structure of technical specifications from the top of the program to the bottom,
which would then provide the technical basis for the development and building,
ultimately the use of the whole hierarchy of things that had to be created to
constitute the system. In other words, a specification program. And a companion
piece of that was the configuration management system. They started with the
specification program and established the processes and the structure by which
the interfaces would be defined between the organizations involved and the
subsystems and systems.70
Phillips' key management tool was the configuration control board, a committee that
brought together engineering managers and project managers and required that all
engineering changes be accompanied by cost and schedule revisions, thus allowing the
committee to predict new costs and estimates based on the engineering changes.
Phillips, however, went on to implement systems management procedures that extended
down past the level of organization or program to specify how testing was to be carried
out, to what standard, and with what expected results. He imposed discipline around
anomalous behaviors in components, refusing to accept random failure as an adequate
explanation. He expected his system to "establish formal processes to ensure all of that
[expected behavior] so that it wasn't just a matter of chance or somebody's judgment as
to whether it occurred." 71
For Shea and Phillips, systems engineering was also the vehicle for another agenda -
centralization and the exercise of increasing control over the NASA centers. NASA
headquarters had expressed concern about its ability to control the research centers of
which the organization was made up, particularly around technical matters. Shea's
introduction of systems engineering methods served as a means of increasing the power
70 Samuel C. Phillips, Interview, 19 June 1987. Held in Folder 013285, NASA Historical Reference
Collection, NASA Headquarters.
71 Phillips, Interview, 19 June 1987.
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of NASA HQ. It also precipitated the hiring of Bellcomm as systems engineering
contractors, in order to provide an alternative source of technical expertise for NASA
HQ.
Systems engineering challenged the previous model of engineering decision-making - a
model of craft decisions that some felt better-supported engineering innovation and
overall excellence. The greater centralization and organization of systems engineering
however promised greater cost and schedule control while still providing a means to
ensure quality.
Mueller and Shea created a system of parallel engineering hierarchies at NASA
headquarters, Johnson Space Center and North American, but Shea also believed that he
himself was to be the final arbiter of major decisions. He implemented a comprehensive
program of control configuration boards, which he dominated, impressing with his
encyclopaedic grasp of detail and ability to make the right decision.72
Shea was certainly very familiar with the formal techniques of systems engineering and
they were widely implemented at both NASA and North American during Shea's time at
the Apollo program. It is important to note, however, that systems engineering as the set
of tools and techniques applied at NASA and North American in the mid-1960s, was not
entirely a way of moving engineering away from craft decisions and engineering
judgment. In the way that Joe Shea implemented systems engineering, it was also
dependent on the right people being in place. Shea himself was critical to the
development of the Apollo spacecraft. Far from embodying judgment in techniques and
tools, Shea centralized information in his own person. His personal assistant Thomas
Markley noted that Shea's main management tool seemed to be his notebook in which
Markley compiled a detailed status report, often 500 or 600 pages long.73 Markley noted
that Shea was able to assimilate all this information and able to communicate between
72Yasushi Sato, "Local Engineering in the Early American and Japanese Space Programs: Human Qualities
in Grand System Building," unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2005, pp. 122 -
134.
73 Thomas Markley, Interview, 24 June 1999. Johnson Space Center Oral History Project,
http://www.isc.nasa.gov/historv/oral histories/MarklevJT/marklevit.pdf accessed 17 September 2005.
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engineering sub-disciplines. Shea made a revealing comment, several years after the fire:
No one guy has enough time to be aware of everything in the program, that I
would buy. But the individual elements were really simple, by technical
standards. ... The guys running the program, whether they understood it
themselves even or not had the intellectual capacity and the intellectual
competence and maybe the intellectual arrogance to feel that one knows Apollo
(struck out in the transcript and replaced with knows a problem). They could go
and sit with the people who were trying to solve the problems and know whether
a solution was right or not.74
Shea's training as a systems engineer was outweighed by his personal faith in his abilities
to know and understand the system he was building by virtue of his training as a hands-
on engineer. Systems engineering was a method for control of complexity, cost and
schedule, but as it was implemented at NASA, it was also a method that required an
engineer at the top who was conversant with engineering details - who was, in the words
of one Apollo engineer talking about Joe Shea, "able to drill down to the heart of the
problem." 75 In the way Joe Shea implemented systems engineering at NASA and at
North American, there was an ongoing tension between the role of engineering judgment,
and in particular, Shea's judgment, and the role of process and procedure. In the opinion
of other senior officials at NASA, Shea's faith in his own administrative abilities was not
justified.76 Shea was seen as sloppy,77 a poor manager,78 and "not an organizer." 79
74 Joseph Shea, Interview,10 March 1973. Held in folder 013289, NASA Historical Collection, NASA
Headquarters.
7 Charles Mathews, Interview, 17 February 1970. Held in folder 013287, NASA Historical Collection,
NASA Headquarters. Mathews discussed the involvement of Bellcom, a subsidiary of General Electric, as
a systems engineering contractor to NASA in 1962 -63. Bellcom was employed ostensibly to provide
systems engineering capability to NASA, but also served to bolster centralized control over the NASA field
centers.
76 Wernher von Braun, Interview, 19 November 1969. Held in folder 013285, NASA Historical Collection,
NASA Headquarters.
7 Neil Armstrong, Interview, 23 September, 1971. Held in folder 013289, NASA Historical Collection,
NASA Headquarters.
78 George Low, Interview, 21 June 1972. Held in folder 013287, NASA Historical Collection, NASA
Headquarters.
79 von Braun, Interview, 19 November 1969.
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During this period, the Apollo program office under Shea also introduced systems
engineering procedures to North American, in an attempt to improve North American's
technical performance and to control both cost and schedule. Joe Shea wrote to George
Mueller in 1964:
North American also gives me the impression of being a loose, inefficient
organization, with extremely slow and frequently garbled lines of communication.
Too often we discuss things with their top people (Myers, Feltz, etc.) take
excessive time, literally months, to filter down and get implemented - and then
not crisply."
One of Joe Shea's first actions as head of ASPO, in conjunction with Sam Phillips and
George Mueller, was to start work with North American to freeze the configuration of the
Apollo spacecraft, so that no new design changes would be made.81 In this endeavor,
Shea found an ally in the newly appointed Program manager for the Apollo spacecraft at
North American, Dale Myers. Myers' initial assessment concurred with that of Shea: "I
guess Joe Shea and I really ganged up on the rest of the world and said we're going to
have some specs that are right and meaningful." 82 Throughout 1964, Joe Shea and Dale
Myers worked together to develop processes to define the spacecraft specification and to
start to manage the number of design changes being sought by both NASA and North
American, by way of a hierarchy of change control boards.
This effort took place through 1964 and resulted in one configuration called the Block I
spacecraft, which was finalized in March 1964 and a second called Block II, which was
finalized in December 1964. Block I was essentially the spacecraft as originally specified,
before the LOR decision was taken. Block II, which would be designed before it was
manufactured, in keeping with Shea's desire to bring some system and order to the
80 See an excerpted letter from Joseph Shea to George Mueller, 5 August 1964 in "History of NASA/North
American Contractual Relationships, Memorandum for Mr. Webb from Joseph Shea, with attachments." 16
April 1967. p. 6. Held in folder 013363, NASA Historical Collection, NASA Headquarters.
8 Samuel Phillips, Interview, 25 September, 1970. Held in Box 074-57, Johnson Space Center History
Collection, University of Houston Clear Lake.
82 Myers, Interview, 12 May 1969.
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process, would include the changes necessary to conduct a lunar mission with the lunar
module. This change took time to implement as there were a number of commonalities
between the Block I and Block II in design, about 80% similarity, but still a significant
new amount of work was needed, in conjunction with the work still required on Block I.83
While the LOR decision meant that the Block I spacecraft could never be used for lunar
missions, the six Block I spacecraft would still be used for earth-orbit missions and
testing. Critically, Joe Shea noted that unlike Block II, which would be the subject of
further design studies. Block I craft would "be improve[d] to the point where it would be
acceptable for earth orbital operations, assuming it met the requirements. The standard of
comparison here was, in effect, the Mercury and the then evolving Gemini design. This
decision permitted the program to proceed without major perturbation." 84 Many
specification, engineering, and manufacturing changes were proposed for Block II
spacecraft. Not all of these were carried over to the remaining Block I craft.
As part of Phillips and Shea's attempts to bring a new style of engineering to Apollo,
they implemented a series of management and procedural changes at North American,
associated with the specification of the new Block II spacecraft. With the Block II
spacecraft, there was a discrete configuration phase, followed by release to engineering
for detailed design work, rather than the concurrent process used for the individual Block
I craft, in accordance with the configuration management procedures originally set out by
the Air Force." Similarly, the standardization of the Block II design meant that mock-
ups and jigs could be constructed to help manage the problematic wire harnesses and
plumbing for the ECS.8 6
It is important to note however, that the changes that Shea and Phillips attempted to
implement were difficult and took some time. By January 1965, Shea observed in a
83 Joseph Shea, "Apollo Spacecraft and related facilities," undated presentation. Held in folder 012971,
NASA Historical Collection, NASA Headquarters.
84 
"History of NASA/North American Contractual Relationships, Memorandum for Mr. Webb from Joseph
Shea, with attachments." 16 April 1967. p. 3. Held in folder 013363, NASA Historical Collection, NASA
Headquarters.
85 Al Kehlet, Interview, 26 January 1970. Held in Box 074-45, Johnson Space Center History Collection,
University of Houston Clear Lake.
86 Kehlet, Interview, 26 January 1970.
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memo to George Mueller that North American's cost and schedule performance was
better than it had been and that their ability to forecast was improving. Shea also noted,
however, that he was concerned that performance improvements had been against
relatively simple tasks and more complex ones were to come."
Not all North American engineers felt that Shea's endeavours were focused in the right
place. There were concerns that Shea's emphasis on cost and schedule meant that he
overlooked issues that needed to be addressed but would have delayed the Apollo
spacecraft further. John Boynton, a senior North American engineer, recalled in 1970:
Shea was more schedule conscious than he should have been, and I think was the
criticism that most people have of Shea. I don't care what the hell you guys do,
but don't let it slip the schedule. We're going to meet all our design milestones.
And you can slip in a piece of paper mach6 and satisfy a design milestone but that
doesn't mean it's going to fly.88
Systems engineering as a discipline was designed to assist managers to control cost,
schedule and technical performance. At North American in the mid 1960s, the focus on
cost and schedule pressure was pervasive, and the introduction of new management and
engineering methods kept these pressures as primary drivers of the design and
manufacture of the Apollo spacecraft.
The Phillips report
Contrary to the message Shea's report of January 1965 may have conveyed, by mid-
1965, North American and NASA's relationship had deteriorated over continued cost and
schedule slippages on both the SII and the Apollo spacecraft, including five-month delays
on the first Block II craft and a reschedule of spacecraft CMO 12, the last Block I craft,
87 See excerpted letter from Joseph Shea to George Mueller, 9 January 1965 in "History of NASA/North
American Contractual Relationships, Memorandum for Mr. Webb from Joseph Shea, with attachments." 16
April 1967. p. 6. Held in folder 013363, NASA Historical Collection, NASA Headquarters.
88 John H. Boynton, Interview, 27 April 1970. Held in Box 074-41, Johnson Space Center History
Collection, University of Houston Clear Lake.
111
from April to June 1966, necessitating a move of the first manned earth-orbit mission to
the combined 204 mission.89 Sam Phillips was dispatched to review the management,
engineering and manufacturing practices of North American. The outcome of Phillips
and his team's visit was a comprehensive report which identifies several key concerns
with North American's performance.
In November and December 1965, Sam Phillips and a team of reviewers visited North
American. Phillips was not impressed with what he saw and he made his views quite
clear to North American's CEO:
I am definitely not satisfied with the progress and outlook of either program and
am convinced that the right actions now can result in substantial improvement of
position in both programs in the relatively near future. Even with due
consideration of hopeful signs, I could not find a substantive basis for confidence
in future performance. I believe that a task group drawn from North American at
large could rather quickly verify the substance of our conclusions, and might be
useful to you in setting the course for improvements. 90
The problems that had precipitated Phillips' review of North American were glaring.
Delivery dates for both the Apollo spacecraft and the second stage of the Saturn booster
had slipped by more than a year. Costs on both programs had massively increased
despite significant hardware deletions. North American's technical performance was
poor: Saturn II stages had exploded on the test stand and NASA had found stress
corrosion in the Apollo spacecraft airframe, cracking in tanks, and failures in the reaction
control system. Relations between NASA, North American's corporate headquarters and
North American's Space and Information Division were poor.91
89 George Mueller, Letter to J. Leland Atwood, 19 December 1965. Held in folder 007752, NASA
Historical Collection, NASA Headquarters.
90 Samuel Phillips, Letter to J. Leland Atwood, 19 December 1965. Held in folder 007752, NASA
Historical Collection, NASA Headquarters.
9' Samuel Phillips, "NASA Review Team Report," undated. pp. 1 - 20. Held in folder 007752, NASA
Historical Collection, NASA Headquarters.
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The tone of the Phillips report was harsh, with Phillips reserving his main criticisms for
the failure of North American to implement the type of systems management structure
that Phillips had been brought to NASA to champion. Phillips recommended that North
American thoroughly revise (and in many cases implement) its systems management and
engineering procedures. He called for them to implement a program management
system, and to significantly improve their manufacturing and quality control. 92
When examining the progress being made (or not being made) on the Apollo spacecraft,
Phillips was particularly concerned about the workmanship on display. He noted the
large number of components and even subsystems that were being rejected and then
reworked and reinstalled. Coupled to this was Phillips' team's concern that many of
these substandard parts were not being caught by North American's quality assurance
operation but rather by NASA inspectors.93 The Phillips report also noted the
downstream consequences for the manufacturing division of North American of
continuing delays in design and engineering. Manufacturing was at the end of the
process of building the Apollo spacecraft, and was dependent on other parts of North
American keeping their scheduled delivery dates for release of detailed engineering
drawings and information. When, as Phillips discovered, that as a matter of course, these
schedule dates slipped, the carefully planned sequencing of fabrication of parts, and
subassemblies was badly disrupted. This led, in his opinion, to significant quality control
lapses.94 By 1965, it is clear that the changes NASA and North American management
were attempting to make to North American's engineering culture had still not
significantly changed shop-floor practice.
J. Leland Atwood, the CEO of North American Aircraft, suggests that this report may
have been misinterpreted. He noted his surprise at the language used in the Phillips
report:
I was seriously concerned about it. I'd heard from others that - representatives at
92 Phillips, "NASA Review Team Report."
93 Phillips, "NASA Review Team Report," appendices III and IV.
94 Phillips, "NASA Review Team Report," appendix IV, pp. 1 - 9.
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Houston, for instance - the instructions had gone out sub rosa, "write it bad."
Those were the words that were supposed to be running through the [Phillips]
group informally, "write it bad.""95
The feeling at North American reflected Atwood's understanding: while Phillips was
seen as an excellent manager, his placing the full blame for the situation at the feet of
North American without acknowledging NASA's role in it, seemed to some unfair.96 By
contrast, Phillips was basing his understanding of what he had been sent to do at North
American on his Air Force experience. He had no expectation that the document would
ever become public and so was focused on "find[ing] out what the heck we needed to do
to get the program done." 97
Understood at another level, the Phillips report reflects a theme that ran throughout the
development of the Apollo spacecraft. The report notes the messiness and non-linearity
of the process of design and manufacturing. It notes the ways in which procedures were
seldom followed, the poor record keeping and the poor standards of workmanship and
quality control. As Brian Wynne and Philip Scranton have suggested, these gaps
between the idealized model and the observed reality are common to many technical
projects, and it is usually only in retrospect, perhaps following an accident, that this
difference comes to be seen as symptomatic of organizational failure. 98
During the period of time Phillips' team was at North American, several spacecraft were
in the process of construction. One of these was spacecraft CM012, the final Block I
craft. Fabrication of the CM012 spacecraft began in August 1964 and the basic structure
was completed in September 1965. Installation and final assembly of subsytems into the
Command Module took place between September 1965 and March 1966.
95 J. Leland Atwood, Interview, 19 January 1989.
http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/dsh/TRANSCPT/ATWOOD1.HTM accessed 12 December 2004.
96 Mike Gray, Angle ofattack: Harrison Storms and the Race to the Moon (New York: W.W. Norton,
1992), p. 201 - 202.
97 Phillips, Interview, 2 July 1971.
98 Brian Wynne, "Unruly Technology: Practical Rules, Impractical Discourse and Public Understanding,"
Social Studies of Science 18, no. 1 (February 1988), pp. 147 - 167; Philip Scranton, "Urgency, uncertainty,
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2 (2006), pp. 127-157.
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The Apollo 204 spacecraft was built within the intersection of changing engineering
cultures over the course of several years - with its designers and manufacturing
responding to differing and changing ideas about how to design and manufacture a
spacecraft. It carried within it the history and politics of the relationship between NASA
and North American. And the passage of time and the writing and overwriting of design
changes on the body of the block I spacecraft took its toll. From the frantic search for
weight reductions in 1963 and 1964 leading to the removal of protective panels covering
the wiring, to the multiple redesigns and removals and reinstallations of the ECS system
with its vulnerable soldered joints, to North American's VIP guests moving in and out of
the spacecraft, to manufacturing and shopfloor practices that did not control access of
materials, tools or technicians into the spacecraft, the conflicts and compromises that
characterized the shifting engineering practices at North American were inscribed in the
Apollo 204 spacecraft. Even where those tensions had been resolved, their residue
remained materially present as incompletely erased alternatives to the final design.
Apollo and Gemini - oxygen and fires.
While the Apollo program was being established during 1962 through 1966, much of
NASA's focus was on the Gemini program, albeit as a program designed to develop new
techniques and technologies for Apollo. The Gemini program was aimed to provide
experience in long-duration spaceflight, to develop and test techniques of orbital
rendezvous and re-entry, and to develop and accomplish Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA)
or space-walks. Over the five years of its operations, 10 manned and 2 unmanned
Gemini flights were conducted, providing a wealth of experience for pilots, flight
operations crew, engineers and managers throughout NASA. The Gemini program cost
$1.147 billion in 1966 dollars, but was around a 5% component of the costs of NASA in
1966, when NASA's spending was at its peak.99
99 Barton C. Hacker and James M. Grimwood, On the shoulders of Titans: a history of Project Gemini,
NASA Sp 4203 (Washington DC: NASA Scientific and Technical Information Office, 1977), pp. 383 -
389. The comparative figures for Apollo are available in Appendix H of Brooks, Grimwood, and Swenson,
Chariotsfor Apollo.
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The relationships between the Apollo program and the Gemini program were not always
close, with each side feeling as if their counterparts were being uncooperative. Even
NASA's official history of Gemini, On the Shoulders of Titans, hints at this issue:
Gemini had too many financial and technical problems of its own to give much
energy to worry about Apollo. Nor was the Apollo office, with its two dissimilar
spacecraft, quite as cohesive an organization as it might have thought. ... No-one
had the time to consider the problems dispassionately and apply them to their
counterparts in a practical manner.1"'
The Apollo project engineers did, however, draw on some of the experience gained
through Gemini - with a critical lesson learned being that designing spacecraft to avoid
fires in the cockpit mitigated the risks associated with a pure oxygen environment. The
Gemini spacecraft, like the Mercury spacecraft before it, had been designed to use a one
gas environment. NASA and North American engineers were aware of the risks involved
with this design decision, and indeed, North American engineers had raised these
concerns with NASA as early as 1963.'0 Joe Shea overrode North American's concerns,
and continued to use the one-gas environment within the Apollo spacecraft through both
Block I and Block II. Shea's logic was that previous experience on Gemini and Mercury
had shown that if ignition sources within the spacecraft were controlled, then the risks of
fire were low and the advantages of the simplicity and low weight of a pure oxygen
environment were greater than the risks. 102 Following the decision to establish the Blocks
I and II, the Block I spacecraft was quite explicitly designed to the standards of Gemini
and Mercury.
In April 1966, a fire broke out during an altitude test of the Apollo ECS system at a North
American subcontractor, AiResearch. NASA's analysis of the fire both reflected and
100 Hacker and Grimwood, On the shoulders of Titans, pp. 384 - 385.
'"' "CCA2," Held in Box 051-63, Johnson Space Center History Collection, University of Houston Clear
Lake.
102 "Preliminary findings of the review of Apollo 204 data and related material," 1 February 1967. Held in
Folder "Miscellaneous Information", box 4, Apollo 204 Review Board Office files of the Chairman,
Record Group 255, National Archives.
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confirmed the thinking that Gemini, and by extension, Apollo, was safe from fires if
ignition sources in the spacecraft were controlled. The analysis noted that in 1966, over
6700 hours of test time had been conducted with Mercury and Gemini craft in either a 5
or 15 psia environment and that no fires had occurred. From this statement, the analysis
went to examine the potentially flammable materials and make some suggestions about
reducing the use of Velcro in the cabin. The analysis concluded with an explicit
endorsement of the one-gas design: "Based on Mercury/Gemini flight experience and
current Gemini design practice, it is very improbable that a fire will occur in the cabin."'0 3
The NASA safety office, by contrast, drew several conclusions about the fire at
AiResearch. They concluded that controls over materials left in the spacecraft were
inadequate, that there had been a rate of up to 15% failed components in the ECS, and
most disturbingly, that there were fabrication problems, particularly with wiring
harnesses: there was "a considerable amount of corrosion in evidence on various metal
surfaces. Soldering practices in test wiring were below acceptable standards. Numerous
splices in test wiring were noted."' 0 4
Hilliard W. Paige of General Electric's Apollo Support Division warned Shea about the
likelihood of spacecraft fires on the ground in September 1966.105 In the internal
response to Paige's letter, William Bland, the chief of the Reliability, Quality and Test
Division, noted to Shea that "press of business with more significant problems" had
meant that he had been unable to find time to schedule a review of Paige's concerns.
However, he added, a recent assessment of fire hazards in the Apollo spacecraft crew bay
volumes had indicated that "inherent hazards from fire in the spacecraft are low."'0 6
Shea's handwritten response to Paige was poignant: "Hilly: the problem is sticky - we
think we have enough margin to keep fire from starting - if one ever does we have
'03 "An Evaluation of the Gemini Spacecraft Fire Preventative Measures, May 25, 1966." Held in folder
007252, NASA Historical Collection, NASA Headquarters.
104 The NASA Safety Office, "Summary Report of Accidents and Related Actions Re Apollo Program
Prime and Subcontracts under the Cognizance of North American Aviation, Incorporated," 13 February
1967. Held in folder 007250, NASA Historical Collection, NASA Headquarters.
105 Hilliard W. Paige, Letter to Joe Shea, 30 September 1966. Held in folder 007223, NASA Historical
Collection, NASA Headquarters.
106 William Bland, Letter to Joe Shea, 23 November 1966. Held in folder 007223, NASA Historical
Collection, NASA Headquarters.
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problems."' ' 7
Shea's ability to overlook or disregard signals that a pure oxygen environment might be
risky points to the limits of his implementation of Sam Phillips' systems engineering.
While Phillips sought to remove engineering judgment from his systems, Shea trusted his
own judgment over systems engineering processes and procedures. In this case, he over-
ruled the concerns of others and continued the development of the Apollo spacecraft with
a pure oxygen system.
North American and Grumman
It is important to note that a number of the problems faced by North American were not
confined to them alone. Grumman, as prime contractor for the Lunar Module, was also
experiencing difficulties in their transition to specialized manufacturing, whilst MIT's
Instrumentation Laboratory were adapting to the challenges inherent in moving from an
academic research environment to one focused on producing flyable hardware and
software.108 However, North American, by virtue of both its lead time on the other two
major contractors and the complexity of its two contracts, experienced these problems
first. Both Grumman and MIT were able to learn from North American's experience.
In June and July 1966, Grumman was reviewed by a NASA Management Review Team
led by Wesley Hjornevik, Director of Administration of the Manned Spaceflight
Centre. 0 9 The Hjornevik report was similarly critical to that of Phillips and for similar
reasons. Hjornevik noted that:
I was struck by the anomaly of a group of people who, in our judgment, were
more competent and capable at every level than any other contractor in our
107 Paige, Letter to Joe Shea, 30 September 1966.
08 David A. Mindell, Digital Apoll: Human and Machine in Spaceflight (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2008), ch 6, traces the MIT experience.
'09 Wesley L. Hjornevik, "Findings and Recommendations of the NASA Management Review of the Lunar
Excursion Module Program at Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., Bethpage, Long Island New York."
Held in folder 012971, NASA Historical Collection, NASA Headquarters.
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experience; yet, the net performance was substantially below that capability. The
proof of the quality and capability is there on the floor to see - it's beautiful -
hardware in the true Grumman tradition.
The factor which I believe contributed significantly to the below-capacity
performance is the Grumman tradition of informality and the resulting tendency
to lack detailed planning, for interfacing organizations to have incompatible plans,
and to lack interorganizational commitment discipline. One result is that
management does not have statusing capability and visibility. Firefighting
becomes a way of life. Evidence of this problem is replete in our notes. In a
program of the scale and complexity of the LEM, this traditional Grumman mode
has become a crippling disease."1
Hjornevik identified a series of similar issues at Grumman as Phillips had seen at North
American. Inadequate technical solutions for issues facing the LEM, schedule and cost
slippage, and poor management discipline, especially between Grumman and its
subcontractors were all noted."' As with the Phillips report, Hjornevik recommended a
thorough overhaul of management systems at Grumman.
Apollo RASPO engineers at the Bethpage, NY plant understood that Grumman in 1966
was rather like North American in 1964. Grumman struggled to adapt to building a
number of differently configured one-off vehicles, struggled to adapt to the much closer
working relationship with NASA, and struggled to adapt to the engineering philosophy
that puts schedule and cost alongside technical performance, instead of subordinate to
it." 2 And as with North American, NASA's solution to slipping schedules and increasing
costs was to prescribe more rigorous management.
In the Grumman case, the changes suggested by NASA were put in place and appeared to
o10 Wesley Hjornevik, Letter to Llewellyn J. Evans, 27 July 1965, pp. 1 - 2. Held in folder 012971, NASA
Historical Collection, NASA Headquarters.
"' "Hjornevik Report," pp. 2 - 3.
112 Lewis Fisher, Interview, 9 February 1970. Held in Box 074-43, Johnson Space Center History
Collection, University of Houston Clear Lake.
119
have worked to improve the quality of Grumman's management and engineering. 113 Tom
Kelly, leading the LEM development program, noted after the fire however that the
situation at Grumman was very similar to that experienced at North American, with
ongoing schedule slippage, pressure to meet deadlines, and problems with flammable
materials in the LEM. Kelly noted: "There was no way to avoid the realization that the
Apollo program was in crisis and we were going to have to work very hard to dig our
way out of it."" 4 This view was shared at NASA, with senior officials acknowledging
that Grumman had experienced similar problems to North American, and that perhaps
Grumman had been lucky, whereas North American had not."'
If the Apollo 204 accident was a direct result of the tensions experienced as engineering
cultures and consequent practices at North American and NASA shifted, the Grumman
experience shows that these tensions were experienced through other parts of the Apollo
program. A view of the accident that begins too late and remains limited to a small set of
factors in only one of the NASA contracts deflects attention from this underlying set of
larger, pervasive, and problematic tensions.
This closer examination of problems and adaptations at North American and NASA
reveals four things: that engineering practice in the 1960s tolerated a high level of error
and continuous refinement as a normal part of the design and development processes; that
these normal errors and continuous corrections left a material imprint on the final
outputs; that schedule and cost pressures were prominent and continuous and must be
factored into any understanding of the design and production decisions; and that it is
problematic to accept uncritically an accident Review Board report that obscured or
implicitly denied the previous three points.
1966
13 Thomas J. Kelly, Moon Lander: How we developed the Apollo Lunar Module (Washington, DC:
Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), p. 147 - 151.
."4 Kelly, p. 157.
"5 Bernard Moritz, Interview,10 October 1969, pp. 1 - 2. Held in folder 013287, NASA Historical
Collection, NASA Headquarters.
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A Customer Acceptance Readiness Review was conducted by NASA at the North
American plant at Downey, California in July and August 1966.116 During that review,
which all three Apollo 1 astronauts attended, Grissom jokingly presented a signed photo
to Harrison Storms, who had led the design and manufacture of CMO 12 at North
American. The photo made reference to the history of problems with CM012, and
depicted the three astronauts with bowed heads in prayer over a scale model of CM012,
appealing to a higher power than NASA: Stormy, this time we are not calling Houston!
(see Image 2). 17
The image reflects the greater involvement of the astronauts in the Apollo program as the
Gemini program came to an end. Gus Grissom spent a great deal of time at the North
American plant in Downey, California, taking particular interest in the manufacture of
spacecraft CM012, which he was due to fly. Grissom became increasingly concerned
about the quality of workmanship at North American. One North American engineer
later noted:
We had many difficulties with the spacecraft, and whatever went wrong seemed
to go wrong in front of the crew. Twice coins were dropped by mechanics inside
the s/c (spacecraft), though they weren't supposed to be carrying coins. But Gus
and Roger Chaffee heard the tinkling of coins in the workmen's pockets even
after that."8
Alongside the concerns with the quality of workmanship was also Grissom's sense of a
loss of control over the number of changes being made to the spacecraft. Grissom's
experience with his Mercury and Gemini craft, both built by McDonnell Aircraft
Corporation, was that he was able to maintain a level of personal knowledge and control
over their design and manufacture, assisted by his ability to go directly to Jim McDonnell
if Grissom felt that changes were needed. Grissom and the other astronauts also had
"6 U.S. Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, p. 4-1.
"7 Gray, Angle of attack, pp. 219 - 220.
"s Sigurd Sjoberg, Interview, 26 July 1972. Held in folder 013290, NASA Historical Collection, NASA
Headquarters.
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concerns over the seeming willingness of North American to over-ride concerns about
safety and workmanship in order to meet delivery schedules." 9
Image 2: The three Apollo 1 astronauts praying over a scale model of CM012. 19 August 1966, following
the final hand-over of the CM012 from North American to NASA. NASA Historical Collection, NASA
Headquarters.
During 1966, problems with North American's fabrication and workmanship continued,
all symptomatic of the messy nature of manufacturing on the shop-floor at North
American. In a letter sent to Dale Myers after the accident, 20 incidents of damage to
Apollo spacecraft were noted as having occurred between October 1966 and January
"9 Ray E Boomhower, Gus Grissom: The Lost Astronaut (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society Press,
2004), pp. 288 - 294. Donald K. Slayton with Michael Cassutt, Deke! - US Manned Spaceflight from
Mercury to the Shuttle (New York: Forge Books, 1994), pp. 187 - 188.
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1967. The incidents included:
The crew compartment floor on CSM 101 was punctured on 11/23/66 reputedly
by a wrench left in the aft heat shield
While trouble-shooting panel #5 in CSM 101 on 12/26/66, sparks were noticed
arcing to the structure, probably because power had not been turned off while the
trouble-shooting was progressing.
During the cryogenic gas storage system checkout for Service Module 103 on
1/19/67, a pressure line was inadvertently attached to the ECS Glycol Loop rather
than the fuel cell simulator port. I understand this ruptured the ECS system and
causes local rupture of the radiators.
CSM 2S-1 was dropped approximately six feet to a concrete floor during what
should have been a normal handling operation on 1/12/67.120
By the end of 1966, the CM012 spacecraft, which would form the Apollo component of
Apollo-Saturn mission 204 had been delivered to Kennedy Space Center in Florida.
CM012 had been built within the intersection of two engineering cultures with differing
and changing ideas about how to design and manufacture a spacecraft. Written into the
body of the spacecraft were these changing ideas and a series of changed design
decisions. The spacecraft carried within it the history and politics of NASA/North
American relationships, and the passage of time and the writing and overwriting of
design changes on the body of the Block I spacecraft had taken its toll. The need for
weight reductions in 1963 and 1964 had led to the removal of protective close-out panels
covering the wiring harnesses, and a familiarity with building craft to operate in gravity
had meant that these now-unprotected harnesses were prone to being trodden upon. An
initial interest in creating opportunities for in-flight maintenance had meant the cabin of
120 Joseph Shea, Letter to Dale Myers, 18 February 1967. Held in Box 067-65, Johnson Space Center
History Collection, University of Houston Clear Lake.
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the CM012 craft was configured in a way that left these unprotected harnesses even more
vulnerable. An environment of constant change, redesign and re-engineering meant that
foot traffic was increased through the cabin, and North American's shop-floor practices
did not recognize any need to control access. This also took its toll, both on wires and on
the environmental control system, which was also physically vulnerable and full of a
potentially flammable and potentially corrosive mixture of water and glycol.
At the same time, the spacecraft carried with it the mark of another engineering culture -
that of Joe Shea's system engineering. Shea's implementation of systems engineering at
NASA and North America in the mid-1960s had changed the focus of the engineers and
managers responsible for the building of the Apollo spacecraft towards managing not
only the technical issues, but also giving the same importance to managing costs and
schedules. There was no more ability to trade performance for cost or time; the sentiment
"better is the enemy of good" ruled. At the same time, Shea's implementation of systems
engineering did not remove elements of engineering judgment from the Apollo program,
as some of the NASA systems engineers intended. Instead, the engineers at the top of the
NASA organization used the tools of systems engineering to centralize engineering
judgment within themselves.
This left the Apollo spacecraft was vulnerable to flawed engineering judgment and to
unchallenged assumptions about risk and safety. One such assumption, made early on in
the development of the Apollo spacecraft, was that despite the differences between the
Gemini and Apollo spacecraft, it was safe to use a pure oxygen environment. Over the
course of the Gemini program, successful missions (or least, the lack of significant
accidents with the oxygen environment) meant that growing concerns and evidence that
there was potential for a fire in the Apollo spacecraft was ignored at the most senior
levels.
In the Aftermath of the Fire
While the Apollo program was neither shut down nor derailed by the Apollo 1 accident,
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there were nevertheless consequences for the space program and for NASA.
There were personnel changes at both NASA and North American. Joe Shea was
removed from his position as manager of the Apollo program office and promoted to
deputy associate administrator for manned space flight.21 It was, for all intents and
purposes, a sinecure, designed to keep him out of the congressional hearings. Shea
resigned soon after and went to work for Raytheon, before moving to the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology as a professor in 1989.122 He was replaced by George Low,
another systems engineer. At North American, Harrison Storms was replaced as
president of North American's S&ID by Bill Bergen, former head of Martin Marietta, the
company beaten out by North American for the Apollo spacecraft contract in 1962.123
The Apollo 1 accident marked the end of the Shea mode of engineering management.
Shea's style of engineering was a hybrid. He brought from the Air Force ballistic missile
development programs of the 1950s a series of systems engineering tools like control
configuration boards and other bureaucratic procedures, designed to manage cost and
schedule as well as technical progress in large-scale development programs. But Shea's
use of the tools of systems engineering was dependent also on his own skills and
expertise as an engineer experienced in interface management. Shea combined a set of
management skills with engineering expertise and engineering judgment that extended far
below interfaces of subsystems down to the individual component level. Shea was neither
a full-fledged systems engineer nor an older-style purely technical engineer - his personal
style of engineering used a series of bureaucratic procedures, but was dependent on the
engineering judgment and translation skills of the engineer in charge.
Thus, as the 1960s ended, NASA had developed a set of bureaucratic procedures to
manage the design, development and operation of this most complex spacecraft. In the
aftermath of Apollo 1, NASA refocused its attention on the expansion and adherence to
121 "Manned Spaceflight Centre Announcement no. 67-51," 7 April 1967. Held in box 068-15/16, Johnson
Space Center Historical Collection, University of Houston Clear Lake.
122 Joseph Shea, Interviews, 26 August 1998 and 23 November 1998. Johnson Space Center Oral History
Project, http://www.isc.nasa.fov/historvy/oral histories/SheaJF/sheajf.pdf Accessed 17 September 2005.
123 Gray, Angle of attack, p. 253 - 256.
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the control configuration boards that Mueller, Shea and Phillips had established and
whose presence had been validated by the Apollo 204 investigation board and the
subsequent Senate and Congressional hearings. 124 George Mueller, speaking in 1988,
expressed this point nicely: "about the time of the fire, we began to create paper, and it's
grown ever since." 125 NASA's tendency to favor bureaucratic management styles over
intuitive engineering judgments, irrespective of the abilities of the engineers concerned,
was the result of the lesson learned in Apollo 1 - that systems that rely too much on
personal judgment and memory are not capable of the coordination required by large-
scale complex projects.. The Challenger sections of this study will make the argument
that a conservative attitude to engineering change persisted through to the 1980s, and was
a factor in the second fatal accident at NASA.
The Apollo 1 accident was also the beginning of the end of the political coalition that had
funded and supported the Apollo program since 1961. James Webb's performance before
the Senate and in several subsequent hearings damaged both his and NASA's reputation
with key Senators like Clinton Anderson, Edward Brooke of Massachusetts, Charles
Percy of Illinois and Margaret Chase-Smith of Maine. After the disastrous congressional
hearings in 1967, Webb "never regained the confidence of the Senate Committee since he
lied," Anderson said a year later. 126 From then on, NASA no longer was able to rely on
Congress giving it the money and resources it said it needed. And this change was to
have very long-term consequences, for coinciding with NASA's new vulnerability in
1967 was the need for funding decisions about the Apollo Applications Program (AAP),
the follow-on to Apollo.
In early 1967, the Apollo Applications Program was an ambitious attempt to capitalize on
the hardware development activities that had taken place over the past six years. AAP
planned to continue to use Apollo hardware after the end of the lunar landing missions in
124 Samuel Phillips, Interview, 2 July 1971. Held in Folder 013288, NASA Historical Reference Collection,
NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC. Phillips, Interview, 19 June 1987, pp. 2 - 11.
125 George Mueller, Interview, 22 June 1988. Held in Folder 013287, NASA Historical Reference
Collection, NASA Headquarters.
126 Clinton Anderson, Interview, 25 July 1968. Held in folder 013285, NASA Historical Collection, NASA
Headquarters. See also Lambright, Powering Apollo.
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order to put an orbital workshop into place in 1969, multiple earth orbit scientific
missions in 1970 and an extended program of lunar exploration in 1971.127
Recognizing that he and his agency had lost political capital, James Webb sacrificed AAP
for continued funding for Apollo. In May 1967, Deputy Administrator Robert Seamans
issued instructions that the lunar landing missions were to have priority over AAP, and
that any design decisions to increase the utility of Apollo hardware for activities other
than the lunar missions were to be curtailed. Seamans added that these decisions would
not have any budget impact for 1968, meaning that no more money would be requested
for AAP, over and above funding for Apollo. 128 In August 1967, James Webb instructed
Samuel Phillips to start examining ways to dramatically scale back post-Apollo activities
in order to ensure that the lunar landing could be achieved within downwardly revised
budgets. 129 In October 1967, the NASA budget was cut by over $500M from $5.5B to
$5B and the AAP experienced a 50% funding cut. 130
AAP became Skylab and Apollo-Soyez Test Project, which while scientifically and
diplomatically important, were not the main focus of the US space program going into
the 1970s and beyond. The decision to build the space shuttle, which would replace AAP
as the main focus of the manned spaceflight program during the 1970s, was made only
three years after Apollo 1, at a time when the institutional power of the astronaut was at
its peak. While it cannot be claimed that the power of the astronauts was such that they
determined the shape of the post-Apollo program,"' it is interesting that the new direction
of the manned spaceflight program was to provide pilots with interesting maneuverable
craft, rather than satisfy scientists or others who might want a lunar research base. The
astronauts themselves welcomed a turn towards a machine they might have more control
127 "Statement of Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Deputy Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration before the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Science, United States Senate," 27
February 1967. Held in folder 007225, NASA Historical Collection, NASA Headquarters.
128 "Memorandum for the Record from Deputy Administrator," 17 May 1967. Held in folder 007223,
NASA Historical Collection, NASA Headquarters.
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over, as Michael Collins recounts:
A mature vehicle must not be plucked out of the ocean after every flight. That
was not only expensive but so awkward and ungraceful. Clearly, landing on a
runway was in order, and to do that one needed the ability to maneuver, that is -
WINGS! And the machine would come down on what? WHEELS! Wings and
wheels, a dignified flying machine at last, no more awkward capsules with their
puny lift to drag ratios, but a mature workhorse that would launch vertically like
its rocket predecessors, but fly back to a horizontal landing like a conventional
airplane. 132
There were technical and organizational changes at North American after the fire.
Following the accident there were substantial redesigns of the new Block II CSM. The
environmental control system was redesigned and strengthened with stainless steel
replacing aluminum tubing, and new techniques of brazing to strengthen tubing joints,
although the use of water glycol was continued, with the expectation that strengthening
the plumbing would prevent leaks. 133 The wiring harnesses were redesigned and
standards for their manufacture were increased - subsequent craft had non-flammable
ties, combed bundles, non-flammable covers on the backs of switches and circuit
breakers, and non-flammable potting of connectors and switches. The two-piece inwards
opening hatch was replaced by a unified outwards opening hatch, constructed to allow it
to be unlatched in less than 3 seconds by the flight crew inside and less than 10 seconds
from the outside. 134 Velcro and Raschel nylon nets were removed from the cabin and
replaced by the non-flammable Betacloth, as part of a substantial program of assessing
and re-assessing the flammability of all materials in the Apollo spacecraft cabin."'3 Over
132 Michael Collins, Liftoff The Story of America's Adventure in Space (New York: Grove Press, 1988), p.
202.
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1,000 pounds of weight was added to the Block II spacecraft, a bitter pill for some North
American engineers who remembered the search for ways to reduce that weight several
years earlier."'36
There were organizational changes at North American, where a new system of
management was put in place, whereby each new Block II spacecraft had a designated
spacecraft manager with total control over that craft. The management tools that Phillips
had introduced to NASA - configuration management, problem reporting systems - were
applied in a much more stringent way. Bill Bergen recalled:
I decided that what we had to have on each of these spacecraft individually, was
one guy who was Mr. Spacecraft 101, one was Mr. 102 and so forth. I wanted
those guys to live with it and know what was in it. I put it this way: 'if necessary
you have my authority, I don't want you to use it unless you have to. I want you
to really make these things go together. '"37
Bergen's first appointment as spacecraft manager was John Healey, a manufacturing
specialist from Martin-Marietta who had taken a similar role on the Gemini spacecraft. 138
Healey was enthusiastic and energetic, and immediately started to address issues on the
North American shop-floor through the imposition of a more rigid pattern of control of
tools, materials and people through the spacecraft, and the assumption of personal
responsibility for his craft. Healey also drew on his experience at Gemini, and an
accident of timing, in another way. The Gemini program had launched its last mission in
November 1966,' 39 which meant that the astronaut corps was free to devote its attention
to the Apollo program. Starting with the first of the new Block II Command Modules, an
astronaut was placed in charge of overseeing each spacecraft as it moved through the
redesign and manufacturing process. After Apollo 1, astronauts, many of whom were not
136 Myers, Interview, 5 March 1999. Johnson Space Center Oral History Project,
http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/history/oral_histories/MyersDD/myersdd.pdf accessed 17 September 2005.
137 William B. Bergen, Interview, 21 June 1971. Held in box 074 -41, Johnson Space Center Historical
Collection, University of Houston Clear Lake.
"13 John Healey, Interview, 21 July 1970. Held in box 074-44, Johnson Space Center Historical Collection,
University of Houston Clear Lake.
139 Hacker and Grimwood, On the Shoulders of Titans, p. 383.
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design engineers, took a much more active role in the engineering of spacecraft, in
particular Frank Borman, who had moved to North American to oversee the
implementation of the Apollo 204 Review Boards findings. 140
There were changes to safety at NASA and North American. The first section of this
study has suggested that safety concerns at NASA and North American in the early years
of the Apollo program were aimed at designing for safety and reinforced with a quality
assurance system and worker engagement program on the shop-floor. The first section of
this study has also suggested, however, that the evidence of shop-floor practices as seen
through the Phillips report, and observations from both NASA and North American
observers, shows that quality assurance systems and shop-floor practices struggled to
cope with the demands of building the Apollo spacecraft. While the term safety culture
was not in existence at the time of the accident, it is clear that a number of the elements
that have been identified to support and constitute a safety culture were not present or
effective at either NASA or North American before the Apollo 1 fire.
In the aftermath of the Apollo 1 accident, several actions were taken to re-energize safety
culture at both NASA and North American. First, the safety functions across the NASA
centers and programs were centralized and strengthened. Martin Raines was placed in
charge of a new consolidated Safety Directorate within the Office of Manned Space
Flight and coordinated safety activities across both the Manned Spaceflight Center and
the Kennedy Space Center.14 1 Raines' appointment signaled a rise in status for the safety
function, reporting directly to George Mueller the Associate Administrator for Manned
Space Flight, rather than through two line managers below the Associate Administrator
for Administration. 142 The Manned Space Flight Safety Office was charged with
developing a coordinated safety policy for all manned spaceflight activity, monitoring the
implementation of this policy, and serving as a focal point for all safety efforts by
140 Frank Borman and Robert J. Serling, Countdown: an autobiography (New York: Silver arrow books,
1988), pp. 181 - 188,
141 Martin L. Raines, Interview, 20 August 1998. Johnson Space Center Oral History Project,
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conducting a system of reviews of safety programs across NASA and its contractors. 43
At the same time, Congress legislated into existence the Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel (ASAP) in order to provide independent advice around issues connected with
safety in NASA."44 The Panel was to have nine members, of whom only four could be
NASA employees, and they reported directly to the Administrator. The Panel had
responsibility for industrial safety, public safety, and a new type of safety: systems safety.
Systems safety in this formulation was defined as:
those activities specifically organized to deal with the potential hazards of complex
R&D systems that involve many highly specialised areas of technology. It places
particular emphasis on achieving safe operation of these systems over their life-
cycles, and it covers major systems for aeronautical and space flight activities,
manned or unmanned, including associated ground based research, development,
manufacturing, and test activities."'45
At North American, the PRIDE program was reinvigorated, and with John Healey's
move into North American, a safety program was developed based on one in existence at
Martin. The Manned Flight Awareness program presented individual awards to workers
deemed to have performed particularly well. These awards were in the form of a Snoopy
pin, presented to the worker by an astronaut, in front of colleagues. These awards were
rare, with only a few hundred given to the over 34,000 workers at North American over
the Apollo program. 46 As has already been discussed, management changes to ensure
stronger levels of individual responsibility for spacecraft at North American were also
implemented, along with changes to shop-floor practices.
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Conclusions
This study has argued that the Apollo 204 accident has generally been described, both by
its investigatory board and subsequently by historians, in a somewhat teleological
manner, rendering invisible the history of the development of the Apollo spacecraft
within two engineering cultures and within the context of the introduction of a new set of
engineering practices. The implication of this critique of the investigation of Apollo 204,
is that there is another story to be told, one that explores the engineering culture and
practices that surrounded the Apollo spacecraft, and provides an explanation for the
accident that is sensitive to the changing contexts and methods of doing engineering in
the US manned spaceflight program.
Chapter two has attempted to provide that explanation. It has suggested that the history
of the Apollo 204 accident reveals the two different engineering cultures of NASA and
North American coming together, struggling to adapt to a new engineering style, systems
engineering, with its own new set of engineering practices, focused around greater
control of cost, schedule and technical change. The history of the tensions between North
American's engineering culture and practices and NASA's engineering culture and
practices in the early 1960s was written into the body of the CM012 spacecraft,
imperfectly erased by the subsequent passage of time and the development of a working
relationship and shared style of engineering between NASA and North American. The
emergence of Joe Shea's systems engineering was a transitional style, a hybrid of older
technical practices and newer systems engineering thinking, which was not to survive the
Apollo 204 accident.
This study now moves from Apollo in the 1960s, to Challenger in the 1980s, but will note
that some of the effects of the Apollo 204 accident can be seen in the engineering cultures
and practices that were revealed in the aftermath of the Challenger accident.
132
MITLibraries
Document Services
Room 14-0551
77 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139
Ph: 617.253.5668 Fax: 617.253.1690
Email: docs@mit.edu
http://libraries.mit.edu/docs
DISCLAIMER OF QUALITY
Due to the condition of the original material, there are unavoidable
flaws in this reproduction. We have made every effort possible to
provide you with the best copy available. If you are dissatisfied with
this product and find it unusable, please contact Document Services as
soon as possible.
Thank you.
Pages are misnumbered
CHAPTER THREE: CHALLENGER - THE
ACCIDENT AND RESPONSES
Introduction
The Challenger section of this study is in two parts. The first part discusses the accident
and then critically examines the accident report produced as an artifact. This is a new
approach to the Challenger accident. Other studies have used the Challenger accident
report as a source of information, or as the evidentiary basis in an application of new
theoretical approaches. This study takes a critical approach to the documents themselves,
analyzing the ways in which they use evidence to develop an argument, the techniques
used to position the report, and seeking to ask what is not being said in the reports.
After examining the accident reports, which themselves are critical documents in NASA's
history, the study goes on to examine how these reports have been received by the
Congress and by the wider historical community. In effect, the study asks what
interpretation historians have put on these documents, and the accidents they describe.
Analysis of the report is important, because the report is one of the most important
histories of the Space Shuttle Program. It is certainly one of the most expensive and
well- researched.' And yet, rather than a narrative history, the Commission report is a
particular interpretation of a set of facts. And this interpretation, in part because of its
official imprimatur, has become an official history and a evidence source for significant
intellectual energy in areas like organizational behavior, engineering ethics and
communication studies. This study argues that the way in which the Commission report
constructs its argument sets up a collection of powerful categories of analysis, which
have largely defined the way in which the Challenger accident has been understood. The
significance of this is wider - as chapter five of this study will show, the interpretation of
the Challenger accident put forward in the Commission's report in part shaped the
understanding of the investigators of the Columbia accident in 2003.
'Frank Oliveri, "NASA gets $50 million for Shuttle Investigation," Florida Today (21 February 2004).
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The second section of the Challenger study examines the events leading up to the
accident, seeking to develop a new understanding of the engineering practices that led to
the accident, locating the accident in the intersection of differing engineering cultures and
in the challenges of adapting normal engineering practice to the unique engineering
circumstance of the Space Shuttle program. This section also draws explicit
comparisons with the AS204 accident, showing the similarities between the two. Finally,
the second Challenger section of this study looks to the Challenger accident to find traces
of the AS204 - not similarities but rather connections, suggesting that there are links
between the two.
A note about sources is necessary. There has been less historical interest in the Space
Shuttle than Apollo or other Apollo-era space programs, and historical sources for the
Space Shuttle program are more limited than for Apollo. It is illustrative to note that the
Apollo Oral History series used in chapter one has no comparison for the Space Shuttle
program. NASA, in the early 1970s, did not commission its historians to record the
events unfolding at NASA in the same way they did in the 1960s. Thus, there are some
constraints in the source material available to provide context to the Challenger section of
this study.
However, the Rogers Commission which investigated the Challenger accident collected a
vast amount of material and conducted over 170 in-depth substantial interviews with
engineers, managers and administrators in the months after the Challenger accident.
These voluminous records provide a part of the evidentiary base for the Challenger
section of the study.2 The nature of the Challenger source material is such that it permits a
very detailed examination of events and issues deemed broadly relevant to the
investigation, and encompasses the perspectives of shopfloor and workbench engineers as
well as more senior managers and administrators. It is also a curious fact that these
documents have seldom been examined by the historical community, with all but one
major work relying on the printed Rogers Commission report, rather than the surrounding
2 The records of the Rogers Commission are held in the National Archives at College Park, MD. The
record collection is over 200 boxes of textual material, comprising over 122,000 pages of technical
documents, 12,000 pages of interview transcripts and 2,800 pages of hearing transcripts.
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document archive. Thus, by going into this under-used resource, it is possible to draw a
far richer, and more nuanced picture of the Challenger accident than has generally been
seen before. The nature of the sources available to study the Challenger accident does,
however, mean that this section of the study will necessarily be of smaller, but more
detailed scope than the discussion of the AS204 accident.
The Challenger accident and its investigation
Since the early 1980s, NASA has provided the United States of America access to low-
earth orbit through the National Space Transportation System (STS). The STS consists of
three main components. First is the reusable Orbiter, a winged vehicle with a payload
bay, three main engines fed from the external tank and an orbital maneuvering system
with two smaller engines used after jettisoning the external tank. The second element of
the STS is a non-reusable external fuel tank (ET) containing cryogenic oxygen and
hydrogen to fuel the Orbiter's main engines. The tank is depleted and jettisoned soon
after launch at an altitude of 60 nautical miles and breaks up upon reentry. The third
element of the STS consists of two reusable segmented solid-fuel rocket boosters (SRB)
fuelled by ammonium perchlorate and aluminum. The SRBs detach around 120 seconds
after launch at a height of 36 nautical miles and are recovered after landing in the ocean.
The STS was designed by NASA between 1971 and 1974. Construction of the fleet of
five Orbiters was carried out by Rockwell International, now part of Boeing. The first
orbiter, the non-flying test vehicle Enterprise, was rolled out in 1976. Columbia was the
first orbiter delivered to NASA's Kennedy Space Center, Florida., in March 1979.
Challenger was delivered to KSC in July 1982, Discovery in November 1983, and
Atlantis in April 1985. The contracts to build the Solid Rocket Boosters and Solid Rocket
Motors were given to Morton Thiokol, now ATK Thiokol Propulsion of Utah and the
External Tank contracts to Martin Marietta, now part of Lockheed Martin.3
' For a general discussion of the structure of the STS, see Dennis Jenkins, Space Shuttle: The History of the
National Space Transportation System, 3rd. ed. (Stillwater, MN: Voyageur Press, 2000), particularly
chapter 10. The early history of the space shuttle is well discussed in Thomas A. Heppenheimer, History
of the Space Shuttle, vols. 1 and 2 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002).
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On 28 January 1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger launched from Kennedy Space Center
(KSC) on mission STS 51 -L, a mission that had been planned since mid-1984. Mission
STS 51-L was the 25th shuttle mission of the STS program.4 The launch date of the 2 8th of
January was the fourth launch date scheduled; the mission had been postponed three
times previously since the original flight date of January 22, 1986. The first two
postponements were caused by the slippage in the schedule of the previous launch, STS
61-C. The third postponement, on January 27, had been caused by problems with an
exterior hatch handle causing a delay up to the point that crosswinds at the KSC had
increased to the point where they exceeded acceptable levels. At around 12:35pm, the
January 27 launch was postponed until the morning of January 28.
Overnight on January 27 at the KSC, the temperature had dropped below freezing, and
ice teams had been sent out three times to examine potential damage to the shuttle.
Images show icicles hanging from guard rails on the launchpad at the Kennedy Space
Center.5 The 28th of January was a very cold morning. Parts of the Space Shuttle,
including the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB), were still below freezing point at launch. The
ambient air temperature was 360F, 15 degrees lower than any previous flight.
There were seven astronauts on board STS 5 1-L: Dick Scobee, Michael Smith, Ellison
Onizuka, Judith Resnik, Ronald McNair, Christa McAuliffe, and Gregory Jarvis. Scobee
was an experienced astronaut, having piloted the Challenger before on mission STS-41C
in 1984, as were Reznik, Onizuka and McNair. For Smith, McAuliffe and Jarvis, it was
their first mission.6 The STS 51-L mission had eight components: to deploy two satellites
and recover one of them from orbit, to conduct three sets of experiments, and to
participate in the monitoring of Comet Halley. Christa McAuliffe, who was a teacher
4 After the ninth manned flight of the STS, NASA instituted a naming scheme for missions such that the
first digit indicated the fiscal year in which the mission was scheduled and the second digit indicated the
launch site. The letter suffix indicated the position in the launch series for the year. Thus, mission STS 51-
L was scheduled in fiscal year 1985-86 to be launched from Kennedy Space Center (the digit 2 indicated a
launch from Vandenburg in California), and was the twelfth mission scheduled for that financial year. It
should be noted that the mission codes was assigned at an early planning stage, and did not necessarily
reflect the circumstances at launch. As such, missions 61-A, 61-B, and 61-C launched before 51-L.
' U.S. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President
(Washington, DC: The Commission, 1986), vol. 1, p. 113.
6 Presidential Commission on Challenger, Report, vol. 1, pp. 10 - 13.
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from New Hampshire, was to conduct a science lesson in orbit via teleconference.7
At 11:38am on January 28 1986, STS 51-L launched. The ambient air temperature was
36°F, 16'F colder than any other launch. Less than a second after launch, a puff of gray
smoke emerged from a joint around two-thirds the way down the right SRB. The cameras
on the launch pad that might have recorded the exact location of the origin of the smoke
were not working. Over the next two seconds, eight more puffs of smoke, blacker and
more dense, emerged from the same place on the SRB. After this time, the puffs of
smoke from the SRB ceased.
Thirty-seven seconds after launch, the Shuttle experienced a 27-second period of severe
wind shear, stronger than any other Shuttle launch had experienced. The Shuttle's
guidance, navigation and control system responded to these conditions by issuing a series
of commands to correct for these environmental effects, more extreme than had ever been
seen before.
Fifty-eight seconds after launch, a small flame appeared on the aft field joint of the right
SRB. Over the next 14 seconds, the flame grew rapidly, burning through the lower strut
holding the SRB to the External Tank. At 65 seconds, Mission Control at Houston
informed commander Dick Scobee that the Shuttle's main engines had successfully
throttled up, and he acknowledged that information. Seventy-two seconds after launch,
the strut burned through and the right SRB rotated around the upper strut, crashing into
the External Tank. The tank collapsed, venting the hydrogen fuel into the atmosphere.
The fuel immediately ignited, and the entire Shuttle flew into the fireball.
At 73 seconds, communication signals with the Challenger was lost. The orbiter entered
the fireball, broke up under severe aerodynamic load, and fell back into the Atlantic
Ocean around 20 miles off the shore of Cape Canaveral. Air and sea rescue vessels - 10
NASA, Navy and Coastguard ships and 12 Air Force Navy and Coastguard aircraft -
rushed to the site, but there were no survivors.
7 "Space Shuttle Mission 51-L Press Kit, January 1986." Held in folder 009214, NASA Historical
Collection, NASA Headquarters.
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Within an hour of the accident, Jesse Moore, NASA's Associate Administrator for
Manned Space Flight, convened a NASA group to investigate the accident. This group
consisted of the directors of KSC and Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), Richard
Smith and William Lucas, the manager of the STS program at Johnson Space Center
(JSC), the director of the Spacelab project, and Walt Williams, consultant to the NASA
administrator.8 Over the next few days, several other members were added to the group,
now formally designated the 51-L Interim Mishap Review Board.9
On 3 February 1986, President Ronald Reagan appointed a Presidential Commission to
investigate the Challenger accident and to report back within 120 days. io The
Commission was chaired by William Rogers, formerly Secretary of State under Richard
Nixon and an attorney by training and experience. The Commission included two
astronauts, Vice Chairman Neil Armstrong and Dr Sally Ride; a test pilot, Charles
Yeager; two physicists, Nobel laureate Dr Richard Feynman and Dr Albert Wheelon; an
attorney, David C. Acheson; three engineers, Robert Rummel, Eugene Covert, and
Joseph Sutter; a senior Air Force officer, General Donald Kutyna; an aerospace
journalist, Robert Hotz; and an astronomer, Dr Arthur Walker. Another engineer was
executive director.
On 5 February, the 51-L Interim Mishap Review Board was disestablished, and replaced
with the 51-L Data and Design Analysis Task Force, comprised of lower-level NASA
officials. The task force was charged with supporting the Commission's activities. On
February 15, the President ordered that NASA officials involved in the decision to launch
the Challenger not be involved in the investigation, resulting in several members of the
task force being replaced."
The Commission conducted public and private hearings over the early part of 1986, and
8 "STS 51-L Data and Design Analysis Task Force: Historical Summary, June 1986." Held in folder
009269, NASA Historical Collection, NASA Headquarters.
9 "STS 51-L Data and Design," pp. 4-6.
10 Presidential Commission on Challenger, Report, vol. 1, pp. 10 - 13.
" "STS 51-L Data and Design," pp. 44 - 45.
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supervised extensive analysis of existing NASA hardware and the recovered wreckage of
the Challenger orbiter and its components. Individual panel members supervised panels
investigating various aspects of the accident, or carried out their own series of fact-
finding trips and interviews. The Commission presented its report to President Reagan
on 6 June 1986.12
The investigation report
The report that the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident
(hereinafter called the Commission) presented was an interesting artifact, particularly in
comparison to the AS204 Review Board report. Physically, the Commission's report
was a full-size, glossy document, with color photographs and a professional, magazine-
style layout, with sidebars and professional illustrations. Volume one was the analytic
section, setting out the Commission's findings and the account of events that supported
those findings. Volume one was supported with four volumes of appendices containing
reproductions of critical documents, a series of reports from investigative teams, detailed
reports on photographic evidence and the recovered debris and wreckage. The report also
reproduced around 2,800 pages of hearings before the panel, with all the written evidence
tabled in the hearings.
The Commission report opened with a preface, noting the national significance of the
manned space flight program and noting the President's personal sadness over the
accident. The preface also laid out the Commission's mandate to:
Review the circumstances surrounding the accident to establish the probable
cause or causes of the accident; and
Develop recommendations for corrective or other action based upon the
Commission's findings and determinations.3
12 Presidential Commission on Challenger, Report, vol. 1, pp. 202-203
13 Presidential Commission on Challenger, Report, vol. 1, p. 1.
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But the preface also makes veiled criticism of previous accidents, observing that in an
open society, immediate public investigations are necessary, and that "in a closed society,
other options are available." 4 The preface also hastens to add that despite appearances in
the few days immediately following the accident, NASA had cooperated fully with the
Commission. The contrast with NASA's investigation of AS204 is immediately obvious;
the Challenger accident was to be investigated in a manner separate from and overriding
any internal investigation conducted by NASA.
After a chapter setting out a brief history of the space shuttle program and a short
description of the shuttle system, chapter two of the Commission's report sets out a short
history of the STS 51 -L mission, noting the numerous reschedules and redefinitions of
the mission, before going on to provide a synopsis of the Flight Readiness Review for 51-
L and then a short history of the launch delays. Following chapters one and two is a third
brief chapter setting out the timeline of events from launch at 11:38am until the final
disintegration of the Challenger orbiter around two minutes later. These first three
chapters are almost entirely narrative, with no conclusions drawn or recommendations
made. Very little of the material included is footnoted or in any other way has its source
indicated.
Chapter four, however, takes a different tone to the first three chapters. Its title, The
Cause of the Accident, makes its overt purpose simple. The chapter goes through a
process of elimination, assessing the performance of each sub-system of the STS system;
the orbiter, the external tank, the space shuttle main engines, and the payload, arguing
that no evidence exists to conclude that any of these sub-systems caused or contributed to
the accident. From there, chapter four goes on to conduct a similar process of analysis of
the SRB - first eliminating the left SRB, then systematically examining possible causes
of failure in the right SRB. After eliminating the consequences of excess structural load,
the possibility of case membrane failure and anomalies in the propellant, the attention
turns to the possibility of SRB joint seal failure. The chapter identifies joint seal failure
as the key candidate for the cause of the accident, and again moves through a series of
'4 Presidential Commission on Challenger, Report, vol. 1, p. 1.
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possibilities. This section examines the sensitivity of the joint to a series of factors -
assembly contamination, gap opening, compression of the o-rings at launch-time, the
temperature of the joint and its effects on the resilience of the o-rings and the possibility
of ice in the joints, and the performance of the insulating putty. The report sets out the
testing procedures used to examine each of these factors, noting that in most cases, there
was significant difficulty in extrapolating subscale performance out to an understanding
of the behavior of the seal at full scale. This section concludes by noting that its analysis
has separated out the elements of a dynamically-interacting system, which may also
affect joint behavior.
At the end of chapter four, there are a series of 16 findings, which are reproduced here in
part:
8. Experimental evidence indicates that due to several effects associated with the
Solid Rocket Booster's ignition and combustion pressures and associated vehicle
motions, the gap between the tang and the clevis will open as much as .017 and.
029 inches at the secondary and primary O-rings, respectively.
9. O-ring resiliency is directly related to its temperature.
10. Experiments indicate that the primary mechanism that actuates O-ring sealing
is the application of gas pressure to the upstream (high-pressure) side of the 0-
ring as it sits in its groove or channel.
11. The sealing characteristics of the Solid Rocket Booster O-rings are enhanced
by timely application of motor pressure.
12. Of 21 launches with ambient temperatures of 61 degrees Fahrenheit or greater,
only four showed signs of O-ring thermal distress; i.e., erosion or blow-by and
soot. Each of the launches below 61 degrees Fahrenheit resulted in one or more
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O-rings showing signs of thermal distress. 5
From these findings, chapter four concludes that:
In view of the findings, the Commission concluded that the cause of the
Challenger accident was the failure of the pressure seal in the aft fieldjoint of the
right Solid Rocket Booster. The failure was due to a faulty design unacceptably
sensitive to a number of factors. These factors were the effects of temperature,
physical dimensions, the character of materials, the effects of reusability,
processing and the reaction of the joint to dynamic loading."
Chapter four sets out, as matters of fact, five assumptions about the field joint, but does
not make any conclusions about which of these factors were more or less relevant, or
even present at the accident, reflecting the complexity, and relative lack of knowledge
about the function of the field joint in the SRB, a point the chapter hints at in its comment
about the difficulty of extrapolating subscale test findings to full-scale joint operation. If
the footnotes to chapter four are examined, however, this sense of complexity and
uncertainty is accentuated. In the technical report that supports the analysis of the field
joint, one of the major findings makes this point clear:
The joint that failed was not found to be unique in that many of the factors
identified and assessed during the investigation that can adversely affect seal
performance were present to varying degrees in other SRM field joints on STS
51-L. It is therefore necessary to modify the SRM joint design to preclude or
eliminate the effect of all these factors and/or conditions acting singularly and in
combinations. 17
Chapter four sets out to discuss the cause of the accident, but presents a rather uncertain
finding: that the accident was caused by the failure of the aft field joint on the SRM.
15 Presidential Commission on Challenger, Report, vol. 1, pp. 70 - 72.
16 Presidential Commission on Challenger, Report, vol. 1, p. 72.
", Presidential Commission on Challenger, Report, vol. 2, appendix L, p. 89.
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What is not made clear is what the mechanism for failure was, how the joint failed, or
even exactly how and why the design was faulty.
Chapter five, The Contributing Cause of the Accident, sets out its argument in the first
paragraph:
The decision to launch the Challenger was flawed. Those who made that decision
were unaware of the recent history of problems concerning the O-rings and the
joint and were unaware of the initial written recommendation of the contractor
advising against the launch at temperatures below 53 degrees Fahrenheit and the
continuing opposition of the engineers at Thiokol after the management reversed
its position. [...] If the decisionmakers had known all of the facts, it is highly
unlikely that they would have decided to launch 51-L on January 28, 1986.
Chapter five sets out the series of events that led to this conclusion, with the key piece of
evidence a detailed discussion of a teleconference held on the evening of January 27
between Morton Thiokol (MT), the manufacturers of the SRB and personnel from
NASA's KSC and Marshall Space Center (MSC). As recounted in the Commission's
report, the purpose of the telecon was for Thiokol managers to raise concerns by Thiokol
engineers about the effects of cold temperature on the SRB joints. The telecon was
convened at approximately 8:45pm following an earlier, abortive attempt to convene, and
Thiokol engineers Roger Boisjoly and Arnie Thompson presented their case for concern.
At the end of this presentation a recommendation was presented to NASA that Thiokol
did not feel they could safely recommend launch at temperatures lower than 53F.
Upon hearing this recommendation, senior NASA managers George Hardy and Lawrence
Mulloy used vigorous language to challenge Joe Kilminster, the Thiokol manager giving
the recommendation. Kilminster than called for an offline conversation between the
Thiokol engineers and managers. In the course of this offline conversation, Kilminster
and the three other Thiokol managers present were asked to reconsider their
recommendations not to launch, and in one infamous incident, Bob Lund, the vice-
145
president of engineering was instructed "to take off his engineering hat and put on his
management hat." The telecon was then reconvened, at which point Kilminster informed
NASA that Thiokol management reversed its initial recommendation and indicated that it
was no longer recommending against launch. The Commission report than goes on to
observe that the concerns of the Thiokol engineers around launch temperatures should
have been conveyed further up the NASA decision-making chain, but were not.
On the basis of this analysis, the Commission drew some conclusions:
The Commission concluded that there was a serious flaw in the decision making
process leading up to the launch offlight 51-L. A well structured and managed
system emphasizing safety would have flagged the rising doubts about the Solid
Rocket Booster joint seal. Had these matters been clearly stated and emphasized
in the flight readiness process in terms reflecting the views of most of the Thiokol
engineers and at least some of the Marshall engineers, it seems likely that the
launch of 5 l-L might not have occurred when it did.
4. The Commission concluded that the Thiokol Management reversed its position
and recommended the launch of 51 -L, at the urging of Marshall and contrary to
the views of its engineers in order to accommodate a major customer.18
While the text of the findings does not specifically ascribe blame, its use of language is
very suggestive. Chapter five draws clear distinctions between managers and engineers
throughout the telecon on January 27. This point is clearly indicated by the literary
techniques used in chapter five. Unlike the previous four chapters, chapter five quotes
extensively from testimony given to the Commission during public hearing, with the
most prominent positions given to the testimonies of Roger Boisjoly and Arnold
Thompson, Thiokol engineers opposed to the launch, and George Hardy and Lawrence
18 Presidential Commission on Challenger, Report, vol. 1, p. 104.
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Mulloy, NASA managers who challenged them. These large pieces of verbatim
testimony are then followed by testimony from more senior NASA managers William
Lucas and Arnold Aldrich, who indicate their lack of awareness of the content of the
January 27 telecon, but their reassurances that they would have acted had they known.
Despite an untargeted finding of a flawed decision-making system, Chapter five clearly
lays the blame for the accident at the feet of NASA and Morton Thiokol managers, who
overrode the demonstrable safety concerns of their engineers, in order to continue to fly.
The argument set out in chapter five is oddly teleological, in the sense that because
Challenger crashed and the information that could have prevented the launch was known
to some but not all, the Commission concluded that the decision to launch must have
flawed. Because the processes of information transmission were poor, key decision-
makers must have not been adequately informed, as no-one would willfully ignore safety
concerns. And yet chapter five seems to suggest that mid-level NASA managers did
exactly that, whereas senior managers were simply misinformed. The evidence for this is
a series of testimonies from senior officials saying exactly that - if they had known, they
would have acted. It is hard to imagine how a senior NASA manager would deny this
point after the fact.
Chapter five is clear to draw distinctions between engineers and managers present on the
night of January 27, categorizing the speakers by virtue of job title and organizational
position. This point will be discussed in greater detail later in this study, but it worth
noting that almost all present at the telecon were managers in the sense of having some
formal management responsibilities within their organizations, and were almost all
engineers in the sense of having formal engineering qualifications and experience. The
chapter also draws a distinction between mid-level managers present at the January 27
telecon who applied inappropriate pressure to Thiokol to reverse their recommendation
not to launch, and more senior managers, presumably resistant to the flight schedule
pressures placed on mid-level managers, who were either not informed or mis-informed
about Thiokol's concerns over flight safety.
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Chapter five has some omissions. Testimony is mainly quoted from NASA managers and
from Thiokol engineers, leaving largely silent the voices of the other participants from
NASA and Thiokol who do not fit so neatly into the Commission's framework,
particularly the contingent of NASA engineers present at the January 27 telecon who
were also familiar with the SRB joints and who did not support Thiokol's
recommendation against launching.
Following chapters four and five, the Commission report then sets out three chapters that
present contributing factors to the flawed launch decision. Chapters seven shows how the
capability of NASA's safety system had been systematically degraded over time to the
point that by 1986, the Commission could indict it as silent and ineffective in the face of
increasing pressure on the launch schedule. Chapter eight details the history of the space
shuttle program, focusing on the increased launch tempo over the mid-1980s, noting the
stresses and strains that this was placing on NASA and its contractors and resources.
While no explicit connection is drawn to the findings of chapter five, the implicit
message was that this relentless pressure was leading to compromises in safety and
quality in order to keep to the flight schedule.
Chapter six, An Accident Rooted in History, is a history of the SRB joint, noting the long
list of concerns, dangers signs and failures of comprehension involved in the
development of the joint. Explicit in chapter six is the idea that enough was known about
the SRB joint to have raised concerns for NASA engineers. The story told in chapter six
is told from a series of documents, rather than from the comprehensive set of interviews
the Commission's investigators conducted. It is not a story of engineering in the making,
but rather a chronological series of warning signs, mistakes and omissions, aimed to
demonstrate the moments at which the accident could have been averted, if appropriate
attention had been paid.
The Commission's report concludes by making a series of recommendations including a
comprehensive redesign and certification of the SRB joints, a review of NASA and the
shuttle program's management structures, improved communications at MSC, and
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greater institutional focus on safety via a number of mechanisms. The report also
recommended addressing the flight schedule to ensure it was compatible with the
resources devoted to it, and also addressing concerns around safety with the shuttle
landing and with maintenance. The report concludes with some broader sentiments:
The Commission urges that NASA continue to receive the support of the
Administration and the nation. The agency constitutes a national resource that
plays a critical role in space exploration and development. It also provides a
symbol of national pride and technological leadership.
The commission applauds NASA's spectacular achievements of the past and
anticipates impressive achievements to come. The findings and recommendations
presented in this report are intended to contribute to the future NASA successes
that the nation both expects and requires as the 21st century approaches.' 9
This is a very muted statement of support for NASA, perhaps not surprising given the
findings of the Commission. By contrast, the AS204 report, whose findings could also be
interpreted as critical of NASA, was far more willing to be complimentary: "The Board is
very concerned that its description of the defects in the Apollo Program [...] will be
interpreted as an indictment of the entire manned space flight program and a castigation
of the many people associated with that program. Nothing is further from the Board's
intent. 20
Commissioner Richard Feynman, a Nobel Prize winning physicist from the California
Institute of Technology, went further in appendix F to the report. This appendix
contained Feynman's personal observations from his service on the Commission and
particularly addressed the difference he had observed between NASA and Thiokol
engineers and managers. Feynman observed that managers and engineers tended to
calculate risk in very different ways-managers determined risk from a number of
"9 Presidential Commission on Challenger, Report, vol. 1, p. 201.
20 U.S. Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (Washington DC: GPO, 1967), p. 1-3.
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qualitative factors, whereas engineers calculated risk quantitatively, using standard
statistical methods. He also observed that these two methods tended to produce widely
divergent results. Managers generally believed risks to be orders of magnitude less than
engineers understood.21 Feynman was highly critical of this gap, arguing that there were
only two explanations for it. The first was dishonesty on the part of managers, designed
to ensure a continuous flow of funding for the Shuttle. The second was an incredible lack
of communication between engineers and managers.22 He argued that to ensure safe
operation of the Shuttle, NASA managers needed to understand the realities of risk
involved in flying high-performance vehicles like the Shuttle. After all, he concluded,
"for a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for
Nature cannot be fooled."23
The wider arguments set forward in the Commission's report largely echoed Feynman's
findings, even though Feynman felt upset that his views had not been adequately
incorporated into the final document.24
The message of the Commission report is clear. The accident was caused by a faulty
field joint on the right SRB. The joint was badly designed, there had been a long history
of problems with it, and this history was known to engineers at both NASA and Thiokol.
In a crucial meeting on the evening before the Challenger launch, Thiokol engineers
presented their concerns about the effects of low temperatures on the functioning of the
SRB joints, arguing that there was a grave danger to flight safety if the launch went
ahead. Pressured by NASA managers unwilling to let flight schedules slip, Thiokol
managers overruled their own engineers and reversed their decision, and agreed to a
launch. The concerns of Thiokol engineers and the overturned recommendation not to
launch were never passed up the chain of command at NASA, and so the launch went
ahead, with fatal consequences.
2' Richard Phillips Feynman and Ralph Leighton, What Do You Care What Other People Think? Further
Adventures of a Curious Character (New York: Norton, 1988), pp. 179-184. This volume also contains a
version of appendix F edited for clarity, pp. 220-237. For the original version, see Presidential Commission
on Challenger, Report, vol. 2, pp. F-1-F-5.
22 Feynman and Leighton, What Do You Care, pp. 236-237.
23 Presidential Commission on Challenger, Report, vol. 2, p. F-5.24 Feynman and Leighton, What Do You Care, pp. 199-205.
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The key analytic distinction that the Commission's report drew was between managers
and engineers, arguing that management and engineers saw the world in very different
ways, and argued implicitly that managers and engineers adhered, probably
inappropriately, to different sets of moral rules. Engineers understood the performance
and risks of the technology of spaceflight as quantifiable and determined by the material
world, and so were able to speak authoritatively about safety from that perspective, whilst
managers understood safety and risk as flexible and manageable in commercial and
political contexts. The cause of the accident, the report concluded, was the failure of
communication between these two perspectives, and the decision-making process that
was skewed in favor of managers. The ultimate expression of this philosophy, they found,
was the statement by Jerry Mason of Morton Thiokol telling his subordinate Robert
Lund, vice-president of engineering, "You've got to put on your management hat, not
your engineering hat" in order to determine whether the Challenger would launch the
next day.25
This analytic division between managers and engineers essentially silences the engineers
as actors in the Challenger story. At best, the engineers become the voices of the
technology, simply passing on messages to their managers, as the findings of the
Commission's report make clear:
The Commission has concluded that neither Thiokol nor NASA responded
adequately to internal warnings about the faulty seal design. Furthermore, Thiokol
and NASA did not make a timely attempt to develop and verify a new seal after
the initial design was shown to be deficient. Neither organization developed a
solution to the unexpected occurrences of O-ring erosion and blow-by even
though this problem was experienced frequently during the Shuttle flight history.26
Engineers "warn" NASA, with no sense that the engineers might be part of NASA.
NASA and Thiokol - and this must be taken to mean managers at NASA and Thiokol -
25 Presidential Commission on Challenger, Report, vol. 1, p. 94.
26 Presidential Commission on Challenger, Report, vol. 1, p. 148.
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did not make a timely attempt to resolve problems with the seal, by which it must be
meant that NASA and Thiokol managers did not instruct NASA and Thiokol engineers in
time, for it seems hard to imagine how the managers could resolve this engineering
problem by themselves.
The Commission report is very different in tone from the AS204 Review Board report.
The Commission report discusses in significant detail the cause and contributing cause of
the Challenger accident, developing a very strong narrative to explain both how the
accident happened, why it happened, and who bore the responsibility for that accident.
As chapter two has discussed, the AS204 report was at pains to note that it was not
seeking to assign responsibility or blame, and its analysis of the causes of the accident is
almost entirely devoted to an analysis of the proximate physical causes.
And yet, the reports share characteristics as well. Neither of the reports tells a story of
engineering in the making - or how the physical causes of the accident came to be. The
Commission's report tells a brief history of engineering mistakes, as does the Apollo 204
report, which hides the engineering history that might explain how these mistakes came
to be made, or even if they were mistakes, if understood in historical context, or based on
what was known at the time.
The American people and the Congress heard the message that the Commission was
sending. In a New York Times-CBS poll taken in January 1987, 60% surveyed
considered NASA officials to be to blame for the accident, compared to 13% who blamed
the engineers responsible for the design, while 8% blamed both.2 7 A larger set of polls,
however, showed that NASA's public support had not significantly diminished as a result
of the publication of the Commission's report, and indeed that public opinion of the
Commission and its findings was high.28
27 "NASA to blame a year after the Challenger explosion," UPINational Wire, 28 January, 1987. Held in
folder 018181, NASA Historical Collection, NASA Headquarters.
28 John D. Miller, "The Impact of the Challenger Accident on Public attitudes to the Space Program: A
report to the National Science Foundation," 25 January 1987. Held in folder 009273, NASA Historical
Collection, NASA Headquarters.
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The House Committee on Science and Technology started holding hearings on the
Challenger accident on 10 June 1986. As with Apollo 204, from which the Committee
drew its precedent, hearings were delayed until the Commission report was published.
The committee conducted 10 days of hearings, questioning senior NASA and Morton
Thiokol officials, as well as members of the Commission, astronauts, and Morton
Thiokol engineers. 29 While the Committee endorsed the findings of the Commission, their
report went further:
The Committee feels that the underlying problem which led to the Challenger
accident was not poor communication or inadequate procedures as implied by the
Rogers Commission conclusion. Rather the fundamental problem was poor
technical decision-making over a period of several years by top NASA and
contractor personnel, who failed to act decisively to solve the increasingly serious
anomalies in the Solid Rocket Booster joints.30
The Committee went on to criticize a number of other hardware problems at NASA,
arguing that there were major issues of concern surrounding the performance of the
Space Shuttle Main Engine, the shuttle landing gear and brakes, and the nose-wheel
assembly. The Committee linked these problems both the communication system at
NASA, criticized by the Rogers Commission, but also to wider government practices.
The Committee expressed its concern that:
The Committee is not assured that NASA has adequate technical and scientific
expertise to conduct the Space Shuttle program properly. NASA has suffered
staffing reductions in key areas over several years. Moreover, it loses a
significant number of technical/scientific personnel due to an imbalance between
the government salary structure and that of the private sector. The salary structure
also inhibits NASA's ability to recruit top technical talent to replace its losses.31
29u.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology, Investigation of the Challenger Accident.
Report of the Committee on Science and Technology, House of Representatives, Ninety-Ninth Congress,
Second Session, 1986, pp. 37-38.
30 House Committee on Science and Technology, Investigation of the Challenger Accident, Report, p. 5.
31 House Committee on Science and Technology, Investigation of the Challenger Accident, Report, p. 6.
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Responses: Historians
The Challenger historiography is extensive and wide ranging, but has several common
features. The first is that, with few exceptions, these studies are primarily dependent on
volume one of the Commission's report as their evidence base. Where other evidence is
used, it is largely journalistic accounts, wider historical material about NASA and
published histories of the space program. With one exception, which will be discussed in
detail later, few discussions of the Challenger accident have examined the vast collection
of interviews and documents collected during the course of the Commission's
investigation. As such, the very powerful narrative framework and set of analytic
categories developed by the Commission have seldom been challenged or questioned.
Second, much of the literature about the Challenger accident is focused around
developing an argument for a particular way of thinking about the world, and fitting the
Challenger accident into that framework. All historical writing is selective about its
choice of evidence, but much of the Challenger literature is very selective about the
exclusion of pieces of evidence that do not fit its framework. In many cases the purpose
of the writing seems to be far more to advance the authority of the framework rather than
explain the Challenger accident.
Third, the shape of the Challenger historiography can in many ways be explained by the
nature of the report itself. As Peter Galison has suggested, accident reports have built
into them an intrinsic tension between the local explanation and the diffuse social or
systems explanation.32 The Commission report is no different. Reading through chapters
five through eight, the cause of the accident becomes more diffuse chapter by chapter, as
the report's attention moves from the misconduct of NASA managers in a specific
meeting in chapter five, to a history of technical failure and oversight around one
particular piece of technology in chapter six, to a failure of the entire NASA safety
organization in chapter seven, to an indictment of the entire NASA organization in
32 Peter Galison, "An accident of history," in Peter Galison and Alex Roland, eds., Atmospheric Flight in
the Twentieth Century (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), pp. 3 - 45.
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chapter eight. But chapter four of the report in particular systematically focuses
perspective on the causal object, the right hand SRB aft field joint, after eliminating other
physical causes. Why does this matter, Galison asks? Because in the search for a local
cause comes the promise that anomalies can resolved, that change can be effected, and
that the appropriate sanctions and remedies can be put in place to prevent the situation
from recurring.33
This insight helps to explain the shape of much of the Challenger historiography. Almost
all the analytic works examine the report from the perspective that a certain theoretical
perspective, or re-ordering of the facts can identify the cause of the accident and then can
help to suggest remedies. As such, the focus for much of the Challenger historiography
(and most of the analytic, rather than narrative work on Challenger) has been on the
telecon of January 27. In the Commission report, the telecon is a contained event, with a
distinct cast of characters, and a clear set of facts, and even the words that were spoken
by the key players on that night, available for analysis.
Interpretations of the Challenger accident fall into a number of schools of thinking.
The first school builds on both the critical tone of the Commission report and its
conclusions, emphasizing managerial misconduct, the over-ruling of engineering
concerns about safety in order to maintain schedule, the placing of cost and schedule
concerns over safety in a more general sense, and political pressure which NASA was
unable or unwilling to resist. Key works in this mode include Malcolm McConnell's
Challenger: A Major Malfunction: A Story of Politics, Greed and the Wrong Stuff and
Joseph Trento's Prescription for Disaster: From the Glory ofApollo to the Betrayal of
the Shuttle.34 In both works, the sources used are newspapers accounts, the Commission
reports and a series of interviews with very senior (and at the time retired) NASA
officials.
33 Galison, pp. 39 - 40.
34 Malcolm McConnell, Challenger: A Major Malfunction: A Story of Politics, Greed and the Wrong Stuff
(New York: Doubleday & Co, 1987); Joseph J. Trento (with reporting and editing by Susan B. Trento)
Prescription for Disaster: From the Glory of Apollo to the Betrayal of the Shuttle (New York: Crown
Publishers, Inc, 1987)
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Both McConnell and Trento follow the narrative set out by the Commission report -
telling a story of the shuttle as a flawed piece of engineering, of engineers overruled by
managers bowing to political and corporate pressure. Both go on to hint at political
cover-ups, with McConnell explicitly accusing NASA of withholding information
requested under the Freedom of Information Act.
Both authors emphasize the wider political context of the accident, looking back to the
award of the SRB contract to Morton Thiokol in the mid-1970s. Both examine the claims
that a "Mormon Mafia" associated with NASA Administrator Jim Fletcher and Senator
Jake Garn, both of Utah, were responsible for the inappropriate award of the contract to
Thiokol. Both works go on to trace the political pressures placed on NASA, and the
compromises NASA made in order to get the shuttle program approved initially and then
continuing funding. For Trento, the US Air Force and the Department of Defense are key
villains in the piece, having never wanted the Space Shuttle program and devoting
significant time and effort to attempting to having it shot down, alongside President
Jimmy Carter and NASA administrator Jim Fletcher.35 For McConnell, blame can be
spread wider:
The average person viewing Challenger on Launch Pad 39B would have
perceived a technological miracle, the quintessence of this country's innovative
scientific excellence. In reality, the vehicle - and especially its vulnerable and
hazardous propulsion system - was the ultimate product of blatant Congressional
pork barreling, bureaucratic duplicity, inexcusable corporate deception, and
public ignorance. 36
The conclusions the works come to are unsurprising. Trento wrote:
The NASA that lifted our spirits and our pride is gone. The spirit and perhaps the
last vestiges of that old NASA spirit was spread over 93,000 square miles of
35 Trento, p.
36 McConnell, p. 10.
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ocean last January twenty-eighth. The Department of Defense, in fact the United
States Air Force, has offered to provide a pair of empty Minuteman silos at the
Canaveral Air Force Station to bury the remnants of Challenger. A plaque should
be put up that reads: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration 1958-
1986.
And McConnell's conclusions are similar, discussing his visit to KSC to examine the
wreckage of the Challenger:
Here among the debris of the orbiter one is forced to recognize that political
compromise, bureaucratic deception, and corporate duplicity all have
consequences. [...] Chipping a goose barnacle from the Challenger's crumpled
wing serves as an adequate reminder that political decisions involving complex
technology often produce unexpected results. 37
Building on McConnell and Trento's work, as well as drawing on the Commissions
report, are less bitter, more neutral in tone works by Claus Jensen and Richard Lewis.3"
These works provide detailed narrative around the Challenger accident, but remain
faithful to the basic elements of the Commission's reports. Jensen's work is more
discursive than Lewis's, and he discusses in his conclusions concerns around the role of
individuals in large organizations:
Great strength of conviction may be demanded for an individual to speak his mind
and trust to his own sense of what is right and decent - as Roger Boisjoly and
Allan McDonald did on the eve of the Challenger launch. [...] The systems are
going to guard themselves. So - in the Space Transportation System, as in other
large, complex systems, it takes employees with personal integrity, intuition and
common sense, along with undiminished human experience. 39
37 McConnell, p. 252.
38 Claus Jensen, No Downlink: A Dramatic Narrative About the Challenger Accident and Our Time (New
York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1996); Richard S. Lewis, Challenger: The Final Voyage (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1988).
3 Jensen, p. 370.
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Once again, the basic narrative of the Commission report is reproduced, although with
moral overtones made more explicit. For Jensen, good engineers were overruled by bad
managers, themselves influenced by inappropriate external factors.
Jensen's work leads into another school of thinking around the Challenger accident. This
group of works is focused on the ethic lessons that can be drawn from the Challenger
accident, especially ethic lessons for engineers. The vast majority of this work focuses
on the personal qualities of the engineers involved. In this construction, Roger Boisjoly
has become a critical figure. Carolyn Whitbeck's Ethics in Engineering Practice and
Research exemplifies this type of work, although there are a number of other examples
available. 40
Whitbeck makes the case that Boisjoly's actions over the year leading up to the Challnger
launch in 1986 exemplify responsible engineering behavior. Whitbeck's account is
heavily dependent on the Commission's report, taking as given the events and their
interpretation set out. She assumes that the account given of the telecon on January 27 is
both accurate and correctly analyzed. From there Whitbeck pulls out the key elements of
Boisjoly's behavior that she regards as an exemplar of ethical engineering. She notes his
actions in conduct tests to further explain what he saw as engineering problems, his
keeping of a diary recording this, his sharing of his findings with his colleague Arnie
Thompson, and his willingness to speak out in the face of hostility from his managers. 41
At the website of the National Academy of Engineering's Online Ethics Center, Roger
Boisjoly is one of the "moral exemplars" listed in the section that "gives detailed stories
of scientists and engineers in difficult circumstances who have demonstrated wisdom that
enabled them to fulfill their responsibilities as scientists and engineers. Their actions
40 Caroline Whitbeck, Ethics in Engineering Practice and Research (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998). See also the Online Ethics Centre of the National Academy of Engineering
http://www.onlineethics.org/cms/7123.aspx, and Lea P. Stewart, "Who were the Whistleblowers? The Case
of Allan McDonald and Roger Boisjoly." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Speech
Communication Association (73rd, Boston, MA, November 5-8, 1987).
41 Whitbeck, pp. 135 - 143.
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provide guidance for others who want to do the right thing in circumstances that are
similarly difficult."42 The reader of this section is invited to step through seven elements
of the lead-in to the Challenger launch, and then to ask themselves questions about how
they might have acted when confronted with Boisjoly's situation. In the element titled
"A Management Decision Overrides a Recommendation Not to Launch," the reader is
invited to consider the following questions:
What is the situation that Boisjoly faces now? He has presented his case. NASA
has acted in a way that was unprecedented in Boisjoly's experience. They have put
the burden of proof on those who believed it was risky to fly rather than on those
who felt it was safe to fly. Fearing that NASA will not continue to make Morton
Thiokol the sole contractor for the Solid Rocket Booster program if they insist on
holding back the Challenger flight, management has reversed the decision made
by engineering. He has had over a year to work on the joint problem and in that
time ten shuttle missions have flown successfully. Is there anything else that can
be done at this point?43
The discussion of Boisjoly's position concludes with a brief statement:
Roger Boisjoly made a number of choices in the months leading up to the
Challenger accident. He consistently took an ethical course of action, often
risking his job. Nevertheless, he was unable to avert the January 28 launch. In
1988 Roger Boisjoly was given the American Association for the Advancement
of Science Award for Scientific Freedom and Responsibility for his extensive and
well conceived efforts to avert the shuttle disaster.44
The basic narrative of the Commission report is here again repeated, in more detail and
with names attached to the actors. The Challenger accident has become an exemplar of
appropriate (and inappropriate) ethical and moral action. It is interesting to note that the
42 http://www.onlineethics.org/CMS/profpractice/exempindex.aspx
43 http://www.onlineethics.org/CMS/profpractice/exempindex/RB-intro/Override.aspx
44 http://www.onlineethics.org/CMS/profpractice/exempindex/RB-intro/RB 1-7.aspx
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story is told to inform and guide the position of an engineer; there is no discussion of
what a responsible engineer in a management position might learn from the accident.
In a similar vein, the Columbia Journalism Review published, in 1986, an article looking
at the role of the media in the Challenger accident. 45 The article questions the inability of
unwillingness of the national media to question NASA despite awareness amongst
journalists of safety issues in the shuttle program and indeed a series of published articles
in The New York Times, The Washington Post, Time and Newsweek, pointing out
episodes of danger during shuttle missions. The article concludes that the press was
dazzled by NASA's glamorous image, dating back from Mercury, which blinded them to
the patterns of danger signals:
an overpowering stereotype can cause reporters to downplay important facts of
failure to make connections between them: NASA was highly successful, so
shuttle engine shutdowns, brake failures, tire blowouts, fuel leaks, cost overruns,
must be of relatively minor significance. They were reported as isolated events,
not perceived jointly as a mosaic of danger demanding investigation.46
In a more technically oriented interpretation, Edward Tufte examined the Challenger
accident.47 Tufte's conclusion was that, irrespective of any indirect causes of the
accident, there was one clear proximate cause: the inability of Thiokol engineers to
clearly communicate their concerns at the January 27 telecon around the resilience of the
SRB O-rings under low temperature conditions. Tufte goes further to suggest even that
the engineers themselves failed in professional responsibility to analyze and present data
clearly succinctly. When discussing the 13 charts presented by the Thiokol engineers in
support of their initial recommendation not to launch, Tufte argues that:
Failure to think clearly about the analysis and presentation of evidence opens the
45 William Boot, "NASA and the Spellbound Press," Columbia Journalism Review, no. 4 (July/August
1986). http://www.cjrarchives.org/issues/2003/1/rewind-hanson.asp
46 Boot.
47 Edward Tufte, Visual and Statistical Thinking: Displays ofEvidence for Making Decisions (Cheshire,
CT: Graphics Press LLC, 1997).
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door for all sorts of political and other mischief to operate in making decisions.
For the Challenger, there were substantial pressures to get if off the ground as
quickly as possible: an unrealistic and over-optimistic flight schedule[...]; the
difficulty for the rocket maker to deny the demands of its major client; and a
preoccupation with public relations and media events [...]. But these pressures
would not have prevailed over credible evidence against the launch, for many
other flights had been delayed in the past for good reasons. Had the correct
scatterplot or data table been constructed, no-one would have dared to risk the
Challenger in such cold weather.48
Other authors, in particular F. F. Lighthall and Siddhartha R. Dalal, Edward B. Fowlkes
and Bruce Hoadley have re-analyzed the data presented to support Thiokol's initial
recommendation not to launch.49 These authors have concluded, like Edward Tufte, that
data analysis and presentation was so weak that a discernable pattern of correlation
between the performance of the SRB joints and temperature was obscured in the critical
telecon of January 27, and so the preventable Challenger accident took place.
The issue of communication is picked up Phillip K. Tompkins in his work Apollo,
Challenger, Columbia: The Decline of the Space Program, A Study in Organizational
Communication.50 Tompkins argues that the Commission report on the Challenger shows
that communications channels within NAS had badly broken down. Drawing on his
experiences from time spent at MSC while Wernher von Braun was Director, Tompkins
concludes that MSC's communications protocols had changed such that there was no
longer a free flow of information up and down the hierarchy at MSC, nor was there free
flows on information between MSC and its contractors. These communications failures
48 Tufte, p. 30.
49 F.F. Lighthall, "Launching the Space Shuttle Challenger: disciplinary deficiencies in the analysis of
engineering data," IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 38, no. 1 (February 1991), pp. 63 - 74;
Siddhartha R. Dalal, Edward B. Fowlkes and Bruce Hoadley, "Risk Analysis of the Space Shuttle: Pre-
Challenger Prediction of Failure," Journal of the American Statistical Association 84, no. 408 (December
1989), pp. 945-957; Michael Lavine, "Problems in Extrapolation Illustrated With Space Shuttle O-Ring
Data," Journal of the American Statistical Association 86, no. 416 (December 1991), pp. 919-921; Emilio
Matricciani, "Guest Editorial: The "Missing" Damage-Temperature Relationship in the Challenger
Incident," IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 48, no. 3 (August 2001), pp. 267-271.
50 Phillip K. Tompkins, Apollo, Challenger, Columbia: The Decline of the Space Program, A Study in
Organizational Communication (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Company, 2005).
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meant that MSC, on the night of January 27, had put Thiokol in the position of having to
prove that launching the Challenger was not safe, rather than having to prove that it was
safe. Tompkins goes on to discuss the problems in communications between the
engineers and managers, concluding that the Challenger accident shows that von Braun's
philosophy at MSC in the 1960s of responsible individuals - that everyone had a
responsibility to fix an problem they saw, irrespective of organizational status - had
broken down. This breakdown, he concluded, led to the accident: "Upon reflection, the
accident wouldn't have happened if there had been one individual in management who
had said 'No, this isn't the way we do it.""'
Other authors have also examined the Challenger accident from the perspective of group,
organizational or technical communication and decision-making. Randy Y. Hirokawa,
Dennis S. Gouran, and Amy E. Martz conclude that the Challenger accident was the
result of a interaction between a number of cognitive, psychological, and social forces
constituting the decision environment, including faulty shared beliefs held decision
makers, questionable reasoning decision makers, perceived pressure, and use of
ambiguous language. 52 In a similar manner, D.A.Winsor argues that miscommunication
lay at the heart of the accident, caused by several factors, including managers and
engineers interpreting data from different perspectives and compounded by the difficulty
of delivering unfavorable conclusions, especially to superiors or outsiders. Winsor's
article concludes: "an understanding of the dynamics at work in the Challenger case can
help engineers and engineering managers elsewhere reduce miscommunication in their
own companies.""53
The concept of groupthink has also been used extensively to analyze the Challenger
accident. The concept of groupthink was developed by Irving Janis in the early 1970s,
and argues that tightly-knit social groups can have a tendency to arrive at consensus
51 Tompkins, p. 127.52 Randy Y. Hirokawa, Dennis S. Gouran, and Amy E. Martz, "Understanding the Sources of Faulty Group
Decision Making," Small Group Research 19, no. 4 (1988), pp. 411-433.
5 Winsor, D.A., "Communication failures contributing to the Challenger accident: an example for technical
communicators," IEEE Transactions on Professional Communication 31, no. 3 (September 1988), pp. 101-
107.
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decisions without evaluating other, less palatable options in order to maintain group
harmony. Janis went on to argue that this phenomena is more prevalent in situations
where there is a high level of social or professional homogeneity in the group, or under
particularly stressful circumstances.5 4 Several authors have applied this concept to the
Challenger accident, concluding from an examination of the Commission report and other
secondary sources that the Challenger accident was indeed characterized by groupthink.5 5
In a thoughtful article published in 1988, William H. Starbuck and Frances J. Milliken
have argued that the causes of the Challenger accident can be found in incremental
changes over time to the technology of the SRB, combined with a cognitive style of
learning from experience that suggested that past successes increased the likelihood of
future successes, and differing responsibilities of engineers and managers. 56 They
suggest that over time, NASA and Thiokol's incremental changes to the SRB joints were
making them more risky which was masked by a growing belief that past successes
validated these decisions. Safety margins were seen by engineers as necessary, but
managerial experience of over-engineering and the natural conservatism of engineers
meant that managers were willing to negotiate safety margins in the context of wider
pressures around their managerial role.
Addressing the issue from a public policy perspective, Barbara S. Romzek and Melvin J.
Dubnick argue that mechanisms of accountability changed at NASA between the 1960s
and the 1980s, suggesting that an older style of professional engineering accountability
was replaced by political and bureaucratic accountability in response to NASA's
changing political and technical context as the agency moved from Apollo to the
Shuttle.57 Romzek and Dubnick point to the Commission's identification of political
pressures to maintain the launch schedule, and bureaucratic pressures from an
54 Irving L Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1972).
55 G. Moorhead, R. Ference, and C.P. Neck, "Group decision fiascos continue: Space Shuttle Challenger
and a revised framework," Human Relations 44, no. 1 (1991), pp. 539-50; J.K. Esser and J. L. Lindoerfer,
"Groupthink and the Space Shuttle Challenger accident: toward a quantitative case analysis," Journal of
Behavioral Decision Making, 2, no. 3 (1989), pp. 167-77.
56 William H. Starbuck and Frances J. Milliken, "Challenger: Fine-Tuning The Odds Until Something
Breaks," Journal of Management Studies 25, no. 4 (July 1988), pp. 319-340.
57 Barbara S. Romzek and Melvin J. Dubnick, "Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons from the
Challenger Tragedy," Public Administration Review 47, no. 3 (May - Jun., 1987), pp. 227-238.
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increasingly hierarchical organizational structure at NASA, and argue that these
mechanism of accountability overrode engineering concerns around safety. They
conclude that for NASA to avoid such accidents in future, it must ensure that professional
accountability systems are appropriately included in decision-making:
Had NASA relied exclusively on a professional system of accountability in
making the decision to launch the Challenger space shuttle, perhaps deference
would have been given to the technical expertise of the engineers. [...] The
Thiokol engineers' initial recommendation against launch as ignored by their
hierarchical superiors. Decision-makers relied upon supervisors to make the
decision rather than deferring to professional experts."8
The vast majority of analyses of the Challenger accident largely reproduce the arguments
made in the Commission report, and this is perhaps not surprising. Upon examining the
sources used, it becomes clear that few, if any, of these works reviewed the evidence the
Commission considered. By working only from the Commission report, much of the
Challenger literature serves to perpetuate the Commission's analysis and frame of
reference. Almost all these studies of the Challenger work within the categories of
analysis set out by the Commission report - reproducing the report's distinctions between
engineers and managers, examining the decision-making process for flaws, and focusing
their attention on the resilience of the o-rings under low temperature conditions. They
then read backwards looking for reasons to support an appropriate intellectual structure
within which to understand the accident. In many, if not most cases, no new explanations
for the accident are given, but rather a theory is advanced, and the available explanations
provided by the Commission's report are chosen to fit that theory. In most cases, these
theoretical perspectives lead clearly into a potential remedy, whether that be better
teaching of ethics, better engineering education around the presentation and analysis of
data, or organizational reforms at NASA.
There is a significant exception to this rule and that is the major study carried out Diane
58 Romzek and Dubnick, pp. 235-236.
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Vaughan and published as The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture
and Deviance at NASA.59 Vaughan's work fundamentally re-examines the Challenger
accident in light of new developments in the scholarship around organizational behavior
and organizational misbehavior. By working with the Commission's original records,
Vaughan produced a substantial revisionist account of the Challenger accident. Her
argument starts from a question - why did mid-level NASA managers present at the
January 27 telecon or aware of concerns surrounding the O-rings fail to act? Vaughan
argues that the answer is not misconduct, but rather that the Challenger accident was
socially produced. Via a long history of what Vaughan calls the "normalization of
deviance" NASA and Thiokol personnel came to an understanding that the o-ring joints
were safe. "Normalization of deviance" is the key concept in Vaughan's work, arguing
that over time, engineers and managers gradually constructed an understanding of the
SRB joints that incorporated greater and greater signals of deviance, while understanding
these as normal. At the same time, Vaughan argues that a culture of production was
created around the shuttle program during the 1970s and 1980s - drawing on elements of
the changing cultures of NASA, the aerospace industry, and the Marshall Flight Center -
which provided a worldview that limited the ability of engineers and managers to
consider stopping the Shuttle program to redesign the joint. Finally, Vaughan argues that
the formalized mechanisms of information transfer within NASA were such that they
created a condition of "structural secrecy" such that more senior NASA personnel were
not privy to the information that might have led them to reject the increasingly deviant
SRB joints.
Vaughan's work was extremely well-received amongst the academic community, and
was awarded several prizes, including the Rachel Carson Prize and the Robert K. Merton
Award. Vaughan's work was also was nominated for the Pulitzer Prize and the National
Book Award. In 2006, Vaughan was awarded the American Sociological Association's
Public Understanding of Sociology Award for her work on the study of Challenger and,
" Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); see also Diane Vaughan, "Theorizing Disaster: Analogy,
historical ethnography, and the Challenger accident," Ethnography 5, no. 3 (2004), pp. 315-347; Diane
Vaughan, "The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster," Annual Review of
Sociology 25 (1999), 271 - 305.
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later, Columbia.6 0
There are, however, several limitations to Vaughan's work. The first is that it over-
determines the Challenger accident. In the provision of such a comprehensive structure
for understanding the accident, it obscures the agency of the individual actors present -
showing them to be conforming to social norms, albeit deviant norms, in this case. There
is a sense that this explanatory framework is so powerful that there is little sense of why
this accident happened when it did, why similar accidents had not happened before, and
why they did not happen again. Vaughan's argument is teleological - it ascribes the
decision to fly with known risky SRB joints to be the normalization of deviance, but
deviance is determined by knowing that the SRB joint failed. Had the SRB joints not
failed, the same process would still have carried on, in her account.
The second limitation is the assumption that the key process going on was a sociological
one; the negotiation and construction of risk such that stronger and stronger danger
signals became systematically understood as normal. As will be discussed in greater
depth in chapter four of this study, it is also possible to see the design, development,
testing and operation of the SRBs as a normal process of the creation of engineering
knowledge, albeit under constrained circumstances. At the same time, the evidence
suggests that far from a unified perspective of the joints as safe, there were increasing
concerns around their safety, combined with a growing sense of the sheer complexity of
operation of the joints, that even advancing engineering testing technology was unable to
address. The evidence also suggests that almost every member of NASA and Thiokol
staff had a differing set of ideas about the nature and operation of the joint, which will be
discussed later in this study.
The literature around the Challenger accident puts forward two major explanatory
narratives: that of the Commission, focusing on faulty technology, managerial
misconduct and pressure on NASA; and that of Diane Vaughan, looking to the
organizational structure, culture and norms of NASA in the years leading up to 1986.
60 See http://www.asanet.org/cs/root/leftnav/awards/diane-vaughan
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While this is simplistic, and it must be acknowledged that a number of authors have
developed quite sophisticated mechanisms to explain the interpretation of the accident
put forward by the Commission, there have been very few challenges to that basic
interpretation. The authority of the Commission, developed via its status external to
NASA and its distinguished membership, and further established through its report has
seldom been tested.
Chapter four locates this study against these two perspectives, setting forward another
way to think about the Challenger accident, based on primary sources rather than
interpretations, and taking a longer perspective on the accident, seeking to locate the
accident in a recurring pattern of engineering practice that started in the age of Apollo.
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CHAPTER FOUR: CHALLENGER - THE CAUSES
OF THE ACCIDENT
Introduction
The Challenger accident is over-determined. There have been many explanations put
forward for the accident, and these explanations provide so many compelling causes that
the reader may be left wondering why the accident happened on STS 51-L rather than on
another flight, if the shuttle program had so many flaws. Most of the accounts discussed
in chapter three assume that there was a fundamental truth about the operation of Solid
Rocket Booster (SRB) joints that could be communicated. From there, the accounts trace
how the wrong understanding of the SRB joints was used to make decisions, either by
way of poor communication, managerial misconduct, unethical behavior by engineers, or
through the operation of broader sociological processes. These accounts are working
backwards from a knowledge that the SRB joints in Challenger did not function as
expected, and therefore error must have occurred at some point.
This section of the study makes several arguments both about the accident and how it has
been understood. This chapter suggests that some of the causes of the accident may not
lie in either managerial misconduct or the normalization of deviance, but in the
challenges of adapting normal engineering practice to the unique engineering
circumstance of the Space Shuttle program. This study suggests that the practice of
engineering design is an iterative process of the testing and modifying of initial design
hypotheses. As such, it is to be expected that as new, or scaled-up technologies are
operated and redesigned, changes to their expected performance will occur, as more
understanding is developed over time. Engineers have developed a number of ways to
test their designs as they move from paper to material reality, and with the information
that is generated via these tests, the expected performance of the technology changes.
Safety margins are built into this process in order to give surety that unexpected
performance will not cause the technology to fail.
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This study also suggest that causes of the Challenger accident may lie in the ongoing
relationship between two modes of engineering present at NASA and Thiokol: an
analytic, quantitative mode and an intuitive, craft mode, and in the relationships between
the two organizations. The accident report suggests that managerial misconduct and
communication failures were apparent and contributed to the accident. A close review
and reconsideration of the evidence finds however that there is no decline from a
previously better standard. Modes of engineering differed across projects, teams, and
organizations throughout the space program. This was a creative tension as well as a
potentially risky one. Reconciling those differences was an ongoing challenge. The
causes of the accident lie here, but in combination as well with contingency - the launch
on January 27 was not only very cold, but also very windy, and the SRB joint was
subjected to unprecedented stresses.
This chapter of the study takes advantage of a unique feature of the three accidents
examined. Unlike either Apollo 204 or Columbia, the Challenger accident has created an
enormous, and open, archive. In the months after the accident, and in many cases after
testimony before the Presidential Commission, around 170 engineers, administrators and
managers were interviewed in depth by the Commission's investigating staff. These
sources permit a very detailed examination of the engineering history of the O-rings,
allowing the discussion of how these joints came to be understood, how that
understanding was created, and the engineering practices that were employed to do so,
and the meanings given to those practices. By teasing out the engineering history of the
SRB field joints, it is possible to see engineering in the making, in its messiness, its
uncertainty and its passion. The accident report, and the subsequent literature on
Challenger, neglects this engineering history and misses the opportunity to develop
consequent insights into what was normal engineering practice. Without a better
understanding of what was normal, the identification in the report and the literature of
engineering deviance was haphazard and in some cases flawed.
As well as paying increased attention to the the material history of the design and
production, and the tensions of differing engineering cultures that infused the space
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program, this reconsideration of the accident also reviews the episodes that have received
close attention in the accident report and subsequent accounts. In particular, it examines
the launch decision, and the material failure of the O-rings.
It is impossible to write such a history without a knowledge of what happened on 2 8' of
January 1986; the sources available make it impossible to examine any other part of the
engineering of the Space Shuttle to such a level of detail with such a level of commentary
from the engineers responsible. Nevertheless, it is possible to write without imposing the
impossible standards of hindsight on the Thiokol and NASA engineers, without assessing
them against which of their decisions or understandings were to be proved wrong or
misguided.
The sources also permit a detailed examination of the teleconference on the evening of
the 2 7th of January 1986, at which the decision to launch the 51-L was discussed. It is
possible to read accounts from almost all the participants, discussing how they
understood the question they were being asked, the evidence (both present at the meeting
and from their own histories with Thiokol and Marshall) that they used to make their
decisions, and their rationale for coming to the decisions they did. The story that will
emerge from this is substantially richer than that presented by the Presidential
Commission.
Where this study differs from the Rogers Commission report is that it asks about
engineering in the making, rather than from a retrospective position. It traces how NASA
and Morton Thiokol engineers created knowledge about SRB joints, through the
operation of normal engineering practices and the use of engineering judgment, working
within the almost unique constraints of the space shuttle program.
Where this study differs from Vaughan is that what she sees as the normalization of
deviance at NASA - increasingly anomalous circumstances being rendered acceptable
over time through sociological processes - this study suggests can also be understood as
normal engineering practice adapting to the circumstances of the space program.
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Vaughan argues that by stripping out the technology, one can penetrate to the heart of the
situation to find human interactions, which are amenable to sociological examination. I
argue that the technology is at the heart of the Challenger accident, and indeed the three
accidents examined here, and that any examination must be rooted in understandings of
how engineers solve problems about technology.
This. study concurs with Vaughan and disagrees with the Rogers Commission in not
seeing any evidence of deliberate misconduct. Examination of eye-witness accounts of
the fateful telecon on the night of the 2 7 th of January 1986 suggest that there was no
untoward pressure placed on any of the decision-makers at either Morton Thiokol or
NASA.
Solid Rocket Booster Joints
Key to the Challenger accident was a continuing commitment to technologies developed
relatively long ago in the space program beyond the point that they could continue to
serve adequately through with only minor adjustment. Over the period 1974 to 1986,
NASA and Thiokol designed and developed a system to seal joints between segments in
the SRBs. Over time, and with the development of knowledge about this system, it
became clear that what seemed a straight-forward, off-the-shelf piece of technology was
far more complex that had been thought. Over the period 1977 - 1985, there emerged at
least three substantial technical problems with SRB seals, not to mention the effects of
interactions between these three sets of phenomena. Each of these problems changed
over time, reflecting both changing engineering and manufacturing circumstances and the
development of more knowledge about the technology. This is not an element of the
Challenger accident that the Rogers Commission highlights.
The SRBs were composed of a series of eleven cylindrical segments, with a nose-cone
containing avionics, range safety assemblies, parachutes and a small series of motors to
drive the SRBs away from the Orbiter on separation. At the base of the SRB was a
nozzle with a control system to direct the thrust. The cylindrical segments that make up
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the body of the SRB were filled with a solid propellant. An SRB was 150 feet long and
12 feet in diameter. At the Thiokol manufacturing plant in Utah, joints between the
eleven components that made up the four segments of the SRBs were made, called
factory joints. Once the SRB segments arrived at Kennedy Space Center, the four
segments were joined together to form the SRB, these joints being called field joints.
Materially, a key to the Challenger accident was the design of the field joints. The design
of the field joints for STS 51-L was as follows. The upper cylinder tapered slightly and a
tongue of metal (the tang) fitted into a U-shaped groove on the lower cylinder (the
clevis). The tang was held in the clevis by 177 steel pins spaced at equal intervals around
the cylinder, extending right through the tang and into sockets in the inner wall of the
clevis. In order to prevent the escape of hot gasses when the SRB fired, there was a need
to seal the joint. This seal was effected by the use of two circular Viton rubber rings (the
O-rings), which extended right around the diameter of the SRB, between the inner side of
the clevis and the tang. The upper O-ring was the primary O-ring, as it would seal first.
The lower O-ring was the secondary. The O-rings sat in slight grooves in the inner wall
of the clevis, and were surrounded by an insulating grease. The O-rings were slightly
compressed. Between the two O-rings was a leak-check port, an aperture extending back
out to the outer wall of the tang. This port was in place to allow tests to be conducted to
ensure that the O-rings were seated correctly within their grooves, and had not been
displaced during assembly. The inner walls of both top and bottom cylinders were lined
with an insulating material, and an insulating putty was applied in the gaps between the
segments, right back almost to the O-ring.
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Propellant
Figure 14
Sc!ic Rocket Motor cross section snows positons of tang,
cevis and 0-rings. Putty lines the joint on ihe side toward the
propellant
Figure 1. Reproduced from the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident,
Report to the President (Washington, D.C.: The Commission, 1986) vol. 1, p. 57.
It is important to realize that the description given above is of the system in a static mode.
The system was dynamic, in that it did not function before SRB ignition, and as such
could not be fully checked before ignition. When the SRB was ignited, an increase in the
pressure inside the SRB would drive the insulating putty into the gap between cylinders,
pushing before it a small volume of air. This volume of air would push the primary seal
downwards, against the back wall of the groove in which it sat. The flexibility of the 0-
ring would allow it to deform, and squeeze out into the gap below slightly, thus sealing
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the joint. In design, it was not anticipated that there would be any contact between the
hot gasses inside the SRB and the O-rings. If for any reason the primary O-ring did not
seal the gap, the air driven by the putty would flow past the primary O-ring for a short
distance, but then activate the secondary seal by the same mechanism as the primary.
As this chapter will go on to show, despite the intention of its designers, this joint seal
was extremely complex in its function, and very far from being fully understood.
Accident reports and the literature that is based on them tend to assume the technologies
used were completely understood. Instead, a review of the evidence suggests that in
practice, what was known was that the O-rings worked, rather than precisely why and
how they worked in the different circumstances in which they were used.
Initial design
The history of the SRB for the shuttle starts with the initial design planning conducted in
the early 1970s to support Thiokol's bid to NASA for the contract to build the SRBs.
There is a key piece of context that must be understood about the shuttle design process.
Chapter two of this study noted that the Joe Shea-style of systems engineering was a
transitional style. By the early 1970s, systems engineering had been fully implemented at
Marshall. At Marshall this meant a combination of a conservative attitude towards
engineering change, and a philosophy of controlling cost via limiting testing, an attitude
that was to persist throughout the Shuttle program. During the 1970s, this was combined
with a substantial decrease in the funding available to design, develop, and operate the
Shuttle.2 Stanley Reinartz explained the implications of these factors:
It requires you to carefully select, or more carefully select methods or approaches
The previous three paragraphs are a synopsis of U.S. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle
Challenger Accident, Report to the President (Washington, DC: The Commission, 1986), vol. 1, pp. 57 -
58.
2 See John M. Logsdon, "The Space Shuttle Program: A Policy Failure?" Science 232. no. 4754 (30 May
1986), pp. 1099 - 1105; see also Thomas A. Heppenheimer, History of the Space Shuttle, vol. 1
(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002), pp. 1 - 21; Dennis Jenkins, Space Shuttle: The
History of the National Space Transportation System, 3rd ed. (Stillwater, MN: Voyageur Press, 2000), pp.
139- 152
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that you go on, and when you pick an approach that you're pretty well tied to that
approach, as opposed to any multiple or parallel, particularly in the design phases,
like Apollo.
Your decision process enabled less range of options. By having the lesser funds,
you have a narrower range of options and you have to boil them down to a narrow
range sooner of how you approach a problem.3
This legacy of Apollo was a strictly controlled process for engineering change, and a
program that emphasized the testing of entire subsystems rather than component-level
testing. The other implication of the reduced budget for the Shuttle was that key
decisions were made at a very early stage in the design process. Commissioner Richard
Feynman was very critical of this process, noting with reference to the Space Shuttle
main engines in this case, but in comparison to the SRBs:
The usual way that such engines are designed (for military or civilian aircraft)
may be called the component system, or bottom-up design. First it is necessary to
thoroughly understand the properties and limitations of the materials to be used
(for turbine blades, for example), and tests are begun in experimental rigs to
determine those. With this knowledge larger component parts (such as bearings)
are designed and tested individually. As deficiencies and design errors are noted
they are corrected and verified with further testing. Since one tests only parts at a
time these tests and modifications are not overly expensive. Finally one works up
to the final design of the entire engine, to the necessary specifications. There is a
very good chance that the modifications to the engine to get around the final
difficulties are not very hard to make, for most of the serious problems have
already been discovered and dealt with in the earlier, less expensive, stages of the
process.
The Space Shuttle Main Engine was handled in a different manner, top down, we
3 Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, interview with Stanley Reinartz, 3
April, 1986, pp. 40 & 43. The Presidential Commission interviews are held at National Archives.
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might say. The engine was designed and put together all at once with relatively
little detailed preliminary study of the material and components. Then when
troubles are found in the bearings, turbine blades, coolant pipes, etc., it is more
expensive and difficult to discover the causes and make changes. [...] Using the
completed engine as a test bed to resolve such questions is extremely expensive.
One does not wish to lose an entire engine in order to find out where and how
failure occurs.
A further disadvantage of the top-down method is that, if an understanding of a
fault is obtained, a simple fix, such as a new shape for the turbine housing, may
be impossible to implement without a redesign of the entire engine.4
It was in this context, with limited opportunities for either testing or substantial design
change that the SRBs were designed, developed, and operated.
Jack Kapp, one of the designers involved in the initial design work, recalled that the key
point of reference for the Thiokol designers was the Titan III motor, in manufacture by
Thiokol at the time.5 In particular, the Thiokol designers chose to use the tang and clevis
design of the field joint as their baseline for the SRB field joints, although with one
exception. The Titan rocket field joint used just one seal in the field joint, whereas
NASA's Request for Proposals required that there be two verifiable seals. Thiokol's
initial design was for a face seal - that is a seal between the tip of the tang and the base of
the clevis - as well as a bore seal - between the side of the clevis and the side of the tang.
George Hardy, who was SRB project manager at Marshall from 1974 - 1982, recalled the
reasoning for building from the Titan experience:
The objective was to avoid inventing anything new, stay within state-of-the-art at
4 U.S. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 2,
p. F-2; See also Richard P. Feynman, What Do You Care What Other People Think? (New York: W. W.
Norton, 1988), pp. 159- 188.
5 Presidential Commission interview with Jack Kapp, 2 April, 1986, pp. 4 - 6, 10; See also David K.
Stumpf, Titan II: A History ofa Cold War Missile Program (Fayetteville, AR: The University of Arkansas
Press, 2000).
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all times, if possible, and even if beyond that, stay within state of the experience.
And I make a distinction between the two because state of the experience means
to me that it's well-characterized, it's been demonstrated, it's not new.6
This avoidance of new ideas, new design, or new technology was a logical consequence
of the adoption of systems engineering. However, over time this commitment to
established technologies created problems. It prevented engineers from significant
redesign or creative leaps, and committed them in many cases to technologies developed
many years prior. Over time, these technologies became more familiar, but in practice
less well understood as the generation that had developed them moved into senior roles.
In 1973, the NASA Source Evaluation Board (SEB) awarded the contract to design, build
and refurbish the SRBs to Thiokol, in conjunction with NASA's Marshall Space Flight
Center. The SEB ranked Thiokol's bid second highest, noting that it scored fourth on the
design, development and verification element of its bid, second on the manufacturing,
refurbishment and product support factor, and first on the management factor. William
Leon Ray, a NASA engineer who sat on the SEB, recalled that Lockheed out-scored
Thiokol on the technical merits of its design, but that like Thiokol, the Lockheed design
for the field joints had included o-rings and was based on the Titan design. Ray noted
that in retrospect, there were problems with the Titan joint of a similar nature to those
that were to be experienced on the Shuttle SRBs, but that this was not known at the time.
Ray recalled that "we all went into it with the very best knowledge that we could gather,
and we at that time thought it was an acceptable decision. We didn't suspect anything at
the time."
As a result of successful experiences with the Titan, Thiokol designed its SRBs along the
same lines as the Titan, taking a cautious, conservative approach. Howard McIntosh, a
Thiokol engineer, noted this rationale:
6 George Hardy, Interview 13 July, 1984. Held in folder 005227, NASA Historical Collection, NASA
Headquarters.
7 Presidential Commission interview with William Leon Ray, 2 April, 1986, p. 7.
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The initial design, we were supposed to try to come as close to the Titan design as
possible because it was a very successful booster motor similar to the tang and
clevis, and they flew with one O-ring and we decided to do something better than
that.8
However, it soon became clear to Thiokol and Marshall engineers that for several
reasons, the joint design using a face and bore seal would not work. First was ease of
assembly. A design using a bore seal and a face seal was not conducive to being
assembled in a horizontal position, as the SRBs were to be tested. Second was the effect
of repeated reuse on the delicate seal arrangement at the tip of the tang, where it fitted
into the clevis. Third was the prediction that when the SRB fired, there was likely to be
an elongation along the vertical axis of the SRB which had the potential to pull a face
seal away from the base of the clevis.9 For these reasons, during the initial design stage,
Thiokol engineers moved to a two bore-seal design, believing that this design was more
faithful to the successful flight experience of the Titan, which had one bore seal and no
face seal.
Other options were considered in the design of the new two bore seal joint. The
possibility of gaps opening up between the clevis and the tang was a concern from the
outset of the design of the SRB. It was understood that tolerances were low and that the
stresses placed on the segments of the SRB during re-entry might make restoring the case
segments to a perfectly round configuration might be difficult to impossible. One
possible solution to this problem was to install a so-called capture feature which would
limit the amount of movement that could occur between the tang and clevis.l0
This capture feature was seriously considered in the period 1973 - 1974, but some of the
unique features of the SRB hardware eventually mitigated against its use. The sheer size
of the SRBs, twelve feet in diameter, compared with the required tolerances of the tang
8 Presidential Commission interview with Howard McIntosh, 2 April, 1986, p. 4.
9 Joe Kilminster, Presidential Commission Testimony, 2 May, 1986. U.S. Presidential Commission on the
Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 5, pp. 1599 - 1600. Presidential
Commission interview with Howard McIntosh, 2 April, 1986, pp. 6 - 8.
0 Presidential Commission interview with William Leon Ray, 2 April, 1986, pp. 34 - 35.
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and clevis joint capture feature, 10/1000ths of an inch, meant that Thiokol engineers did
not believe that they could successfully assemble and test an SRB in the horizontal
position if the feature was installed. At that point in time the test hardware that would
support the SRB testing program had been built and the test schedule laid out, so there
was no prospect of redesigning the test program. Jack Kapp, the Thiokol engineer with
responsibility for the decision, also noted that if the Thiokol engineers were unable to
successfully assemble an SRB to perform a horizontal test, then the test schedule was
likely to slip by about two years."
Previous successes with the Titan field joints, which had no capture feature, but
performed appropriately, combined with the challenges of engineering such large-scale
pieces of hardware combined to remove the possibility of installing a capture feature. In
the AS204 accident, Apollo engineers drew on experience with Gemini to give
themselves assurance that a pure oxygen environment was not of concern, because many
flights had used it with no problems. In the Challenger accident, Marshall and Thiokol
engineers used the experiences of the Titan missile boosters to reassure themselves that
O-ring seals, even without a secondary seal, could be used without problems. This
important context for understanding the design choices in the space program is not
emphasized in the investigation reports which, with the benefit of hindsight, portray these
choices as blindingly obvious mistakes. For the engineers, relying on proven
technologies that had not caused failures in the past was seen as a prudent choice.
Joint Rotation and Gathering
When the proven technology exhibited unexpected behaviors, it proved difficult for the
engineers to assess what level of problem this represented and even more difficult to
devise an appropriate design refinement. Over the period 1974 - 1977, Marshall and
Thiokol engineers started to build and test SRBs. In 1977, a test called DM-1 was carried
out. DM-1 was a firing test conducted on an SRB case at Marshall, designed to determine
the structural capability of the SRB case under ignition. 12 During this test, several
" Presidential Commission interview with Jack Kapp, 2 April, 1986, pp. 10 - 12.
12 Presidential Commission interview with James Thomas, 10 April, 1986, pp. 19 - 21.
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phenomena began to be demonstrated that suggested that the functioning of the seal joint
was not as the Titan experience base had lead some engineers to believe. Keith Coates,
Chief Engineer in the Special Projects Office at Marshall, recalled:
we began to see things which said that joint is not as simple as we thought it was
because the concept of the SRM was that it was a state-of-the-art design. I mean,
that the was the Space Shuttle SRM concept, because we used state-of-the-art
propellant that had been used in many, many items, nothing unusual there. Cases
can from Titan experience base, V6AC steel. Titans used a joint configuration
tang and clevis. So, you know, it was supposed to have been one of those
programs that you can just sort of sail through.13
The DM-1 test was a horizontal test firing of the SRB, and during the test, it became clear
that the field joints in the SRB leaked. Prior to the testing program in 1977, some
analytic work had been carried out on the joints, modeling them to examine what might
happen when the SRB was ignited. Although this modeling work was limited by the
computing power available at the time, it was predicted that at the time of ignition, the
phenomenon of joint rotation might be expected to occur to a small degree. 14
Joint rotation is a slight misnomer. What the term refers to is the movement outwards of
the tang element of the joint under conditions of pressure. Essentially, despite being
made of steel, the SRB case would bulge outwards slightly when the SRB was ignited.
Inside the joint, this meant that the gap between the tang and the inner wall of the clevis
might be expected to open, which would affect the ability of the O-rings to seal the joint.
Joint rotation is similar to another phenomenon which had also been expected to some
degree, called joint gathering. Gathering refers to the problem that can occur if the two
cylindrical segments of the SRB are not exactly circular, and thus the gap between the
clevis and the tang is not exactly the same size all the way around the SRB. This
problem of variable gap size around the diameter of the SRB also had implications for the
13 Presidential Commission interview with Keith Coates, 25 March, 1986, p. 35.
14 Presidential Commission interview with James Thomas, 10 April, 1986, pp. 20 - 23.
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ability of the O-rings to seal, as the rings might well be attempting to seal two quite
different size gaps. Joint rotation was a dynamic problem, joint gathering was a static
problem. In both cases, it would be expected that the opening of a gap between tang and
clevis would affect the upper, primary O-ring more that it would affect the lower,
secondary O-ring."5
During the test firing program, it became clear that the gap between the clevis and the
tang that opened up on ignition was higher than modeling and analysis had predicted, to
the point that confidence in the ability of the O-rings would seal was compromised.
Around this time, it also became clear that a similar problem was occurring on the
Titan.16
This point was later clarified during a series ofhydroburst tests carried out at Thiokol in
September 1977. During the hydroburst tests, the SRB cases were filled with water and
pressurized up to 1.4 times the level of pressure expected, in order to determine the
strength of the cases. Because the SRB was expected to be reused over the course of its
lifetime, the hydroburst tests were repeated 20 times. By the eighth tests, the primary O-
rings were leaking. These tests not only showed that the joint was rotating, but also
showed that there was potential for joint rotation to damage the primary O-ring as
rotation stopped. The hydroburst tests showed that as the joint rotated, and as the
primary O-ring moved to seal, if the gap behind the O-ring was large enough, then a
small part of the O-ring could extrude into that gap. When rotation ceased, there was the
potential for the gap behind the O-ring to close, pinch the O-ring and damage it.'7
There were significant differences between Marshall and Thiokol engineers around this
issue. Leon Ray, representing Marshall, recalled that the test data demonstrating joint
rotation came as a surprise to both Marshall and Thiokol, as they had expected the joints
"5 "Restatement of Position on SRM Clevis Joint O-ring Acceptance Criteria and Clevis Joint Shim
Requirements," 9 January 1978. U.S. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident,
Report to the President, vol. 1, pp. 234 - 235; Presidential Commission interview with George Hardy, 3
April, 1986, pp. 15 - 16.
16 Presidential Commission interview with Jack Kapp, 2 April, 1986, pp. 16 - 18.
7 Presidential Commission interview with Howard McIntosh, 2 April, 1986. p. 11.
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would actually get tighter under pressure. Ray further recalled:
We had quite a debate about [joint rotation] until we did a test on the first couple
of segments that we received from the manufacturer, which in fact showed that
the joint did open. Later on we did some tests with the structural test article. At
that time we really nailed it down. We got some very accurate numbers on joint
rotation, and we knew for a fact that during those tests that the joint rotated. The
primary O-ring was extruded up into the joint. The secondary O-ring did in fact
detach from the seat. Now, the proof of this is that we, in addition to measuring
the relative movement between the two parts, we also screwed a pressure
transducer into the port so that we were able to judge the performance of the
secondary seal as well. 8
For Thiokol engineers, however, this story does not reflect their understandings of the
test. Howard McIntosh argued that what the tests actually showed was that leaking in the
joint actually only happened after the eighth pressure cycle and in flight, the SRB would
only experience one pressure cycle. 19
Moving forward into late 1977 and early 1978, the next opportunity to conduct full scale
testing on the SRB was the Static Test Article test (STA-1), to be conducted in early
1978. Leading into the STA-1 tests, Marshall and Thiokol worked on separate areas of
the joint rotation problem, reflecting their differing styles and organizational concerns.
Leon Ray recommended to Marshall that several short and longer term fixes be
considered to address the problem of joint rotation. He suggested that continuing with
the joints as currently designed was unacceptable and proposed in the short term that a
series of shims be used to close the gap between the clevis and the tang.2 0 After a series
of conversations with Thiokol around this issue, it was decided that shimming would be
'8 Leon Ray, Presidential Commission Testimony, 2 May, 1986. U.S. Presidential Commission on the
Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 5, p. 1620.
"9 Presidential Commission interview with Howard McIntosh, 2 April, 1986, pp. 9 - 10.
20 Leon Ray, "SRM Clevis Joint Leakage Study," 21 October 1977. U.S. Presidential Commission on the
Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 1, pp. 233.
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used to close the gap in STA-1. Thiokol determined that it would manufacture one
standard sized shim, rather than custom-sized shims to fit the circumstances of each joint.
When Marshall engineers objected, Thiokol observed that the manufacture and fitting of
custom shims for each of the 177 pins holding the segments together would be
prohibitively difficult and expensive. 21
Thiokol engineers continued to analyze the issue of joint rotation. In a series of subscale
tests conducted in later 1977, Thiokol concluded that even at 3000 psi, three times the
operating pressure inside the SRB, and with a gap of 125/1000ths of an inch, around 2.5
times the highest gap rotation Thiokol believed possible, the joint would still seal.
At the same time, Marshall engineers were also modeling and analyzing the joint and its
performance. Using a worst case scenario, where the Marshall engineers calculated all
the possible tolerance ranges and matched up the worst-on-worst cases, they became
concerned about the possibility that the primary and secondary O-rings would not be
adequately compressed in their static position, and as such, when the SRB fired, the 0-
rings would not have enough energy to activate fast enough to seal the gap. Leon Ray
calculated that on a worst-on-worst case, the primary O-ring would only compress by
20/1000ths of an inch, or about 7.5%. Ray understood that industry standards suggested
a 15% compression was a minimum standard required, and wrote a memo over the name
of his superior, John Q. Miller, to Miller's superior, articulating these concerns.22
Thiokol engineers understood those industry standards to be different.23 They also
understood that the Marshall figures around the possibility of a 7.5% squeeze were
coming from worst-on-worst calculations, which were in practice not possible. The
reason Thiokol engineers believed that these worst-on-worst cases were not possible is
that they were derived from performing calculations on the specification for the SRB
21 Presidential Commission interview with Jack Kapp, 2 April, 1986, p. 11.
22 Presidential Commission interview with William Leon Ray, 2 April, 1986, pp. 21 - 26; "Restatement of
Position on SRM Clevis Joint O-ring Acceptance Criteria and Clevis Joint Shim Requirements," 9 January
1978. U.S. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President,
vol. 1, pp. 234 - 235.
23 Presidential Commission interview with Arnold Thompson, 4 April, 1986. p. 12.
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joints, juxtaposing the highest tolerances for one component against the lowest for
another.24 Thiokol engineers were able to measure the component parts to the field joints
as they were being assembled, and knew from these measurements that a compression
number much closer to 15% was being achieved in reality.25
Thiokol's response to the joint rotation issue was to attempt to determine that the joint
would function under all circumstances that could be expected to be seen during flight,
whereas Marshal engineers took a more broad-ranging approach, seeking to satisfy
themselves as to under what specific circumstances the joint rotation issue would be
problematic. The differences between these two approaches reflected a dynamic that will
recur throughout the history of the O-rings. Marshall's conservative approach sought to
fully understand and quantify all phenomena, whilst Thiokol's approach reflected a
production engineering contractor's view, concerned with identifying the way the
phenomena of rotation could be expected to behave under flight conditions, and how
problem fixes could be developed to address that problem.26 Faced with the unexpected
behavior of the O-rings, the different organizations responded according to their
engineering cultures.
In 1977 a series of problems also started to emerge with the quality of the O-rings. In
January of 1978, Leon Ray wrote a memo to his supervisor, Glen Eudy, noting that
several problems had been experienced with the quality of manufacture of the 0-rings. 27
Ray was acknowledged at that time as by far the most knowledgeable engineer on matters
concerning the O-rings.2 8 In particular, Ray noted that a calcium-based material
ingredient of the O-ring was not being ground finely enough during manufacture and was
leaving visible particles embedded in the O-ring. These particles had the potential to
leave gaps in the 0-rings. 29
24 Presidential Commission interview with Howard McIntosh, 2 April, 1986, pp. 18 - 20; Presidential
Commission interview with Arnold Thompson, 4 April, 1986. pp. 6 - 11.
25 Presidential Commission interview with Jack Kapp, 2 April, 1986, pp. 35 - 37.
26 Presidential Commission interview with Howard McIntosh, 2 April, 1986, pp. 64 - 68.
27 "Restatement of Position on SRM Clevis Joint O-ring," pp. 234 - 235.
28 Presidential Commission interview with Bill Rice, 26 March, 1986, p. 14.
29 "Restatement of Position on SRM Clevis Joint O-ring," vol. 1, pp. 234 - 235.
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Calcium particles in the O-ring material were there to create additional stiffness in the 0-
rings. At that early point, O-rings were made to a 90 durometer specification, making
them very hard.30 Arnold Thompson recalled:
in a 90 durometer O-ring you have to put a lot of reinforcement in it in order to
get the hardness of the line, and in doing so, it took a lot of filler, and there were a
lot of inclusions in it, and so finally after a series of extrusion tests, we found out
that the 70 durometer was perfectly acceptable from the point of view of
extrusion, and certainly a better seal because it was softer. So, we finally
concluded, that the 90 durometer was just - we could not get acceptable so we
went to the 70 durometer, and a lot of these things went away because with the
lower reinforcement we are just getting better O-rings.3 1
At the same time, Ray noted that he was concerned that small cuts were appearing in the
O-rings. During the process of manufacturing, the O-rings were molded into a 450 inch
long string, and then passed on to a subcontractor to be ground down to the size required
and then spliced together to form the circular O-ring. At some point during this process,
small radial cuts were appearing in the 0-ring.32 Thiokol engineers originally intended
that the O-rings would be inspected at KSC, as the SRBs were assembled. As a result of
Ray's concerns, a new process was put in place such that the O-rings would be packaged
at the Thiokol manufacturing plant in Utah, sealed and shipped to KSC.33 Nevertheless,
in the aftermath of the 5 1-L accident, it became clear that manufacturing standards had
not been maintained - seven of 27 O-rings in stock at KSC were shown to be below the
standard expected by NASA.
During 1977, Thiokol engineers continued to fire a series of test articles, generating more
knowledge about the joint rotation issue, but also developing a concern around
contamination and pitting in the joint seal. Howard McIntosh recollected:
30 Shore Durometer is a measure of a resilient material's hardness. An automobile tire is around 70
durometer, whereas chewing gum is around 25 durometer.
31 Presidential Commission interview with Arnold Thompson, 4 April, 1986, p. 14
32 Presidential Commission interview with William Leon Ray, 2 April, 1986, pp. 8 - 10.
3 Presidential Commission interview with William Leon Ray, 2 April, 1986,, pp. 10- 12.
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We did efforts on checking out corrosion, because one of the problems is if you
have pits in the seating surface, what does that do to your O-ring groove, if your
O-rings are going to seal or not. So we did extensive tests with those to study
corrosion, to study what would actually make an O-ring leak. The worst thing we
found was a very small hair or piece of wire going across the O-ring. It would just
open up and let it leak, but we would always catch it in some of our subsequent
tests here when we did the leak checks.34
This awareness of potential O-ring deficiencies, and continuous refinement to improve
them, typified this era of the shuttle's development. Far from being complacent, the
engineers actively identified potential problems and took steps to remedy them. The
accident report acknowledges some of this activity but frames it as a series of warning
signs that NASA engineers missed, dismissed, or made inadequate attempts to respond
to. A better interpretation might be that the engineers noted problems, investigated,
diagnosed them, and devised remedies, but that this was a continual process. In practice,
at any single point in time the problem was understood differently across different sets of
engineers, the investigations were at disparate stages, the diagnoses could be incongruent,
and the remedies were tentative and a source of considerable disagreement.
The STA-1 SRB was shipped to Marshall in late 1977 and the test took place in July
1978. During the STA- 1 tests, active attempts were made to learn more about the joint
rotation phenomenon. Electrical instrumentation was attached to the SRB via the leak
check ports, and measurements made. In these first sets of tests, joint rotation was
measured to be enormous - in some cases well over 125/1000ths of inch.35 This number
was far larger than either Marshall or Thiokol engineers were expecting. In order to test
this result, mechanical measurement devices were used which measured results up to a
maximum rotation of 48/1000ths of an inch rotation, that were more believable to the
Thiokol engineers. 36
34 Presidential Commission interview with Howard McIntosh, 2 April, 1986, p. 22.
15 Presidential Commission interview with Arnold Thompson, 4 April, 1986, p. 6.
36 Presidential Commission interview with Howard McIntosh, 2 April, 1986, pp. 23 - 24.
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These results gave comfort to the Thiokol engineers for several reasons. First was that
these results aligned with those predicted by the Thiokol analytical model of the joint, so
strengthening confidence in the model. The second, and perhaps more important reason
was that the test results confirmed, for the Thiokol engineers, that the secondary O-ring
would seal under maximum joint rotation. In other words, the STA- I1 test showed that
even if the SRB joint rotated to the maximum degree observed across the suite of tests,
the gap between the inner wall of the tang and clevis would not open up enough so that
the secondary O-ring would fail to seal. For Thiokol, STA-1 suggested that the SRB
field joint was redundant. 37
For Marshall engineers, and indeed some Thiokol engineers, the results of the STA-1
tests told a different story. The mechanical indicators used to measure the extent of
rotation in the field joints were not reliable. The location of the leak check port at the
bottom of the horizontally laid SRB combined with the effects of the liquids used to fill
the SRB for the tests meant that results were no more reliable, Marshall engineers
believed, than the electrical tests conducted previously. Marshall engineers believed
from their calculations, and attempting to correct for the effects of the horizontal position
of the SRB that the extent of rotation could be almost a third greater (60/1 0 0 0' of an
inch) than the maximum put forward by Thiokol. Roger Boisjoly, a Thiokol engineer
recalled:
In all honesty, the engineering people, namely Leon Ray, Ben Powers and myself,
always had a running battle in these flight readiness reviews because I would
use .042 inch and they were telling me I was using a number too low, and I would
retort back and say no, the horizontal number doesn't apply because we really
don't fly in a horizontal position, we don't assemble in a horizontal position and
you really don't know what the flexure of the joint is at that particular location.3 8
The significance of the 18/1000ths of inch difference between Marshall and Thiokol's
3 Presidential Commission interview with Jack Kapp, 2 April, 1986, pp. 28 - 29.
38 Presidential Commission interview with Roger Boisjoly, 4 April, 1986, pp. 37 - 38.
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interpretation of maximum possible joint rotation from the STA-1 tests was great. If
Thiokol was correct, then the secondary O-rings would always seal if the primary did not.
If Marshall was correct, then there were circumstances under which it was possible that
the secondary O-ring would not seal if the primary O-ring failed. Thiokol attempted to
resolve the issue by way of another test. Maurice Parker observed that:
we deliberately put together the center joint on a structural test article where the
worst, what was considered the worst possible conditions, the smallest O-ring, the
largest diameter - we shimmed in such a way that we would get the least O-ring
squeeze. [...] We deliberately tailored the O-ring and the shims used to give the
worst possible sealing conditions for the center joint with the understanding we
would attempt to demonstrate that the joint would not leak with MEOP
(maximum expected operating pressure) cycles which would, in everybody's
mind, satisfy people as to the O-ring function, which only had to work once in its
lifetime, would go not once but three times more before it would be damaged and
leak. So we did tailor that joint that way, and the first four pressurizations of the
STA did in fact demonstrate that the O-ring did the job, that the joint did not leak
and was considered by all to be in effect a qualification of the joint under the
worst conditions. 39
Following the STA-1 tests, several actions were taken. The first was to implement the
use of shims in the field joints to ensure that potential gaps caused by joint rotation would
not compromise the joint's ability to seal. Secondly, Thiokol changed from a .275 inch
O-ring to a slightly larger O-ring, thus increasing the area of the O-ring available to
seal.40 The third change was that Thiokol continued to test, using subscale tests and
modeling the behavior of the joint, in order to develop a better understanding of the
rotation phenomena. Over the next two years, Thiokol engineers continued to work on
this issue, eventually running enough tests to conclude to their own satisfaction that joint
rotation would never be enough to cause the secondary O-ring not to seal, should the
39 Presidential Commission interview with Maurice Parker, 4 April, 1986, pp. 14- 15.
40 Presidential Commission interview with Joe Kilminster, 4 April, 1986. p. 12.
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primary O-ring fail.41
In the mid-1980s, after concerns around another joint phenomenon, erosion, had
emerged, Thiokol engineers examined the available data, but were never able to make a
correlation between erosion and the level of compression. In fact, in a number of cases,
they found that joints with a greater amount of squeeze experienced more erosion that
joints with less compression.42
In 1980, Walter Williams, NASA's Chief Engineer, coordinated a review of the
certification process of the shuttle. His group reported back that specialist engineers had
reviewed the field joint on Williams' instruction and had found it adequate.43
The discussion ofjoint rotation shows engineering at work. The joint rotation
phenomenon and how it was addressed by both Thiokol and Marshall engineers reflects a
process of design that is cumulative as Henry Petroski describes, building on past
experiences with other technologies as a start point, in this case experience with the Titan
rocket. It reflects the incremental nature of normal technological development, as
Edward Constant uses the term, where technological change happens in response to
problems; shims are manufactured to ensure that the tang and clevis gap is maintained
tightly. The strategies being used reflect the typology of engineering knowledge set out
by Walter Vincenti. It is possible to see the process whereby basic ideas and operating
principles are translated into quantitative specifications, but reflecting as well the messy
way in which this happens in the real world; calcium clumps in the 90 durometer O-ring
induced Thiokol engineers to make a transition to a softer O-ring, adapting the
specification to the constraints of the material world.
But it is also possible to see, in the investigation and management of the joint rotation
phenomenon, the particular constraints of working in the spaceflight program. A very
limited number of tests were available to assist in creating knowledge about the
41 Presidential Commission interview with Maurice Parker, 4 April, 1986, pp. 14 - 16
42 Presidential Commission interview with Roger Boisjoly, 4 April, 1986, p. 30
43 "Verification/Certification Space Shuttle Program Response to Assessment," September 1980.
Presidential Commission document PC 094010.
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phenomenon of joint rotation. There were only four test SRB motors on which tests
could be run, and even those tests were conducted in a manner that did not entirely reflect
the conditions under which they would be operated, in that the tests were carried out
horizontally whilst the SRBs would be flown vertically. It has been seen how these
constraints served to render test results quite ambiguous and the knowledge about the
SRB joints quite uncertain. Subscale tests carried out also created ambiguous knowledge,
in part because the ability of their findings to be generalized to fullscale performance.
The lack of opportunities for testing also constrained the use of mathematical analytical
tools, which were not able to be calibrated against observed performance.
These ambiguities feature poorly in the investigation report and subsequent literature. In
the aftermath of the accident, the lack of engineering agreement and certainty was
portrayed as symptomatic of a tolerance for error. This closer view of the engineering
and materials shows instead that the ambiguities were a feature of normal engineering
practice. In the context of limited time and funds, a commitment to older technology, and
a lack of resources to fully explore the unexpected behavior of this technology, the
evidence shows engineers at both Marshall and Thiokol continually attempting to identify
and remedy potential problems. The disagreements were honest, and symptomatic of a
desire not to rush to a premature decision on a course of action.
Marshall and Thiokol engineers differed in their assessments about what scale a problem
the joint rotation issue represented. Thiokol maintained that whilst it remained an area
of concern, the phenomenon was not of sufficient magnitude to cause the joint to fail and,
as such, needed to be examined but did not need a redesign past the development of a
shimming system. Marshall engineers, particularly Leon Ray, maintained that the
phenomenon of rotation rendered the field joint no longer redundant, as under some
circumstances it was possible that the secondary seal would have to serve.'
Marshall engineers acted on this disputed understanding of the field joint, and in 1982,
formally designated the field joint a criticality 1 item. Criticality 1 status meant that the
44 Presidential Commission interview with William Leon Ray, 2 April, 1986, pp. 16 - 17.
191
item in question had the potential, if it were to malfunction, to cause a loss of the shuttle
vehicle or astronaut life.45 Prior to this, the field joint had been designated a criticality 1-
R item, with the "R" status indicating that redundancy was present. The document
created to record this status change records the NASA view of the field joint in late 1982:
On the shuttle SRM, the secondary O-ring was designed to provide redundancy
and to permit a leak check, ensuring proper installation of the O-rings. Full
redundancy exists at the moment of initial pressurization. However, test data
shows that a phenomenon called joint rotation occurs as the pressure rises,
opening up the O-ring extrusion gap and permitting the energized O-ring to
protrude into the gap. [...] This gap may, however, in some cases, increase
sufficiently to cause the unenergised secondary O-ring to lose compression,
raising questions about its ability to energise and seal if called upon to do so by
primary seal failure.46
The document goes on, however, to suggest that in eight static test firings and five flights,
no evidence of leakage had been seen, and nor, in over 1000 Titan III tests, had leakage
been seen. Titan served as a critical point of reference for the operation of the SRBs, and
would continue to do so through to 1986, lending comfort to some NASA managers, as
they were later to testify, that the characteristics of the joint were understood.47
Maurice Parker, the Thiokol engineer responsible for initiating the change on Marshall's
instructions, later recounted the lack of consensus around this redesignation:
At the time the question was raised, does that (joint rotation) make this thing a
Crit 1 or a Crit 1-R? I personally wasn't concerned whether it was called a Crit 1
or a Crit l-R. The condition was the same as far as I was concerned, so I didn't
45 U.S. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 1,
pp. 124- 125.
46 U.S. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 1,
pp. 241 - 242.
47 L. Michael Weeks, Presidential Commission Testimony, 10 February, 1986. U.S. Presidential
Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 4, pp. 489 - 500.
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have any great concern as to whether it got reclassified or not. I did feel we had a
safe situation, and I felt that the important time for the joint to be redundant was
at the start, and I felt we had a redundant joint at the start. Having had some
experience with the O-rings in series, I personally always felt that once the sealing
job is accomplished by either the primary or the secondary, only one O-ring was
doing the job anyway, so that after it (the SRB ignition) started, it was the
argument. When does it have to be redundant?4 8
This issue of timing persisted in a number of understandings of the O-ring and its
function. Lawrence Mulloy and George Hardy, respectively the Manager of the SRB
project at Marshall and the Deputy Director of Science and Engineering at Marshall, both
understood that the redundancy still existed, particularly at the early stages of the ignition
of the SRB. Hardy commented, discussing joint rotation and redundancy:
Now, I'm not suggesting that those tests (hydroburst) carried all the fidelity in
detail that one would look at from this side of 51 -L, but the basic question on
when the joint rotates, will it seal, the answer was yes, it did seal.
It was recognized that if for some reason - and a reason had not been identified or
quantified - but if for some reason the primary seal seals and it sits there and it
holds and does its job for ten seconds or 20 seconds or whatever, but if for some
reason it lets go, the joint has already rotated, and under a worst case set of
conditions, the secondary seal may be off the seat, and therefore if it gets its
pressure now, it may not seal. 49
Larry Mulloy made the point even more explicit, describing his understanding of the
joint's function in a worst-case scenario:
If this primary now fails, you no longer have a redundant seal. Therefore we need
to change the critical items list to change this joint classification from redundant
48 Presidential Commission interview with Maurice Parker, 4 April, 1986, p. 29.
49 Presidential Commission interview with George Hardy, 3 April, 1986, pp. 15 - 16.
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to non-redundant and describe the conditions that can make it non-redundant, and
those conditions were described as after motor pressurization, after seating of the
primary. Should the primary subsequently fail, you don't have a backup.
And that's where a lot of the confusion is coming in, is how can it be both? [...]
You mean it's 1-R from five to seven and then after seven it's 1? I said exactly.
That's exactly right, except its zero to 300 milliseconds and then 300 to 600
milliseconds instead of hours.50
This is a critical point. Hardy and Mulloy, both engineers and both involved in the
ongoing creation of understanding about the field joint, believed that the joint was
redundant for the first 0.3 of a second after ignition, despite an official recharacterization
of the joint as not redundant.
The difference here was not only about tensions between engineering cultures. Thiokol
and Marshall disagreed at a fundamental level about the standard to which they were
working. Thiokol took a pragmatic approach that assessed whether the joint would do its
job, and did not worry thereafter whether the redundancy was fully functioning. Marshall
assessed whether the joint was working as designed, meaning that if the redundancy were
absent, this was in itself a significant problem. Where accident reports can reduce this
conflict to a sort of professional bickering, in fact it reveals the shifting standards
imposed by the move to systems engineering. Where craft engineering tended to ask if a
technology was good, systems engineering instead asked whether it was good enough.
Erosion and Blowby
Joint rotation was not the only problem to be encountered with the SRB joint. Following
the flight of STS-2 in November 1981, and the subsequent disassembly of the SRB for
refurbishment, a new phenomenon was observed on the SRB joints. In the disassembly
of the SRBs, it was observed that there was significant erosion of the primary O-ring of
50 Presidential Commission interview with Lawrence Mulloy, 2 April, 1986, p. 19.
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the aft field joint. Erosion was observed to a depth of.053 inches."5
Erosion on the field joint of STS-2 was a critical data point for the entire history of the
SRB leading into the Challenger accident. First identified in 1981, erosion challenged
the fundamental concept of a shuttle as a fully restorable and reusable craft based on
proven older technologies. Engineering responses to erosion revealed how deeply the
commitment to older technologies had come to limit problem-solving at NASA.
Several points about STS-2 need to be clear. First, the aft field joint saw a substantial
amount of erosion, more than was ever seen before 51-L in 1986. Second, STS-2
launched at an ambient temperature of 70°F, a substantially warm temperature, and third,
that the SRB survived and functioned as expected. This very early datapoint set the
upper bounds of expected behavior and set that bound quite wide.
Erosion, or the eating away of the O-ring, probably by hot gas, was a new phenomenon in
November 1981. Thiokol engineers responded by investigating the way in which the
insulating putty inside the joint had been applied. They thought that microscopic
pinholes in the insulating putty might be letting hot gas into the joint at the very early
stages of ignition. The gas would then eat away at the O-ring.52 Arnold Thompson of
Thiokol did the initial analysis of the STS-2 erosion, and assessed the problem as being
caused by the volume of air in front of the primary O-ring being filled with hot gas via a
blowhole created in the putty. These blow holes could be created during the process of
assembly or during leak-checking. The problem was that the volume in front of the 0-
ring was being filled only at one point, so the hot gas impinged onto the O-ring and
eroded it away."
Following STS-2, several efforts were put in place at Thiokol to address the erosion
issue. The application of putty was studied and changes were made to these processes.
A modeling effort was set in place to attempt to understand more about the phenomenon
5~ U.S. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 2,
p. H-1.
52 Presidential Commission interview with Joe Kilminster, 4 April, 1986, pp. 34 - 35.
53 Presidential Commission interview with Arnold Thompson, 4 April, 1986, pp. 22 - 23.
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of erosion. Changes to the way in which the putty was applied were made, and the
problem did not recur on successive flights until 1984. At that time, the problem with the
SRB was seen to be one of manufacturing, rather than a problematic design of any kind.
Lawrence Mulloy remembered that Leon Ray spent a great deal of time at KSC following
STS-2, working with the Thiokol engineers to ensure that the putty inside the SRBs was
applied correctly. Mulloy also noted that:
We also made changes to ensure cleanliness of the O-rings because we were
failing leak checks because we had dirty O-rings. But there was not a
consideration of a fundamental design change to the joint. It was aimed at
making this joint work. In putting joints together and finding they leaked and
having to take them apart again, it was contamination of the O-ring, nicks in the
O-ring, this type of thing. So that was the perceived problem. It was not a
perceived problem of this design won't work. It was this design won't work
unless we do these things.54
Describing attitudes at the time, Leslie Adams recalled that STS-2 was the "only incident
of any erosion (prior to 1984) that we had, and it was attributed to a blow hole or a defect
through the putty. And it was a very isolated incident and we did not see any recurrence
of that." 55 Following STS-2 in 1981, other launches and static tests were conducted
through until February 1984, with little or no erosion problem observed."5
The launch of STS-41B in February 1984 was the next major incident of erosion
observed in the field joints of the SRBs. The launch of STS-41B was in February 1984,
and upon retrieval of the SRBs and their disassembly, erosion of the O-rings was
observed in both the right-hand nozzle joint and the left-hand forward field joint." NASA
immediately ordered Thiokol to investigate the issues, asking Thiokol to determine the
54 Presidential Commission interview with Lawrence Mulloy, 2 April, 1986, pp. 16 - 17.
55 Presidential Commission interview with Leslie Adams, 12 March, 1986, pp. 31 - 32.
56 Presidential Commission interview with James Thomas, 10 April, 1986, pp. 29 - 33; U.S. Presidential
Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 1, pp. 129 - 131.
57 "Erosion of SRM Pressure Seals, Presentation to NASA Headquarters," 19 August 1985, pp. A-5 - A-7.
Held in folder 018181, NASA Historical Collection, NASA Headquarters.
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cause of the erosion, changes necessary to prevent it, the role of the insulating putty in
erosion and "acceptability of "O" ring erosion - if so - why?" 58
This flight had coincided with a number of changes to the SRB joints. STS-41B was the
first SRB to use a new type of zinc-chromate putty. At some point during 1983, the
manufacturer of the putty used in all the SRBs before that time, Fuller-O'Brien, stopped
manufacturing the product. A new supplier was sourced, Randolph, and new putty was
obtained from them. This new putty was qualified as the old putty had been, and in tests
at Thiokol, no problems were detected. However, after the putty had been moulded into
kits delivered to KSC to apply to the SRBs as they were assembled, it was discovered
that its characteristics were somewhat different from that of the older putty. James
Thomas noted:
We noticed that exposed to the Florida environment, it became very tacky, kind of
like tacky and sticky. As opposed to the prior putty. So we started doing at the
Cape a series of tests down there, and we determined that it was temperature and
humidity sensitive, the warmer more humid environment at Kennedy versus the
drier and supposedly cooler environment at Brigham City, Utah, because we used
it back there on the plant joints.59
Thiokol engineers immediately began to investigate to a greater degree the phenomenon
of O-ring erosion, starting to develop analytical models of the phenomena and
performing subscale tests. They soon believed that they understood some of the key
elements of the erosion phenomena, confirming Arnold Thompson's diagnosis following
STS -2 in 1981.60 With access to more computational power, Thiokol engineers were
able to create a model of the field joint which strengthened their belief that the cause of
the erosion was a single hole through the insulating putty that filled the field joint. If a
hole was present, on pressurization of the SRB, hot gas could move into the joint and
58 "SRM Nozzle/CASE "O" Ring Charring," undated, p. 1. Held in folder 018181, NASA Historical
Collection, NASA Headquarters; "Protection of Space Shuttle SRM Primary Motor Seals," 4 May, 1984.
Presidential Commission document PC 0014053.
59 Presidential Commission interview with James Thomas, 10 April, 1986, p. 35.
60 Presidential Commission interview with Roger Boisjoly, 4 April, 1986, pp. 14 - 16.
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damage the O-ring. If more than one hole was present, the force of the gas was
dissipated and erosion was not observed.61 At the same time, physical tests were
conducted, involving physically removing material from an O-ring by grinding it down,
than testing the ability of the O-ring to seal. Arnold Thompson from Thiokol recalled that
tests were conducted, grinding the O-ring down to 155 thousandths of an inch and still
observing sealing, whereas James Thomas from Marshall recalled that the O-rings only
sealed down to 125 thousandths of an inch.62
Engineering work to resolve this problem proceeded down several tracks. First, the
possibility of creating blowholes in the putty was investigated, using short lengths of
plastic tubing. This was soon discarded, as both difficult and potentially hazardous,
particularly if the process of stacking the SRBs resulted in some or all of the blowholes
being covered.6 3 Focus then shifted to the possibility of replacing or eliminating putty
altogether. Thiokol engineers were not the only ones commenting about the putty used in
the SRB joints. George Morefield of United Space Boosters, in a letter to Larry Mulloy,
drew on his experience with the Titan boosters to conclude that:
I alluded to the Titan III SRM history which is quite similar to the current STS
SRM experience. Post-fire inspection of Titan SRM static test motors showed
that pressurization of the single-"o"-rings in the pressure vessel routinely occurred
via a single breakdown path across the joint putty. [...] It should be pointed out
that single point pressurization of a Titan "O"-ring annulus is a less severe event
than on an STS SRM because, being a smaller diameter motor, the Titan "O"-ring
plenum has less volume and comes to pressure equilibrium faster (less time to
melt the "O"-ring.)64
Morefield went on to suggest that the putty in the SRB joints be either replaced or
61 Presidential Commission interview with Mark Salita, 2 April, 1986, pp. 4 - 6.
62 Presidential Commission interview with Arnold Thompson, 4 April, 1986, pp. 29 - 30; Presidential
Commission interview with James Thomas, 10 April, 1986, pp. 42 - 44.
63 Presidential Commission interview with James Thomas, 10 April, 1986, pp. 35 - 38.
64 George Morefield, Memorandum to Larry Mulloy, 9 March 1984. U.S. Presidential Commission on the
Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 1, pp. 246 - 247.
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eliminated, noting that: "I think that the primary seal should be allowed to work in its
classical design mode. Both the Titan and the STS SRMs have been designed for this not
to happen. Titan has flown over a thousand pressure joints with no failure."65 Once
again, the Titan experience base was a key source of understanding of the performance of
the SRB, despite the differences between the Titan and the SRB.
Second, models were built to examine the extent of the phenomenon, in order to
determine how extensive the erosion could possibly be. George Hardy explained that this
"tests were run and an attempt was made, which is a normal sort of thing to do in the
engineering community, is if you have a condition that is a warning condition for you, so
to speak, you ask yourself the question, is that as bad as it can ever get?"66 Thiokol
engineers determined that the phenomenon of erosion was self-limiting, in that they
understood that there was a limited amount of hot gas that could flood into the joint,
determined by the volume of the joint. This volume of gas was not, under any
circumstances, enough to completely erode the primary O-ring, or even to erode the
primary O-ring to the point where it would not seal.67 William Horton of NASA
explained his understanding of the erosion phenomenon:
Something in the arrangement of the putty, something in the configuration of the
putty, something in the location or configuration of the grease, was somehow
causing an occasional erosion of the primary O-ring; it was not possible to get
sufficient erosion to cause that primary to lose its sealing capability. Therefore,
we felt like we could continue to fly and there was no need for a radical redesign
of the joint, but rather a need to understand how the anomaly was being caused
and what was causing it and taking steps to avoid that anomaly.68
In other words, the focus would be to discern what they were doing differently that was
causing the new problem. The commitment to Titan-era design remained firm.
65 Morefield, Memorandum, pp. 246-247.
66 Presidential Commission interview with George Hardy, 3 April, 1986, pp. 51 - 53.
67 Presidential Commission interview with Mark Salita, 2 April, 1986, pp. 7 - 9.
68 Presidential Commission interview with William Horton, 27 March, 1986, pp. 20 - 21.
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Thiokol engineer Roger Boisjoly recalled a rather similar response to the appearance of
erosion on STS 41-B:
Back in '84, there was a lot of subscale testing done that was characterized very
well, the analytics were understood. They had a pretty good handle on the
impingement characteristics. You don't like to see erosion on a seal, but if you
can characterize where it is coming from, how it's getting there, and characterize
its magnitude so that you can determine how safe or lack of safety you are, then
you feel reasonably comfortable that while you are trying to fix the problem,
everything is OK. And that's what happened, we were trying to fix the problem,
were starting to look at fixing the problem on that basis and whether or not to take
the putty out of the joint, things like that, whether or not to put larger seals in. 69
The attitude that while problems were emerging with the O-rings, these were limited and
solvable, carried through to the formal recommendation following 41-B. In the flight
readiness review for STS 51-C, the next shuttle launch following 41-B, the analysis was:
Rationale for accepting possibility of Joint O-ring erosion on STS 41-C
* Conservative analysis indicates max erosion possible
0.090 in (field joint)
0.090 (nozzle)
* Laboratory test of full-scale O-ring/joint cross section shows capability to
support joint sealing integrity at 3,000 psi pressure using an O-ring with a
simulated 0.095 in. erosion depth. 70
This analysis led to a recommendation to launch STS 41-C, the next in the sequence of
launches for 1984. STS-41-C launched without incident.
Horton and Boisjoly's points reflected the reality of engineering in the manned
69 Presidential Commission interview with Roger Boisjoly, 4 April, 1986, pp. 14 - 16.
70 L. Mulloy, "STS 41-B (SRM-10) O-ring Erosion Assessment," March 27, 1983. Held in folder 018181,
NASA Historical Collection, NASA Headquarters.
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spaceflight program. Faced with a problem that appeared to be understood, flight
continued while a fix was developed, in the mode of normal technological activity.
Keith Coates articulated a similar point, commenting about the emergence of the
phenomena of both joint rotation and O-ring erosion that "we started off with state-of-the
-art design based on successful Titan program. We have proceeded, you get into the
middle of a program and you find that you've got joint rotation [and erosion], you've got
a lot of hardware and you're in the middle of a program. Do you shut it down and go
back and start all over [...] or do you go with what you can? And you go from one step
to another step." 7'
This is not well recognized in the accident report. The report's catalogue of warning
signs that NASA failed to pay sufficient attention to is compelling when read in the
knowledge of the loss of Challenger and her crew. Normal engineering, however,
particularly in the era of the shuttle, would not tolerate stoppages for every potential
problem. In many cases, an identified problem was scoped for its seriousness, then
tracked over time. Engineering at NASA in the 1970s and 1980s involved collecting
ever-more evidence of how materials and design performed over time. Refinements were
needed, and were developed, but this was a gradual process.
It has been observed that STS 41-B showed erosion of both the nozzle joints and field
joints. The nozzle problem was more severe than the field joint problem on 41-B and
much of the attention of both NASA and Thiokol engineers during 1984 was focused on
the nozzle joints. 72 During 1984, three more shuttle launches were conducted and erosion
was seen in the SRBs of all three missions, with two instances of erosion in field joints
and three instances of nozzle joints. This erosion was, however, understood by Thiokol
engineers to be within the bounds of conditions that had been seen before, and further
assurance was given by the understanding that erosion was a self-limiting phenomenon.
Larry Sayer, Thiokol's Director of Engineering and Design commented that:
We had an analytical effort that had been going on, and we had some testing, that
71 Presidential Commission interview with Keith Coates, 25 March, 1986, p. 49.
72 "Erosion of SRM Pressure Seals." pp. A-8 - A-9.
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we had been doing since the spring of '84, and so each flight then we had
assembled and put together the recommendation that this was a limiting condition,
that we did not expect a catastrophic failure because of that condition.7 3
Arnold Thompson was the engineer in charge of activities at Thiokol around the O-rings
during 1984. He directed that a trend analysis be performed on the frequency and
severity of damage to the O-rings during this period, and Thiokol engineers Roger
Boisjoly and Jerry Burns carried these out. As has already been noted, however, this
period of time coincided with at least four changes to the configuration of the field joints
- changes in putty manufacture and application, but also with a change in inspection
procedure. There was also another change.
From mid 1984 onwards, the testing of the seating of the O-rings was changed. In this
process, after the assembly of the SRBs, the gap between the primary and secondary O-
rings was pressurized with an inert gas. This was in order to ensure that the two O-rings
were firmly seated in the grooves in the clevis before the SRB was fired to ensure the
joint sealed and there were no leaks. In mid-1984, the pressure used for this leak check
was increased from 100 psi to 200 psi.74 In the investigation of the Challenger accident,
it became clear that the incidence of erosion grew dramatically after the leak check
pressure was increased, but as Arnold Thompson later observed, at the time there seemed
to be so many variables in the field joints that making correlations between them and the
new phenomenon of erosion was difficult.75
By the end of 1984, Thiokol engineers believed that the erosion phenomenon was
undesirable but understood. It was understood to be linked to the methods of application
of putty to the SRB field joints, to the physical characteristics of the putty, and to the
existence of blowholes in the putty. However, exactly how these relationships worked
was not clear. Brian Russell, a manager in the SRM project office, remembered that
Thiokol were concerned about the issue and carried out a number of problem-fixes with
73 Presidential Commission interview with Larry Sayer, 20 March, 1986, p. 32.
74 Presidential Commission interview with Arnold Thompson, 20 March, 1986, pp. 25 - 27.
75 U.S. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 1,
p. 133 - 135. Presidential Commission interview with Arnold Thompson, 20 March, 1986, pp. 41 - 44.
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the putty to try to resolve the problem."6 Marshall engineers were also concerned about
the increasing incidence of erosion, and were equally uncertain of the exact causes,
although their focus was also on the installation and composition of putty, and the effect
of leak checks on the putty. Marshall engineers were also urging more fullscale testing to
verify that erosion was self-limiting.7 7
These types of interaction appear to have characterized the differing engineering culture
of Marshall and Thiokol. A number of historical studies have characterized Marshall as
possessing an extremely conservative style of engineering, and indeed, Marshall
engineers' resistance to the introduction of the systems engineering approach combined
with all-up testing in the 1960s has already been noted.7 8
By contrast, Marshall engineers felt that Thiokol's style of engineering was less rigorous,
and was often characterized by the drawing of conclusions without sufficient data to
justify them. James Smith, Marshall's chief engineer on the SRB Program, recalled that
when the STS 51-L SRBs were being stacked at KSC, Thiokol's stacking procedures had
caused damage to the field joint area of one of the SRB segments. Smith noted that while
Thiokol engineering recommended that it was safe to fly, Marshall engineers did not
believe that there was adequate data to support the recommendation. Smith noted:
We were very concerned, and still are today, that unless we know more about that
particular segment there is no way Marshall engineering would ever sign up to
use that segment on a flight unit. I guess I was surprised for the lack of analytical
tools, and it was my opinion that we did not have sufficient recommendation to
fly it. And that's a case, I guess the only way to say it is just an engineering
76 Brian Russell, Presidential Commission Testimony, 2 May, 1986, p. 17. U.S. Presidential Commission on
the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 5, pp. 1571 - 1573; Presidential
Commission interview with Brian Russell, 7 April, 1986.
" John Q. Miller, "Burned Rings on STS-11," memo to George Hardy, 28 February, 1986. National
Archives.
78 Yasushi Sato, "Local Engineering and Systems Engineering: Cultural Conflict at NASA's Marshall
Space Flight Center, 1960- 1963," Technology and Culture 46, no. 3, 2005, pp. 561 - 583; Howard
McCurdy, Inside NASA: High Technology and Organizational Change in the US Space Program
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).
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disagreement between various groups of engineers. 79
Smith's point was reiterated by Stanley Reinartz, one of the more senior Marshall Shuttle
personnel. Reinartz also observed that in his opinion, the engineering skill level of
Thiokol was lower than he had experienced with other prime contractors in the aerospace
industry. This weakness was evidenced by the fact that "very frequently Thiokol's
analysis of their data and their conclusions - their engineering conclusions - are
somewhat weak and once they are analyzed by Marshall engineering down here, that the
conclusions do not stack up."80
At the end of 1984, the SRB field joints were proving to be increasingly complex.
Working on the problems with joint rotation, although not in agreement as to the
seriousness of rotation or whether it reduced redundancy in the field joint, engineers at
Thiokol and Marshall were attempting to understand how this new phenomenon of
erosion had occurred, and what implications there might be for the SRBs. Differing
understandings of how this phenomenon had developed were emerging, with some
Thiokol engineers linking erosion to changes in putty, and others associating it with
manufacturing changes or the changes to the leak check pressure. Marshall engineers,
including senior engineers like Larry Mulloy and George Hardy, believed they
understood the effects and limits of erosion in the field joints, but did not know its causes.
Mulloy, in particular, as a result of his communications with George Morefield, also
understood that erosion had frequently been seen in the Titan motors and that Titan had
operated as designed in over 1000 launches.
The history of joint erosion reflected an iterative process of design within a normal
technology framework. As Henry Petroski has described the process of design, the initial
design of the SRBs was a hypothesis and that hypothesis was tested and modified over
the period 1977 - 1985, in light of new evidence. This evidence was obtained from the
series of Shuttle launches, subscale and a limited amount of fullscale testing and
analytical modeling. As has been shown, the knowledge about the functioning of the
79 Presidential Commission interview with James Smith, 13 March, 1986, pp. 27 - 28.
8o Presidential Commission interview with Stanley Reinartz, 3 April, 1986, p. 22.
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field joints was constrained by the availability of fullscale testing, the number of launches
from which to derive data and changes to the manufacturing of the joint which interacted
with each other in unknown ways. By the end of 1984, there was no shared
understanding of the field joints, and there was no clear evidence that pointed to possible
solutions to the problem.
Resilience
Much attention has focused on the issue of the resilience of the O-rings, and how this
changed as a result of changes in temperatures. This is largely as a result of the dramatic
Commission hearing when Richard Feynman conducted an impromptu demonstration of
the resilience of the O-ring. In his memoir, Feynman noted that he prepared the
demonstration in advance and waited for the apposite time. Having acquired a small
piece of viton O-ring, Feynman applied a C-clamp to it and submersed it in a glass of ice-
water. During questioning of Larry Mulloy in front of the Commission, Feynman
observed that:
I took this stuff that I got out of your seal and I put it in ice water, and I
discovered that when you put some pressure on it for a while and then undo it, it
doesn't stretch back. It stays the same dimension. In other words, for a few
seconds at least and more seconds than that, there is no resilience in this particular
material when it is at a temperature of 32 degrees. I believe that has some
significance for our problem.8 1
Despite Feynman's dramatic display, resilience had not been overlooked in the ongoing
process of the generation of knowledge about the SRB joint. The question of the effects
of temperature on the O-rings had, however, only really become an issue of concern
following the launch of STS 51-C in January 1985.
The launch of STS 51-C had taken place on an exceptionally cold day in Florida, recalled
81 Richard Feynman, Presidential Commission hearings, 11 February, 1986. U.S. Presidential Commission
on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 4, p. 363.
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by many as one of the coldest days on record, with ambient temperatures around 53"F at
the time of launch.82 Following the recovery of the SRBs, they were disassembled and it
was discovered that both SRBs had encountered erosion of O-rings in both field and
nozzle joints, as evidenced by soot being found behind the primary O-rings. But as
Roger Boisjoly recalled, how this was to be interpreted was not so simple:
That time we had bypassed a primary seal and the erosion wasn't that significant.
We had .01 erosion on one seal [...] and we had .032, .033 on another joint, in the
field joints. We also had hot gas pass both primary seals and the nozzles on that
flight.
... and that is really what sparked the great amount of attention because we had
now penetrated a primary seal, not eroded, and it was obvious that by the shape of
what we saw, it had been penetrated, but yet it had also sealed and the reason for
that very simply is that if it had not sealed, if the primary had not sealed, we
would have experienced erosion on the (secondary seal)....83
For Boisjoly, the new element in STS 51-C was temperature. The temperature at launch
was extremely cold for Florida - 53°F - and he became convinced that the cold had
affected the behavior of the 0-ring.84 While Boisjoly was convinced of this, other
engineers and managers at Thiokol regarded the problem as still one of erosion. Joe
Kilminster, Thiokol's Vice-President of Space Booster Programs, remembered that
during this time period his concern was to continue to work on the erosion issue.
Kilminster commissioned a series of activities, largely sub-scale tests and analytical
models, to continue to build the experience base around the joint. Kilminster's aim with
these tests in 1985 was to develop a series of solutions to the erosion problem that could
be used in early 1986, when the next full-scale tests on an SRB would be run."
82 Roger Boisjoly, Presidential Commission hearings, 25 February, 1986. U.S. Presidential Commission on
the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 4, p. 1392.
83 Presidential Commission interview with Roger Boisjoly, 2 April, 1986, p. 15
84 Presidential Commission interview with Roger Boisjoly, 2 April, 1986, pp. 16 - 17.
85 Presidential Commission interview with Joe Kilminster, 4 April, 1986, pp. 38 - 39.
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For Marshall and some Thiokol engineers, the disassembly of STS 51-C suggested that
the phenomenon of erosion proved to have two elements. The first was the impingement
erosion already known, where hot gas penetrated the putty within the joint and ate away
at the O-rings, generally at the top of the O-ring. The second was a new phenomenon of
blow-by, where hot gas penetrated past the primary O-ring, eroding some of the O-ring
on the way, but not eroding through the O-ring.
This discovery was soon followed by the disassembly in June of the SRBs from STS 51-
B, where it was discovered that both impingement and blow-by erosion had occurred on
both the primary and secondary O-rings of the nozzle joints, and that for the first time the
primary O-ring had not sealed.
At the same time, some attention was being paid to Boisjoly's concerns around
temperature and its effect on the resilience of the O-rings, but this effort was not as well-
resourced as the endeavors to address the O-ring erosion problem. Brian Russell, who
worked on the resilience testing, noted that:
We found that the O-rings' rebounding capability was diminished, particularly
with temperature, and that was driven pretty much by the cold weather launch, in
January, the 51-C launch. And we found at that time ... that there were times in
the flight of the vehicle that we did not have redundancy.8 6
These results were passed to Marshall, whose engineers attempted to develop an
understanding of how the joint was functioning. But as Leon Ray remembered, when
asked by a Presidential Commission investigator whether the resilience phenomenon was
considered a major concern, connected with the problems seen in the O-rings:
I think really, really there was a misunderstanding. I think people failed to realize
there were two problems, two problems. One was jet impingement damage to the
O-rings, burning of the O-rings. The other was resilience or loss of resiliency due
86 Presidential Commission interview with Brian Russell, 7 April, 1986, p. 20.
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to lower temperatures.87
During 1985, most Marshall engineers understood the erosion phenomenon to be the
major source of concern around the functioning of the O-rings, and to the extent that
they considered resilience, saw it as linked to erosion, but in an unknown way. Irving
Davids, the Marshall SRB Projects manager, in July 1985 was increasingly concerned
about the existence of erosion on the primary seal because he understood that if the
primary seal failed, there was no redundancy. He also discussed his concerns with his
superiors at Marshall, linking the issues ofjoint rotation and erosion, drawing attention
to the catastrophic possibilities were the primary to erode and the secondary not to seal
because of rotation. His concerns were heard, and prompted the calling of a meeting
between Thiokol and Marshall to address the joint problems, a solution Davids
characterized as "a fairly quick reaction, especially when there were a lot of people
involved and you have people's schedules and top management schedules.""
During that meeting, Thiokol made an extensive presentation to Marshall engineers and
administrators. The presentation was focused around four topics: the history of seal
erosion, erosion predictions, primary concerns and a summary of programs to fix the
problem." The presentation made several points about the history of seal erosion: that it
was more prevalent in nozzle joints (12 of 47 joints) than in field joints (5 of 111), and
that in the field joints, the erosion experienced in STS-2 in 1981 was the worst yet
seen.90 The summary at the end of the history section presented Thiokol's thinking
about the causes of erosion issue, suggesting that seal erosion is always associated with
blowholes in putty, but that putty blowholes have appeared without causing erosion.91
Thiokol then set out their modeling, and the conclusions they drew from that modeling,
which suggested erosion is caused by increasing pressure and a jet of hot gas into the
cavity between putty and seal, that these conditions only occur within the first 600
87 Presidential Commission interview with William Leon Ray, 4 April, 1986, pp. 40 - 42.
88 Presidential Commission interview with Irving Davids, 4 April, 1986, p. 27.
89 "Erosion of SRM Pressure Seals," pp. 55-1 - 55-2.
90 "Erosion of SRM Pressure Seals," pp. 55-6 - 55-9.
91 "Erosion of SRM Pressure Seals," pp. 55-12 - 55-13.
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milliseconds of the SRB ignition, that the model agrees with the observed data from
previous SRB firings, and that amount of erosion possible is less than safety margins. 92
Thiokol's presentation concluded with their primary concerns about the joint - which for
the field joint were the reduced likelihood of the secondary sealing if the primary joint
failed after joint rotation. This was presented in one page, whereas concerns around
erosion in the nozzle joint were great enough to need four pages. Thiokol's proposed
solutions for the field joint included both short and long-term options. In the short term,
they proposed to increase the size of the O-rings, and increase the size of the shims in the
joint. In the longer term, Thiokol was proposing introducing a second O-ring into the
primary position, a solution they believed would take at least a year to implement.93
In concluding the meeting, Thiokol set out its recommendations, noting that the lack of a
secondary seal was critical and that joint rotation fixes were needed as soon as possible to
reduce criticality. Thiokol also noted that if joints were adequately leak checked,
assembled free of contamination and met the squeeze requirements, then flight could
safely continue.94
Far from neglecting the warning signs, NASA and Thiokol noticed and acted upon them.
Given the complexity of the shuttle, however, it was not immediately clear what steps
should be taken, and the initial assessment of the O-ring problem focused on some
elements that were not ultimately significant factors in the Challenger accident.
The O-ring Taskforce
The issues raised at the 19 August meeting caused concern at both Marshall and Thiokol,
and prompted the formation of a task-force at Thiokol to immediately address the erosion
issue. The charter of the taskforce did not mention investigation of the issue of
92 "Erosion of SRM Pressure Seals," pp. 55-31.
9 "Erosion of SRM Pressure Seals," pp. 55-44.
94 U.S. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 1,
pp. 249 - 255.
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resilience, but this was also investigated, albeit with a lesser intensity than erosion.95 This
taskforce was led by Ron Macintosh from Marshall and included four or five Marshall
engineers. On the Thiokol side, it was led by Don Kitner, and included Roger Boisjoly,
and Arnold Thompson.96 The taskforce was charged with developing long and short-term
fixes to the erosion problems within the SRB joints.
Joe Kilminster, the authorizing manager from Thiokol, recalled that the focus of the
taskforce was on generating a better understanding of the behavior of the putty, and had
developed some reassuring results:
we also did some testing with this small subscale motor that verified that you
could lose up to over 125 thousandths of material from these O-rings and still
seal.
We conducted a series of tests with small five-inch center perforate rocket motors
[...] Subscale motors, five inches in diameter. Where we provided an orifice, and
we varied these orifice sizes so that hot gases would impinge on the O-ring. And
we tried to duplicate the volumes that those gases would have to fill in a full-scale
motor in order to assess the timing dimension and the extent of erosion. 97
Over the second half of 1985, the O-ring taskforce worked on developing solutions to the
problem of erosion, primarily via developing new methods to mould and apply putty to
the interiors of the SRBs. A concerted effort to model the erosion phenomenon also took
place. Mark Salita, a mathematician, was brought in to create a series of models. He
recalled his conclusions:
Given the appearance of erosion, whether it be jet impingement or blow-by
erosion, can we explain the mechanisms that are involved and can we extrapolate
with the model, with the model correlated on subscale data and full motor data,
95 Presidential Commission interview with Don Kitner, 4 April, 1986, pp. 1 - 3.; Presidential Commission
interview with Brian Russell, 4 April, 1986.
96 Presidential Commission interview with Mark Salita, 2 April, 1986, pp. 11 - 12.
97 Presidential Commission interview with Joe Kilminster, 4 April, 1986, pp. 38 - 39.
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could we extrapolate a worst case scenario for those two situations? And the
conclusions I came to were, number one, that it would be improbable that jet
impingement erosion would burn through an primary O-ring and it was
improbable that if you had blow-by of a primary O-ring of hot gases such that
those gases would burn a tunnel underneath the O-ring, [...] that for a secondary
O-ring you would not expect to see jet impingement erosion compromise that
seal.98
Salita, in the aftermath of the accident, however noted his key omission: that there was a
third question. His model had examined the question of whether impingement erosion
would compromise the primary O-ring, and the causes of impingement erosion were
strongly linked to blowholes in the sealing putty. His model also considered whether
blow-by erosion would compromise the secondary seal. He had not examined how blow-
by erosion might occur, and what its mechanisms might be.99
At the same time, subscale tests were being conducted to simulate erosion, and it was
found after 12 tests that the erosion seen on the subscale tests was predicted by the
analytical model. 100
Frustrations emerged during the latter half of 1985, as some of the Thiokol engineers felt
that their growing concerns about the safety of the joint were not being heard by their
superiors at Thiokol. This was compounded by a concern that a lack of action by Thiokol
was being observed with disapproval by NASA. During this period, Roger Boisjoly, Bob
Ebeling and Arnold Thompson from Thiokol wrote memos to their superiors complaining
about the lack of resources and management attention being given to the O-ring
taskforce. In the aftermath of the Challenger accident, the Presidential Commission made
much of these memos, noting that they were evidence of growing concerns about the 0-
rings, that were ignored by Thiokol and NASA management.' 0
98 Presidential Commission interview with Mark Salita, 2 April, 1986, pp. 6 - 7.
99 Presidential Commission interview with Mark Salita, 2 April, 1986, pp. 8 - 9.
'00 Presidential Commission interview with Arnold Thompson, 4 April, 1986, pp. 28 - 29.
0o' U.S. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 1,
pp. 140 - 141.
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While these memos certainly express the concerns held by some of the Thiokol
engineers, that is not their only purpose. Boisjoly, Thompson and others also note their
concern that Marshall will become displeased with the performance of Thiokol, and that
this is something that Thiokol management should be concerned about. A memo from
Bob Ebeling in October 1985 makes this point clearly: "HELP! The seal task force is
constantly being delayed by every possible means. People are quoting policy and
systems without workaround. MSFC is correct in stating that we do not know how to run
a development program." While the Presidential Commission's report emphasizes the
first sentence, as did other investigators including the Congress, it is important to note
that Ebeling's concern appears to be as much for Thiokol's relationship with Marshall as
for the safety of the system. 102 Another memo by Roger Boisjoly accentuates this
concern. Boisjoly wrote that "finally the basic problem boils down to the fact that ALL
MTI (Thiokol) problems are #1 priority and that upper management apparently feels that
the SRM program is ours for sure and the customer be damned."' 0 3
Also coming through these memos is a sense that short-term fixes would be needed to
continue to fly, whilst long-term solutions would require substantially more time to
develop. Joe Kilminster and Bob Lund, the Thiokol managers most associated with the
O-ring task force noted their responses to the memos coming from the taskforce were not
about delaying or rejecting the actions the taskforce recommended, but reflected a desire
to adhere to the formalized systems of change management put in place by Marshall.
Kilminster noted that he had responded to Boisjoly's desire to expedite work on the 0-
rings:
"I was willing to do that for the subscale-type work, and at that time talking about
a combination of subscale work and full-scale work. And I says, We absolutely
cannot circumvent the system when we're working with flight hardware. [...] It's
not something that you can just go out and let the engineers do something in the
102 Quoted in U.S. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the
President, vol. 1, p. 252.
103 Quoted in U.S. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the
President, vol. 1, pp. 254 - 255.
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factory without having it planned and without having it recorded. And I think his
frustration in the time that it was taking to do all that was probably what caused
some of those comments. 04
Commenting on the work of the taskforce, Brian Russell from Thiokol noted that he
believed the work would have been completed by mid-1986, but that the program of
work was determined by the availability of full-scale testing facilities and test articles.'05
This point was reiterated by Allan McDonald, who observed that by August 1985, there
was no possibility of any full-scale testing on the SRB field joints until at least February
1986, and that there was also no intention of making changes to flight hardware until it
had been qualified by a static test. 10 6 Jerald Mason, senior vice president and in charge of
the Thiokol operation at the Wasatch plant, expressed the conservative philosophy behind
this unwillingness to make hardware changes:
I can't overemphasize in our business that change has as much a chance of
making things worse as it does of making thing better, and there's been a long
history of going in and making a change and then it turns out, you fix one thing
and you make something else much worse.'o 7
From the Marshall perspective, however, there were concerns that Thiokol's capability to
resolve the problem was not high. Ben Powers, a Marshall engineer, noted that:
I do think they have staffing problems. I don't think they have enough good
quality engineers. I think that contributes to (problems with the taskforce), not
that they don't have some good ones. They do. They have some excellent
engineers, but they don't have very many of them. It's not like dealing with
Rockwell or somebody like that, where they can send them in busloads. 8
104 Presidential Commission interview with Joe Kilminster, 4 April, 1986, pp. 63 - 64.
1o5 Presidential Commission interview with Brian Russell, 4 April, 1986, pp. 12 - 13.
106 Presidential Commission interview with Allan McDonald, 19 March, 1986, pp. 50 - 51.
'07 Presidential Commission interview with Jerald Mason, 2 April, 1986, p. 18.
08 Presidential Commission interview with Luther Ben Powers, 12 March, 1986, p. 73.
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Associated with concerns about Thiokol's technical capability were concerns with their
management style and systems. A number of Marshall personnel noted Thiokol's
relative lack of sophistication in systems management, which was reflected in a limited
ability to document and manage engineering change. Cecil Houston noted that "they are
a free-wheeling bunch and are sort of crude in their approach to management." He
speculated that this may have been associated with their relatively recent move into the
large-scale aerospace business." 9
Over 1985, concerns around the O-rings and their performance increased, both at Thiokol
and at Marshall, particularly around the phenomenon of erosion, and its increased
incidence during that period. Faced with a conservative attitude to engineering change,
and a constrained ability to conduct fullscale testing, Thiokol engineers continued to
work on incremental, iterative problem fixes on the phenomenon of erosion, which they
saw as both most problematic and best understood. Meanwhile, during this period, the
issue of joint rotation had not gone away, and there was a small amount of evidence that
temperature may have affected the performance of the joint.
Set against these concerns was a growing sense among Marshall engineers, senior and
junior, that Thiokol was prone to overreaction, a tendency exacerbated by a lack of
communication between their engineering workforce and the project management
workforce. Lawrence Wear, manager of the solid rocket booster office at Marshall,
recalled that during 1985:
there have been other occasions when (Thiokol) engineering has stated something
and, you know, 24 hours later that wasn't what came out of the corporation. I
have seen it go both ways, I have seen it go from, you know, it's a big problem,
the sky is going to fall on you, to 24 hours later where it's really not a big
problem. And I've seen it go the other way, where engineering says we can
accept that view, and 24 hour later, Thiokol's project says, we're not going to do
that. 11°
109 Presidential Commission interview with Cecil Houston, 10 April, 1986, p. 85.
o0 Presidential Commission interview with Lawrence Wear, 12 March, 1986, pp. 32- 33.
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The SRB field joints became significantly more complex in 1985, and more engineering
effort was devoted to understanding how they functioned. A set of tests and other
activities was set in place to determine how to resolve this anomalous behavior, using
well-established practices. Concerns were high at both Marshall and Thiokol.
On the eve of the launch
By 27 January 1986, the SRB joint had become recognized as a very complex and
complicated technology - with a range of understandings of how it was intended to work,
how it had worked, and which elements of it were problematic. The technology had not
stayed static, but instead had changed over time in response to changing circumstances -
a growing experience base, the need for new suppliers, and greater analytic capability to
model its behavior. It can also be seen that Marshall and Thiokol personnel had
differing understandings of how the SRB joint could be expected to work. There were at
least three different technical concerns with the field joint: rotation, impingement and
blow-by erosion, and resilience. It was unclear to either Thiokol or Marshall engineers
how these phenomena interacted, or which was of greater concern. Over the period 1981
- 1986, the experience base relating to the operation of the SRB joints had expanded.
Following the flight of STS-2 in 1981, no erosion of equal magnitude had been seen
again, and the joint rotation issue had not resulted in the loss of a primary seal. The
upper bound of erosion had been seen early, and subsequent flights had never shifted that
bound.
This aligns with the explanation provided in the accident report, but also goes beyond it
by recognizing both the growing concern and the growing efforts at NASA and Thiokol
to develop a better understanding of the joint issues.
By late 1985, computing technology had advanced substantially, as a number of both
Marshall and Thiokol engineers recall. Mark Salita and other Thiokol scientists were
able to produce increasingly more sophisticated models of certain elements of the
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functioning of the field joints. But this technology had its limits. There were no
integrated models available and so no understanding of how the joint functioned as a
system was possible.
The issue of safety culture has not been greatly mentioned in this chapter, which has
largely been focused on engineering culture and engineering practice. This is in part
because the interpretation placed on the existence of safety culture by the Presidential
Commission is largely supported by the evidence. The Presidential Commission's report
commented that the Commission:
were surprised to realize after many hours of testimony that NASA's safety staff
was never mentioned. No witness related the approval or disapproval of the
reliability engineers, and none expressed the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the
quality assurance staff. No one thought to invite a safety representative or a
reliability and quality assurance engineer to the January 27, 1986, teleconference
between Marshall and Thiokol."'
The formal safety mechanisms, systems and organizations at Marshall and across NASA,
many of which had been put in place in the aftermath of Apollo 204, had been targeted as
sources of efficiency gains during the 1970s when the oil crisis and sudden recession
created budget pressures on all government programs. Safety systems were also seen as
lower priorities as the Shuttle program came to be understood as routinized and no longer
a developmental program. Safety concerns were associated with new developments, and
the commitment to older, proven technologies appeared to make formal safety systems
less necessary.
Nevertheless, the story that has been told in this chapter reflects that most of the Marshall
and Thiokol engineers were deeply concerned with safety, and routinely considered the
safety implications of their day-to-day work. Indeed, the nature of engineering design as
an iterative, cumulative problem-solving activity suggests that safety is a key element of
"' U.S. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 1,
p. 152.
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the process. As Henry Petroski points out, "engineering design has as its first and
foremost objective the obviation of failure." 112 This chapter has told a story of
engineering design, of design in the making. It has told a story of how Marshall and
Thiokol engineers attempted to determine how a complex and uncertain technology
functioned, in an environment where the ability to generate reliable knowledge was
limited by the technology of testing and by the constraints of the testing schedule and
budget.
It may be possible that engineering cultures are also implicitly safety cultures. Safety
culture involves commonly shared, stable set of values and practices in which all
members of an organization learn from errors and accidents so as to maximize safety in
the performance of organizational goals. These are also the set of values and practices
that have been identified as constituting the engineering cultures and practices at
Marshall and Thiokol.
The Telecon
Much attention has been devoted to the teleconference at which NASA and Thiokol
considered the possibility that the O-rings might fail on STS 51-L due to the unusual cold
snap but decided against halting the launch. In the Presidential Commission investigation,
this was seen as the crucial failure leading to the loss of Challenger and her crew. The
telecom also features in later writing about the accident as a case study in poor decision-
making. These depictions of the teleconference routinely strip out the engineering from
this discussion to focus instead on communications styles, management styles, and group
psychology. By returning engineering to its central position in this teleconference, we
gain a better understanding of what occurred there.
On the 2 7" of January, around 12:30 pm, NASA's Mission Management Team cancelled
the launch of STS 51 -L, known as Challenger, that had been scheduled for that day. The
112 Henry Petroski, To Engineer is Human: The Role ofFailure in Successful Design (New York: Vintage
Books, 1992), p. x.
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reason was high crosswinds at the launch site."' The launch of STS 51-L was postponed
until the next day. During the afternoon of the 2 7 th of January, Thiokol personnel,
including Roger Boisjoly, Bob Ebeling, Allan McDonald and Carver Kennedy became
aware that the predicted temperature at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida for the
morning of the 2 8th of January could be as low as 20 0F. 114
Boisjoly and Ebeling became concerned and started a process of organizing a
teleconference with Marshall and Thiokol personnel at three sites: Marshall, at KSC and
at the Thiokol plant in Utah. This telecon was originally convened at around 5:45pm
EST, and for an hour or so, Thiokol engineers presented their concerns about
temperature, and its effects on the likelihood of the field joints sealing. Because of
technical difficulties, this telecon was curtailed, and another was scheduled for
approximately three hours later, allowing engineers from both organizations the time to
gather or start to draw up some written material to support their concerns."'
The telecon reconvened at around 8:45pm EST. It was attended by 36 personnel. From
Thiokol in Utah were 14 personnel, including a senior vice-president, Jerald Mason, and
three vice presidents. Also present were members of the O-ring task force, and two
Thiokol resident engineers at Kennedy Space Centre. From Marshall were 13 personnel
including George Hardy, the Deputy Director of Science and Engineering, and at KSC,
Lawrence Mulloy, the Manager of the SRB Project. The Presidential Commission lists
all 36 the participants at the telecon; with five exceptions (Roger Boisjoly, Jerry Burn,
Kyle Speas, and Joel Maw from Thiokol; and John Schell from Marshall), all the
participants have job titles that imply management responsibility. By the same token, the
interviews of all 36 participants confirm that almost all of the participants had
"' U.S. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 1,
p. 85.
"114 Allan McDonald , Presidential Commission Testimony, 25 February, 1986. U.S. Presidential
Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 4, pp. 1264 - 1268;
Presidential Commission interview with Robert Ebeling, 4 April, 1986.
"' The Presidential Commission report includes a very detailed timeline of the teleconferences on the 27'
of January 1986. This study does not dispute any of these times and does not repeat the minute-by-minute
anatomy of the meeting. See U.S. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident,
Report to the President, vol. 1, pp. 104 - 111.
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engineering educations and experience as working engineers. 1 6
The telecon opened with a presentation from Thiokol, which had been hastily prepared in
the three hours since the first telecon. Several participants recalled that slides were still
being written while the second telecon began.
The presentation was given by Roger Boisjoly, Brian Russell and Thiokol vice president
of engineering, Bob Lund, and consisted of 13 slides. The first three slides set out a
history of erosion damage on O-rings, familiar to those who had attended the 19 August
1985 briefing on O-rings, and listed Thiokol's concerns about the possibility of the
secondary seal not seating if the primary O-ring failed some seconds into ignition. The
fourth slide, handwritten by Roger Boisjoly, indicated his concerns about temperature.
More specifically, Boisjoly indicated that he believed that lower temperatures would
change the behavior of the primary O-ring, creating a lower squeeze, a longer time to
actuate, and hence would increase the likelihood of joint rotation causing the secondary
seal not to seat."11
The next six slides laid out some data about temperature and the performance of the 0-
rings. A number of these slides were either ambiguous or contained little data.
Comparisons were drawn between shuttle missions STS 41-B, 51-C, and STS 61-A,
which had launched at temperatures of 52F, 55°F, and 77F respectively and had each
experienced blow-by erosion."18
Bob Lund then presented the conclusions and recommendations slides, setting out
Thiokol's interpretation of their data, which is reproduced in full below:
"I6 U.S. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 1,
p. 111.
7 Roger Boisjoly, Presidential Commission Testimony, 14 February, 1986. U.S. Presidential Commission
on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 4, pp. 645 - 651, 674 - 675;
Presidential Commission interview with Roger Boisjoly, 4 April, 1986. See also
http://www.onlineethics.org/cms/13470.aspx, which reproduces the slide with Roger Boisjoly's
commentary, and was written several years after the Challenger accident.
"' U.S. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 4,
pp. 645 - 651;
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Temperature of o-ring not only parameter controlling blow-by
SRM 15 (STS 51-C) with blow-by had an o-ring temp at 530 F
SRM 22 (STS 61-A) with blow-by had an o-ring temp at 750F
four development motors with no blow-by were tested at o-ring temp of 47 to
520F
development motors had putty packing which resulted in better performance
at about 50'F (10 oC) blow-by could be experienced in case joints
temp for SRM 25 on 1-28-86 launch will be
290F 9 a.m.
380F 2 p.m.
have no data that would indicate SRM 25 is different than SRM 15 other than
temp
Lund then presented his recommendation that "O-ring temp must be >53OF at launch.
Development motors at 47 to 520 F with putty packing had no blow-by. SRM 15 (the best
simulation) worked at 530F."
Even among the Thiokol taskforce members present at the telecon, opinions about the
Thiokol presentation were divided. Don Kutner noted that there was only one piece of
data that supported the idea that O-ring resilience was worse at lower temperatures, and
that was contradicted by the fact that blow-by had been experienced at both the hottest
and coldest motor temperatures."' He further noted, however, that he believed the
correlation between temperature and resilience to be intuitively obvious, as did the other
Thiokol taskforce members present, Thompson, Boisjoly and Sayer.120 Jack Kapp, also a
"9 Presidential Commission interview with Don Kitner, 4 April, 1986, p. 16.
120 Presidential Commission interview with Don Kitner, 4 April, 1986, p. 17; Presidential Commission
interview with Jack Kapp, 4 April, pp. 22 - 23.
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Thiokol engineer, remembered that he was concerned that the presentation was
"qualitative in nature. At that particular time we had a very difficult time having enough
engineering data to quantify the effects that we had been talking about. A lot of it was
based on engineering feel."''
During Thiokol's presentation of the slides, Boisjoly recalled that he was interrupted a
number of times by Marshall personnel to ask for more data, or ask for his contentions to
be quantified. 122 Other Thiokol personnel noted that this type of interchange appeared
entirely normal to them, reflecting a standard engineering debate, rather than any violent
disagreement. 123
On the Marshall side of the house, however, recollections of the Thiokol presentation
differed somewhat. Bill Riehl, chief of the non-metallic materials division at Marshall,
remembered his surprise at Thiokol's recommendation that they could not launch at
temperatures below 53F. Riehl's experience with the O-ring elastomer had suggested
that while there was some loss of resilience as temperature dropped, this effect did not
become pronounced until around 20F. So, as Riehl explained:
I was very surprised that they came in - and I expected them to come in and say,
let's wait until the temperature comes up to somewhere above freezing. That's
what I expected. [...] And we got to the back of the thing (the Thiokol
presentation) and they said don't launch below 53 degrees, and I practically came
unglued myself. I didn't see how we could substantiate that from the data that I
had here, you see. 124
In later discussion, Riehl clarified what about the Thiokol recommendation astonished
him:
"12 Presidential Commission interview with Jack Kapp, 4 April, 1986, p. 25.
122 Roger Boisjoly, Presidential Commission Testimony, 14 February, 1986. U.S. Presidential Commission
on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 4, pp. 674 - 675.
123 Presidential Commission interview with Allan McDonald, 19 March, pp. 11 - 13.
124 Presidential Commission interview with William Riehl, 13 March, 1986, pp. 10 - 11.
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Personally, I didn't see how we (Marshall) could live with such a
recommendation any time. And I didn't see how - the data didn't, from what I
could see, didn't indicate 53. If they had come in with 30 degrees, based on what
I saw, I would have understood it. But when they came in with 53, if I had been
in the conference at the head table, I would have challenged it and said: Come
here; where'd you come in with the 53 degrees? And they said, as I understood it,
because they had flown at 53 before, which is no reason to me. That's tradition,
not technology. 125
Others at Marshall had similar concerns about the recommendation, but for different
reasons. John Schwinghammer, also a materials expert, noted that he was of the opinion
that while resiliency was likely to decrease in the colder temperatures, he believed that
the functioning of the joint was too complex to be understood just in terms of
resilience. 126 He characterized the Thiokol presentation as "not a good case" and
reflecting Thiokol's "nervousness" rather than on the basis of any "hard technical
data." 127 Frank Adams, deputy manager of the SRB program, remembered that Thiokol's
discussion of the relationship between durometer and performance caught his attention.
During the Thiokol presentation, he remembered that in the early stages of the Shuttle
program, the SRBs had been built with significantly harder durometer O-rings. There
had not been any problems experienced with the harder O-rings, and so, in Adams' mind,
the predicted cold would not make the O-rings any harder than had been seen before, and
so the cold temperature was actually within experience base. 128
Senior Marshall personnel Larry Mulloy and George Hardy took the lead in questioning
the Marshall presentation. Larry Mulloy opened the conversation. Mulloy was also
concerned about the recommendation, both from the point of view of the longer term
impact on the Shuttle program, and from a concern about the logic used to arrive at the
recommendation. Testifying before the Presidential Commission, Mulloy recalled:
125 Presidential Commission interview with William Riehl, 13 March, 1986, pp. 12 - 13.
126 Presidential Commission interview with John Schwinghammer, 13 March, 1986, pp. 20 - 21.
127 Presidential Commission interview with John Schwinghammer, 13 March, 1986, p. 22.
128 Presidential Commission interview with Leslie Adams, 12 March, 1986, pp. 22 - 23.
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Mulloy: After we had looked at all of the data, the conclusion and the
recommendation charts that Mr Lund had prepared came in and the logic for this
recommendation, which did not specifically address don't launch 51 -L, what it
said was that, within our experience base we should not operate any solid rocket
motor at any temperature colder than we have operated one, which was 51-C.
Chairman Rogers: Didn't you take that to be a negative recommendation?
Mulloy: Yes sir. That was an engineering conclusion, which I found this
conclusion without basis and I challenged its logic. Now that has been interpreted
by some people as applying pressure. I certainly don't consider it to be applying
pressure. Any time that one of my contractors or, for that matter, some of Mr
Hardy's people who come to me with a recommendation and a conclusion that is
based on engineering data, I probe the basis for their conclusion to assure that it is
sound and that it is logical. 129
Mulloy's probing involved him recounting his understanding of how the SRB joint
worked, based on his four years of experience as manager of the SRB project office.
Mulloy later noted that he had been specifically briefed on problems with the SRB field
joints on assuming his role in 1982, taking over from George Hardy. 130 Mulloy's logic in
responding to Thiokol was that first, the joint problem had been observed since the flight
of STS-2 in 1981, and since that time, had been studied and understood as not posing a
threat to safety. Second, that the data presented by Thiokol did not demonstrate that
blow-by was correlated with temperature - as demonstrated by the appearance of blow-
by on STS 61-B launching at a temperature of 75'F. Temperature may affect the
hardness of the O-rings, but Thiokol's own tests had demonstrated that a 90 durometer 0-
ring would still seal, which was the equivalent of a 75 durometer O-ring at the predicted
temperatures. Finally, while resilience may affect the primary O-ring, the leak check
would ensure that the secondary O-ring would seat and seal before joint rotation was
129 Lawrence Mulloy, Presidential Commission Testimony, 26 February, 1986. U.S. Presidential
Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 4, p. 839.
"30 Presidential Commission interview with Lawrence Mulloy, 12 March, 1986, pp. 7 - 8.
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likely to affect it.131'
Mulloy went on to say that his intention in recounting these ideas was to tell Thiokol to:
look at all the data that we have, look at our flight experience, look at our test
data, look at our analysis, don't just look at this isolated body of data we have on
12 charts in reaching your conclusion. 132
A number of participants in the telecon, particularly from the Thiokol side, recall Mulloy
as then asking, perhaps rhetorically, "My God, Thiokol, when do you want me to launch,
next April?"' 33 Mulloy's interpretation of this statement was that he was expressing his
concern that Thiokol, in presenting a recommendation not to launch below 53F, was
effectively changing the ground-rules of launching the shuttle. It is important to
remember that Thiokol's recommendation did not just affect STS 51-L and the possibility
of its launch the next day, but potentially all future launches.
Following Mulloy's questioning, George Hardy responded to the Thiokol presentation.
George Hardy is quoted in the Presidential Commission report as saying that he was
"appalled" at Thiokol's recommendation. He clarified that point to say that:
I stated I was somewhat appalled and that was referring specifically to some of
the data or the interpretation of some of the data that Thiokol had presented with
respect to its influence on the joint seal performance relative to the issue under
discussion, which specifically was the possibility that the primary seal may fail to
actuate and therefore to blow-by the primary seal. [...] Then I went on to say that
I supported the assessment of data presented essentially as summarized by Mr
Mulloy, but I would not recommend launch over Thiokol's objections.3 4
'3' Lawrence Mulloy, Presidential Commission Testimony, 26 February, 1986. U.S. Presidential
Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 4, pp. 841 - 842.
132 Lawrence Mulloy, Presidential Commission Testimony, p. 842.
133 Lawrence Mulloy, Presidential Commission Testimony, p. 843.
134 George Hardy, Presidential Commission Testimony, 26 February, 1986. U.S. Presidential Commission
on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 5, pp. 1598 - 1601.
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Mulloy and Hardy's challenge to the recommendation was on two grounds: first, that the
recommendation was not supported by the data, and second, that Thiokol appeared, at
very late notice, to be introducing an entirely new criterion for launching the shuttle.
For some, particularly more junior, members of the Thiokol side of the telecon, Mulloy
and Hardy's comments were interpreted as threatening and hostile.35 They also felt that
Marshall was putting them in the position of being forced to prove that the O-rings were
unsafe, rather than prove that they were safe, a reversal of normal procedure. 13 6 But for
more senior Thiokol personnel, Mulloy and Hardy's comments were seen as a standard
part of engineering conversations between Thiokol and Marshall. Robert Lund,
Thiokol's vice president of engineering noted that Hardy's comments: "made me ponder
of what I'd missed, and so we said, what did we miss, and Mr. Mulloy said, well, I'd like
you to consider these other thoughts that we have had down here.""'37 Following Mulloy
and Hardy's comments, Joe Kilminster, Thiokol's vice president of the space booster
program, called for a brief offline caucus with his Thiokol colleagues.
As the Thiokol team in Utah moved to their offline caucas, Thiokol's resident engineer at
KSC, Allan McDonald, asked them if they had considered that the secondary O-ring
would seal if the joint rotated and the primary O-ring experienced blow-by and slow
erosion. McDonald wanted to ensure that it was understood that the effects of the leak
check would blow the primary O-rig upwards in its groove, but blow the secondary O-
ring down in its groove. This would mean that the effects of cold on the primary would
be greater, because it had further to move to seal."3
For the more senior members of Thiokol's team, the vigorous interaction with Marshall
was a normal element of their engineering practice, designed to ensure that views on both
sides of the conversation were tested and examined before decisions were made. Another
35 Presidential Commission interview with Joel Maw, 20 March, p. 11; Presidential Commission interview
with Brian Russell, 19 March, 1986, pp. 17 - 19.
136 Presidential Commission interview with Don Kitner, 26 March, 1986, pp. 13 - 14.
37 Presidential Commission interview with Robert Lund, 1 April, 1986, pp. 39 - 40.
138 Presidential Commission interview with Allan McDonald, 19 March, 1986, pp. 16 - 17.
225
NASA participant noted that this kind of behavior was also part of Hardy and Mulloy's
attempts to ensure that they would be able to understand the recommendation in order to
justify it to their superiors. Ben Powers of Marshall remembered that during the offline
caucus, George Hardy was conversing with his immediate superior, Judd Lovingood, the
deputy manager of the shuttle program office, and "talking about who they were going to
call on the phone to shut it (the launch) down. They were already lining up the calls in
their mind. These are the guys we have to notify because we're not going to go.""'39
On the Thiokol side, during the offline caucas, the engineering data was re-examined, and
Mulloy's points were considered. Present were Kilminster, Lund, Mason and Cal
Wiggins, deputy to the General Manager of the Space division of Thiokol. Also present
were Thompson, Boisjoly, Russell and Ebeling. 40
Wiggins, Kilminster and Lund remember that the first part of the caucus was spent going
over the data that they had presented to Marshall. Thompson and Boisjoly were the most
active participants in this discussion, arguing that while they did not believe they were
able to further quantify their concerns, hands-on experience and "gut-feel" told them that
resilience was the major factor controlling the behavior of the joints. Mason's response
was to separate the issue of resilience out from the issue of erosion, and argue that
erosion was a known, and limited problem, and that Thiokol's own testing supported that
point. The taskforce members agreed with this point, but continued to argue that the
blow-by seen on STS 51-C and 61-A suggested that resilience changes due to
temperature was also a factor, and that this would make the primary O-ring slower to
activate. 4 1 Don Kutner, who had been chair of the O-ring taskforce recalled: "It was
intuitively obvious that cold is worse, and therefore, because it was so much colder than
any previous flights, that we should not launch. And that was the same opinion that
others in the room expressed." 142
139 Presidential Commission interview with Luther Ben Powers, 12 March, 1986, pp. 16 - 17.
140 U.S. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President,vol. 1,
p. 108.
141 Presidential Commission interview with Brian Russell, 19 March, 1986, pp. 25 - 26.
142 Presidential Commission interview with Don Kitner, 26 March, 1986, p. 16.
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At this point, the comments of Allan McDonald were discussed, with opinions varying as
to the significance of the secondary being able to seal. Boisjoly and Thompson were
clear that they understood that joint rotation meant that there was less probability of a
secondary seal if the primary seal took longer to seal and experienced blow-by.' 43
Wiggins, Mason and Kilminster believed that the leak check ensured that the secondary
seal would seat, and that testing had demonstrated that erosion of the primary was a self-
limiting phenomenon.'"
After fifteen or twenty minutes of conversation, Jerald Mason decided that discussion had
become repetitive; no new facts were being presented and that there was little more to be
gained by continuing to relitigate the same points. He decided that it was time to make a
decision about Thiokol's recommendation and asked each of the four senior personnel for
their opinions:
I said something to the effect, to Cal (Wiggins) or Joe (Kilminster), "What do you
think?" And that ended up being a poll. I think Joe said, "Well, my feeling is it's
okay. What do you think, Cal?" And He said, "Well, I think it's all right." And
then I said to Bob, and everyone remembers this, I said, "Bob, you've got to put
on your management hat, not your engineering hat."
And my message was intended to be that we had all been spending our time there
as engineers, looking at numbers and calculations and so forth. We now had to
take that information and do some management with it. And there have been a lot
of people who have characterized that expression like I was telling "Don't be an
engineer, be a manager," and that isn't the case. 145
Lund understood that same thing from Mason's statement: that he was being asked to
make a decision, rather than argue about data. When interviewed by the Presidential
'43 Roger Boisjoly, Presidential Commission Testimony, 26 February, 1986. U.S. Presidential Commission
on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 4, p. 676.
'44 Presidential Commission interview with Jerald Mason, 2 April, 1986, pp. 26 - 27; Presidential
Commission interview with Calvin Wiggins, 19 March, 1986, pp. 15 - 17.
"45 Presidential Commission interview with Jerald Mason, 2 April, 1986, pp. 27 - 28.
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Commission he was at pains to make clear that he was not being asked to "do something
dumb", but to use his best judgment. 46 He indicated his support to launch the
Challenger.
With the declared support for launching from the three most senior Thiokol personnel in
the room, Mason reviewed the situation again. He restated that he believed the primary
O-ring had a safety margin of over three times the amount of erosion that had been seen
to date, but that there was still concern and doubt from Boisjoly and Thompson. He then
reiterated McDonald's observation that the secondary O-ring would already be seated due
to the leak check, and would be pressurized via gas before joint rotation could take place.
He concluded:
Although the engineers, Boisjoly and Thompson, had expressed some question
about how long it would take that (primary) O-ring to move, we accepted that that
was a possibility, not a probability, but it was possible. So, if their concern was a
valid concern, what would happen? And the answer was, the second O-ring
would seal.' 47
Mason then resumed the telecon with Marshall and indicated that their position had
changed. Joe Kilminster quickly wrote out Thiokol's new position and sent it via fax to
Marshall: "Calculations show that SRM-25 O-rings will be 20 degrees colder than SRM-
15 O-rings. Temperature data not conclusive on predicting primary O-ring blow-by.
MTI recommends STS-51L launch proceeds on 28 January 1986. SRM-25 will not be
significantly different from SRM- 15."48
The telecon finished at approximately 11:15 EST, and the decision to launch the
Challenger was not seriously questioned again.
Behaviors at the telecon can, in part, be explained by looking at the tensions between the
146 Presidential Commission interview with Robert Lund, 1 April, 1986, pp. 44 - 45.
'47 Presidential Commission interview with Jerald Mason, 2 April, 1986, p. 29.
'48 U.S. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 1,
p. 97.
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two engineering cultures at Marshall and Thiokol over the period 1974 - 1986. It has
been seen that the more rigorous, conservative Marshall engineers had frequently
disagreed with Thiokol, and understood them to be slightly prone to making
recommendations that they were later not able to justify or had to retreat from. It is
possible to see the telecon of the 2 7 'h of January within this context. Keith Coates, of
Marshall, reinforces this point when discussing the telecon:
I think there is a philosophy adopted, our role being more of finding fault, of
finding mistakes. I mean, our role is not to just go out there and rubber stamp
things, so the things that I always see are comments relative to what's wrong. So
you can develop an impression that the Thiokol people are always wrong because
that's all you ever hear.149
The history of the O-rings also shows that the technology of the O-rings was far from
being universally understood. Many participants in the telecon had differing
understandings of which the key factors were in determining the function of the joint.
The concerns around temperature was presented ambiguously, using only two data
points, with a number of the Marshall personnel also linking the issue of temperature-
induced loss of resilience with their early experience of successful use of higher
durometer O-rings. The history of the O-ring joint was also contested, with a sense of
elevated concern since the beginning of 1985 due to an increased incidence of erosion,
but also an awareness that the most extensive erosion had been seen on STS-2, back in
1981.
Bringing Porter's insight to bear, we can see that a quantified style of engineering had
developed in order to bring the two engineering communities together and allow them to
manage a complex technology. The January 27 telecon was an engineering telecon, as
almost all participants testify - the conversations were around engineering data, and the
style of questioning was congruent with the practice of engineering at NASA and MT at
that time. In that context, and on examination of the material presented to NASA, it can
'49 Presidential Commission interview with Keith Coates, 25 March, 1986, p. 15.
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be seen that Mulloy's position was not unreasonable - Thiokol was presenting a
recommendation that did not align with his engineering understanding of the SRB joint,
nor was supported by engineering data. He and George Hardy presented their critique of
the Thiokol position, on the basis of their experience as engineers and their knowledge of
the SRB joint. Again, on that basis, Thiokol personnel went offline to discuss this
engineering argument, with some of the Thiokol personnel aware that their more
intuitive, judgment-based arguments were not crossing institutional and engineering
culture boundaries. It is possible to see that the telecon was not about managers over-
ruling engineers, but rather groups of engineers arguing about evidence, as is standard
engineering practice.
Orbiter brakes
Much of this chapter has focused on the history of the SRB O-rings, as they were the
component of the Space Shuttle system that precipitated the Challenger accident, and as
such were the focus of the Presidential Commission's investigation. However, the
themes explored in the investigation of the O-rings can be seen, albeit in less detail, in
several other of the elements of the STS program.
The Presidential Commission's report allows the examination of the nosewheel and the
brakes on the orbiter. The brief history recounted there is similar to that of the O-rings.
The nosewheel assembly, comprised of a shock strut and two wheel and tire assemblies,
was originally designed to be used to steer the orbiter whilst on the ground. Following
STS-4 in 1982, this capability was disabled as it was proved to be ineffective in an
environment of crosswinds on the runway." 0o Crosswinds proved to be an ongoing
problem for the STS, with all flights experiencing heavy wear on the tires, both from
initial contact with the runway and from side forces caused by crosswinds. While the
individual tires had been fully qualified, by 1986 NASA had not been able to create a
testing apparatus that adequately simulated the effects of landing, and so flights
continued with the wheel issue unaddressed. 51
150 Jenkins, pp. 410 - 411.
15' U.S. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 1,
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On the flight of STS 51-D in April 1985, substantial wear was experienced, both from
pin-up on contact and side wear from crosswinds. One of the nosewheel tires eventually
failed, and completely blew out. Following this incident, the surface of the landing strip
at KSC was determined to be particularly hard on tires, and so Shuttle landings were from
that point moved to Edwards Air Force base in California.152
The brakes on the orbiter were also experiencing damage on landing, and by 1986, had
seen damage in almost all flights.
In spite of the fact that brake energy (design) has been based on abort landings at
240,000 lbs. there have been actual or incipient brake failures on almost every
landing even though landing weights have not yet approached the design
maximum value."'3
They had been designed on the basis of the original design weight of the orbiter, but a
series of decisions to increase the weight of the orbiter had meant that, by 1986, the
brakes were operating without a margin of safety. 54 The Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel (ASAP) recognized the dangers of the brakes and the tires, noting in their reports in
1982, 1983 and 1985, the need for urgent action, either in the form of a major re-design
or a series of incremental changes. At the time of the Challenger accident, these changes
had not been made. The Presidential Commission was critical of this situation, noting
that flights had continued, despite NASA's knowledge of the discrepancies between the
design and performance of the brakes and tires.'
pp. 187 - 188.
52 See http://www.nasa.gov/mission pages/shuttle/shuttlemissions/archives/sts-51D.html and
http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/51 -d/mission-5 1-d.html
153 U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, Annual Report
Covering Calendar Year 1983 (Washington, DC: NASA, 1984), pp. 55 - 57.
154 NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, Annual Report 1983, pp. 55 - 57; U.S. National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, Annual Report Covering Calendar Year
1985 (Washington, DC: NASA, 1986), p. 41.
'55 U.S. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 1,
pp. 187 - 188.
231
Like the O-rings, anomalies had been seen on the brakes of the Orbiter from the early
years of the Shuttle program. Constrained by the limits of testing, NASA continued to use
the brakes, despite signs that problems were occurring.
Conclusions
Like the Apollo program, the Shuttle program had a long series of mishaps and minor
accidents before and after the two accidents thus far considered, which did not result in
loss of life or catastrophic technology failure. The Apollo 1 accident and the Challenger
accident however are understood to have occurred for very different reasons. In part
these different understandings arise from the approaches taken by the official accident
investigations, with the first focusing on specific equipment failure and the second
splitting its focus to encompass management decision-making.
Unlike Apollo 204, the Challenger accident has a key moment - the decision made on the
evening of the 2 7 th of January 1986 to launch the Challenger the next morning. Two
accounts have been set forward to explain this decision. One emphasizes misconduct by
NASA managers who, unwilling to compromise adherence to an accelerated launch
schedule, overruled engineering concerns about safety. The other has argued that a shared
understanding of the field joint developed over time, incorporating more and more
deviance from the intended design, and this led both managers and engineers to follow
accepted cultural norms and accept the joint as safe to fly - they "normalized deviance"
to the point that they were unable to recognize the danger of failure.
This study has argued that over the period 1977 - 1986, the activities of Marshall and
Thiokol engineers can also be seen as an extended exercise in engineering design. These
engineers iteratively developed a series of incomplete and uncertain understandings of an
increasingly complex technology. This account has noted that the engineering style of
personnel at Marshall Space Center in the 1970s and 1980s, inherited in part from their
Apollo experience, brought them into tension with members of a different engineering
culture at Thiokol. The decision to launch the Challenger was made on the basis of
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incomplete and uncertain engineering knowledge, in the context of a professional
relationship between Thiokol and Marshall where Marshall personnel had developed a
history of vigorously challenging the engineering data and recommendations presented
by Thiokol. In the absence of sufficient evidence for changed standards, launch
proceeded after engineers established the craft met long-established and long-successful
standards of readiness for flight. This study has also argued that the account of the
accident set forward in the Presidential Commission's report has obscured this story,
instead describing an engineering history in hindsight, and one that removes the agency
of the engineers from the story.
In this story about the Challenger, there are similarities with the Apollo 204 accident. In
the Apollo 204 accident, Apollo engineers drew on experience with Gemini to assure
themselves that a pure oxygen environment was not of concern because many flights had
used it with no problems. In the lead up to the Challenger accident, shuttle engineers
relied on the experiences of the Titan missile boosters to reassure themselves that O-ring
seals, even without a secondary seal, could be used without problems. In both cases the
simpler story that is told in accident reports is that engineers overlooked design flaws that
should have been obvious. This was not true in either accident. In both cases previous
history created a data base that initially supported engineers to trust these designs, but
that proved to be unreliable under changed circumstances. In the manned spaceflight
program, where the size, cost and complexity of full-scale testing is so great, engineering
analogies were used in the early stages of the design process, reflecting a deliberate
philosophy in some cases not to go with new ideas, but to use proven technology. In
retrospect, it can be seen that these analogies neglected key differences between past craft
and the newer ones under development. The Gemini spacecraft was not enough like the
Apollo spacecraft to justify making the assumption that a pure oxygen environment was
safe, just as the Titan O-rings were not similar enough to the SRB O-rings to ensure a
sealed joint.
By the time of the Apollo 204 accident, problems with engineering and manufacturing at
North American had already been identified in the Phillips report, and fixes had been
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generated and applied, which would come into force with the new Block II CSMs. When
the Challenger accident happened, problems with field joint seals had previously been
identified in July 1985 and a task-force set up to develop fixes, to be applied following a
static test firing of the SRB in February 1986. In both cases, the problem that caused the
accident had already been identified, and solutions had been developed if not yet fully
implemented. In both cases, these problems were seen as high priority and to be
remedied. But in both cases the complexity and interdependency of the test and flight
schedule meant that these fixes had to happen concurrently with the myriad other
activities going on in the program.
In the Apollo 204 accident, the bringing together of two engineering cultures to build a
new piece of technology meant a period of adaptation to each other, as new ways of
working were developed to accomplish the task. The AS204 fire was the cumulative
effect of both an environment of schedule pressure and cost pressure, and differing
engineering cultures and technical philosophies at NASA's Manned Space Flight Centre
and North American. In particular, the introduction of systems engineering created new
pressures. In the Challenger accident, Morton Thiokol and NASA's Marshall Space
Centre came together to build a Solid Rocket Motor, bringing into contact a highly
quantitative, data driven engineering culture with one that was less experienced in the
manned spaceflight endeavor and more attuned to a way of working characterized by a
certain level of informality.
An engineering history of Apollo 204 and Challenger shows a number of similarities
which bridge the passage of time and changes in the types of technology being built and
the goals of that technology. These stories are seldom visible in the accident
investigation reports that became official histories of the manned spaceflight program.
This study now moves from Challenger in the 1980s to Columbia in 2003, and will show
that these similarities between Apollo 204 and Challenger recurred in part in the
Columbia accident.
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CHAPTER FIVE: COLUMBIA - THE ACCIDENT,
RESPONSES AND ANALYSIS
Introduction
The Columbia accident is distinguished by being in many ways different from Apollo 1
and the Challenger accident, but also by being viewed as very similar to Challenger. It is
viewed as another space shuttle tragedy, and depicted by its accident report as a further
episode illustrating the decline in NASA engineering from the heights of the Apollo
triumphs. But the technology was very well known this time, the engineering decision-
making reflected changes brought in after the Challenger accident, and the proximate
cause of the accident was noticed very quickly after it occurred. That the shuttle
continued to be a viable spacecraft in 2003 was a tribute to the success of the space
program and the engineers that worked in it, even if the accident helped reconfirm the
public view of NASA as a failing organization. Ironically, the Apollo 1 accident is
viewed as a prelude to success, but in fact was the beginning of the end for many of the
original ambitions of the space program. And equally ironically, the Columbia accident
came to be viewed as a near-inevitable outcome of NASA's ongoing decline, rather than
a tragic lapse in an otherwise successful long-term engineering program.
The Columbia accident investigation generated fewer usable primary records than either
of the previous two accidents, and as a result there is far less material with which to re-
read the version of the accident that is established by the official investigation report.
The reading of the Columbia accident in this chapter is therefore abbreviated.
On 16 January 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia launched from Kennedy Space Center
on mission STS-107. There were seven astronauts on board: Rick Husband, William
McCool, Michael Anderson, David Brown, Kalpana Chawla, Laurel Clark, and Ilan
Ramon. Fifty-seven seconds after launch, at around 10:40 a.m. EST, the Columbia
entered a period of unusually strong wind shear, which created a low-frequency
oscillation in the liquid oxygen in the External Tank.' About 25 second later, a number of
'U.S. Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report,
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pieces of insulating foam detached from the External Tank, at the location where it
connected to the Columbia orbiter, and fell backwards at between 416 and 573 miles per
hour. The foam broke through the reinforced carbon-carbon panels on the leading edge
of the left wing of the Columbia orbiter, exposing the interior of the wing to the outside
environment. The largest piece of foam was around 2 feet long and 1 foot wide.
Columbia arrived in orbit by 11:39 a.m. EST.
On 1 February 2003, the Columbia reentered the Earth's atmosphere. As the orbiter
reentered, superheated air penetrated the left wing through the foam strike in the leading
edge and started to melt away the wing from the inside. At around 9:00 a.m. EST, the
orbiter broke up under severe aerodynamic load and disintegrated over the Southwest of
the United States. There were no survivors.
The section of this study that deals with the Columbia accident will be different from the
previous four chapters. Those chapters took advantage of a body of primary evidence
created by both NASA and the bodies that investigated the two accidents. In the twenty
years since Challenger and the forty years since Apollo 204, there has been time also for
these events to be considered and reconsidered by historians and other scholars, thus
creating a body of literature concerning each accident. The Columbia accident is still
relatively new, and the CAIB made the conscious decision not to provide public access to
much of the evidence base created in its investigation. The Columbia accident has also
drawn less attention in part because of its accident report. That report fed a public view
of Columbia as a third data point establishing the trajectory of NASA's development: it
reinforced the view that Apollo was a period of engineering triumph, followed by steady
decline.
Unlike the two previous accident investigations, the CAIB produced a report that is at
different times a Whig history of the physical causes of the Columbia accident; a critical
and revisionist history of the Shuttle program, NASA's manned spaceflight program and
the Challenger accident; a study of theories of accidents and safety; and a theoretically-
(Washington, DC: Columbia Accident Investigation Board and NASA, 2003), vol 1, pp. 33-34.
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informed critique of NASA's organizational and safety cultures. The report explores a
number of the themes that this study has addressed: NASA's engineering cultures and
practices, NASA's safety culture, and the challenges of doing engineering in the US
manned spaceflight program. The CAIB report also starts to explore the history of
NASA that can be written using the Challenger and Columbia accidents as the key source
of data.
This chapter engages with the CAIB report and explores themes of engineering culture
and practice through an example - the CRATER modeling tool. Because of the restricted
source base, it stops short of developing an alternative explanation for the accidents, as
was done for Apollo 1 and Challenger. Nevertheless, the same themes will recur
throughout the Columbia story as have been seen in Apollo 1 and Challenger: the use of
experience with differing space technologies to compensate for the lack of data in the
manned spaceflight program, the limits of testing within the manned spaceflight program,
the coming together of differing engineering cultures and the challenges presented
therein, and the limits of both engineering judgment and engineering calculation.
The Accident
On 16 January 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia launched from Kennedy Space Center
on Mission STS- 107. Columbia had been the first orbiter to be flown into orbit, in 1981,
on mission STS-1, and STS-107 was Columbia's 28th mission. There were seven
astronauts on board: Rick Husband, William McCool, Michael Anderson, David Brown,
Kalpana Chawla, Laurel Clark and Ilan Ramon. At 57 seconds after launch, at around
10:40am EST, the Columbia entered a period of unusually strong windshear, which
created a low frequency oscillation in the liquid oxygen in the External tank. At 81.7
seconds after launch at least three pieces of Thermal Protection System foam detached
from the left bipod ramp of the External Tank and fell backwards at between 416 and 573
miles per hour, smashing through the leading edge of the left wing of the Orbiter. The
largest piece of foam was around two feet long and one foot wide. The launch was
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otherwise without incident and Columbia arrived in orbit by 11:39am EST.2
Foam detaching from the External Tank on launch was a well known phenomena, having
occurred on over 80% of previous launches.3 Nevertheless, after reviewing footage of the
launch on the morning of the 17 th January and discovering that foam had been lost from
the bipod ramp on the Columbia's launch, members of NASA's Intercenter Photo
Working Group (IPWG) became concerned about the size and momentum of the foam
debris. Although there were five cameras to track the Columbia as it ascended, only
three of them were in position to see the foam debris strike. Unfortunately, one camera
was out of focus due to lack of maintenance, one was misaligned and the third was only
able to see the upper wing. The group requested outside assistance in developing
imagery of the Columbia. Over the course of the next week, three requests were made to
the Department of Defense for imagery. In each case, DoD personnel checked back with
NASA and the requests for imagery were cancelled by NASA personnel more senior than
the members of the IPWG, so that the additional imagery requested was never able to
inform decisions about what response, if any, was needed to the foam strike.4
As soon as the concerns of the IPWG became known to the larger NASA, Boeing and
United Space Alliance communities, emails and phone conversations started between
them, attempting to determine the severity of the foam strike. On the 1 7' of January, a
group of analysts was formed, the Debris Assessment Team (DAT). Over the weekend
of the 18th and 19' of January, NASA and Boeing engineers attempted to model damage
from foam debris strikes. They used a modeling tool called CRATER, originally
developed from Gemini and Apollo data, but updated to model ice and foam impact on
Thermal Protection System tiles. Their results suggested that serious damage was
unlikely.5
The Monday following the weekend of the 18th and 19th of January was Martin Luther
King day, so little formal work was conducted. The DAT met informally and continued
2 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol 1, pp. 32-33.
3 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol 1, p. 122.
4 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol 1, pp. 140 - 166.
S Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol 1, pp. 143 - 145.
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to express its desire for more imagery to determine the location and severity of the foam
strike. The next day, the STS-107 Mission Management Team (MMT) met for the second
time. At the STS-107 MMT meeting, Chair Linda Ham expressed her interest in
reviewing the rationale for continuing to fly after foam strikes on STS-87 and STS-112.
If this rationale was poor and STS-107 had sustained damage, the next mission, STS- 114,
would be delayed. Linda Ham was to be launch manager for STS-114. Also on Tuesday
21"' of January, Calvin Schomburg, a senior and well connected engineer at Johnson
Space Center, consulted with managers Linda Ham, Ralph Roe and Lambert Austin,
assuring them that any damage to the orbiter was minor, a maintenance problem rather
than a safety concern.6
On 2 3 rd January, Mission Control emailed commander Husband and pilot McCool to
inform them of the foam strike, informing them that some foam had hit the Orbiter, but
reassuring them that "we have seen this phenomenon on several other flights and there is
absolutely no concern for entry."7
On 2 4 th January, the DAT presented their findings to the manager of the Mission
Evaluation Room. The DAT attempted to convey that their analysis did not suggest
serious damage to the orbiter, while also conveying their uncertainty over the results
based on the limitations of the analytical methods. However, the manager to whom they
were presenting did not pass on the uncertainties to the Mission Management Team when
he briefed them later that day. At that meeting, the problem of the foam strike on a TPS
tile was officially classified as a maintenance problem only.8
6 These paragraphs are synopsized from Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol 1, ch. 6.
v Quoted in Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol 1, p. 159.
8 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol 1, pp. 161 - 163.
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On 1st February 2003, after a successful 17 day mission, the Columbia re-entered the
earth's atmosphere for a landing at Kennedy Space Center. As the Columbia re-entered
the earth's atmosphere over California and the southwestern United States, superheated
air penetrated the left wing through the hole left by the foam strike to the RCC panels in
the leading edge of the left wing of the Columbia. This superheated air quickly started to
melt away the wing from the inside. At 8:54 EST, Mission Control in Houston started to
get off-scale low readings from temperature and hydraulic and tire pressure sensors inside
the Columbia's left wing.
Over the next four minutes, more and more sensors in the left wing started to read off-
scale low, and the flight control system aboard Columbia performed a series of
unexpected rolls. Observers in California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona and New Mexico and
Texas saw a bright flash followed by the emergence of a cluster of brightly lit particles
accompanying the Columbia. At 8:59 EST, Mission Control in Houston heard
Commander Husband say "Roger, ah, buh..." before communication with the Columbia
was lost. At 9:00 EST the Columbia broke up under severe aerodynamic load and
disintegrated. There were no survivors.9
The Investigation
Around 10:00am on 1 February, 2003, NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe declared a
Shuttle Contingency and, acting under procedures set in place after the Challenger
accident, established the International Space Station and Space Shuttle Mishap
Interagency Board. O'Keefe named Admiral Harold Gehman as Chair of investigation
board. Gehman was retired from the Navy and had recently headed the investigation into
the terrorist attack on the USS Cole. l. Ex officio, there were immediately seven board
members: four military officers with responsibilities for safety in their home services, a
Federal Aviation Administration representative, a Department of Transportation
representative, and a NASA Center Director. O'Keefe soon thereafter named both
9 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol 1, pp. 35 - 39.
10 William Langewiesche, "Columbia's Last Flight: The inside story of the investigation and the
catastrophe it laid bare," The Atlantic Monthly (November 2003), pp. 63 - 65.
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NASA's chief engineer and counsel to Glenn Research Center to the Board. After
significant criticism from the press and the public that NASA had appointed a board of
insiders, in essence asking NASA senior officials to investigate and assess their own
conduct, five more members were appointed to the renamed Columbia Accident
Investigation Board (CAIB)." They included an aeronautical engineer and former Air
force Secretary, Sheila Widnall; a Nobel laureate physicist, Douglas Osheroff; a former
astronaut and Challenger Commission member, Sally Ride; a space policy and history
expert, John Logsdon; and the retired CEO of a major defense contractor, Roger
Tetrault.'2
Over the first six months of 2003, the Board held hearings and conducted investigations.
A significant part of their work involved the recovery and examination of debris from the
explosion. As the debris was recovered, it became increasingly clear to the Board that the
key area of interest was the left wing. Figure 1 shows the striking difference in amounts
of debris collected from the left and right wings. The lack of debris aft of the left wheel
well suggested that while both wings succumbed to aerodynamic stresses, the left wing
was also subject to significant heat, most probably rendering the left wing unable to
sustain further heating in re-entry and causing vaporization.
" See Matthew L. Wald, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Inquiries; With Lessons From Challenger, Outside
Experts Search for Clues," New York Times, 3 February 2003; Matthew L. Wald, "Panel Leader Wants to
Add Three to Inquiry Into Columbia," New York Times, 6 March 2003.
12 Biographies of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) members are located at
http://caib.nasa.gov/board_members/default.html
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Figure 1: Left and right wings of Columbia debris. CAIB report, p. 72
The Board further focused its attention on the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panels
on the leading edges of the wings of the Orbiter and conducted a series of tests involving
the firing of chunks of insulating foam at RCC panels. The Board had originally intended
that it would require NASA to conduct these tests, with CAIB acting in oversight.
However, substantial resistance from NASA to conducting these tests eventually resulted
in the Board detaching Dr Douglas Osheroff to write and supervise test protocols. 13
As a result of these tests, the Board was able to conclude that the most likely physical
scenario was that the foam that had been seen to detach from the External Tank on launch
had hit the RCC panels on the left wing. This foam was identified as having come from
the left bipod ramp of the External Tank, where the tank connected to the Columbia
orbiter. The tests suggested that a piece of foam weighing 1.67 lb and measuring
approximately 19.5" by 11.5" by 5" would create a 16" by 17" hole in RCC panels 6 and
"3 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol 1, pp. 78 - 83; Langewiesche, p. 77.
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7. By early summer 2003, the Board was certain that they had identified the physical
causes of the accident. The foam did it.' 4
But the Board did not only investigate the physical causes of the accident. They
conducted extensive interviews with personnel from NASA Headquarters, Johnson Space
Center, Marshall Space Flight Center, Kennedy Space Center and Michoud Assembly
Facility, as well as with employees of Boeing and United Space Alliance.
They also came to believe very early in the investigation that there were social, political
and organizational causes to the Columbia accident and that many of these causes had
been identified back in 1986, as the Rogers Commission investigated the Space Shuttle
Challenger accident. Dr. Sally Ride, who had been both a Shuttle astronaut and a
member of the Rogers Commission, noted early on that "I'm hearing an echo here,"" a
comment that shaped the findings of the Board.
As they continued to investigate, they became increasingly conscious of the similarities
between the two shuttle accidents and brought in as a consultant Professor Diane
Vaughan, on the basis of her study of the Challenger accident. 16 Her work quickly
provided a language and framework for the Board to use. In an interview with the New
York Times, Admiral Gehman noted that following receipt of Vaughan's book in early
2003, he urged others in the investigation to read it and other social science works.
Gehman invited Vaughan to testify at one of the public hearings the CAIB held, 7 and
then hired her to help shape the final product. "She ended up writing Chapter 8."'
The Report
14 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol 1, pp. 83 - 85; Duane W. Deal, "Beyond the Widget:
Columbia Accident Lessons Affirmed," Air and Space Power Journal, vol. 18, no. 2.
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/api/api04/sum04/deal.html accessed 20 November 2005.
15 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol 1, p. 195.
16 John Schwartz with Matthew L. Wald, "Echoes of Challenger: Shuttle Panel Considers Longstanding
Flaws in NASA's System," New York Times, 13 April 2003.
"7 The testimonies given before the CAIB in its public hearings are archived on the CAIB website. See
http://caib.nasa.gov/events/public hearings/20030423/transcript pm.html for Diane Vaughan's testimony.
" John Schwartz, "Investigator's Assignment Nears End," New York Times, 24 August 2003.
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On 26 August 2003 the CAIB released its report. Unlike the Apollo 204 and Challenger
reports, the CAIB report had its own logo, and its own page headers and footers. The
report contains sidebars to provide contextual or background material and is illustrated
with images of the Columbia in preparation and in flight and images of the Columbia
crew both before and during the STS-107 mission. While some of this was due to
advances in document production standards, it also suggests that the report was written
for a broader audience than the previous investigation boards had envisioned for their
work.
The report opens with a preface setting out the mandate the CAIB took on itself. CAIB
viewed its task as not only to investigate the cause of the accident and recommend fixes
to the specific problems identified, but also to recommend changes that would address
safety issues within the Shuttle program more generally. Compared to the mandates
taken on by either the Apollo 204 board or the Presidential Commission, this was far
more extensive. The CAIB report then sets out its framework for thinking about
accidents:
It is our view that complex systems almost always fail in complex ways, and we
believe it would be wrong to reduce the complexities and weaknesses associated
with these systems to some simple explanation. Too often, accident
investigations blame a failure only on the last step in a complex process, when a
more comprehensive understanding of that process could reveal that earlier steps
might be equally or even more culpable. In this Board's opinion, unless the
technical, organizational and cultural recommendations made in this report are
implemented, little will have been accomplished to lessen the chance that another
accident will follow.19
As the CAIB report moves from the preface to its first substantive chapter, there is first
an executive summary and then a report synopsis, each emphasizing the importance of
the historical and organizational contexts of the Columbia accident, and reiterating the
19 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol 1, p. 6.
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CAIB's argument that these were as much causal factors as any physical cause.
Chapter three of the CAIB report is the first chapter that addresses the physical causes of
the accident, but it does so in a straight-forward narrative manner, observing on its first
page:
The physical cause of the loss of Columbia and its crew was a breach in the
Thermal Protection System on the leading edge of the left wing. The breach was
initiated by a piece of insulating foam that separated from the left bipod ramp of
the External Tank and struck the wing in the vicinity of the lower half of
Reinforced Carbon-Carbon panel 8 at 81.9 seconds after launch. During re-entry,
this breach in the Thermal Protection System allowed superheated air to penetrate
the leading-edge insulation and progressively melt the aluminum structure of the
left wing, resulting in a weakening of the structure until increasing aerodynamic
forces caused loss of control, failure of the wing, and breakup of the Orbiter.20
Chapter three first provides a discussion of the External Tank and the foam that surrounds
it, noting the structure and composition of the sections of the tank. It then goes on to
outline possible causes for foam loss, but concluding that the mechanism for foam loss is
unknown, and compounding that problem is that there are no non-destructive methods
available to test characteristics of the foam once it has been applied. Chapter three also
concludes, rather like both the Apollo 204 and Challenger reports, that while a broad
understanding of the physical cause is possible, the complexity of the technology means
that no one cause can definitively be identified. Several possibilities are raised, including
windshear, sloshing of the contents of the External Tank, and SRB and shuttle engine
responses to the windshear.2 1
Chapter three then discusses the techniques used to predict the path of the shed foam as it
left the External Tank and moved into the path of the Orbiter, and goes on to discuss the
RCC panels it hit, and then how the debris from the accident and signals from the
20 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol 1, p. 49.
21 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol 1, p. 53.
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telemetry onboard Columbia were used to reconstruct the accident.22 There is extensive
discussion of the testing carried out under the CAIB's auspices, where chunks of foam
were fired at RCC panels in order to determine whether it was possible for foam to
breach those panels. Chapter four of the CAIB report briefly summarizes the other
physical factors examined by the CAIB, even though these factors were not deemed to be
causal. 23
The examination of the physical causes of the accident leaves a number of open questions
about how these situations came to be. These sections are ahistorical, seeking to identify
a single physical fault, rather than to ask how the physical fault came to be, and under
what circumstances. While chapter three notes the uncertainties around the performance
of the foam, there is no attempt to interrogate what was known and when, which might be
able to illuminate how the history of treating foam strikes as normal was justified.
Back in the first chapter of the CAIB, the reader is presented with a brief history of the
Shuttle program, although it is not long before it becomes clear that this is not a standard
narrative history of the Shuttle program but rather a full-throated critique. History, in the
CAIB report, is analytical, not narrative.
The account set out in the first CAIB chapter is critical of the Shuttle program from the
outset, arguing that it was sold to the Congress at a moment when political interest in
space exploration was low. As such, the arguments used to justify the creation of the
shuttle program were economic: the Shuttle would offer low-cost and routine access to
space. NASA presented financial estimates to support this contention that were too
optimistic and known to be so. In approving the Shuttle the Nixon administration
provided NASA with a budget that was too small to do anything other than produce a
vehicle to a flawed design, and required it to attempt to meet a number of conflicting
policy requirements. In the final analysis, this meant that:
the increased complexity of a Shuttle designed to be all things to all people
22 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol 1, p. 55 - 78.
23 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol 1, p. 85 - 96.
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created inherently greater risks than if more realistic technical goals had been set
at the start. Designing a reusable spacecraft that is also cost-effective is a
daunting engineering challenge; doing so on a tightly constrained budget is even
more difficult.24
The first chapter then argues that the decision to declare the Shuttle operational after four
flights was flawed, a point also made by the Presidential Commission in the aftermath of
the Columbia accident, and that this operational status was a myth shattered by the
Challenger accident. 25 The presence of historian and policy analyst John Logsdon on the
CAIB suggests that the Board were concerned to place the accident in its historical
context, and so it is no surprise that much of chapter one is credited as drawing on
Logsdon's published works on the history of the shuttle, primarily Logsdon's influential
article "The Space Shuttle Program: A Policy Failure?" What is perhaps more surprising
is the willingness of the CAIB to adopt such a critical tone towards the entire Shuttle
program - something unprecedented in the Apollo 204 and Challenger accidents, where
the investigating authority was quick to affirm its support for NASA's leading program.
The post-Challenger history of the Shuttle is continued in chapter five of the CAIB
report, and takes a similarly critical view on the history of the shuttle program. Chapter
five of the CAIB report argues that the Challenger accident cast into sharp relief
problems with NASA's organizational culture. After outlining some of the findings of the
Presidential Commission, the report argues that:
by the eve of the Columbia accident, institutional practices that were in effect at
the time of the Challenger accident - such as inadequate concern over deviations
from normal performance, a silent safety system, and schedule pressure - had
returned to NASA.26
24 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol 1, p. 23.
25 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol 1, p. 23 - 24; U.S. Presidential Commission on the
Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President (Washington, DC: The Commission, 1986),
vol. 1, pp. 170 - 171.
26 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol 1, p. 101.
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The choice of language here is instructive. The Board's summary of the findings of the
Challenger investigation is not actually what the Presidential Commission found, but
instead is close to Diane Vaughan's revisionist account of the Challenger accident.
Chapter five continues on, drawing on the work of historian Howard McCurdy to outline
what it saw as the critical points of cultural change at NASA since its inception.
Following McCurdy, the CAIB report argues that an original NASA "can-do" culture
was created during the 1960s, shaped by Cold War rivalries with the Soviet Union
playing out in the Apollo program. Characteristics of this original technical culture were
an emphasis on research and testing, hands-on engineering experience, and a
dependence on the exceptional quality of its workforce and leadership that
provided in-house technical capability to oversee the work of contractors. The
culture also accepted risk and failure as inevitable aspects of operating in space,
even as it held as its highest value attention to detail in order to lower the chances
of failure.27
Moving from the work of Howard McCurdy to that of Garry D. Brewer", the CAIB
report than argues that the success of Apollo created a self-image of NASA as the
"perfect place," while not recognizing that NASA was not perfect. This illusion, CAIB
argued, prevented NASA personnel from understanding the changed political context
after Apollo, and instead of adapting, the:
Apollo-era organizational culture came to be in tension with the more
bureaucratic space agency of the 1970s, whose focus turned from designing new
spacecraft at any expense to repetitively flying a reusable vehicle on an ever-
tightening budget. This trend towards bureaucracy and the associated increased
reliance on contracting necessitated more effective communications and more
extensive safety oversight processes than had been in place during the Apollo-era,
but that the Rogers Commission found that such features were lacking.29
27 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol 1, p. 102.
28 Garry D. Brewer, "Perfect Places: NASA as an Idealized Institution," in Radford Byerly, Jr., ed., Space
Policy Reconsidered (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989).
29 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol. 1, p. 102.
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The tension between culture and organization prompted NASA managers to attempt to
maintain their original perspective of their agency as perfect and thus were unable to
accept criticism from outside the agency, and thus rejected recommendations from the
Challenger investigation and other investigatory bodies. 30
This passage points to at least two ongoing analytical and historical flaws in the CAIB
report. The era of Apollo is looked back upon as an engineering Big Rocky Candy
Mountain, free from cost and schedule pressures. In reality, as chapter two of this study
has shown, cost and schedule pressures were of concern from within two years of the
inception of Apollo, necessitating the whole-scale introduction of new engineering
methods to bring them under control. The chosen method was systems engineering,
whose protagonists, as well as later scholars, have argued was the key to the success of
Apollo, a success achieved through the adoption of strictly controlled and documented
systems for managing engineering change. This study has argued that the causes of the
Apollo 204 accident partially lay in the attempts to embed systems engineering
techniques into NASA in the 1960s, and that in the aftermath of the accident, systems
engineering was even more firmly embraced. Systems engineering may have
underpinned the major success at NASA, but it also underpinned the fatal accidents.
Some NASA personnel did not like the transition from intimate, informal, local traditions
of doing engineering to a more centralized, formalized style, in particular those more
associated with the flight operations facet of NASA in the 1960s. It may come as no
surprise to see that the CAIB drew on the memoirs of Chris Kraft and Gene Kranz to
make their arguments: two NASA (and NACA) veterans who were particularly opposed
to the types of changes brought about by the introduction of systems engineering.3'
These memoirs viewed systems engineering as diminishing the quality of engineering
practice, and underplayed the cost and schedule overruns that made craft engineering
30 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol. 1, p. 102.
31 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, p. 119 cites both Christopher C. Kraft, Flight: My Life in
Mission Control (New York: E.P. Dutton, 2001) and Gene Kranz, Failure is Not an Option: Mission
Control from Mercury to Apollo 13 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000) as exemplars of NASA's original
culture.
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impractical for NASA.
The other interesting feature of the CAIB's argument is the way in which the word
culture is used to hide agency. By arguing that "Apollo-era organizational culture came
to be in tension with the more bureaucratic space agency of the 1970s," the CAIB report
leaves the reader somewhat confused as to where these two forces in tension might be
embodied. It would appear that NASA managers could both be deeply embedded in the
original technical culture and at the same time represent a newer bureaucratic style of
working. This confusion is further compounded if some of the testimony heard by the
CAIB board is examined.
On 23 April 2003, the CAIB held public hearings in Houston TX. Giving testimony that
morning were Dr. Milton Silveira, George Jeffs, Owen Morris, Aaron Cohen, and Robert
F. Thompson.32 All five men were veterans of Apollo and senior NASA managers during
the 1970s and 1980s, with some of them still working for NASA during the Challenger
accident. All might be seen as members of the original technical culture, and all were
responsible for implementing changes to the manned spaceflight program in the 1970s,
and yet their testimony gives no hints of tensions between their roles during Apollo and
the Shuttle programs. This assumed division of NASA into old-school craft engineers
and new model bureaucrats does not match the evidence: the senior NASA leaders at the
time of Columbia were often the same men who had successfully participated in NASA's
earlier craft-engineering activity. The previous chapters show that tensions between
engineering cultures were embodied in organizations, work programs, some individuals,
and in the materials and machines the engineers produced. They are not vaguely ascribed
to whole eras and did not colonize unwitting engineers into producing flawed work.
These two analytic and historical problems combine, and are accentuated by the historical
summary of the Shuttle program provided in the first chapter of the CAIB report, to
create the impression that the key causes of the accidents lay in the management of
Shuttle program.
32 U.S. Columbia Accident Investigation Board. Hearings.
http://caib.nasa.gov/events/public hearings/20030423/transcript am.html
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Chapter five of the CAIB report argues that the political environment of the Shuttle
program had been turbulent over the 1990s. Its budget and workforce had become
increasingly constrained, decreasing by over 40% in the 10 years prior to 2003.
Furthermore, constant political pressure had been exerted on NASA to reduce operating
expenses as its top organizational priority. The Board noted the particular schedule
pressure exerted by the linkage of the continued survival of the Shuttle to arbitrary
International Space Station construction goals. The retirement date for the shuttle had
been continuously extended over the 1990s, leading to an ongoing series of delays in
maintaining and upgrading the Shuttle. Finally, NASA had mis-classified the Shuttle as
fully operational, meaning that the operation of the shuttle could be turned over to a
private contractor and NASA could stop examining engineering anomalies on a mission-
by-mission basis. Under these circumstances, the Board concluded, those responsible for
the safe operation of the shuttle were unable to act without outside pressure.33
Chapter six of the CAIB report sets out a history of foam strikes during the Shuttle
program, noting that these had occurred ever since the first shuttle flight, despite design
specifications that required no foam to be lost.34 The report notes seven occasions when
foam chunks were seen to have detached from the left-hand bipod ramp of the External
Tank, noting that the last event was seen during the flight of STS-1 12 in October 2002,
only two flights before STS-107. The CAIB report goes on to criticize NASA managers
for continuing to fly, knowing that foam loss was a hazard, and particularly for failing to
follow up on their recommendation that action be taken to remedy this fault. The Board
noted that "assessments of foam-shedding and strikes were not thoroughly substantiated
by engineering analysis," and that "NASA's lack of understanding of foam properties and
behavior must also be questioned." 35 The Board concluded that NASA's treatment of
problems with foam falling from the External Tank was a classic case of "normalization
of deviance," whereby deviance from design specifications became normal and
acceptable.
33 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol. 1, pp. 101 - 117.
34 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol. 1, p. 122.
" Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol. 1, p. 130.
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The CAIB criticized the quality of decision-making at NASA, particularly during the
period that the Columbia was in orbit, identifying flaws in the initial visual analysis, the
low level of concern for safety amongst Shuttle management, poor lines and poor styles
of communication, and a failed safety system. The Board identified three requests for
imagery that were turned down and eight missed opportunities to derive new information
about the condition of the shuttle. The Mission Management Team and NASA's safety
organization were singled out for particular criticism for their lack of ability to question
technical judgments outside their own specialties and for their willingness to hear results
that conformed to the great goal of maintaining schedule.36
Chapter six of the CAIB report identifies and examines the moment of the key mistake,
according to the investigation; it is the equivalent of chapter five of the Challenger report,
where the decision-making in the 27 January 1986 telecon was set out in great detail.
The CAIB report goes through, day by day, the sequence of events that took place while
the Columbia was in orbit. Drawing parallels between the Presidential Commission's
interpretation of conflicts and uncertainties within Thiokol on the evening of the 2 7t of
January 1986, the CAIB report notes how NASA and Boeing engineers within the
Damage Assessment Team sought to address the possibilities of foam debris having
caused serious damage to the orbiter. The DAT team members are reported to have used
a modeling tool called CRATER, which despite known limitations to its predictive
power, was able to quickly generate results. The CRATER results, however,
overpredicted damage to the orbiter, in the opinion of the engineers using the tool, and so
other methods including "qualitative extrapolation and engineering judgment" were used
to conclude that foam was unlikely to have damaged either the RCC panels on the
leading edge of the orbiter's left wing or to have damaged the tiles in the surrounding
areas.37 However, the Board concluded, the uncertainty and concerns around the quality
of this analysis were not adequately conveyed to NASA management:
Engineers ultimately concluded that their analysis, limited as it was, did not show
36 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol. 1, pp. 131 - 172.
37 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol. 1, pp. 143 - 145.
254
i _~_~~ _____ 1__(11_11__ (__~1 j__l_^; ;  ~lli_/l;i _ ;_i_;_iii _;i;Fi__l____ilFil/i--iCi~--l.-.- ..
that a safety-of-flight issue existed. Engineers who attended this briefing
indicated a belief that management focused on the answer - that analysis proved
there was no safety-of-flight issue - rather than concerns about the large
uncertainties that may have undermined the analysis that provided that answer.38
CAIB faults NASA management for accepting the technical advice uncritically, and not
asking for further evidence. The remainder of chapter six discusses the other
management decision-making errors made during the time that the Columbia was in
orbit, noting its concerns that NASA management seemed from the outset less anxious
about foam strikes than NASA and Boeing engineers. The CAIB also expressed its
concern that as in the Challenger accident, NASA and Boeing engineers had to prove to
their managers that they required images of the Columbia, rather than the reverse. Once
again, the CAIB concluded, engineers had been required to prove that technology was
unsafe, rather than proving safety.39
Chapter six sets up a powerful set of arguments: that the Columbia accident showed
significant similarities to the Challenger accident, that cost and schedule pressure
continued to drive NASA management almost willfully to dismiss the concerns of their
technical experts, that a process of normalization of deviance took place such that
anomalous behavior around foam shedding became to be understood as normal, and that
decision-making was flawed. The CAIB report was willing to go further in its criticism
of engineers than was the Challenger report, noting that the team performing the analysis
of the possibility of foam strikes was inexperienced and made incorrect judgments, but
the overwhelming focus of chapter six is on the failure of management. As with
Challenger, the history of engineering and any contribution it may have made to the
accident was largely silenced, in favor of a focus on management, organizational culture
and flaws in decision-making.
Unlike chapter five of the Challenger report, chapter six of the CAIB report contains very
few attributed direct quotes, and only excerpts from the emails sent both within and
38 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol. 1, p. 160.
39 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol. 1, pp. 168 - 169.
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between NASA and Boeing during the time that the Columbia was in orbit. Chapters
three and four of this study have observed that the account of the 27 January 1986 telecon
presented in the Challenger report was a particular interpretation of that event, and that an
examination of the several thousands of pages of interviews with participants in that
event can open the way to a reinterpretation. The CAIB's decision not to release the
sources it used for its interpretation of the critical period during which the Columbia was
in orbit means that another interpretation of this period is unlikely to be produced, or if
produced, will not be done so to any level of detail comparable to that of the CAIB
report.
Chapter seven of the CAIB report also drew heavily on the growing body of scholarly
literature on accidents, much of which used the Challenger accident and its investigation
as a prime source of evidence. The Board drew on a variety of theoretical perspectives,
considering Charles Perrow's theory of normal accidents and the work of both Scott
Sagan and Todd LaPorte on high reliability theory.40 In doing so, the Board drew a
number of conclusions about the applicability of these theories to the future safety of the
Shuttle program, arguing that insights from both theoretical perspectives suggested ways
to improve the structure of NASA to ensure greater safety in the future. Also similar to
the Challenger report, CAIB in chapter seven determined that NASA's safety culture was
broken. It argued that institutionally, NASA's financial and personnel commitment to
safety had decreased over the 1990s, while increasing political pressure on NASA's
managers to maintain schedule and cost goals had caused them to de-emphasize their
safety goals. NASA's organizational culture valued conformity to procedure and
hierarchy, meaning that dissenting voices were not listened to, particularly when they
raised concerns about safety that might delay the flight schedule. NASA's
characterization of the shuttle as an operational system allowed safety responsibility to be
passed to private contractors, leaving NASA increasingly dependent on outside sources.
At the same time, cost pressures were forcing NASA to downsize, further eroding
technical oversight. 41
40 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol. 1, pp. 180 - 194.
4~ Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol. 1, pp. 168 - 169.
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The CAIB's key structural recommendation in chapter seven was the establishment of an
independent Technical Engineering Authority with authority to conduct all hazard
analyses and maintain technical requirements, as well as acting as the sole source for
waivers of technical requirements. In essence, the TEA would provide an alternative
decision-making process around hazards and anomalies, in order to oversee other NASA
managers, who might be influenced by concerns other than those of either safety or
engineering.42
The concluding chapter of the Columbia report pulled together the findings of the
previous seven, arguing that the causes of the accidents were rooted in the history and
culture of NASA's manned spaceflight program, or at least one interpretation of the
history and culture of NASA's manned spaceflight program. Chapter eight was written
primarily by Diane Vaughan and starts from the same premise as her 1996 book about the
Challenger. Indeed, the words that open chapter eight echo her book's introduction. The
report chapter opens:
The Board began its investigation with two central questions about NASA
decisions. Why did NASA continue to fly with known foam debris problems in
the years preceding the Columbia launch, and why did NASA managers conclude
that the foam debris strike 81.9 seconds into Columbia's flight was not a threat to
the safety of the mission, despite the concerns of their engineers?43
This opening closely follows the introduction to Vaughan's book, The Challenger
Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA, where she says:
I develop a historical ethnography that answers two questions: Why, in the years
preceding the Challenger launch, did NASA continue launching with a design
known to be flawed? And why did NASA launch the Challenger against the eve-
of-launch objections of engineers? 44
42 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol. 1, pp. 192 - 193.
43 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol. 1, pp. 195.
44 Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), p. xiii.
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Chapter eight of the CAIB report is an extended application of the framework set out in
The Challenger Launch Decision to the Columbia accident. The chapter concluded that
the Columbia accident exhibited flawed decision making processes, a silent safety
program, and schedule pressure. The Board also observed that the causes of these failures
were rooted in NASA's history and culture; the history of the Space Shuttle Program had
been a history of the normalization of deviance. Increasingly large engineering problems
that had not caused catastrophic failures had been incorporated into NASA's experience
base instead of raising safety concerns. NASA had come to rely on past success (or lack
of past catastrophe) rather than rigorous testing and analysis. NASA's safety system was
still silent. Decision making was still flawed, with managers and engineers still unable to
communicate effectively about risk.
The CAIB report concludes by moving from physical and organizational causes of the
accident to re-examine the policy context of the manned spaceflight program. It briefly
discusses the steps needed to return the Shuttle to flight and to continue to fly, before
arguing that a new national vision for the space program was needed. The CAIB report
contrasts the mandate given to NASA through the Apollo program with the more
equivocal support given the Shuttle program, arguing that the failure to replace the now-
aging Shuttle program was a failure of national leadership. 45
Accidents rooted in history: in the shadow ofApollo
The majority of historical writing about the US manned space program draws a sharp
distinction between the three successful manned programs of the 1960s - Mercury,
Gemini and Apollo - and the shuttle program of the 1970s through to the present. Most
studies of the manned spaceflight program focus on and celebrate the technical and
organizational innovations that brought about NASA's triumphal lunar landing in 1969.
The works that do examine the shuttle program tend to lament the lack of political
leadership and national ambition in the post-Apollo era, or criticize the bureaucratization
45 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol. 1, pp. 210 - 211.
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and hence decline of NASA.
This historiographical pattern might be called a declensionist thesis: that NASA had its
heyday in 1969, fulfilling President Kennedy's charge that "this nation should commit
itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and
returning him safely to the earth,"46 and that since then, for a variety of reasons, NASA's
abilities and ambitions have declined. In most accounts of this story, for example
Howard McCurdy's Inside NASA or William Burrows' This New Ocean, there is a clear
set of reasons for the decline. McCurdy's work makes this point most clearly:
As NASA grew older, it changed. Beliefs about how the agency should be run
persisted, but no longer did those beliefs elicit the behavior that characterized the
early years. NASA grew more bureaucratic. It became more concerned with
maintaining its survival. In the eyes of some people, its performance declined.
The NASA story helps reveal forces that work to mollify the capabilities of high-
performance organizations in the public sector. Unlike business firms, whose
fundamental outlooks tend to persist over long periods of time, NASA's
organizational culture blossomed and lost strength within just thirty years. The
NASA experience suggests that high-performance cultures within the public
sector are inherently unstable, given the conditions with which they must deal.47
The CAIB report endorsed McCurdy's thesis, retelling the history of the Shuttle program
as a series of declines from the triumph of Apollo. In the CAIB report, there are three
major data points in NASA's history - the technical achievement of the Apollo program
that was followed by the bureaucratic failures that lost Challenger in 1986 and Columbia
in 2003. If read as historical milestones - coming roughly ten, thirty and fifty years after
the creation of NASA in 1958 - these three incidents create a narrative of technical
success in the 1960s followed by organizational and managerial decline in the 1970s,
46 President John F. Kennedy, "Special Message to the Congress on Urgent National Needs," Delivered in
person before ajoint session of Congress, May 25, 1961. http://www.jfklibrary.org/i052561.htm
47 Howard E. McCurdy, Inside NASA: High Technology and Organizational Change in the U.S. Space
Program, New Series in NASA History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 1 - 2.
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1980s and 1990s. 48
CAIB examines the Mercury, Gemini and Apollo era as the foundation for NASA's
technical culture, but at that point, moving focus from engineering to organization, they
look to organizational causes to explain the decline of NASA's technical culture. NASA
culture was constituted by engineering practices and has declined, they argue, for
political, bureaucratic and organizational reasons. It argues that NASA has, since the
heyday of the 1960s, become more political and more bureaucratic. This formulation is,
in many cases, code for the introduction into NASA of decision-makers and decision-
making systems that privilege concerns other than the purely technical. Put another way,
this line of argument seeks to explain the success of Apollo in one way and the failure of
the Space Shuttle in another, without reconciling the considerable continuities between
the programs. By changing the terms of analysis from Apollo to the Shuttle, the CAIB
report denies continuity between the two programs - that there was good engineering in
both eras and political and economic pressure in both eras - and any relationship between
the Apollo accident and the Shuttle accidents.
It is important to remember that Apollo 1 did not mark the last accident in the Apollo
program. The Apollo program had fatalities, and equipment and manufacturing faults that
led to accidents and anomalies. Very briefly, Apollo 7 suffered from the loss of both AC
busses in earth orbit, Apollo 10 lost a fuel cell in lunar orbit and had a vent cap left on
resulting in pressure in the tunnel between LM and CSM pushing the two spacecraft
apart, Apollo 11 had a major computer alert caused by a misplaced rendezvous radar
switch almost aborting the landing, Apollo 12 was struck by lightning on lift off, causing
major problems with the CSM electrics, fuel cells and computer, almost causing an abort,
Apollo 13 had an oxygen tank in the SM blow, taking out fuel cells and other critical life
support, Apollo 14 had solder balls float in micro-gravity into the switches in the CSM,
giving false signals and indications, Apollo 16 had problems with thrust vector controls
soon after undocking in earth orbit, and the Apollo-Soyuz crew were almost killed after
48 The links between these accident reports and non-official histories of NASA are stronger than might be
initially thought. Both Howard McCurdy and Diane Vaughan, on the basis of their scholarly work on
NASA, were senior advisors to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and played a major role in the
drafting of the CAIB report.
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fuel fumes entered the capsule on re-entry, rendering one astronaut unconscious. 49 To
call the Shuttle program symbolic of NASA's decline is to ignore that Apollo suffered
just as many problems.
It appears that the declensionist NASA thesis ignores specific empirical facts about errors
and accidents in the Apollo program and changes its analytical terms as it moves from
Apollo to the Shuttle. In the declensionist account of NASA's manned space flight
program, Apollo 1 sits in an uncomfortable position - as part of the mythical past from
which modem efforts have declined, it can only be read as a temporary failure that
contributed to later success, and not related at all to later accidents. It is worth noting, for
example, that the time separating Apollo 1 and Challenger is 19 years and the time
difference separating Challenger and Columbia is 17 years. Yet Apollo is treated as an
event in the historical past, whereas the repercussions of the Challenger accident are still
playing out, as the CAIB report illustrates.
Responses to the report: Scholarly responses
The Columbia accident is now six years old, and a number of scholars have addressed the
accident and attempted to draw new meaning from the accident and its report.
William Starbuck and Moshe Farjoun edited a collection of essays on the lessons to be
learned from the Columbia accident. The intent of the volume, Organization at the
Limit: Lessons from the Columbia Disaster, was to draw on the collected expertise of
scholars across a number of domains in order to "dissect the human, organizational and
political processes that generated the disaster, from more perspectives than the CAIB
report."" The collection focuses on these perspectives, using a number of explanatory
theories to derive meaning from the Columbia accident. The list of authors was
distinguished, including scholars of accident and safety like Karl Weick, Karlene
Roberts, and Nancy Leveson. A number of scholars who have previously studied
49 Richard W. Orloff, Apollo by the numbers: A Statistical Reference (Washington DC: NASA, 2000).
50 William Starbuck and Moshe Farjoun, eds., Organization at the Limit: Lessons from the Columbia
Disaster (New York: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), p. 4.
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organizational culture at NASA also had essays included in the volume, including Diane
Vaughan and William Starbuck.1
The essays were written in the immediate aftermath of the Columbia accident and the
publication of the CAIB report, and reflect the relative inaccessibility of information
about the accident beyond that provided in the CAIB report. Nevertheless, a number of
these essays are like much of the Challenger historiography, which was generally
uncritically accepting of the findings of the Presidential Commission and sought to build
on the findings to demonstrate one or another theoretical perspective, largely around
organizational behavior. While the scholarship within this volume is sophisticated,
neither is it critical of the CAIB report, which this study has argued is an extraordinary
document when considered as a work of history, nor do most of the essays seek further
primary source material other than the CAIB report. It is also interesting to note that like
the CAIB report, most of the essays within this volume that compare the Columbia
accident to the Challenger accident, do not actually compare the CAIB report's findings
to the Presidential Commission's findings. In most cases the Challenger accident is told
as a story of the normalization of deviance, echoing Dianne Vaughn's work, as it was by
the CAIB report.52
In the immediate aftermath of the Columbia accident, three works were written about the
accident, all by journalists. These were Philip Chien's Columbia Final Voyage: The Last
Flight ofNASA 's First Space Shuttle, Michael Cabbage and William Harwood's Comm
Check: The Final Flight of Shuttle Columbia, and writing for The Atlantic Monthly,
William Langewiesche's "Columbia's Last Flight: The inside story of the investigation
and the catastrophe it laid bare." 53
Each of these works focuses on a different element of the Columbia accident. Cabbage
'5 The author of this study was the least distinguished contributor to Starbuck and Farjoun.
52 See for example, Angela Buljan and Zur Shapira, "Attention to Production Schedule and Safety as
Determinants of Risk-taking in NASA's decision to Launch the Columbia Shuttle," in Starbuck and
Farjoun, eds., Organization at the Limit, pp. 153 - 155.
53 Philip Chien, Columbia: Final Voyage: The Last Flight ofNASA 's First Space Shuttle (New York:
Copernicus Books, 2006); Michael Cabbage and William Harwood, Comm Check: The Final Flight of
Shuttle Columbia (New York: Free Press, 2004); Langewiesche, pp. 59 - 87.
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and Harwood take a narrative approach, tracing the events of the accident from the
preparation of the astronauts, through the launch, the mission, reentry, and then the debris
recovery process. Their account is uncritical, adding personal color to the story, but
echoing the CAIB findings. Cabbage and Harwood do not indicate from where their
sources originate, but it appears that they have interviewed a number of senior NASA
officials, and this is reflected in their assessment of the CAIB board as frequently
intrusive and seeking to find fault. Their book ends with a sense of skepticism about
NASA's ability to address the CAIB report's recommendations about NASA's culture.
Philip Chien, a veteran journalist, is more concerned to tell the story of the Columbia
astronauts and a full half of his book is devoted to their biographies and a discussion of
their activities both in preparation for and during the STS 107 mission. However, as he
moves into a discussion of the CAIB investigation and report, he makes it clear that his
understanding of the accident differs from that of the CAIB report. He argues:
For all the justifiable concerns about 1990s cutbacks in personnel and specifically
safety personnel, the brutal fact remains: The bipod foam that fell off the ET and
hit Columbia's left wing could have happened just as easily on any shuttle flight
from STS-1 to STS-107. [...] It simply wasn't cutbacks to NASA's budget,
overworked technicians, laid-off safety inspectors, mistakes that were missed by
overworked personnel, or the aging infrastructure that caused the accident. Pure
and simple, it was a flawed design that had been in place from the inception of the
shuttle program three decades earlier.5 4
He goes on to argue that the comparisons between Challenger and Columbia are
overblown, suggesting that the critical moment in the Challenger accident was the 27
January 1986 telecon, whereas in Columbia the critical moment was in the Flight
Readiness Review for STS-113 three months prior, where this use of foam shedding from
the bipod ramp should have been cause to ground the shuttle fleet. In Chien's account,
the Mission Management Team could have done nothing about the foam damage to the
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54 Chien, p. 392.
Columbia whilst it was in orbit, but should not be exonerated from their unwillingness to
acknowledge engineering concerns during that period."
William Langewiesche is concerned to tell the story of the investigation, interwoven with
the story of the accident. His account suggests that some of the criticisms about
organizational culture laid on NASA by the CAIB may have reflected the Board's own
frustrations at the resistance they appeared to encounter in the course of their
investigation. He notes the active resistance to the investigative staff displayed by some
NASA staff, particularly the lower level staff, and hints at the possibility of NASA
personnel withholding documents. 56
But Langewiesche is also critical of the CAIB, and in particular their decision not to: open
up their interviews, noting that "Gehman believed that treating the testimony as
privileged was necessary to encourage witnesses to talk, and to get to the bottom of the
story, but the long-term effect of the investigation will be diminished as a result (for
instance, by lack of access to the raw material by outside analysts).""5 7 Langewiesche
does not fully address the findings of the CAIB report, arguing instead that NASA
managers, for whom Linda Ham stands in, were "imperious and self-convinced,"
"arrogant and insular,"" and disregarded the messages being sent by their engineers.
Drawing on Edward Tufte's analysis, Langewiesche goes on to argue that the messages
being sent by engineers were unclear, but that the primary problem lay with NASA
management. Nevertheless, Langewiesche does not ascribe personnel misconduct to
Ham or any NASA managers.
Several authors have picked up the themes of the CAIB report and the subsequent
comparisons of the Challenger and Columbia accidents. In an essay published in the
NASA-sponsored volume, Critical Issues in the History of Spaceflight, Diane Vaughan
lays out her thesis. 59 Vaughan argues that the historical analysis provided in the CAIB
5 Chien, pp. 213 - 214.
56 Langewiesche, p. 73.
7 Langewiesche, p. 80.
8 Langewiesche, p. 80.
9 Diane Vaughan, "Changing NASA: The Challenges of Organizational System Failures," in Steven J.
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report, when set alongside the Challenger report, demonstrates how the history of
political and management decisions at NASA twice caused accidents, and that cost and
schedule pressure still exist at NASA and that under these circumstances, where the
context remains the same, accidents tend to recur. She argues that it was not that the
lessons of the Challenger accident were not learned, but that the wrong lessons were
identified, and so recurred in the Columbia accidents. In her view, reducing the
probability of accidents means changing NASA's culture along the lines suggested by the
CAIB. In a more limited way, the work of Joseph Hall has addressed similar issues of
organizational change at NASA, arguing that Vaughan's interpretation of the Challenger
accident, when set alongside the CAIB report, is clear evidence of organizational failure
at NASA.60
Focusing on communications, two authors who have both written about the Challenger
accident, Phillip Tompkins and Edward Tufte, have reiterated their conclusions from
Challenger in their studies of Columbia.61 Tufte has argued that the type of software,
Microsoft PowerPoint, used by Boeing engineers in their presentation of analysis of
possible foam strikes on the Orbiter's left wing obscured the message the engineers were
attempting to convey. Similar to his analysis of the 27 January 1986 telecon between
Thiokol and Marshall engineers, Tufte argues that the cause of poor decision-making in
the Columbia accident was poor communication, in this case exacerbated by a poorly
designed piece of software. He goes on to argue that the sense of hierarchy created
through the use of bulleted and sub-bulleted lists in PowerPoint in fact mirrors the
information hiding mechanisms the CAIB report identified as at fault in the Columbia
accident.
Phillip Tompkins has developed a more comprehensive argument, drawing on his
analysis of the communication processes at work during the lead-up to the Challenger
Dick and Roger Launius, eds., Critical Issues in the History ofSpaceflight (Washington DC: NASA, 2006),
pp. 349 - 376.
6 Joseph L. Hall, "Columbia and Challenger: Organizational Failure at NASA," Space Policy, vol. 19
(2003), pp. 239 - 247.
61 Phillip K. Tompkins, Apollo, Challenger, Columbia: The Decline of the Space Program, A Study in
Organizational Communication (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Company, 2005); Edward R. Tufte,
The Cognitive Style of PowerPoint (Cheshire, CT: Graphics Press, 2003).
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accident and further, drawing on his memories and observations of Wernher von Braun
during the 1960s. 62 Tompkins has argued that there were two cultures at work at NASA
in 2003:
two antagonistic cultures, [one of them] a managerial culture caught up in
production decision premises, schedule and budget, and dedicated to bureaucratic
lines of command; the other, a subordinate engineering culture stretched too thin
by attrition and intimidated by the management hierarchy.63
Tompkins then examines Howard McCurdy's concept of the original NASA technical
culture to conclude that each of McCurdy's seven facets of NASA culture had been
systematically weakened by management culture within NASA. Tompkins' critical
argument is that these two cultures spoke in different languages and were unable to
effectively communicate: the engineers spoke in a language of quantification and data,
the managers in a language of cost and schedule.64
Perhaps due to the relative lack of time since the accident, and certainly due to the
paucity of primary source material, there has been little attempt to provide any detailed
revisionist account of the Columbia accident. Neither has there been substantial scholarly
effort to fit the Columbia accident into a wider historical context, with the exception of a
number of pieces drawing out further implications from the CAIB report's strong
connection between the Challenger and Columbia accidents. Many of the CAIB's
interpretations have become historical facts, as much of the Columbia literature treats the
CAIB report as primary source material, rather than as an interpretation, open to criticism
or revision.
CRATER, foam shedding and engineering in the Columbia accident
This study has argued that the CAIB took a particular interpretative approach to the
62 Phillip K. Tompkins, Organizational Communication Imperatives: Lessons of the Space Program (Los
Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Company, 1993).
63 Tomkins, Apollo, Challenger, Columbia, p. 185.64 Tomkins, Apollo, Challenger, Columbia, pp. 187 - 190.
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writing of its report, one that obscures the engineering history of the technology
identified as the cause of the accident, in favor of a history of the decisions taken around
that technology. Rather than seeking to explain how it came to be that foam shedding
occurred on most flights, the CAIB report was more concerned to ask why it was
concluded that foam-shedding was not a risk to the safety of the Columbia. In
developing their explanation, the CAIB argued that a systematic social process occurred,
whereby increasing deviations from design specifications came to be understood as
acceptable.
This study has suggested that the practice of engineering design is an iterative process of
the testing and modifying of initial design hypotheses. As such, it is to be expected that
as new, or scaled-up technologies - like foam and O-rings - are operated and redesigned,
changes to their expected performance will occur, as more understanding is developed
over time. Engineers have developed a number of ways to test their designs as they move
from paper to material reality, and with the information that is generated via these tests,
the expected performance of the technology changes. Safety margins are built into this
process in order to give surety that unexpected performance will not cause the technology
to fail.
Even in the case of technologies understood to be unproblematic, in part because of their
close resemblance to other, older, well-known technologies, the challenges of adapting to
the conditions of the manned spaceflight program have revealed these technologies to be
more complicated than originally conceived by their adopters. Within the environment of
the Shuttle program - where subscale testing was frequently unable to fully simulate the
extreme environments where these technologies would operate, where full-scale testing
was expensive and scheduled far in advance, and where conservative attitudes towards
engineering change prevailed - developing understandings of how technologies
functioned in flight was dependent on a database that could only be created by flying.
The realities of the practice of engineering - uncertain, non-linear, sometimes irrational -
are revealed in this form of explanation, whereas a focus on how (the correct) decisions
are made obscures this history.
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The lack of evidence makes it difficult to reconstruct a history of foam shedding in the
way that chapter four of this study set out a history of the SRB joints. Nevertheless, there
is evidence to suggest that foam shedding was being addressed by engineers at NASA
throughout the history of the shuttle program, and that like the Challenger's O-rings, the
difficulty of addressing this problem was compounded by changes in the materials and
manufacturing processes involved.
In testimony before the CAIB, Scotty Sparks, a NASA engineer noted that over the
period 1999 - 2005, there had been eleven major changes to the foam on the External
tank. These were due to several reasons, including concerns raised the Environment
Protection Agency about the chlorofluorocarbon content of some of the chemical agents
used to blow the foam; the fact that some of the foam materials were becoming obsolete
and no longer being manufactured; and also because these previous two issues interacted,
such that the need for a new blowing agent precipitated the need for a new foam.65
65 Scotty Sparks, Testimony before CAIB Board, 7 April 2003. http://caib.nasa.gov/events/publichearings/
20030407/transcript.html
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CAIB PUBLIC HEARING: Material Changes
BX-250 to SS 1171 to BX-265
* OrigitnaET materiaL BX-250, Chosen lbr RarnplCloseut Applications
* 1993 - CFC 11 blowing aget tnanufacture discontinued (accelerated EPA date)
* 1995 - SS-1171 (wflCFC 141b) c|asent to repl act BX 250
. 1995 -Seuredavailable stock of CFC 11 I r use with remainingBX 250
* 1995 - FR 1138 FlameRetardant discontinued i SS-I 171 foam - acquired Dead Sea Bromide as
eplacement
. 1998 - Production issues identified with use of SS 1171 in F/A & Bldg 420. decision made to
continue BX 250 usage
* 1999 - SS 1171 low strength failure analysis and subsequent acquisition by BASF; muag on El
discontinued
* 2000 - Mondur Dark Isocyanate usal in BX 250 phased out ofproduction (suredsupply ti BX
265 implmented)
* 2001 - BX-265 qualified to rep la BX-250
* 2002 - BX-265 Foam Imp klerntat on on ET- 17 (subsequent repair on ET-I 16 at KSC)
. 2003 - EPA phase out ofHCFC 14 b initiated (Waiver Required for Pmeurement in US)
S2003 - Waiver approvingNASA's IICFC 141b em ption allowancegrantedon March5, 2003.
Figure 5: Changes in foam on External Tank. Source: Scotty Sparks, Testimony before CAIB
Board, 7 April 2003. http://caib.nasa.gov/events/publichearings/20030407/present_et.html
Sparks, in his testimony, went on to discuss the long history of improvements made to the
External Tank to attempt to prevent the shedding of foam. He noted that over the period
from STS-1 onwards, there had been 13 problem fixes implemented in an attempt to
lessen foam shedding. These had included redesigns of the foam over the bipod ramp,
changes to the manufacturing process of the External Tanks and the processes of
application of foam, and the addition of vent holes in the foam around some elements of
the External Tank. Vent holes were used to attempt to release pressure caused by air
within cavities in foam liquefying as the External Tank was filled. This would then
change back into gaseous form quite explosively as the External Tank heated in flight,
possibly causing damage to the foam.66 He noted that "I think we're always trying to
improve the product, but we don't want to change the product unless we're justifiably
66 Scotty Sparks, Testimony before CAIB Board, 7 April 2003. http://caib.nasa.gov/events/public hearings/
20030407/transcript.html; Scotty Sparks, Presentation given before CAIB Board, 7 April 2003, slide 25.
http://caib.nasa.gov/events/public_hearings/20030407/present_et.html
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sure that that's going to improve the product."67
Like the Challenger's O-rings, problems with foam-shedding on the External tank were
known from the earliest days of the Shuttle program. Attempts were made to fix these
problems, within a standard problem-solving mode, or as Edward Constant would
describe, in the mode of normal technology. These attempts were made more complex by
changes to the technology itself.
A critical moment while the Columbia was in orbit was the meeting of 24 January 2003
where the findings of the Debris Assessment Team were presented to a representative of
the Mission Management Team.68 This team had formed early in the flight of the
Columbia to determine whether debris observed falling from the External Tank had the
potential to damage the Orbiter. 69
The DAT determined that transport analyses had shown that there was a possibility that
foam debris had impacted on the leading edge of the left wing of the orbiter, but that
"large uncertainty in trajectory computation does not allow a good prediction of the
impact area."'7 The DAT had tested six scenarios, whereby various shapes and sizes of
pieces of foam were modeled, attempting to determine what damage might be done were
they to hit the orbiter. The DAT's presentation showed that in most cases, the CRATER
tool predicted "that multiple tiles would be taken down to densified layer," 71 suggesting
that there was potential in many cases for significant damage to have been done to the
Orbiter. Indeed, were the CRATER results accurate, they were suggesting that in many
scenarios, impact of foam on the thermal protection system tiles might have caused so
much damage that the tile was almost completely cut through, revealing the bare
67 Scotty Sparks, Testimony before CAIB Board, 7 April 2003. http://caib.nasa.gov/events/publichearings/
20030407/transcript.htnml
68 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol. 1, pp. 160 - 161
69 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, vol. 1, pp. 142 - 143.
7o Carlos Ortiz. Arturo Green, Jack McClymonds, Jeff Stone, and Abdi Khodadoust, "Preliminary Debris
Transport Assessment of Debris Impacting Orbiter Lower Surface in STS-107 Mission," Presentation, 21
January 2003, pp. 2 - 4. This presentation is linked from the CAIB website at
www.nasa.gov/pdf/2203main COL debris boeing 030121.pdf
71 P. Parker, D. Chao, I. Norman, M. Dunham, "Orbiter Assessment of STS-107 ET Bipod Insulation Ramp
Impact," Presentation, 23 January 2003, p. 5. This presentation is linked from the CAIB website at
www.nasa.gov/pdf/2203main COL debris boeing 030123.pdf
270
-~"~L~I-'"""'~-'""" ; "";"~''i-i'--"l;"-^i~ll-~;--- ----l  --il ~-- -  - li li--ii-11--;-- 1  ii_~;ii.iii;ii-- :- l i  -= 11'-~--'-~-~~(~'"---~' (- i----ci '^I;ll"i~-'"';;"'" ~'--i-ii'"~~;- -:i-~:
aluminum below, and of course, substantially reducing the resistance of those spots to the
heat of re-entry.
Fortunately, the DAT presentation's continued, "program was designed to be
conservative due to large number of unknowns. Crater reports damage for test conditions
that show no damage." 72 The DAT team went on to recommend that while, "Impact
analysis ("Crater") indicates potential for large TPS damage, and RCC damage limited to
coating, [...] Contingent on multiple tile loss thermal analysis showing no violation of M/
OD criteria, safe return indicated even with significant tile damage."" On the basis of
this recommendation, Don McCormack reported back to the Mission Management Team
that:
Don McCormack: "Okay. And also we've received the data from the systems
integration guys of the potential ranges of sizes and impact angles and where it
might have hit. And the guys have gone off and done an analysis, they use a tool
they refer to as Crater which is their official evaluation tool to determine the
potential size of the damage. So they went off and done all that work and they've
done thermal analysis to the areas where there may be damaged tiles. The analysis
is not complete. There is one case yet that they wish to run, but kind of just
jumping to the conclusion of all that, they do show that, obviously, a potential for
significant tile damage here, but thermal analysis does not indicate that there is
potential for a burn-through. I mean there could be localized heating damage.
There is... obviously there is a lot of uncertainty in all this in terms of the size of
the debris and where it hit and the angle of incidence."
Ham: "No burn through, means no catastrophic damage and the localized heating
damage would mean a tile replacement?"
McCormack: "Right, it would mean possible impacts to turnaround repairs and
that sort of thing, but we do not see any kind of safety of flight issue here yet in
72 Parker et al, p. 5.
73 Parker et al, p. 13.
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anything that we've looked at."7 4
This was effectively the last time the issue of foam debris causing damage to the Orbiter
was seriously considered, and the Mission Management Team officially concluded that
the debris assessment had confirmed there was no risk to the Orbiter. As presented in the
CAIB report, these conclusions were, in part, the result of poor analysis on the part of the
DAT, and the uncertainties and risks inherent in the calculation were not effectively
communicated to the member of the MMT to whom the presentation was given.75
This process does raise the question, however, of why the DAT engineers had a tool that
predicted substantial damage in most of the scenarios they modeled, but yet they
discounted its results in their final analysis, arguing that it was "conservative" and could
not be relied upon. By looking a little deeper into the process by which the DAT
reached their conclusions, there are some windows into the practice of engineering at
NASA in the 1990s and 2000s, particularly as new types of tools were changing the
practice of engineering. An examination of the CRATER tool also gives a little insight
into the relationship between engineering judgment and engineering calculation at work.
CRATER, the tool, had its origins in the Apollo and Gemini programs, and was
originally developed by Allan Richardson, an engineer at Rockwell Space Division. In
1966, Richardson was the head of the stress analysis group at North American, with a
side line in projectile impact analysis.76 During this period, both NASA and Rockwell
had developed concerns about the potential for disaster should micrometeoroids impact
the Apollo and Gemini craft. Should any kind of particle penetrate the Apollo Command
Module heat shield, its ability to function as intended would be compromised. Similarly,
should particles have penetrated the outer honeycomb material of which the Service
Module of the Apollo spacecraft, they were likely to cause a cloud of fragments to move
through the systems behind the location of impact. Over this period, Richardson
developed a series of equations to model this possibility and conducted a series of tests
74 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, p. 161.
7 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, p. 168.76 Allen J. Richardson, Interview with author, 3 February 2005; Who's Who in Aviation and Aerospace
(Boston: National Aeronautical Institute, 1983), p. 814.
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involving shooting particles through aluminum sheets and measuring impact and damage
data. From this, Richardson built what he called Discreet Particle Analysis Program, and
published his theoretical approach in several academic journals. 77
As North American Aviation merged with Rockwell in March 1967 to become Rockwell
International, Richardson continued to be employed with the new organization and to
work on his model. With the award to build the Shuttle orbiter to Rockwell in 1974,78
Richardson's work was adapted to address the concerns that the thermal protection
system, windows and leading edges of the Orbiter were vulnerable, and that modeling for
strikes from ice, birds, meteoroids and foam would need to be developed.79
Over the period 1979 - 1985, a series of tests were conducted to validate Richardson's
Apollo-era model for use in predicting damage to the Orbiter's Thermal Protection
System. Along with NASA personnel, Richardson conducted what he later called the
"race-car tests," which involved building a framework of plywood on the back of a pick-
up truck, covering it with TPS tiles and then driving at speeds of up to 100 miles per
hour, before releasing chunks of foam and ice into the tiles." The theoretical basis to the
new model was soon published, 1 and by 1985, Richardson's model was a clearly defined
set of four equations that could predict quickly both threshold of penetration and depth of
penetration of foam into TPS tiles. Richardson intend that his tool be understood as a
bounding tool; setting the upper bounds of possible penetration and/or damage. This
model was distributed, as a series of graphs and a handbook, to NASA and NASA
contractors. As a side project, Richardson also expanded the CRATER methodology to
model the impact of ice and foam on RCC panels.82
" Allen J. Richardson, "Hypervelocity Particle Penetration into Spacecraft Structures: Apollo Spacecraft
Meteroid Hazard Analysis" unpublished manuscript, pp. 1-1 - 1-4; Allen J. Richardson, "Theoretical
Penetration Mechanics of Multisheet Structures Based on Discrete Debris Particle Modeling," AIAA
Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets 7 no. 4 (April, 1970), pp. 479 - 490.
78 Dennis R. Jenkins, Space Shuttle: The History of the National Space Transportation System, 3" ed.
(Stillwater, N: Voyageur Press, 2000), pp. 182 - 183.
79 Richardson, interview with author.
80 D. Arabian, " NASA Langley Tests - Insulation Debris Impact on TPS Tiles," 1979. Provided to author
by Allen Richardson.
8X James L. Rand, "Impact Testing of Orbiter HRSI Tiles," Texas Engineering Experiment Station Final
Report, 1979. Provided to author by Allen Richardson.
82 Richardson, interview with author.
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The CRATER model developed in the 1970s and 1980s was explicitly designed to
measure the damage caused by small pieces of foam falling from the External Tank,
because its creator did not believe that any incidents of large pieces of foam falling from
the ET had been observed.83 No testing was carried out to determine the validity of
extrapolating CRATER findings out to larger pieces of foam. In the aftermath of the
Columbia accident, Allen Richardson was asked why this was the case. He argued that
rather than needing a better tool, NASA needed smaller debris.84
In 1991 the CRATER model was converted from a series of graphs to a BASIC program.
Also in 1991 Allen Richardson retired from Rockwell, and his successor was responsible
for the computerization of the CRATER tool. In 2002, the CRATER tool was converted
from a BASIC program to a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, with a graphical interface." At
the same time, Richardson's successor also retired from Boeing, which had taken over
Rockwell in 1995.
Thus, by 2002, the CRATER tool had become a substantially easier to use tool. It no
longer required use of paper graphs and a handbook, it no longer required calculation by
hand, and it certainly no longer required an understanding of the theoretical basis on
which it was built. Indeed, use of the CRATER tool could be taught to a new engineer
in less than two hours, as it was done when Richardson's successor retired.86 But ease of
use came at a cost, as the sets of assumptions and theories built into the model, and
necessary to understand its limits, were also rendered invisible.
83 Richardson, interview with author.
84 Allen Richardson, Interview with CAIB, 29 April 2003, p. 30. Provided to author by Allen Richardson.
5 "Orbiter Debris Analysis Tool "Crater": Presented to CAIB, Thursday, March 13, 2003," p. 3;
Richardson, interview with author.
86 Richardson, CAIB interview, p. 14.
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Figure 2: The CRATER model. Source: "Orbiter Debris Analysis Tool "Crater": Presented to
CAIB, Thursday, March 13, 2003," p. 3. CAB102-3610.
In another context, historian George Smith warns of the dangers to engineering judgment
caused by the increasing use of computer-aided design tools. Smith argues that the
increasing use of computer tools made the methods used to create engineering
calculations more opaque to the users, and hence making their ability to use engineering
judgment more difficult. Users of computer-based tools were unable to see the
approaches and assumptions built into the tools, and therefore unable to determine
whether or not these were still valid, particularly in the absence of their designers."
These concerns were still valid in 2003, when Boeing and NASA engineers attempted to
use the CRATER tool to predict damage caused by foam strikes.
The engineers within the DAT understood the CRATER tool to be conservative, by
which they meant that it tended to overpredict the damage that was likely to occur. At
the same time, however, they also understood the CRATER tool to be a bounding tool, by
which they meant it was likely to produce results that set the upper bounds of possible
damage. The basis on which this was believed was a series of tests of CRATER
87 George E. Smith, "The Dangers of CAD," Mechanical Engineering, (February 1986), pp. 58 - 64.
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conducted at Southwestern Research Institute in 1999, which showed that CRATER
results for both ice and foam were consistently overpredicted. 88 Rather than investigate
why the tool was so conservative, however, in 1999, Boeing engineers appear to simply
have assumed that this was the case. However Allen Richardson, and other more
experienced users of the CRATER tool have suggested that when the Southwestern tests
were run, CRATER was not used properly. Richardson suggested that the CRATER tool
modeled two different shapes of foam, and the test results were being measured against
the wrong shape- effectively predicting the damage caused by one shape and physically
measuring the damage caused by a different shape. This was why CRATER was
conservative, argued its creator.89
Comparison of Crater Predicted Damage Depth to
SWRI Test Data
Comparison of Crater Custom Ice Damage Depth Calculations to SwRI Test Data
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Figure 3: CRATER predictions vs. test data. Source: "Orbiter Debris Analysis Tool "Crater":
Presented to CAIB, Thursday, March 13, 2003," p. 13. CAB102-3610.
88 "Orbiter Debris Analysis Tool "Crater": Presented to CAIB, Thursday, March 13, 2003," National
Archives CAB102-3610, p. 13.
89 "Review of CRATER program for evaluating impact damage to orbiter TPS tiles: Presentation to CAIB,
29 April 2003," National Archives CAB048-0582, p. 27. Richardson, CAIB interview, pp. 7 - 9.
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Furthermore, it was also clear that the Boeing engineers performing the analysis using
CRATER were aware that the TPS tiles were not homogenous in consistency, but became
more dense further away from the outside surface. The engineers assumed that the
CRATER predictions did not take into account the dense layer of the TPS tile, which
would resist foam or ice penetration to a greater degree than the more brittle outer layers
of the tile. This layer was in fact only about 4% of the tile, and would have minimal
effect on the CRATER predictions. 90
The CRATER tool was used by engineers at the new Boeing facility in Houston TX over
the first ten days that the Columbia was in orbit. The Columbia mission was the first time
that Boeing engineers based in Houston had been responsible for using the CRATER tool
during a Shuttle mission; previously, the role had been filled by engineers at Boeing's
Huntington Beach facility. The process of shifting responsibility between Huntington
Beach and Houston had left gaps in the engineering skill available to use CRATER. In an
analysis carried out after the Columbia accident, the investigator noted that:
Regarding training on the CRATER model, an HB (Boeing at Huntington Beach)
interview witness familiar with the CRATER tool stated that the new Houston
analyst was trained for approximately 2 weeks, but received only about 2 hours of
training specifically on the CRATER model. Further, the HB witness reported
that the training with the Houston analyst was conducted with the mutual
understanding that the training received was sufficient for the great majority of
routine cases, but that they should work together for any unusual cases. Other HB
analysts expressed that the allotted training period was adequate to train the new
Houston analysts on most of the mechanics and procedures of the analyses, but
not on the theoretical bases of the analyses. This may have created a lack of
proficiency in trouble shooting and rendering judgment calls, particularly in
unusual situations or outside the design boundaries of the code.9 1
90 "Ascent Impact Analysis (includes Crater)," National Archives CABO80-0206, p. 15; Richardson, CAIB
interview, pp. 7 - 9. "Extension Of Crater Analysis To Full-Depth Tile Penetration," 14 March 2003,
National Archives CAB025-0479, pp. 4 - 8.
9' "CAIB -GROUP : Sub-Group 2: Management and Human Factors: Human Factors Section of Final
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Furthermore, during the ten-day period during which the new, Houston Boeing engineers
were using the CRATER tool and other methods to assess the implications of a possible
foam strike, they were forbidden from contacting their counterparts in Huntington Beach.
The CAIB report notes that the reason for this was: "due in part to contractual
arrangements related to the transition, the Houston-based team did not take full advantage
of the Huntington Beach engineers' experience.""92 More candidly, the investigator noted
that Boeing used an internal cost-accounting system that charged groups for consultation
within the organization. The Houston engineers were not permitted to incur costs by
consulting with their colleagues in Huntington Beach.93
When the Boeing analysts presented the results of their use of CRATER to predict any
damage that may have been caused to the TPS system, they noted that CRATER
predicted "significant damage," but partially discounted the results because CARTER
was known to be "conservative." Later in the same presentation, the same logic was used
to discount the CRATER predictions for the impact of foam on RCC panels.
Report on CRATER," National Archives CAB040-7208, p. 2.
92 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, p. 168;
93 "CAIB -GROUP : Human Factors on CRATER," p. 3.
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Damage Results From "Crater" Equations Show
Significant Tile Damage
* "Crater" indicates that multiple tiles would be taken down to
densified layer
* However, program was designed to be conservative due to large
number of unknowns
* Crater reports damage for test conditions that show no damage
Tle nmaton Location Ipct Calculated Damage
Type Thickness Letter X Y Angle Velokty Depth Length kidth
I1h 26-28 A 109 100 13 720 47 258 72
22 b 2.6- 2.8 A 1060 190 13 720 3.2 25,8 72
Ib 2.3-24 8 1090 180 6 700 2.8 31.9 7,2
Ib 2.0-2.4 C 1036 150 8 680 33 298 72
b 2.0-2.4 C 1036 150 8 680 2.3 28.6 72
lb 1.9 -2.0 D 1075 150 8 710 34 32.2 7.2
12 2.8 ,-3.1 E 1029 171 10 680 2.9 19 0 2.4
2 b 2.8-3.1 E 1029 177 10 680 2.6 19 0 2.4
lb 1.7 F 1184 182 6 730 28 328 2-4
Damage data and tile thickness are given in inches.
Debris Size = 20" x 16" x 6"
(Density = 2.4 lb/ft) r< I 1
2/21/03 5
Figure 4: CRATER predictions presented to MMT, 23 January 2003. Source: P. Parker, D. Chao, I.
Norman, M. Dunham, "Orbiter Assessment of STS-107 ET Bipod Insulation Ramp Impact,"
January 23, 2003, p. 5.
The knowledge presented to the MMT by the Boeing analysts was uncertain; derived
from the 40-year history of the US manned spaceflight program, and updated in such a
manner that it was known to be limited, but not known to what extent limited. It had
been validated, but in a manner that further weakened the certainty of the knowledge
produced. The institutional context had changed several times and the wider set of
understandings associated with the use of CRATER had been lost. Finally, the process of
creating a "simple" tool had even further obscured its limitations. CAIB criticized the
DAT for failing to communicate the risks and uncertainties associated with the use of the
CRATER tool; it is not clear that the full extent of these uncertainties were known to the
DAT engineers themselves.
In this case, new engineering practices combined with a reconfiguration of the
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engineering relationship between NASA and Boeing to create substantial uncertainties in
the engineering tools used to support engineering judgments. As Eugene Fergusson
reminds us, "nearly all engineering failures result from faulty judgments rather than
faulty calculations." 94
Moving past the organizational causes of the accident put forward by the CAIB results in
another question however. Much of the focus on safety culture in the CAIB report is
associated with the safe operation of high-technology, rather than its development. The
CAIB report notes that this is a transition from the Apollo-era NASA, when "Contractors
and NASA engineers collaborated closely to assure the safety of human space flight.
Solid engineering practices emphasized defining goals and relating system performance
to them; establishing and using decision criteria; developing alternatives; modeling
systems for analysis; and managing operations." 95 Following Challenger, however,
recommendations for the regeneration of NASA's safety system focused on ensuring that
institutional arrangements for safety would not be subject to inappropriate pressure, either
from within or without NASA. 96 The CAIB report notes that these recommendations
were never fully carried out.97
Focusing on the engineering history of the two shuttle accidents has shown that in both
cases the physical phenomena that were to cause the accidents, were seen from very early
on in the history of the Shuttle program, and were subjects of engineering efforts to fix
them. This study has argued that it is possible to see the Shuttle program as in an
extended design process, where elements of the design of the shuttle are still being tested
by flight, modified and reflown. This suggests that a focus on safety systems at an
organizational level will need to accompanied by a focus on safety at a engineering
design level. The CAIB report makes this point, suggesting that "blind spots" in NASA's
94 Eugene Fergusson, Engineering and the Minds's Eye (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1992), p. 183.
9 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, p. 178.
96 U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Report to the President: Actions to Implement the
Recommendations of The Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (Washington,
DC: NASA, 1986), pp. 18 - 21; John M. Logsdon, "Return to Flight: Richard H. Truly and the Recovery
from the Challenger accident," in Pamela Mack, ed., From Engineering Science to Big Science: The NACA
and NASA Collier Trophy Research Project Winners (Washington, DC: NASA, 1986), pp. 358 - 359.
9 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, pp. 178 - 180.
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safety culture meant that NASA managers made decisions about safety "based on prior
success rather than on dependable engineering data and rigorous testing."98
Both the Challenger and the CAIB report were critical of the way in which NASA had
declared the Shuttle to be operational, rather than still in a research and development
phase. Nonetheless, prescriptions for greater safety appear to focus on comparisons with
the US Navy Submarine and Reactor Safety Program and the Aerospace Corporation,
both of which are highly operational organizations. 99 Similarly, the use of theoretical
perspectives drawn from the High Reliability Organization school of thinking around
accidents also emphasizes how to operate an existing technology in a safe manner, rather
than on how to ensure safety in an ever-evolving (and aging technology).'o
This study has emphasized the difficulty of producing dependable engineering data and
the constraints to performing rigorous testing in the manned spaceflight program over the
course of its history. This suggests that safety is, in part, based on appropriate
engineering practices, as much as it is based on organizational structures. This may also
suggest that an ongoing focus on drawing distinctions between managers and engineers,
with the implication that managers are more responsible for accidents, fails to recognize
that changes to engineering cultures and practices are need to ensure safety, just as much
as changes to organizational structures.
Conclusions
The CAIB produced a sophisticated and complex report, bringing together a substantial
amount of physical analysis to determine the physical cause of the Columbia accident.
Their report determined that the physical cause of the accident was insulating foam
falling from the External Tank and hitting the RCC panels on the leading edge of the left
wing of the Columbia. From there, the CAIB's focus moved outwards, discussing the
organizational causes of the accident within a theoretical framework provided by Diane
98 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, p. 184.
99 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, pp. 182 - 184.
'00 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, pp. 180 - 181.
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Vaughan's revisionist interpretation of the Challenger accident. Like the Challenger and
Apollo 204 historiography, few efforts have been made to look more deeply at the
accident, with most subsequent literature treating the findings of the CAIB report largely
uncritically. As with the other two reports, this has left an explanatory gap in the account
of the accident presented by the CAIB. The CAIB also sets forth an alternative history
of NASA, which posits that the organization was in decline from its successes during the
Apollo era, with the revelations of management failings during both Challenger and
Columbia as prime evidence for this point. This revisionist account of NASA's history
removes meaning from the Apollo 204 accident by placing in it a mythical past, and more
importantly, by denying any similarities between the three accidents. The first fatal
accident was defined as anomalous, while the next two were symptomatic of deep
organizational flaws, and in each case the interpretation of the accident was established
by the accident report.
While limited by sources, this chapter has attempted to interrogate the CAIB report more
critically, and investigate, via a discussion of the CRATER tool, whether there is another
account to be presented of the Columbia accident. Delving more deeply into the history
of this key engineering tool, which was the basis for engineering judgments around the
likelihood and implications of foam damage, suggests that while enginering practices had
changed between Challenger and Columbia, particularly with the use of computerized
tools, some factors were the same. At a critical moment in the series of events that led to
the Columbia accident, an analytical tool that delivered engineering calculations appeared
to be miscalibrated, and so engineering judgment was applied to the results produced.
The engineering data produced by the CRATER tool was even less certain than the
engineers using it believed, a function of the obscurity of many of the theoretical bases
and assumptions built into the original work. The users of the CRATER tool were also
unable to contact more knowledgable engineers who had used the tool before. As a
result, misapplied engineering judgment was used to overrule engineering data, which
left the Columbia vulnerable.
CRATER had become a palimpsest, with the original assumptions and intentions of the
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software imperfectly overwritten as the tool was revisited and refined. This ultimately
rendered it difficult to read, yet also increased rather than decreased its stature as a key
tool. CRATER, by being continually updated, became an established, authoritative, and
trusted source of embodied engineering judgment. Like the CMS 201 in the Apollo
accident and the O-rings of Challenger, CRATER was simultaneously understood as
reliable yet flawed.
All three accident reports focused on identifying flaws - whether in materials,
engineering judgment, or management - and the latter two then turned to discovering
why the flaws were tolerated. This study has shown that the reports, while useful,
obscure as much as they reveal about the underlying causes of accidents. The reports
reinforce a simplistic public understanding of engineering tensions and practices that
have undermined the ability of the space program advocates to successfully achieve
realistic funding, timelines, and goals for NASA's work.
This study of the accidents has replaced engineering practice at the center of its reading
of the work at NASA. By doing so, it provides a more complete view of complex
engineering and the practices that have lead to over fifty years of considerable success in
the space program. It challenges the declensionist view of NASA and reveals the
immense improvements in safety practice and engineering decision-making at NASA. In
Apollo 1, dangerous materials, design and work practices underpinned the fatal accident.
By the time of Challenger, the number and scale of danger factors were significantly
reduced; it took a virtual perfect storm of unusual weather patterns, failures of redundant
systems, and uncertainties among engineers making the launch decision to allow the
accident to occur. The Columbia accident shows a further escalation in how much
needed to go wrong to permit the fatal accident; this involved an accretion over time of
flawed evidence of safety, evidence difficult for engineers making flight decisions to
disregard. Yet it is the Apollo 1 accident that is popularly understood as a whim of fate,
and the Columbia accident that is the tragic result of engineering and organizational
failure. The great change over the course of these three accidents is not the decline of
excellence at NASA; it is the increase in the standards to which NASA is held by
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accident investigation boards.
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CONCLUSIONS
This study has argued that in the three accidents studied, the three accident investigation
reports have demonstrated some similar characteristics. In each case, Apollo 204,
Challenger, and Columbia, the investigation reports have created a powerful narrative
around the causes of the accident. In each case, this narrative has largely obscured the
engineering history of the accidents. And with one notable exception, in each case the
accident investigation reports have been unchallenged in the historical literature. While a
number of scholars have used the reports as primary sources to discuss theories of
organizational behavior, organizational communications or other theoretical concerns,
very seldom have the reports been challenged. Yet, this study has argued, these reports
are themselves interpretations, subject to a number of genre conventions. The reports sit
uneasily between attempting to identify a local cause for the accident and seeking to
identify the larger social and organizational contexts within which the accidents occurred.
Navigating these two urges, the reports move uncomfortably between two explanatory
models. The first is a Whig model that produces histories of the physical causes of the
accident, told in hindsight and concerned to identify the errors and missteps that took
place on the way to the accident. This type of account tends to obscure the role and
agency of the engineers concerned. The second model takes a more modem approach.
The Challenger and Columbia accounts, in particular, move to a more nuanced,
contextual discussion of the decision-making leading to the accidents, but tends to focus
on decisions made by managers. The impression that is left is of engineering as
something of a disembodied, context-free activity. The discussions of decision-making at
NASA deploy concepts and language that tend to identify NASA managers with the
organization, and leave the role and agency of the engineers less clear.
Both the Apollo 204 Review Board and subsequent historical treatments have described
the Apollo 204 accident in such way as to obscure the engineering history of the Apollo
spacecraft. The craft's location within two engineering cultures and its place within the
context of the introduction of a new set of engineering practices is not visible from the
accident report. This study suggests that there is another story to be told, one that
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explores the engineering culture and practices that surrounded the Apollo spacecraft, and
provides an explanation for the accident within that context.
This study has suggested that the history of the Apollo 204 accident reveals the two
different engineering cultures of NASA and North American coming together, struggling
to adapt to a new engineering style, systems engineering, which had its own new set of
engineering practices focused around greater control of cost, schedule and technical
change. Written into the body of the Apollo spacecraft were these changing ideas and a
series of changed design decisions. The spacecraft carried within it the history and
politics of the changing relationship between NASA and North American. The passage
of time and the writing and overwriting of design changes on the body of the block I
spacecraft took its toll.
At the same time, the spacecraft carried with it the mark of another engineering culture -
that of systems engineering. Joe Shea's implementation of systems engineering at NASA
and North America in the mid- 1960s had changed the focus of building of the Apollo
spacecraft towards managing not only technical issues, but also giving the same
importance to managing costs and schedules. At the same time, Shea's implementation of
systems engineering did not remove elements of engineering judgment from the Apollo
program, but instead the engineers at the top of the NASA organization used the tools of
systems engineering to centralize engineering judgment within themselves. This left the
Apollo spacecraft vulnerable to flawed engineering judgment and to unchallenged
assumptions about safety. One such assumption, made early on in the development of the
Apollo spacecraft, was that despite the differences between the Gemini and Apollo
spacecraft, it was safe to use a pure oxygen environment. Over the course of the Gemini
program, successful missions meant that growing concerns and evidence that there was
potential for a fire in the Apollo spacecraft were ignored at the most senior levels.
The change processes put in place in the mid-1960s had resulted in the development of
the Block II command module, with new and more rigorous manufacturing and quality
assurance processes. Tragically, the Apollo 204 accident took place on the one of the last
Block I command modules, after problems had been identified and fixed in Block II.
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Unlike Apollo 204, the Challenger accident had a key moment - the decision made on the
evening of the 2 7 'h of January 1986 to launch the Challenger the next morning despite
engineers' misgivings about the launch conditions. Two accounts have been set forward
to explain this decision. The Presidential Commission's report emphasizes misconduct
by NASA managers who, unwilling to compromise an accelerated launch schedule,
overruled engineering concerns about safety; the Commission also identified a history of
missed warnings and poor engineering at NASA and its contractors. Diane Vaughan's
revisionist account has argued that a shared understanding of the field joint technology
developed over time, incorporating more and more deviance from the intended design,
and this led both manager and engineers to follow accepted cultural norms and accept the
joint as safe to fly.
This study has argued that over the period 1977 - 1986, the activities of Marshall and
Thiokol engineers can be seen as an extended process of engineering design, iteratively
developing a series of incomplete and uncertain understandings of an increasingly
complex technology. This process took place within an environment of constraint: there
was limited scope for testing, a conservative attitude towards change, and an environment
where major redesign was very difficult. This account has noted that the engineering
style of personnel at Marshall Space Center in the 1970s and 1980s, inherited in part from
their Apollo experience, brought them into tension with members of a different
engineering culture at Thiokol. The decision to launch the Challenger was made on the
basis of incomplete and uncertain engineering knowledge, in the context of a professional
relationship between Thiokol and Marshall in which Marshall personnel had developed a
pattern of vigorously challenging the engineering data and recommendations presented
by Thiokol. In this meeting, the conservative, data-oriented engineering style of
Marshall overcame the more intuitive engineering style of Thiokol, but not by silencing
it. In the end, engineers from both organizations agreed that the evidence did not support
Thiokol's initial recommendation against launching.
Seventeen years after the Challenger accident, the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board (CAIB) report determined that the physical cause of the Columbia accident was
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foam falling from the External Tank and hitting the RCC panels on the leading edge of
the left wing of the Columbia. The CAIB report went on to frame the organizational
causes of the accident through Diane Vaughan's revisionist interpretation of the
Challenger accident. As with the Apollo 204 and Challenger reports, the CAIB report
has left an explanatory gap in its account of the accident, focusing on management
decision-making rather than on engineering. The CAIB also sets forth an alternative
history of NASA, drawing on the investigations of Challenger and Columbia to support
the argument that NASA has declined from the triumphs of Apollo. This new history of
NASA removes meaning from the Apollo 204 accident by placing in it a mythical past,
and more importantly, by denying any similarities between the three accidents.
This study has also investigated, by tracing the history of the CRATER tool, whether
there is another account to be presented of the Columbia accident. The history of
CRATER suggests that while engineering practices had changed between Challenger and
Columbia, particularly with the use of computerized tools, some causal factors were
similar. At a critical moment in the series of events that led to the Columbia accident,
engineers used an analytical tool that appeared to be miscalibrated, meaning that they
applied their engineering judgment to the results it produced. The engineering data
produced by the CRATER tool was even less certain than the engineers using it believed,
a function of the obscuring over time of many of the theoretical bases and assumptions
built into it by successive developers. The users of the CRATER tool were also unable to
contact more knowledgeable engineers who had used the tool before. As a result,
misapplied engineering judgment was used to overrule flawed engineering data, which
left the Columbia (and other craft for which engineers had used the CRATER tool)
vulnerable.
These three accounts share a number of similarities. In the Apollo 204 accident, Apollo
engineers drew on experience with Gemini to give themselves assurance that a pure
oxygen environment was not of concern, because many flights had used it with no
problems. In the Challenger accident, shuttle engineers used the experiences of the Titan
missile boosters to reassure themselves that O-ring seals, even without a secondary seal,
could be used without problems. In the Columbia accident, an analytic tool was used and
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trusted that was based on Apollo-era data and an accretion of updates over the Shuttle
era. In the process of computerization, the possibilities but also the limitations of this
tool became lost. In all cases previous experience created a data base that proved to be
unreliable under changed circumstances.
In the manned spaceflight program, where the size, cost and complexity of full-scale
testing is so great, engineering analogies have been drawn in the early stages of the
design process, reflecting a deliberate philosophy in some cases not to develop new ideas
but to use proven technologies wherever possible. In retrospect, it can be seen that these
analogies prevented engineers from adequately recognizing key differences. The Gemini
spacecraft was not enough like the Apollo spacecraft that the same assumption about the
dangers of oxygen was safe, just as the Titan O-rings were not similar enough to the SRB
O-rings to ensure a sealed joint. In something of a reversal, a failure to understand the
assumptions built into the CRATER tool meant that its accurate prediction of tile damage
was discounted. All three of these technologies embodied series of changes that engineers
made over time to maintain their relevance, but all three also retained the blurred echoes
of previous design stages. Ultimately, these palimpsest technologies behaved in
unexpected ways due to the blurred echoes, and contributed materially to the accidents.
In the Apollo 204 accident, problems with engineering and manufacturing at North
American had been identified in the Phillips report, and fixes had been generated and
applied, which would come into force with the new Block II CSMs. In the Challenger
accident, problems with field joint seals had been identified in July 1985 and a task-force
set up to develop fixes, to be applied following a static test firing of the SRB in February
1986. In the Columbia accident, a history of attempts to remedy the problem of foam
shedding can be seen, reflecting ongoing efforts to address the issue. In each case, the
problem causing the accident had been identified, and some solutions had been
developed, although less so in the Columbia case. Particularly in the Challenger and
Apollo 204 accidents, these problems were seen as high priority and to be remedied. But
in both cases the complexity and interdependency of the test and flight schedule meant
that these fixes had to happen concurrently with the myriad other activities going on in
the Shuttle program.
289
In the Apollo 204 accident, the bringing together of two engineering cultures to build a
new piece of technology meant a period of adaptation to each other, as new ways of
working were developed to accomplish the task. The AS204 fire was the cumulative
effect of both an environment of schedule pressure and cost pressure, and differing
engineering cultures and technical philosophies at NASA's Manned Space Flight Centre
and North American. These pressures were underplayed in the accident report. In the
Challenger accident, Morton Thiokol and NASA's Marshall Space Centre came together
to build a Solid Rocket Motor, bringing into contact a highly quantitative, data driven
engineering culture with one that was less experienced in the manned spaceflight
endeavor and more attuned to a way of working characterized by a certain level of
informality. The Challenger report, and the Columbia report that mirrors it, overplay the
role of these tensions in causing the later accidents.
This study has put forward some new explanatory factors for the three accidents studied
here, and has suggested that some similarities can be seen between them. There are some
implications that can be drawn from this.
The first is that the recurrence of similar accidents suggests that the appropriate lessons
have not been learned from the accident investigations and their reports. This is at least
in part due to the strong distinction that is drawn between engineers and managers,
particular in the Challenger and Columbia accident reports, with the focus of both reports
on the decision-making activities of the managers. In not recounting engineering
histories of the accidents with the same theoretical underpinning and nuance as the
histories of decision-making, the possibility was removed of finding the causes of the
accidents within engineering cultures and practices at NASA and its partners. Future
accidents may need to be investigated through the lens of engineering practices that are
understood as both historically and culturally specific, and generic. Future investigations
should examine the engineering history and culture of the space program, as well as
attempt to understand how to examine engineering in the making. Most basically, they
should begin with the knowledge that there is no inherent tension that prevents
individuals from being simultaneously managers and engineers: most senior managers for
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complex, large-scale engineering projects are themselves by training and experience
engineers.
Second, the role of engineering judgment has been identified as a key element in each of
the accidents, although working in slightly different ways in each accident. The Apollo
204 accident showed engineering judgment failing at critical moments, with senior
NASA personnel making engineering judgments about the characteristics and behavior of
their spacecraft that were based on assumptions that later proved to be inaccurate. In the
Challenger accident, the engineering judgment of the Thiokol personnel that the SRB O-
rings were critically sensitive to temperature effects was trumped by the quantitative
arguments of the Marshall personnel on the other side of the table. The Columbia
accident showed how more junior engineers were unable to either fully understand or
trust the tools that were intended to assist them in making engineering judgments, and so
were led to make poor recommendations.
Engineering assumptions are at the heart of the explanations this study has advanced,
which suggests that a process might be undertaken of probing and understanding the
assumptions that are built into the practices of engineering in the manned spaceflight
program. Engineering in the manned spaceflight program is a cumulative process,
building on older programs and technologies, particularly in the now close to forty year-
old Shuttle program. Understanding how history is built into everyday engineering tools
and practices may serve to make these practices and tools more transparent.
In each of these accidents, NASA was engaged with a commercial and technological
partner that had a different way of doing engineering than NASA. Each of these partner
engineering organizations brought their own engineering cultures to the design,
development and operation of spacecraft. Similarly, in each case, the contractor-to-
government relationship created a dynamic whereby NASA's expectations of the
contractor created tensions between the partners. In the Apollo 204 accident, North
American Aviation found itself struggling to adapt to the needs of the ever-expanding
Apollo program. In an environment of simultaneous design, development and
manufacturing, where change to design specifications was relentless, North American
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struggled to apply meaningfully its experience of designing and manufacturing large
production runs of aircraft to the specialist manufacture of individually unique spacecraft.
NASA's response to this was the introduction of systems engineering, which created
further tensions between the two organizations as they struggled to find a way to come
together to build a new type of technology. In the Challenger accident, NASA, and in
particular the Marshall Space Flight Center, came together with Morton Thiokol to build
and operate the SRBs on the Shuttle. Again, the tensions between NASA and its partner
organization came to the fore, culminating in a teleconference on the evening before the
Challenger launch, where Marshall personnel's rigorously quantitative mode of
engineering mixed with Thiokol's more intuitive, engineering judgment-based concerns
about the functioning of the SRB field joints in cold conditions to prevent a thorough
examination of the issue. In the Columbia accident, the evidence is more equivocal, but
it can be seen that NASA and Boeing engineers struggled to work together to create
reliable knowledge about the impact of foam on thermal protection systems tiles and
RCC panels on the left wing of the Columbia orbiter.
NASA has never been a monolithic organization; all its major programs have been
conducted in conjunction with a private-sector organization. In understanding the history
of engineering in the manned spaceflight program, and the role of engineering cultures in
accidents in the manned spaceflight program, it is important to reflect that not only
NASA needs to be examined, but to the extent possible, the engineering cultures of
private-sector partners need to examined as well.
Finally, the similarities between these three accidents suggests that the problems of the
Shuttle program are not necessarily the product of an agency in decline. The declensionist
account of NASA with a triumph in the 1960s and a steady decline in the 1970s onwards
is not sustainable. Building high-performance spacecraft is difficult, and the challenges of
doing engineering within the manned spaceflight program are many. This has not
changed since 1967. Any history of NASA that walls off Apollo 1 from ongoing
importance because of the later success of the Apollo program does a disservice to
NASA, and diminishes the lessons that might be learned from that accident. Similarly, a
history of NASA that tells a story of poor management leading to accidents as
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symptomatic of the Shuttle program misses the continuities that stretch from Apollo to
the Shuttle. The Apollo program had 13 successful missions and one fatal accident; the
Shuttle program has had two fatal accidents and over a hundred successful missions.
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